Wu et al. (2015)

1
ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research
Working Paper 2015/17
Age Pensioner Profiles: A Longitudinal Study of
Income, Assets and Decumulation
Shang Wu1
, Anthony Asher2
, Ramona Meyricke1
and Susan Thorp3
1 CEPAR and School of Risk and Actuarial Studies, University of New South Wales
2 School of Risk and Actuarial Studies, University of New South Wales. Email: a.asher@unsw.edu.au
3 Discipline of Finance, University of Sydney
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the ARC Centre of Excellence in
Population Ageing Research Working Paper Series available at www.cepar.edu.au

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Age Pensioner Profiles: A Longitudinal Study of
Income, Assets and Decumulation
Shang Wu
CEPAR and School of Risk and Actuarial Studies, University of New South Wales
Anthony Asher*
School of Risk and Actuarial Studies, University of New South Wales
Ramona Meyricke
CEPAR and School of Risk and Actuarial Studies, University of New South Wales
Susan Thorp
Discipline of Finance, University of Sydney
December 2014
Abstract
Using eight years of data drawn from the records of Australia’s Centrelink agency, we describe the
income, asset and decumulation patterns of over 10,000 age pensioners. Analysis of this longitudinal
data set shows that age pensioners, on average, preserve both financial and residential wealth,
consuming conservatively and, ultimately, passing on substantial bequests. While younger
households do run down financial wealth early in retirement, older households generally maintain
their assessable asset balances, and some even manage to save. The largest falls in assets are linked
to changes in household structure due to death or the breakdown of a relationship. So, as in many
other developed countries, age pensioners in Australia appear to ‘under-consume’, holding on to
assets, and even building a buffer, well into their later years.
JEL Classifications: D91, E21, G11
Keywords: Retirement wealth; Life-cycle saving; Public pension; Portfolio choice
*
Correspondence: Anthony Asher, School of Risk and Actuarial Studies, University of New South Wales 2052.
Email: a.asher@unsw.edu.au

3
Introduction
Retired Australians can draw income from the publicly funded Age Pension, from mandatory
and voluntary superannuation balances and from private savings. Even though superannuation
savings enjoy generous tax concessions, the superannuation system offers retirees considerable
freedom of choice once they reach the decumulation phase. Tax and social security regulations
provide some inducements to invest in retirement income products, but there are no restrictions on
drawing out lump sums (APRA, 2013) and consuming them quickly. In addition, the Age Pension
means-testing tapers in effect tax wealthier pensioners at higher rates, making spending and risky
investment more appealing (Hulley et al. 2013). The use of annuitisation is low in Australia, leaving
retirees exposed to inflation and longevity risk and potentially increasing the demands on public
safety nets (Agnew, 2013). At the same time, means testing and aged-care funding requirements
encourage households to concentrate wealth in assets that are treated favourably, such as the
family home (Chomik and Piggott, 2012).
As the Superannuation Guarantee matures and Australians live longer, the fiscal burden of tax
concessions, health spending and social security payments continues to increase, raising concerns
about the efficiency of current policy settings and about the suitability of the products and advice
offered by the superannuation industry. However, before any revision of policy or restructuring of
products and advice can be considered, a more detailed examination of decumulation under current
settings is necessary. The contribution of our study is a description and analysis of the income and
asset dynamics of a large, representative sample of Australian Age Pension households over an
eight-year period.
Wealth drawdown patterns are best understood by observing the same set of households
over time, so we use a longitudinal data set (LDS) compiled by the Department of Families, Housing,
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). The LDS is a 1% sample of all Centrelink

4
benefit recipients over the period 1999 to 2007.1
Compared to other sources, such as the Household
Income and Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) survey, the LDS offers a larger sample and provides
more information on the asset holdings of age pensioners at a higher frequency. It is likely to be
more reliable because it is subject to external audit and penalties apply for non-disclosure. The LDS
excludes people who are not eligible for the Age Pension due to means testing, which limits the
scope of the sample but allows us to focus on the group of people whose drawdown patterns will
affect the sustainability of the Age Pension.2
Rather than showing signs of profligacy and short-sightedness, we find the typical pattern of
decumulation among age pensioners to be cautious. While, on average, younger and wealthier
households decumulate financial assets, most households grow financial balances at later ages.
Housing assets are usually preserved until very old ages unless a partner dies or is institutionalised.
Moreover, consumption is low when compared with the ASFA Retirement Standard measures (2014)
for “modest” and “comfortable” incomes, even for the wealthier households in our sample. This
cautious pensioner spending, combined with public medical insurance, means Age Pension
households leave as bequests a high proportion of their initial savings, in addition to the family
home in most cases. While there is considerable heterogeneity in drawdown patterns – with over
10% of single-person households in the study exhausting 90% of their initial assets over the sample
period, for example – the median pensioner passing away during our study left residual assessable
wealth (mainly financial) equal to 90% of the assets recorded at first observation. We conclude that
many households preserve a large proportion of assessable assets as a buffer or bequest.
1
FaHCSIA has been renamed the Department of Human Services. Centrelink is the section of the Department
responsible for the delivery of Federal Government social payments.
2
We conduct a more extensive analysis than Lim-Applegate et al. (2006), who also used the LDS data set to
show that new part-rate pensioners drew down their wealth slowly. We do not limit our analysis to a single
cohort but look at all the available data by making appropriate allowances for left and right truncation. This
enables us to identify more cohort effects on wealth decumulation. We also access eight, rather than four and
a half years, of data.

5
Our findings contribute to a growing body of international evidence of slow decumulation in
retirement. On the face of it, these findings are at odds with conventional life-cycle theory, which
predicts that individuals will draw down their wealth, smoothing the marginal utility of consumption,
over the life cycle, while purchasing longevity insurance and preserving savings to buffer unexpected
shocks or for intentional bequests (e.g. French et al., 2006, Ameriks et al., 2011). However, empirical
studies show low rates of voluntary annuitisation, along with an under-consumption puzzle,
especially in the early retirement period. For example, using data from the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation in the USA (1997-2010), Poterba et
al. (2011b) find a modest rate of withdrawal on personal retirement accounts before the minimum
drawdown rule applies. Even with the minimum drawdown requirement, the average personal
retirement account balance continued to rise until age 85. Outside North America, Börsch-Supan
(2003) finds little evidence that older German households spend down their non-pension wealth in
retirement, and Ooijen et al. (2014) confirm that the same holds for the Netherlands. Other
international studies find similar results (see, among others, Guiso et al., 2002; Milligan, 2005;
Bershadker and Smith, 2006; Love and Smith, 2007; Bryant et al., 2011).3
Results from other Australian research have suggested that more detailed study is needed.
Using four-yearly wealth data from HILDA, Spicer et al. (2013) find the average wealth of all (not just
age pensioner) retired households grew in the period from 2002 to 2006 then declined over the next
four years. Hulley et al. (2013), using wealth levels inferred from the Age Pension payments reported
annually in HILDA, find that wealthier Age Pension households accumulated, while poorer
households decumulated slowly. Using the even more frequent LDS data, but again studying only
age pensioners, Lim-Applegate et al. (2006) find that most younger households decumulated.
In the next section we describe the LDS data we use in this study and then in Section III the
demographic characteristics of the sample. Section IV describes the sources of income received by
3
Australia differs from many other countries by not forcing retirees to annuitise their mandatory retirement
savings balances (Superannuation Guarantee balances).

6
the sample and Section V outlines household asset portfolios. We go on to study decumulation
graphically and via econometric modelling in section VI, and section VII concludes.
I. Data
Our analysis of retired households is based on a sample of people receiving a full or part Age
Pension from a longitudinal data set (LDS) compiled by the Department of Families, Housing,
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). The LDS is a random sample of 1% of all
Centrelink benefit recipient fortnightly records, over the period 1999 to 2007. Age pensioners in the
sample are identified by their benefit type. The number of age pensioners in the LDS rises from
15,938 in July 1999, when asset balance records start, to 19,016 in June 2007, an increase of 19% in
the total number of pensioners. Over the period, the eligibility age for women increased from 61 to
63 years but this did not fully offset the effects of growth in the population eligible for the Age
Pension and higher rates of survival at older ages. (We discuss the demographic characteristics of
age pensioners in the next section.)
The LDS records contain fortnightly administrative data on individual pensioners, including
information about assessed income and assets used for means testing and setting benefit payments.
We study the period for which asset balances are recorded, from July 1999 to June 2007. The LDS
does not have individual breakdowns of asset balances for each member of a couple because means
testing applies to the household, so if a two-person (one-person) household dissolves (integrates
with another) during the study period, the asset balances reflect the change in household structure,
showing asset balances for the new single (couple) households.
If pensioners die or no longer qualify for a pension they are removed from the sample and are
replaced by otherwise randomly selected entrants who are newly eligible for the Age Pension. Out of
26,488 individuals who appear in the initial sample, 6,942 – or just over a quarter – drop out before
8th
June 2007, our last data point. Of the people who drop out, 75% are recorded as having died,
while 11% have other reasons supplied but are most likely to have passed away. A further 11% were

7
removed by the means tests or began to qualify for a veteran’s pension. The remaining 3% drop out
of the sample for unexplained reasons.
Since we are interested in the decumulation patterns of surviving households, we mainly work
with a balanced panel in the analysis below. This lets us minimise selection effects related to
households whose assets are near the means test thresholds, who might be dropped or added to the
sample as their asset holdings vary. We also exclude households whose asset balances are missing at
some point in the sample period.4
By this reasoning, and using households with complete records for
the first payment date in July each year through to June 2007, we construct a balanced sample of
10,350 individuals: 3,683 males and 6,667 females. Of these, 6,316 are part of a couple at the start
of the sample. Fortnightly records run from 16th
July 1999 to 8th
June 2007.
II. Demographics
In this section, we describe the wealth, household structure and institutionalisation of the
longitudinal data set (LDS) sample. The median pensioner from the LDS balanced panel is a married,
74-year-old female homeowner who holds about $54,0005
of assets outside the family home and
receives around $13,900 per annum in Age Pension payments (Table 1). Despite the fact that means
testing moderates right-skewness in the age pensioner wealth distribution, the average pensioner
still has higher assessed assets than the median pensioner, at around $84,000, while average
pension payments are higher than the median, at around $15,700 p.a.
Changes in household structure and shocks to health and/or the ability to live independently
potentially have large effects on wealth (Coile and Milligan 2009; Poterba et al., 2011a).6
The LDS
4
About 4% of the individual in the total sample do not report asset balances. They are mainly single non-
homeowners. On average, they are about two years older than the sample and the Age Pension benefit for this
group is about $15 higher than for the sample. It is likely that no asset data was recorded because the amounts
were trivial and, if so, they are irrelevant to our study.
5
Amounts unless otherwise stated have been re-expressed in 2007 dollars by adjusting by changes in the
consumer price index (CPI).
6
While not easily seen over the eight years of our sample, Australians’ remaining lifetimes at age 65 have risen
by almost one third over just the past three decades, with the highest rates of improvement in survival among

8
sample records when and why couples switch to single status and we summarise these for the
balanced panel in Table 2. About two thirds were widowed, around one fifth moved to nursing
homes/aged-care facilities, while divorce or separation accounted for most of the remainder.
Pensioners in institutional care account for 3.6% of the membership of the balanced panel, or
3,343 individuals, as shown in Table 1. They are 10 years older, on average, than the average panel
member and more likely to be female (77% compared with 64%) and widowed (62% compared with
28%). As we will discuss in more detail below, large reductions in asset holdings are linked to
institutionalisation. Assessable assets for institutionalised people are about 20% lower, and 31% are
homeowners as compared with 75% in the total panel. We evaluate below the changes in asset
balances following changes in household structure and institutionalisation.
III. Sources of income
Pensioner households can receive income from many sources other than public transfer
payments, including labour income, income from superannuation and private savings, and bequests
and gifts. While some pensioners would have superannuation from other sources, most people in
the LDS sample would not have worked very long under the Superannuation Guarantee, which
began in 1993. The LDS shows that Age Pension payments dominate incomes but that income from
other savings contributes around one fifth of reported income each year to households of all wealth
levels. Labour income goes to few households and is very small. A very small proportion of pensioner
households are likely to receive bequests.
Table 3 sets out sources of income by assessable asset quintile over the last year in the sample
period (2006-07). For all groups except singles in the highest asset quintile, the majority of income
comes from Age Pension payments. Income from sources outside the pension, such as occupational
the oldest old (CEPAR 2013). Mortality improvements are disproportionately enjoyed by the wealthy. (See
Poterba, (2014) for the USA, and Turrell and Mathers (2001) for Australia.)

9
pensions, retirement income streams and financial asset returns, is a significant component of
income at all wealth levels, including for a majority of households in the lowest wealth quintile.
Income from these sources contributes about one fifth of income for the median household.
However, only 5.5% of couple households receive labour income (very few single households do)
and the contribution to total income is very small. This suggests that improving labour force
participation rates among the retired would increase diversification of income sources.
Not only is the Age Pension the main source of income for most households in the LDS, around
two thirds receive the maximum pension payment. Table 4 reports means and standard deviations
of the Age Pension benefit as a percentage of the maximum payment, and the proportion of
households receiving a full pension by cohort and asset quintile in June 2007. On average, age
pensioners are receiving 93% of the full pension amount. Just under two thirds (62%) of the payment
observations are at the full pension. Under means testing, the pension payment goes down as
assessable assets increase. However, even in the wealthiest quintile one fifth of pensioners receive
the maximum payment. The average percentage payment declines slightly by age and assessable
wealth cohort until the wealthiest asset quintile, at which point households surviving to ages over 80
are receiving only 75% of the maximum payment on average. This decline in average pension
payments at older ages could be due to increased assessable asset balances once pensioners sell the
family home.
Bequests are not reported as income in the LDS and the best we can do is estimate their
contribution using other data. Kelly and Harding (2006), using HILDA data in 2002 and 2003, report
that 1.7% of those aged in their 60s and 1.1% of those 70 and over received inheritances each year,
which would yield an average of 1.3% for our sample.7
Kelly and Harding put the average value for
these bequests at around $60,000. Given that the LDS is representative of the lower 60% of wealth
distribution, a better estimate of bequest size is the $40,000 average that Kelly and Harding report
7
They report that only a very small proportion of these are inherited from spouses – presumably because they
are not reported as such in the survey. As we are considering household wealth, such bequests are also not
relevant for our purposes.

10
for the lower three quintiles of the wealth distribution. This suggests income from bequests of only
$500 p.a. on average, or 0.7% of assets, although weighted towards the younger cohorts.
IV. Asset allocation
Having shown that income from savings and superannuation is important to age pensioners’
budgets, we now turn to stocks of assets. Allocation to assets such as real estate, shares, managed
investments and bank deposits is likely to be another important influence on the decumulation
behaviour of households.
(i) Home ownership
Around three quarters of age pensioners own their own homes, a proportion that does
not vary much as they age. Looking at the different age brackets, home ownership rates rose
over the study period for couples aged 80 or older, were stable for all households aged between
70 and 80, but declined for all other groups (see Panel A of Table 5). For all age groups, at all
points in the study period, the home ownership rate of singles is at least 20 percentage points
lower than for couples. This generation of pensioners may represent a high- water mark for
home ownership even though it remained constant at 73% over the period.
(ii) Financial asset balances
Once we take out the value of the family home, age pensioners in the LDS had low asset
balances. Table 5 (Panel B) reports aggregate data on asset holdings for three different age brackets.
For all single households, the mean assessable asset balance was about $49,800 in 1999 and $57,300
in 2007.8
Mean assessable asset balances for couple households were about twice those for singles,
as would be expected. Average assessable asset balances decline by 7% in total (less than 1% p.a.)
8
For comparison, single-person households with asset balances below (nominal amounts of) $127,750 in July
1999 and $166,750 in July 2007 would qualify for the full Age Pension.

11
for households observed over the full eight years, but we note that households could be moderating
a decline in balances by adding to assets when they receive a bequest or sell their home.
(iii) Financial asset allocation
We categorise the financial assets of the LDS into six broad groups including “other” assets9
.
Table 6 summarises the percentage of households with holdings in each category in 200310
, and
averages, over the year’s observations, the assessable asset balances.
Younger cohorts are generally wealthier, which is largely explained by higher superannuation
balances than for older cohorts. That said, superannuation balances are small, on average, across
the board – in most cases much less than shares and managed investments held outside
superannuation. However this is changing as the Superannuation Guarantee system matures. ASFA
(2014) reports that by 2012 the average cash and share holdings of employees nearing retirement
age were about one quarter of superannuation balances – a much lower proportion of assets
outside superannuation than in 2003.
Deposits with financial institutions are not reported separately in the LDS but we infer a value
for deposits using the data for “deemed” assets. Under means testing, the income tests apply
assumed or “deemed” rates of returns to certain classes of financial assets, rather than relying on
the reporting of earned income and capital gains or losses. These deemed assets include all deposits
with financial institutions as well as shares and managed funds. By assuming that financial assets
other than deposits, shares and managed investments are negligible, we can infer a value for
9
There are eight broad groups in the LDS, including a class of “other” assets. We group foreign assets and trust
and company assets into the “other” category because the average ownership and balances are minor.
10
We study the asset allocation in 2003, the mid of the sampling period, rather than 2007. For our balanced
sample, if we study the asset allocation in 2007 the age group 60-69 would not be representative (there will be
no males) due to the eligibility age requirement of the Age Pension.

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deposits, and these values are reported for each cohort in the lower panel of Table 6. This data
shows deposits become a more important element in asset allocation as pensioners age.
This is consistent with a pattern of portfolio allocation where exposure to risk is reduced as
people age. Means testing ensures that the Age Pension is a hedge against wealth shocks, and
theoretical models predict that optimal exposures to risk will be higher early in retirement for
wealthier, means-tested households (Hulley et al. 2013). Consistent with this theoretical prediction,
and with increased risk aversion and shorter life expectancy, Table 6 shows that older cohorts have a
smaller proportion of risky assets on their balance sheets. This pattern of portfolio allocations in the
LDS matches the HILDA panel (Spicer et al., 2013) and the US Health and Retirement Survey (Coile
and Milligan 2009). Rates of return on financial assets were positive over most years in the study,
apart from the early 2000s, but share market fluctuations appear to have a minimal impact on
assessed asset value, possibly because changes in market values are not always reported
immediately. Australian retirees do, however, maintain a substantial exposure to investment risk
that is likely to increase as retirement savings become increasingly concentrated in superannuation
accounts. Spicer et al. (2013) document the vulnerability to financial market shocks of some retired
households, as became obvious during the Global Financial Crisis.
The means-tested Age Pension is intended to provide for the needs of the poorest of retirees
and so might be expected to serve as a redistributive vehicle. In Appendix A we report tests of
wealth inequality over time using the Gini index, looking at the changes in the index over the sample
period. We also use the whole distribution of assets and test year-against-year Lorenz dominance
using the method in Barrett et al. (2014). Results indicate that financial wealth inequality did not
decrease over the period 1999-2007. Overall, average asset holdings – both home ownership and
financial assets – are remarkably stable, apart from the decline in risky financial asset holdings as
households age and the noticeably higher superannuation balances of younger households.

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V. DECUMULATION
Having described the stocks of assets in the LDS sample, we now turn to changes in assets, or
decumulation. A key prediction of life-cycle theory is that households accumulate during working life
with the intention of funding consumption in retirement, but many studies of retirement wealth
conclude that evidence of decumulation of non-pension assets is at best weak, and at worst, non-
existent. Pensions from defined benefit plans and some income stream products ensure regular and
automatic distributions, but retirees might also hold on to wealth for bequests and as a precaution
against uninsurable shocks.
Very few Australians use their savings and superannuation to purchase life annuities.11
If
pensioners are choosing to bear investment and longevity risks themselves, life-cycle theory still
predicts decumulation but at rates related to increasing mortality at older ages. Life expectancy for
retirees in the LDS sample falls by about 30% to 40%12
over the eight years we study, based on the
2005-2007 Australian Life Tables, or around 5% p.a., consistent with slow drawdown. If retirees
decide to self-insure, they are likely to leave significant bequests if they die early, or possibly face
privation at very old ages if they live long. Risk-averse, self-insuring retirees could be expected to
prepare for longer lives by decumulating very slowly.
In this section, we analyse the asset drawdown of age pensioners graphically to get a picture
of decumulation. We begin with home ownership and then study financial asset decumulation for
the balanced cohort. We also present estimates of consumption levels and residual wealth at the
end of life, completing the analysis with panel estimates of decumulation.
(i) Home ownership
11
The failure to annuitise can be partly explained by the poor returns offered by annuities, especially when
compared to relatively high yielding Australian equities. The already high dividend yield on Australian equities,
which stands at 4.5% at time of writing, is enhanced by the return of company tax in the form of imputation
credits. The longevity insurance provided by the Age Pension crowds out private sources for many retirees
(Iskhakov et al. 2015).
12
E.g. (e.g. a male 80 year old at the end of the study would have a life expectancy of 8.4 against 12.6 at the
age of 73 - eight years earlier.

14
Housing assets are the largest component of wealth for most Australian households, and rates
of home ownership are high and persistent among age pensioners in this sample. (The ABS (2007)
puts the average house value at around $300,000 in 2006.) When pensioners sell their homes the
proceeds are assessed under the means test and raise asset balances, but we do not have data on
the value of owner-occupied housing for our sample. For this reason, we can only report the year-to-
year change in home ownership.
Figure 1 plots year-to-year changes in home ownership over the period 1999-2007 by
household structure.13
The lines between two connected points measure the difference in home
ownership of individuals observed in two consecutive years, for each type of household. The gaps
between two disconnected points arise from composition effects caused by changes in household
structure.
Younger households are more likely to own their homes, but ownership declines among single
households over time. This is clearly seen for singles over 80, where home ownership drops by
around 3% from year to year, amounting to a 20% decline over the eight years. There is little change
in home ownership rates among continuing couples. Apart from the drop-off in home ownership at
older ages, the dissolution of households is the other cause of home sales, which is consistent with
patterns in the USA (Poterba et al. 2011a). Individuals in a two-person household could lose home
ownership via divorce, while those becoming widowed and/or institutionalised might sell houses to
cover expenses or downsize to reduce the maintenance burden. The persistence in home ownership
rates, when considered along with the evidence that few retired households use financial products
such as reverse mortgages to consume their housing wealth, suggest Australian retirees hold on to
houses for precautionary reasons or as bequests.
(ii) Assessable assets
13
The method of our year-to-year change graphical analysis is that used by Poterba et al. (2011a).

15
The evolution of assessable asset balances provides the most relevant measure of
decumulation of life-cycle savings in our sample. Most assessable assets are more liquid than
housing assets, and so more easily used for consumption. Figure 2 plots year-to-year changes in the
mean asset balances for continuing couples and singles, and for those that transition to single status,
sorted into three age groups. Composition biases are captured by the gaps between line segments
and the year-to-year changes show the effects of time. For continuing couple households under 80,
and especially for the young, the graphs show a decline in asset values in each of the first four
years.14
Dissolved two-person households report large falls in assets. The average decline in assets for
dissolving households is 32% for those under age 70 and 20% for those between 70 and 80, but only
7% for those over 80. Possible explanations for falls in assets on dissolution of a couple are divorce
(including legal and other costs), bequests to charities and other family members, and end-of- life
costs. The division of assets on divorce accounts for some 5% of these decreases: divorce usually
entails a 50% split of assets but only 10% of dissolutions are due to divorce. Bequests might make up
another 5%: Baker and Gilding (2011) analyse probate distributions in Victoria and show that
around 90% of a person’s assets go to surviving spouses, leaving the residual for other beneficiaries.
Some of the remaining declines could be explained by costs associated with divorce, but are more
likely to be health and aged-care expenses.15
To get a fuller understanding of the pattern of drawdown we need to follow the same
households over time. Figure 3 plots average asset balances at each age and family structure for
selected cohorts (labelled by the cohort age in 1999). Each segment shows the same cohort of
14
We had expected that the effect of changes in share prices might be visible in these graphs. However, as the
Australian share market increased in all but 2002 and 2003, it seems that the changes in asset values arise
mainly from other factors.
15
People in ill health who die at at younger ages may incur higher costs than the very old – possibly because
there are more years of life at risk. Kardamanidis et al. (2007) found that in New South Wales in 2002 and 2003,
“Hospital costs fell with age, with people aged 95 years or over incurring less than half the average costs per
person of those who died aged 65–74 years ($7,028 versus $17,927)”.

16
pensioners over these years, for those aged 61, 66, 71, 76 and 81 in 1999, respectively. Couples are
shown as transitioning to single if the transition occurs at any time during the period.
The assets of younger cohorts reduced in the first four years of the observation period, with
the reduction being steepest for those losing partners. Older households mostly accumulated assets
as they aged. The similarity in calendar year patterns among the different cohorts at younger ages
suggests that time effects are important. (See Ooijen et al. (2014) for similar patterns among Dutch
households associated with trends in returns on financial assets.)
Households that change from couple to single – the dashed lines – show a steep decline in
assets. The fact that these households start at a significantly lower level of assets than couples that
survive may arise from their socio-economic circumstances, or they may have already suffered from
health-related costs in periods before the death of a spouse or being institutionalised (Colie and
Milligan, 2009). We further study the dynamic effect of health shocks later in this paper.
This cohort analysis shows that pensioner households, especially singles, appear to be buffer
stock savers, holding onto their relatively small pots of retirement savings and mainly consuming the
current income generated by the Age Pension and investments. The asset balances shown here
could supplement retirement consumption, but, after the first few years of retirement, households
appear to be holding on to them, probably to cover the risk of long life, health and long-term care
costs, other unforeseen expenses and bequests. It is possible that pensioners would be less cautious
if they could access insurance against aged care, or if they could at least estimate future medical
care costs accurately.
So far we have grouped households by age, but people with different levels of wealth may
have different spending behaviours, as observed in other countries (e.g., Hurd, 1990; Börsch-Supan,
1992; Alessie et al., 1999) and in Australia (e.g., Hulley et al., 2013). Figure 4 plots the year-to-year
changes in assessable asset balances by asset quintile of individuals aggregating over ages.
Individuals are grouped by asset values in July 1999, and fixed thereafter, but classification by family
structure depends on the year. We only look at the balanced panel so as to remove survivor bias.

17
The top two quintiles of all household types reduced their assets, on average, in the first four years,
while the lowest two quintiles of couples and singles increased theirs over the whole period. Results
for lowest quintile households transitioning to single are mixed: households with assets over
$50,000 per person are prepared to spend the excess, while those with less than $50,000 tend to
accumulate assets – presumably for precautionary purposes. If this precautionary saving is for
medical and other costs associated with dying, $50,000 looks to be too much. The middle panel of
Figure 4 shows that for households where one partner dies assets sometimes actually increase.
In Figure 5 we show the ratio of assets over time against assets in July 1999. For illustrative
purposes, we have randomly selected 100 continuing couples and show the bottom, middle and
highest quintiles of initial wealth. (The other household types are similar so we don’t show them
separately.) The heterogeneity is remarkable, particularly at the lowest quintile, where the initial
wealth could be very small. There does however seem to be a bifurcation, with one group 10 to 100
times better off, and another group clustered around zero (meaning no change in their assets over
the period). The same bifurcation is not visible in the middle and highest quintiles, where the ratios
are more clustered. This suggests that most changes to assets are not related to investment returns,
which would be proportionate to the asset values. While increases in assets could be due to
receiving bequests or proceeds from the sale of the home, our earlier calculations suggest these
would only apply to about 10% of the sample, so most of the increases will be related to other
causes. Of most relevance to those interested in the financial security of retirees is the number of
couples whose assets decline precipitously: over 10% of the sample experienced a decline in asset
values of more than 50% over the period for reasons that cannot be identified.
(iii) Consumption
Using data from the balanced panel we can estimate annual household consumption by age
and asset quintile in 1999 (Table 7). We calculate household consumption as income (including Age
Pension payment, labour income and income from financial assets) less saving (where saving is the

18
change in the value of assessable assets). This measure excludes the consumption value of housing
services for homeowners, as well as bequests and the proceeds of home sales.16
We compare
consumption in the sample to the ASFA Retirement Standard measures (ASFA, 2014) of spending for
a “modest” or “comfortable” lifestyle, where households are assumed to own their homes and enjoy
good health.
Average expenditure for the lower two quintiles of single homeowner households is slightly
less than the full pension payment and increases to more than double that at higher wealth levels,
although declining at older ages. The current ASFA estimate of the budget required for a modest
lifestyle for a single, home-owning retiree in 2014 is around $23,500 p.a., or around $18,000 p.a.
when deflated back to 2007 levels using a 3.75% p.a. (Average Weekly Earnings-based) deflator. The
majority of single pensioners spent at a slower rate than this benchmark, with the average in the
lower quintiles being less than $13,000 p.a. The related figure for a “comfortable” lifestyle,
according to ASFA, is $33,000 (in $2007), close to the annual spending of only the wealthiest and
youngest singles.
The ASFA “modest” standard for couples at 2007 rates would be around $26,000 p.a., higher
than the spending of all but the top two couple quintiles in Table 7. Further, none of the couple
averages approach the “comfortable” ASFA budget of around $45,000 p.a. We do not infer from this
that the ASFA budgets are overstated, rather that even wealthier pensioner households are
restrained in their current consumption spending and continue to preserve savings.
(iv) Residual wealth at death
16
Our measure may understate the spending by bequest income (estimated at 0.6% p.a. above) and by the
proceeds of home sales. About 5% of the sample sell their houses over the eight-year period, and the value of
the home is reported as being two to three times the value of financial assets for those in the age and wealth
groups (ABS, 2007). This suggests that home sales would have added about 1.6% p.a. to financial assets over
the period. This brings the total drawdown to an average of perhaps 3% p.a. As we saw, however, a large
proportion of this occurs in the transition from couple to single status.

19
Residual wealth at death of pensioners in the LDS confirms that low or slow decumulation is
typical of many households. Table 8 shows the last observation on assessable asset balance of the
5,365 individuals who died over the sample period (and thus are from the unbalanced panel). The
lower panel compares this amount with the real ($2007) wealth of the same individual in 1999.
Residual wealth ratios are almost uniform across ages and wealth levels, at around 90% of assets
recorded at the beginning of the sample. Apart from the wealthiest quintiles, individuals who pass
away at younger ages leave a slightly higher percentage of their initial wealth, but the differences
are very small by age at death.
In the LDS, intended and unintended bequests are observationally equivalent so we cannot
infer the motivation for this conservative behaviour. If we assume that deaths are evenly spread
through the sample so that the average time spent alive is four years, the implied decumulation rate
for the average individual in Table 8 is about 2.5% p.a. from 1999 until death. Some of this
decumulation could have been caused by medical and care costs associated with final illness and for
which precautionary savings would be required. In the next subsection, we report estimates from a
panel model of decumulation to get a clearer idea of the conditional effects of household
characteristics on retirement wealth management.
(v) Panel estimation of decumulation
By estimating a panel model of decumulation, we can measure the marginal impact of the
factors in the graphical analysis. While observations are available fortnightly, there is very little
change over such short periods so we take observations at the first payment date of the Age Pension
benefits in July (June for 2007), October, January and April over the sample period. We drop
households that do not appear in every quarter of the sample to avoid selection effects, which gives
326,048 observations (for 10,189 individuals) to use in estimation. Wealth, income, portfolio
structure and the implicit tax rates of the means test tapers are jointly (endogenously) determined,
so we regress quarterly changes in financial wealth on lagged (predetermined) values of income,

20
portfolio allocation and taper status, and on current values of available demographics, which we
treat as exogenous.
Using the sample of quarterly balanced panel data, we estimate two models to explore
decumulation behaviour. First, we estimate a pooled OLS model:
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒕/𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) × 𝟏𝟎𝟎 = 𝜷 𝟎 + 𝜷 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝒊𝒏𝒄 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝜷 𝒉𝒔𝒕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝒕𝒊 𝑻𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷 𝒉𝒔𝒉 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜷 𝒂𝒐 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷 𝒔 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊,𝒕 ( 1 )
where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the household assessable assets for individual 𝑖 at the end of quarter 𝑡 (i.e., at time
𝑡), measured in 2007 dollars.17
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the age of individual 𝑖 at the end of quarter 𝑡 (i.e., at time
𝑡).18
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 include labour income, non-labour income and the Age Pension benefits
for the household of individual 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡 − 1 (i.e., from time 𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 − 1).
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 includes binary variables for household structure (single,
divorced/separated, widowed – and couple as the omitted base case), whether the individual is
institutionalised and a non-homeowner for individual 𝑖 at the end of quarter 𝑡 − 1, and the
interactions of the non-homeowner indicator with household structure and institutionalisation
indicators. 𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 are two binary variables that are equal to 1 if the individual 𝑖 fails
to receive the full Age Pension due to one of the assets or income tests in quarter 𝑡 − 1.
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝒊,𝒕 include binary variables signalling whether shocks to household structure
(becoming divorced/separated, widowed or forming a couple), home ownership (sale and/or
purchase of a home) and institutionalisation happened to individual 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. Thus the binary
variables are equal to 1 if the changes happened in quarter 𝑡 and 0 for all other quarters. Also
included in 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝒊,𝒕 are one-quarter/two-quarter lead (and lag) terms for the
widowhood shock that are equal to 1 if quarter 𝑡 is one-quarter/two-quarters before (after)
17
We also estimate the model with 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 as the dependent variable. The results are similar.
18
We also test the specification with 𝐴𝑔𝑒2
. The sign and significance of the coefficients are materially the same
and the estimates are very similar.

21
individual 𝑖 becoming widowed, and one-quarter lag term for home sale. The lead and lag terms for
widowhood control for changes to assets associated with the death of a partner, such as end-of-life
health costs and bequests other than to the spouse.19
The one-quarter lag term for home sale
controls for delays in the receipt of the proceeds of a sale. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 includes five
binary variables indicating ownership of five asset classes: shares and managed investment, implied
deposits, superannuation, real property, and other assets.20
The variables are equal to one if the
household of individual 𝑖 holds the asset class at the start of quarter 𝑡 (i.e., at time 𝑡 − 1). 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1
is a set of binary variables indicating the state where individual 𝑖 lived at the start of quarter 𝑡.
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 include time-invariant binary variables for gender, year of birth, country of birth,
aboriginal, and asset quintile in 1999 for individual 𝑖.
To account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we also estimate an individual fixed
effects model:
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒕/𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) × 𝟏𝟎𝟎 = 𝜷 𝟎 + 𝜷 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝒊𝒏𝒄 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝜷 𝒉𝒔𝒕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝒕𝒊 𝑻𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷 𝒉𝒔𝒉 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜷 𝒂𝒐 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷 𝒔 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊,𝒕
(2)
where 𝛼𝑖 is the individual fixed effect. However, we estimate this model for each gender to explore
the different drawdown behaviour between males and females. Including individual fixed effects
implies that the effects of ageing are estimated within each individual over time. (The Hausman test
rejected a random effects specification.) As usual, we cannot separately estimate age, cohort and
time effects, so following Colie and Milligan (2009), and given our short sample of quarterly
observations, we assume that time effects are small relative to age and cohort effects.
19
Bequests to the spouse would remain as household assets and hence will not result in changes in the assets
assessed by asset tests.
20
We also test the specification with proportion of assets allocated in each asset class instead of asset holding
indicators. The results are very similar.

22
Single non-homeowners accumulate financial resources at slower rates than partnered
homeowners, whose couple status offers household economies and insurance against housing
shocks (Table 9, OLS).21
Confirming the graphical analysis presented above, estimation results show
younger and wealthier individuals on the asset taper decumulate, but this changes at older ages,
where slow rates of accumulation are estimated. Labour income also significantly adds to assessable
assets, whereas increases in Age Pension payments pre-empt declining assessable assets. The
unexpected sign-on increases in Age Pension income could be due to slow adjustments as payments
and assessable asset balances are harmonised.
Household structure and its interaction with home ownership has large and significant effects
on decumulation. Long-term singles decumulate much faster than couples, and not owning a home
adds to the rate. The decline in wealth associated with singleness also outweighs the increases in
financial assets reported by divorced or widowed women. The positive impact of institutionalisation
on financial assets for homeowners is almost exactly offset by the negative coefficient on the
interaction term between institutionalisation and non-homeownership, suggesting that
institutionalisation is related to further accumulation for those able to enter care without selling the
family home, but has little net effect on those who don’t own homes to begin with or who sell up to
help fund care. The asset and income taper indicators have the expected negative signs and are
statistically and economically significant.
While Islam et al (2013) report that immigrants are likely to save more than natives, we do not
find this to be true for all foreign countries of birth. The coefficients for two of the countries well
represented among those over 65 in the 2006 census (Italy 4% and Greece 2%) were statistically
significant, but that for Italy was negative and that for Greece positive. The coefficient for those of
aboriginal origin was marginally negative.22
21
The single Age Pension was increased by 10% relative to couples in the 2009 federal budget. Commonwealth
Budget Paper No 2. http://www.budget.gov.au/2009-10/content/bp2/download/bp2_Consolidated.pdf
22
We do not report the estimates, but they are available on request

23
The model explains a relatively small proportion of the heterogeneity in experience. One
important reason is that not all assets were assessable over the period and changes in holdings of
non-assessable assets are probably not well estimated by the models. In particular, increases in
assessable assets in later years could be related to seepage of house sale proceeds into reported
asset balances.23
VI. Discussion and conclusions
Superannuation balances in Australia are preserved to a set age (55 to 60 years) but can be
withdrawn as a lump sum without penalty and, while around half of balances are transferred to
phased withdrawal accounts at retirement, very few Australians voluntarily annuitise to protect
themselves against outliving their wealth. Interest in retirement income policy has intensified as the
baby boomers have reached retirement at the same time that the Superannuation Guarantee has
created sizable defined contribution account accumulations. But before any policy changes are
proposed or enacted, the behaviour of current retirees needs to be carefully reviewed. Here we
examine the income and assessable asset records of a 1% sample of age pensioners using a
longitudinal dataset (LDS) supplied by Centrelink from 1999 to 2007. Since around 70% of
Australians over the eligible age receive at least a part pension payment, the study of age pensioners
covers a comprehensive range of household structures and wealth categories. The LDS records
fortnightly pension payments and income from most sources, as well as a range of financial and
other assets, but does not record the value of the family home or the receipt of bequests.
Despite the implicit income insurance available through the public Age Pension, our study of
decumulation shows that age pensioners are cautious rather than spendthrift in managing their
retirement wealth. At older ages in particular, pensioners preserve a buffer of financial savings in
addition to the family home of around $50,000 per person. Wealthier Australian age pensioners, on
average, spend down their financial assets early in retirement, but tend to accumulate at later ages
23
The value of homes is on average two to three times higher than financial assets – based on the relevant
wealth quintiles reported in Table 6 of ABS (2007).

24
as health and energy reduces. Lower wealth quintile pensioners accumulate from early on. A sum of
$50,000 per person represents four to five years of consumption for the income quintiles to which it
applies, which appears to be unnecessarily high. It is possible that products providing longevity,
health and aged-care insurance could help to increase the welfare of retirees by reducing the need
for precautionary saving. We find that as a consequence of holding buffers, pensioners on average
pass away with almost as much wealth as they had at the beginning of the sample period. We also
find considerable heterogeneity among households’ decumulation experiences, with a significant
minority of retirees spending (or losing) a big part of their assets, and others gaining significantly.
Continuing couple households maintain ownership of the family home, but selling the home is
more common when couple households dissolve due to death or separation. Single households over
the age of 80 show marked declines in home ownership, probably related to the demands of funding
aged care. In general, dissolution of partnerships is associated with large changes in both financial
and housing wealth.
The average rate of pension payment in the LDS sample was over 70%, and while the payment
declined as wealth increased, 20% of households in the highest wealth quintile received the full Age
Pension. Most households drew about one fifth of their income from financial savings in addition to
pension payments, and much more so at the highest wealth quintile. Results from other studies
indicate that younger pensioners are also more likely to be receiving bequests to add to their
financial asset balances. Very few Age Pension households earn labour income and greater
participation in the labour market would help diversify income among the retired.
On average, consumption stays at modest levels, even among wealthier pension households,
and poorer pension households appear to consume even less than the full pension payment.
Consumption appears to decline with age, not increasing much at advanced ages as would be
consistent with increased health and care costs. Wealthier couple households spend slowly when
compared with the ASFA “comfortable” budget standard. Overall, the data suggest that age

25
pensioners live well within their means. If we set aside precautionary and bequest motives, they
would be able, on average, to spend more in retirement and still not exhaust their assets.

26
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29
Appendix A: Assessable asset inequality
Panel A of Table A1 presents the estimates of the Gini index (𝐺̂) and its standard error (𝑠𝑒̂(𝐺̂))
for each year of our sample period, using the method in Davidson (2009). Results show that the
estimated Gini index decreased from 0.5363 in 1999, reaching a low of 0.5146 in 2003, and then
increased to 0.5337 in 2007. We test the year-to-year equality of the Gini index using bootstrapped
standard errors (Davidson 2009) that account for dependence within individuals from year to year.
The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of equal Gini indexes for all pairs of years are
reported in the first (shaded) row for each year 𝑖 of Panel B of Table 8. The results show that despite
a reduction in inequality between 1999 and 2003, there is no significant difference between the Gini
coefficients of 1999 and 2007.
Two populations with the same Gini index can have very different shapes of income/wealth
distribution, representing different kinds of inequality (De Maio, 2007). Lorenz dominance provides
inequality-based ranking of distributions by performing a position test on Lorenz curves for these
distributions, with the consideration given to the whole distribution. Specifically, if the Lorenz curve
for distribution A lies nowhere below that for distribution B, the Lorenz curve for A is said to weakly
dominate the Lorenz curve for B. Strong Lorenz dominance occurs further if the Lorenz curve for A
lies at some point above that for B. Barrett et al. (2014) provides a consistent nonparametric test for
Lorenz dominance. Using this method, we perform tests for Lorenz dominance for each year-against-
year pair of our sample.
Table 8 reports the bootstrapped p-values of strong and weak Lorenz dominance for each year-
against-year pair. The hypothesis that the Lorenz curves are equal is rejected in all but three cases.
The Lorenz curve for year 2003 appears to strongly dominate the curve for year 1999, confirming
that wealth was more equally distributed in 2003 than 1999. This reduction in inequality is possibly
related to low or negative equity returns in 2002-03, lowering wealth in the upper quartiles of the
distribution. However, further analysis shows that in 2007 both the bottom 50% and the top 5% of
age pensioners own a greater share of total assets compared with 1999, but the rest of the upper
quartile own a smaller share.

30
Table A1 Gini index and tests of Lorenz dominance
Year i Year j Null
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Hypothesis
Panel A Gini index
𝐺̂ 0.5363 0.5289 0.5203 0.5167 0.5146 0.5169 0.5211 0.5277 0.5337
𝑠𝑒̂(𝐺̂) 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0027
Panel B P-values
1999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.193 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.082 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.705 0.618 0.601 0.385 0.405 0.389 0.110 0.022 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.037 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.482 0.029 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.344 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.649 0.575 0.342 0.324 0.260 0.015 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2001 0.001 0.001 0.033 0.754 0.011 0.000 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.738 0.836 0.890 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.712 0.442 0.398 0.172 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.000 0.000 0.041 0.308 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2002 0.065 0.881 0.060 0.001 0.000 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.067 0.573 0.737 0.828 0.887 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.460 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.151 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2003 0.099 0.011 0.001 0.000 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.799 0.751 0.924 0.959 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2004 0.015 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.808 0.935 0.980 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.001 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.001 0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2005 0.001 0.000 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.906 0.986 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.000 0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
2006 0.000 𝐻0
(𝐺)
0.908 𝐻0
(𝑖)
0.000 𝐻0
(𝑗)
0.000 𝐻0
(𝑒)
𝐻0
(𝐺)
: 𝐺𝑖 = 𝐺𝑗 tests equality of the Gini index against a two-sided alternative; 𝐻0
(𝑖)
: 𝐿𝑖(𝑝) ≥ 𝐿𝑗(𝑝) for all 𝑝 ∈ [0,1], or 𝐿𝑖 weakly Lorenz
dominates 𝐿𝑗, 𝐻1
(𝑖)
: 𝐿𝑖(𝑝) < 𝐿𝑗(𝑝) for some 𝑝 ∈ [0,1]; 𝐻0
(𝑗)
: 𝐿𝑗(𝑝) ≥ 𝐿𝑖(𝑝) for all 𝑝 ∈ [0,1], or 𝐿𝑗 weakly Lorenz dominates 𝐿𝑖,
𝐻1
(𝑗)
: 𝐿𝑗(𝑝) < 𝐿𝑖(𝑝) for some 𝑝 ∈ [0,1]; 𝐻0
(𝑒)
: 𝐿𝑖(𝑝) = 𝐿𝑗(𝑝) for all 𝑝 ∈ [0,1], or 𝐿𝑖 and 𝐿𝑗are equal, 𝐻1
(𝑒)
: 𝐿𝑖(𝑝) ≠ 𝐿𝑗(𝑝) for some
𝑝 ∈ [0,1]. The combination {𝐻0
(𝑖)
, 𝐻1
(𝑗)
, 𝐻1
(𝑒)
} indicates 𝐿𝑖 strongly Lorenz dominates 𝐿𝑗; {𝐻0
(𝑖)
, 𝐻1
(𝑗)
, 𝐻0
(𝑒)
} indicates 𝐿𝑖 weakly Lorenz
dominates 𝐿𝑗; {𝐻0
(𝑖)
, 𝐻0
(𝑗)
, 𝐻0
(𝑒)
} indicates 𝐿𝑖 and 𝐿𝑗 are equal; {𝐻1
(𝑖)
, 𝐻1
(𝑗)
, 𝐻1
(𝑒)
} indicates neither of the above relationship is true.

31
Table 1 Summary statistics: demographics; assets, income and the Age Pension benefits (in '000 of $2007)
Full sample Institutionalised
Annual
Unbalanced
Annual
Balanced
Quarterly
Balanced
Annual
Unbalanced
Annual
Balanced
Quarterly
Balanced
Variable Av SD Med Av SD Med Av SD Med Av SD Med Av SD Med Av SD Med
Age 73.51 7.52 72.00 74.49 6.66 74.00 74.49 6.59 74.00 84.39 7.81 85.00 83.98 7.57 85.00 83.91 7.60 84.00
Female 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.75 0.43 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42
Non-homeowner 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46
Divorced/separated 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32
Single 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.17 0.38 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32
Widowed 0.25 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.49
Assessed assets 82.86 89.46 50.96 83.73 86.09 54.41 82.93 84.86 54.20 66.30 84.44 29.88 68.76 85.40 31.53 66.69 83.66 30.44
Labour income 0.62 3.49 0.00 0.36 2.57 0.00 0.06 0.51 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
Non-labour income 4.66 7.29 1.82 4.94 7.60 2.09 0.92 1.71 0.27 3.97 6.39 1.34 4.21 6.87 1.50 0.85 1.59 0.21
Age Pension benefits 13.37 5.06 12.28 15.73 4.76 13.89 3.02 1.91 3.07 10.33 2.65 10.71 11.94 2.28 12.28 2.41 1.23 2.97
Asian 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02
Australia 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.72 0.71 0.72
East Europe 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
New Zealand 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
North West Europe 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Other 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14
South Europe 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.04
Number of observations 158587 93150 336237 8673 3343 11658

32
Table 2: Couple-to-single transitions, balanced panel
Reasons for changing from couple benefit to single benefit
Count Per cent
Death of spouse 847 57
Divorced or separated 115 8
Moving to Aged care or Nursing homes 232 16
Missing 282 19
Total 1476 100
Table 3: Income sources, 2006-07
Asset quintile in June 2007
Income type Household type 1 2 3 4 5 All
Panel A: Percentage of People Receiving Income Type
Labour income
Single 1.6 2.4 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.6
Couple 4.7 7.3 6.7 4.6 4.8 5.5
Non-labour income
Single 66.1 94.5 98.6 99.2 99.3 88.1
Couple 61.0 88.2 97.3 99.8 99.4 93.5
Age Pension benefits
Single 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Couple 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel B: Percentage of total income and mean total income value
Labour income
Single 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4
Couple 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.0 1.2 1.4
Non-labour income
Single 11.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 50.3 22.5
Couple 14.5 16.8 20.4 22.1 36.3 24.8
Age Pension benefits
Single 87.9 84.9 79.7 69.3 49.5 77.0
Couple 84.1 81.5 77.5 76.9 62.5 73.8
'000 of $2007
Mean total income
Single 13.7 14.1 15.1 16.6 18.8 15.1
Couple 23.4 24.0 25.1 25.4 27.7 25.6

33
Table 4: Age Pension benefit by age cohort and assessable asset quintile
Age in June 2007 Asset quintile in June 2007
1 2 3 4 5 All
Panel A: Age Pension benefit as proportion of full payment
60-69 Mean 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.84 0.93
SD 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.16
70-79 Mean 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.81 0.93
SD 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.16
80+ Mean 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.75 0.92
SD 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.17
All Mean 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.80 0.93
SD 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.16
Panel B: Percentage receiving full payment
60-69 90 74 75 56 18 60
70-79 85 80 75 61 20 62
80+ 86 80 76 41 8 62
All 85 80 75 54 16 62

34
Table 5: Home ownership rate and mean assessable asset balances and by age
Year Age interval
60-69 70-79 80+ All age
Single Couple All Single Couple All Single Couple All Single Couple All
Panel A: Percentage of homeowners
1999 63 87 80 63 85 76 64 76 67 63 86 77
2000 63 87 79 64 86 77 62 75 66 63 86 77
2001 63 86 79 64 86 77 60 77 66 63 86 76
2002 64 86 78 63 86 77 59 79 65 62 85 75
2003 62 86 77 63 86 77 58 80 65 62 85 75
2004 62 87 77 63 85 76 57 80 64 61 85 74
2005 61 87 77 63 85 76 57 82 65 61 85 73
2006 60 86 76 64 85 76 56 81 64 60 84 72
2007 58 81 72 63 85 76 56 83 65 60 85 72
Panel B: Mean assessable asset balance
1999 55.0 125.0 103.9 48.0 104.2 80.2 42.6 81.5 54.2 49.8 115.1 89.7
2000 53.5 121.0 100.1 49.4 104.9 81.9 43.6 83.3 55.7 49.6 111.6 86.7
2001 52.2 114.6 94.3 50.3 105.3 83.3 43.5 81.2 54.9 49.2 107.4 83.3
2002 50.9 116.8 94.4 52.1 105.9 84.4 45.1 83.7 57.0 50.0 107.6 82.8
2003 51.0 113.5 91.5 51.9 104.9 83.9 48.5 88.1 60.8 50.7 105.3 81.0
2004 50.0 115.1 90.8 54.3 107.0 86.1 50.3 92.7 63.7 52.4 106.5 81.6
2005 51.0 117.1 91.7 56.6 110.0 88.3 52.6 97.2 66.6 54.6 108.8 82.9
2006 50.3 113.1 88.9 57.6 111.1 88.8 54.3 100.2 69.2 55.8 109.0 82.7
2007 49.9 111.7 88.3 58.0 112.7 89.6 57.0 102.1 71.8 57.3 110.1 83.0
8-year change -9% -11% -15% 21% 8% 12% 34% 25% 32% 15% -4% -7%
Mean asset balances are calculated at the first benefit payment dates in July from 1999 to 2006 and in June in 2007, in thousands of 2007 Australian dollars. 99.5% of the
observations have a positive asset balance.
Note that the this table reflects the asset of the balanced panel, who remain in the sample over the eight years, and so the composition of each age bracket changes over
the years as people age and potentially move into a higher age bracket.

35
Table 6: Asset Allocation, July 2003
Ages 60-69 70-79 80+ All Ages
Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple
Resp. Spouse Resp. Spouse Resp. Spouse Resp. Spouse
Percentage of pensioners with positive asset holdings by category
Shares and managed investments (1) 22 34 5 22 30 30 14 21 52 19 30 26
Implied deposits(2) 96 92 91 97 94 94 99 97 96 97 94 93
Deemed assets (3) 96 98 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 98 98 98
Superannuation (4) 9 9 17 5 8 6 1 2 2 5 7 8
Real estate (5) 8 12 14 7 11 11 4 8 8 6 11 11
Other assets (6) 83 92 93 75 90 89 50 76 75 69 89 89
Mean value (in '000 of $2007)
Share and managed investments (1) 7 8 9 7 9 9 5 7 7 6 8 9
Implied deposits* (2) 22 20 19 28 23 23 32 24 24 28 23 22
Deemed assets** (3) 29 28 28 35 32 32 38 31 31 35 31 31
Superannuation (4) 7 7 15 3 6 4 0 1 1 3 5 6
Real estate (5) 5 6 7 4 5 6 3 4 4 4 5 6
Other assets (6) 11 11 13 10 11 11 7 8 8 9 11 11
Sum of (3) to (6) 51 52 63 53 54 52 49 45 44 51 53 54
Total assets under asset test*** 51 114 110 52 105 103 48 88 86 51 105 103
Inconsistency**** -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 0 -1 -2
* This is calculated by subtracting share and managed investments from deemed assets (3) – (1), assuming asset values of other risky financial assets are
negligible.
** Under the deeming rule of the Age Pension, deemed assets include bonds, share investments, managed investments and other financial assets such as bank accounts.
*** This is the total amount of assets recorded in the data set that is assessed by asset test;
**** For singles: Inconsistency= Total assets under asset test – Sum of (3) to (6); For couples: Inconsistency= Total assets under asset test (Respondent)- Sum of (3) to (6) for
respondent – Sum of (3) to (6) for spouse.

36
Table 7 Average household consumption (in '000 of $2007)
Homeowners Non-homeowners
Age cohort Age cohort
Asset quintile in July 1999 60-69 70-79 Over 80 All 60-69 70-79 over 80 All
Panel A: Single households
1 11.9 13.1 12.7 12.8 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.9
2 13.2 14.1 13.7 13.8 11.4 12.2 10.3 11.4
3 16.5 16.7 15.3 16.2 14.4 13.2 12.0 12.9
4 22.1 19.9 21.0 20.5 20.8 16.8 15.4 16.8
5 32.4 29.1 27.5 29.4 32.9 24.2 22.6 24.1
All 18.6 17.8 15.9 17.3 13.6 13.1 12.2 12.9
Panel B: Couple households
1 18.9 21.6 23.7 21.5 21.0 21.2 22.8 21.4
2 21.7 22.8 23.3 22.6 20.6 21.4 20.2 21.0
3 23.7 25.3 23.0 24.6 22.1 22.8 22.3 22.6
4 28.6 27.3 25.6 27.5 19.5 20.7 24.1 20.9
5 37.9 32.8 31.0 34.1 34.6 30.9 27.7 30.7
All 29.7 27.7 25.5 27.9 21.8 22.4 22.9 22.3

37
Table 8: Residual wealth at death
Single households Couple households
Age at death Age at death
Asset quintile in 1999 60-69 70-79 Over 80 All 60-69 70-79 Over 80 All
Panel A: Mean (in '000 of $2007)
1 6.3 6.0 11.7 9.3 13.1 12.8 16.0 13.7
2 31.4 28.9 27.4 28.1 30.9 28.2 23.3 27.7
3 69.7 62.2 45.6 51.3 74.7 63.8 38.2 58.7
4 126.3 110.6 80.4 88.3 135.5 119.5 73.1 106.8
5 219.6 196.7 166.3 172.4 245.3 244.1 201.8 228.3
All 47.7 49.5 58.6 55.5 98.0 94.9 84.2 92.3
Panel B: Median of the ratios of wealth at death to real wealth in 1999
1 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.91
2 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.91
3 0.97 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.91 0.91
4 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.90
5 0.91 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.90
All 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.91
5365 people died during the sample period. In comparison, the total number of age Pensioners in the unbalanced data set rises from over 15,938 in 1999 to 19,016 in
2007.

38
Table 9: Pooled OLS and fixed effects regression results
Dependent variable Model 1: OLS Model 2: Fixed effects
Quarterly % change in assessable assets Male Female
Constant 4.841 2.755 0.342
(0.00) (0.77) (0.11)
Aget -0.001 0.086* 0.139***
(-0.04) (1.89) (3.82)
Age Pension(t-1) -0.084*** -0.090 -0.138**
(-2.63) (-1.61) (-2.16)
Labour Income(t-1) 0.417*** 0.490** 0.681***
(4.16) (2.16) (2.87)
Non labour Income(t-1) 0.046* -0.158 -0.144
(1.66) (-1.65) (-0.70)
Single(t-1) -0.731*** -10.418* -11.822*
(-2.89) (-1.68) (-1.81)
Div’d or Sep’d (t-1) -0.508** -0.600 1.681
(-2.16) (-0.29) (0.73)
Widowed(t-1) -0.664*** 0.069 2.244***
(-4.47) (0.06) (3.42)
Institutionalised(t-1) 2.282*** 8.168*** 3.836**
(2.63) (3.07) (2.57)
Non-homeowner(t-1) -0.958*** 1.837 0.253
(-3.94) (1.45) (0.22)
Single(t-1)* Non-homeowner(t-1) -0.257 -1.470 -0.393
(-0.59) (-0.34) (-0.16)
Div’d or Sep’d (t-1)* Non-homeowner(t-1) -0.370 2.111 -0.511
(-0.96) (0.72) (-0.19)
Widowed(t-1) * Non-homeowner(t-1) 0.012 1.170 -0.554
(0.04) (0.39) (-0.40)
Institutionalised(t-1) * Non-homeowner(t-1) -3.325*** -8.537** -4.486**
(-3.27) (-2.25) (-2.28)
Asset Taper(t-1) -2.321*** -8.102*** -8.276***
(-8.90) (-8.10) (-10.71)
Income Taper(t-1) 0.130 -2.150*** -3.548***
(0.83) (-3.81) (-6.47)
Other control variables
Household structure shock YES YES YES
Home ownership shock YES YES YES
Asset class ownership(t-1) YES YES YES
State of residence(t-1) YES YES YES
Gender, cohort and country of birth YES By fixed effects By fixed effects
Aboriginal YES By fixed effects By fixed effects
Asset quintile in 1999 YES By fixed effects By fixed effects
N 326048 116096 209952
R-square 0.051 0.052 0.054
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; t-stats calculated from cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

39
Figure 1: Changes in home ownership by age and household structure

40
Figure 2: Changes in assessable asset balances by age and household structure

41
Figure 3. Mean balances of assets for selected cohorts by age and household type

42
Figure 4: Assessable assets by wealth quintile: balanced panel.

43
Figure 5 Asset ratio of couples by duration in a random sample
Bottom Quintile
Middle Quintile
Top Quintile

Wu et al. (2015)

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