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1. Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem. (2013). Ro, Wiebke .
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2. NATURE OF THE FARM: REVISITED. (2013). Elliott, Matthew ; James, Harvey.
   In: 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C..
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3. Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness. (2010). Kunimoto, Takashi.
   In: Review of Economic Design.
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4. Contracting in the Shadow of the Law. (2008). Macleod, W. Bentley ; Chakravarty, Surajeet.
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5. Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: theoretical models and empirical evidence *. (2008). Phillips, Shauna ; Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z..
   In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
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6. Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidence. (2008). Phillips, Shauna ; Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z..
   In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
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7. Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency: A non-contingent approach. (2007). Willington, Manuel ; Costilla, Roy.
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8. Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information. (2007). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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9. Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information. (2007). Lee, Jihong.
   In: Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance.
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10. Incomplete contracts and investment : a study of land tenancy in Pakistan. (2006). Mansuri, Ghazala ; Jacoby, Hanan.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
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11. The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing. (2006). Ellman, Matthew.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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12. Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. (2006). Vasconcelos, Luis.
    In: Nova SBE Working Paper Series.
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13. Optimal Liability for Terrorism. (2006). Lakdawalla, Darius ; Talley, Eric.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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14. Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem. (2006). Morita, Hodaka ; Itoh, Hideshi.
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15. Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments. (2006). Evans, Robert.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
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16. Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages. (2006). Evans, Robert.
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17. Uncertainty and Specific Investment with Weak Contract Enforcement. (2006). Swinnen, Johan ; Vercammen, James.
    In: 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA.
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18. A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post Marital Residence Rules. (2005). Jacobsen, Joyce ; Baker, Matthew.
    In: Wesleyan Economics Working Papers.
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19. The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism €“ Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
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20. Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention. (2005). Shavell, Steven.
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21. Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?. (2005). Schmitz, Patrick.
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22. Contracting on Time. (2005). Kvasov, Dmitriy ; Guriev, Sergei.
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23. Contracting on Time. (2005). Kvasov, Dmitriy ; Guriev, Sergei.
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24. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2005). Antras, Pol.
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25. Human Capital and Hold-ups in Indigenous Society: The Role of Customs and the Market. (2004). Baker, Matthew.
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26. Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In. (2004). Moore, John ; Hart, Oliver.
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27. Downstream Concentration and Producers Capacity Choice. (2004). Montez, Joao.
    In: Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie.
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28. Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem. (2004). Rasmusen, Eric ; Lyon, Thomas.
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29. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2004). Antras, Pol.
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30. Strategic Ex-ante Contracts: Rent-Extraction and Opportunity Costs. (2004). HUA, Xiny.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
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31. Holdup with Subsidized Investment. (2004). Hanazono, Makoto.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings.
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32. Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?. (2004). Schmitz, Patrick ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie.
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33. On Watsonís Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation. (2004). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
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34. On Watsons Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation. (2004). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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35. Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures.*. (2003). Wu, Changqi ; Tao, Zhigang ; Bai, Chong-En.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
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36. A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post-Marital Residence Rules. (2003). Jacobsen, Joyce ; Baker, Matthew.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
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37. The Boundary of the Firm in a Model of Trade Within a Hierarchy. (2003). Levy, Nadav.
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38. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2003). Antras, Pol.
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39. Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure. (2003). Antras, Pol.
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40. Optimal Design of Research Contests. (2003). Gale, Ian ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
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41. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. (2002). Matthews, Steven ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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42. Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail. (2002). Watson, Joel.
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43. Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst ; Klein, Alexander.
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44. Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst.
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45. Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness. (2001). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst ; Klein, Alexander.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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46. A dynamic theory of holdup. (2001). Sákovics, József ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Working papers.
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47. On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. (2001). Maskin, Eric.
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48. Expropriation and Incentives for Team Production. (2000). Wu, Changqi ; Tao, Zhigang ; Bai, Chong-En.
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49. Competition and Technological Complexity in Procurement: An Empirical Study of Dual Sourcing. (2000). Lyon, Thomas.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
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50. Bargaining, Revenue Sharing and Control Rights Allocation. (2000). Zhu, Tian ; Wang, Susheng.
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51. Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications. (2000). Schmidt, Klaus ; Fehr, Ernst.
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52. The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents. (). Ewerhart, Christian.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:203.

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53. The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting. (). Watson, Joel ; schwartz, alan.
    In: Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:bep:yaloln:yale_lepp-1004.

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