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Uninformed voters with (im)precise expectations: Explaining political budget cycle puzzles. (2024). Crombach, Lamar ; Bohn, Frank.
In: Economics and Politics.
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:36:y:2024:i:1:p:275-311.

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