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Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning. (2020). Gürtler, Oliver ; DeVaro, Jed ; Gurtler, Oliver.
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:29:y:2020:i:2:p:335-376.

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  1. The Importance of Luck in Executive Promotion Tournaments: Theory and Evidence. (2024). DeVaro, Jed ; Fung, Scott.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17327.

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  2. Exploring the Continuous Motivation of Algorithm Engineers under Multiple Objectives: A Mixed-Methods Study. (2022). Wu, Xiaolong ; Zhang, Shujun.
    In: Sustainability.
    RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:22:p:15371-:d:977259.

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