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2. Information design, externalities, and government interventions. (2023). Xiao, Yancheng ; Li, Cheng.
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1. Sharing Information and Threshold Ambiguity in Public Bads Prevention. (2025). Kotani, Koji ; Tanaka, Kenta.
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2. Sharing information and threshold ambiguity in public bads prevention. (2024). Kotani, Koji ; Islam, Md Tawhidul ; Tanaka, Kenta.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2024-3.

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3. Algorithm Design: A Fairness-Accuracy Frontier. (2024). Lu, Jay ; Mu, Xiaosheng ; Liang, Annie.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2112.09975.

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4. Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance. (2024). Iyer, Krishnamurthy ; Zu, You ; Xu, Haifeng.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2102.10156.

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5. Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation. (2023). Linhares, Luis Henrique ; Monte, Daniel.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:115926.

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6. Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?. (2023). Silva, Francisco.
   In: Economic Inquiry.
   RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:61:y:2023:i:3:p:720-737.

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7. Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders. (2023). Wu, Jibang ; Xu, Haifeng ; Badanidiyuru, Ashwinkumar.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2109.04888.

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8. Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information. (2022). Ui, Takashi.
   In: Working Papers on Central Bank Communication.
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9. A type-adjustable mechanism where the designer may obtain more payoffs by optimally controlling distributions of agents types. (2022). Wu, Haoyang.
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   RePEc:pra:mprapa:113150.

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10. Search without looking. (2022). Smirnov, Vladimir ; Ponomareva, Natalia ; Matros, Alexander ; Wait, Andrew.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:139:y:2022:i:c:s0165188922001464.

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11. A Scalable Bayesian Persuasion Framework for Epidemic Containment on Heterogeneous Networks. (2022). Pathak, Shraddha ; Kulkarni, Ankur A.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2207.11578.

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12. Information Design for Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication. (2022). Brown, Philip N ; Gould, Brendan T.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2207.06411.

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13. Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition. (2022). Ui, Takashi.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2204.09250.

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14. Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information. (2022). Ui, Takashi.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2203.16809.

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15. Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning. (2022). Zhang, Zixuan ; Yang, Zhuoran ; Feng, Zhe ; Wang, Zhaoran ; Jordan, Michael I ; Wu, Jibang ; Xu, Haifeng.
    In: Papers.
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16. Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders. (2022). Subramanian, Vijay G.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2202.06479.

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17. Is More Precise Word of Mouth Better for a High Quality Firm? ... Not Always. (2022). Foroughifar, Mohsen ; Soberman, David.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2105.01040.

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18. Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver. (2022). Strack, Philipp ; Candogan, Ozan.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2101.10431.

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19. A Model of Scientific Communication. (2021). Shapiro, Jesse ; Andrews, Isaiah.
    In: Econometrica.
    RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:5:p:2117-2142.

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20. Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. (2021). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Kim, Kyungmin ; Kamenica, Emir.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01383-4.

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21. Contagion Management through Information Disclosure. (2021). Oyarzun, Carlos ; Hedlund, Jonas ; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan.
    In: Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:qld:uq2004:651.

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22. Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition. (2021). Zhou, Jidong ; Armstrong, Mark.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:108395.

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23. Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions. (2021). Whitmeyer, Mark.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:94:y:2021:i:c:s0304406820301270.

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24. Co-worker altruism and unemployment. (2021). Weretka, Marek ; Vasquez, Jorge.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:224-239.

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25. Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach. (2021). Bergemann, Dirk ; Zuo, Song ; Leme, Renato Paes ; Duetting, Paul.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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26. Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion. (2021). Hennigs, Raphaela.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:23:y:2021:i:4:p:710-731.

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27. Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials. (2021). Subramanian, Vijay G ; Schoenebeck, Grant.
    In: Papers.
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28. Information Design for a Non-atomic Service Scheduling Game. (2021). Heydaribeni, Nasimeh ; Savla, Ketan.
    In: Papers.
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29. Coopetition Against an Amazon. (2021). Gradwohl, Ronen ; Tennenholtz, Moshe.
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30. Optimal Advertising for Information Products. (2021). Chen, Yiling ; Zheng, Shuran.
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31. Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games. (2020). Takahashi, Satoru ; Oyama, Daisuke.
    In: Econometrica.
    RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:88:y:2020:i:2:p:693-726.

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32. Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements. (2020). Burkovskaya, Anastasia ; Li, Jian.
    In: Working Papers.
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33. Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”. (2020). Morris, Stephen ; Kajii, Atsushi.
    In: The Japanese Economic Review.
    RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:71:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s42973-019-00007-w.

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34. Organized Information Transmission. (2020). Taneva, Ina ; Mathevet, Laurent.
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35. Marketing with Shallow and Prudent Influencers. (2020). Zheng, Xudong ; Berman, Ron.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:net:wpaper:2006.

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36. A Model of Scientific Communication. (2020). Shapiro, Jesse ; Andrews, Isaiah.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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37. Concentration and variability of forecasts in artificial investment games: an online experiment on WeChat. (2020). Zhao, Xiaojian ; Chen, Xiu ; Hong, Fuhai.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-019-09632-z.

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38. Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?. (2020). Silva, Francisco.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo.
    RePEc:ioe:doctra:538.

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39. Warning Against Recurring Risks: An Information Design Approach. (2020). Wang, Shouqiang ; Alizamir, Saed ; de Vericourt, Francis.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:10:p:4612-4629.

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40. Information disclosure on the contest mechanism. (2020). Feng, Xin.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:91:y:2020:i:c:p:148-156.

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41. Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets. (2020). Galperti, Simone ; Trevino, Isabel.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118304150.

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42. Buyer-optimal extensionproof information. (2020). Wasser, Cédric ; Terstiege, Stefan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118303570.

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43. Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation?. (2020). Loertscher, Simon ; Marx, Leslie M.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:71:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300461.

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44. Should the Talk be Cheap in Contribution Games?. (2020). Jen-Wen, Chang.
    In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:20:y:2020:i:2:p:16:n:12.

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45. Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals. (2020). Choi, Jay Pil ; Mukherjee, Arijit.
    In: RAND Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:4:p:989-1013.

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46. Equilibrium opacity in ultimatum‐offer bargaining. (2020). Thum, Marcel ; Konrad, Kai.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:5:p:1515-1529.

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47. Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks. (2019). Starkov, Egor ; Smirnov, Aleksei.
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48. Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries. (2019). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1121.

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49. The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems. (2019). Kenkel, Brenton.
    In: Journal of Theoretical Politics.
    RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:31:y:2019:i:3:p:370-402.

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50. Consumer information and the limits to competition. (2019). Zhou, Jidong ; Armstrong, Mark.
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51. Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries. (2019). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: KIER Working Papers.
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52. Welfare optimal information structures in bilateral trade. (2019). Schottmüller, Christoph ; Schottmuller, Christoph.
    In: Working Paper Series in Economics.
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53. Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues. (2019). Iyer, Krishnamurthy ; Lingenbrink, David.
    In: Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:oropre:v:67:y:2019:i:5:p:1397-1416.

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54. Pivotal persuasion. (2019). Wang, Yun ; Li, Fei ; Gupta, Seher ; Chan, Jimmy.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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55. On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations. (2019). Pram, Kym.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:1-10.

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56. The price of discovering your needs online. (2019). Righi, Simone ; Carroni, Elias ; Ferrari, Luca.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:164:y:2019:i:c:p:317-330.

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57. Information Design with Agency. (2019). Vigier, Adrien ; Perez, Eduardo ; Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13868.

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58. Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries. (2019). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CARF F-Series.
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59. Communication in a threshold public goods game with ambiguity: Anomalies and regularities. (2018). Marini, Matteo M. ; García-Gallego, Aurora ; Corazzini, Luca ; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora.
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60. How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games. (2017). , Thomaspalfrey ; Roy, Nilanjan ; Rosenthal, Howard.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:234-259.

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61. Environmental agreements under asymmetric information. (2015). Slechten, Aurélie.
    In: Working Papers.
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62. On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information. (2011). Roy, Santanu ; Bag, Parimal.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:1:p:119-145.

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63. On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information. (2008). Roy, Santanu ; Bag, Parimal.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
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