1. The Division of Surplus and the Burden of Proof. (2025). Preusser, Justus ; Kattwinkel, Deniz.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2501.14686.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Rules for the rulemakers: asymmetric information and the political economy of benefit-cost analysis. (2024). Kreps, Avner ; Besanko, David ; Yang, Clair.
   In: Journal of Regulatory Economics.
   RePEc:kap:regeco:v:66:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-024-09483-4.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Signaling covertly acquired information. (2023). Kos, Nenad ; Ekmekci, Mehmet.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:214:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001424.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough. (2021). Guadalupi, Carla ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:197:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001654.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough. (2020). Guadalupi, Carla ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
   In: Documentos de Trabajo.
   RePEc:ioe:doctra:547.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Alós‐Ferrer, C. and Prat, J. “Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 147 (2012), pp. 1787–1817.

2. Armstrong, M. and Taylor, S. Armstrong's Handbook of Human Resource Management Practice. London: Kogan Page, 2017.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
3. Avenhaus, R., von Stengel, B., and Zamir, S. “Inspection Games.” Chapter 51 in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North–Holland, 2002.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

4. Bagwell, K. and Riordan, M. “High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality.” American Economic Review, Vol. 81 (1991), pp. 224–239.

5. Ball, I. & Kattwinkel, D. Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design. CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper, 124 (2019), http://www.wiwi.uni‐bonn.de/bgsepapers/boncrc/CRCTR224_2019_124.pdf (accessed at June 1 2021).

6. Banks, J. S. “Monopoly Pricing and Regulatory Oversight.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 1 (1992), pp. 203–233. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00203.x.

7. Bester, H. and Ritzberger, K. “Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Information Acquisition.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19 (2001), pp. 1347–1361. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(00)00057-6.

8. Card, D., Heining, J., and Kline, P. “Workplace Heterogeneity and the Rise of West German Wage Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 128 (2013), pp. 967–1015.

9. Castleman, B. and Long, B. “Looking beyond Enrollment: The Causal Effect of Need‐Based Grants on College Access, Persistence, and Graduation.” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 34 (2016), pp. 1023–1073.

10. Certo, S., Daily, C. and Dalton, D. “Signaling Firm Value with Board Structure: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings.” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 26 (2001), pp. 33–50.

11. Cho, I.‐K. and Kreps, D. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102 (1987), pp. 179–221.

12. Daley, B. and Green, B. “Market Signaling with Grades.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 151 (2014), pp. 114–145.

13. Dessler, G. Human Resource Management. Boston, Mass.: Pearson, 2017.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

14. Dynarski, S. “Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on College Attendance and Completion.” American Economic Review, Vol. 93 (2003), pp. 279–288.

15. Ekmekci, M. and Kos, N. “Signaling Covertly Acquired Information.” Working Paper 658, IGIER Bocconi University, 2020. https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/wp/2020/658.pdf.

16. Feltovich, N., Harbaugh, R., and To, T. “Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (2002), pp. 630–649.

17. Garfagnini, U. The Downsides of Managerial Oversight in Signaling Environments. SSRN Working Paper, 2184838 (2017), http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184838 (accessed at June 1 2021).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
18. Goux, D. and Maurin, E. “Persistence of Inter‐Industry Wage Differentials: A Reexamination Using Matched Worker–Firm Panel Data.” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17 (1999), pp. 492–533.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
19. Guasch, L. and Weiss, A. “Self‐Selection in the Labor Market.” American Economic Review, Vol. 71 (1981), pp. 275–284.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

20. Khalil, F. “Auditing without Commitment.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 629–640.

21. Kreps, D. and Sobel, J. “Signalling.” Chapter 25 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: North–Holland, 1994.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

22. Kurlat, P. and Scheuer, F. “Signaling to Experts.” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 88 (2021), pp. 800–850.

23. Leland, H. and Pyle, D. “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 32 (1977), pp. 371–387.

24. Lutz, N. “Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20 (1989), pp. 239–255.

25. Martin, A. Introduction to Human Resource Management. Uxbridge, UK: Koros, 2012.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

26. Mayzlin, D. and Shin, J. “Uninformative Advertising as an Invitation to Search.” Marketing Science Vol. 30 (2011), pp. 666–685.

27. Noe, R., Hollenbeck, J., Gerhart, B., and Wright, P. Human Resource Management: Gaining a Competitive Advantage. New York: McGraw‐Hill, 2018.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
28. Pollrich, M. “Mediated Audits.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 48 (2017), pp. 44–68. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12167.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

29. Riley, J. “Silver Signals: Twenty‐Five Years of Screening and Signaling.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39 (2001), pp. 432–478.

30. Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90 (1976), pp. 629–649.

31. Sobel, J. “Signaling Games.” Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Vol. 19 (2009), pp. 8125–8139. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_481.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

32. Spence, M. “Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability.” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 44 (1977), pp. 561–572.

33. Spence, M. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87 (1973), pp. 355–374.

34. Thaler, R. H. “Anomalies: Interindustry Wage Differentials.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3 (1989), pp. 181–193.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

35. Titman, S. and Trueman, B. “Information Quality and the Valuation of New Issues.” Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 8 (1986), pp. 159–172.

36. Wolinsky, A. “Prices as Signals of Product Quality.” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 50 (1983), pp. 647–658.

1. Signaling green capability with wholesale price or certification. (2024). Cao, YU ; Shao, Tong ; Wan, Guangyu ; Yi, Chaoqun.
   In: International Journal of Production Economics.
   RePEc:eee:proeco:v:268:y:2024:i:c:s092552732300333x.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces. (2023). Tan, XU ; Barraquer, Tomas Rodriguez.
   In: Review of Economic Design.
   RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00279-y.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Algorithmic Transparency with Strategic Users. (2023). Huang, Yan ; Jasin, Stefanus ; Wang, Qiaochu ; Singh, Paramvir.
   In: Management Science.
   RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:4:p:2297-2317.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Signaling covertly acquired information. (2023). Kos, Nenad ; Ekmekci, Mehmet.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:214:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001424.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Student leadership experience and job accessibility: An experiment from China. (2023). Li, Xue ; Deng, Weiguang ; Cai, Guowei.
   In: China Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:chieco:v:78:y:2023:i:c:s1043951x23000238.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Signaling versus Auditing. (2021). Lang, Matthias ; Bester, Helmut ; Li, Jianpei.
   In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
   RePEc:rco:dpaper:286.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough. (2021). Guadalupi, Carla ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:197:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001654.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Signaling versus Auditing. (2021). Lang, Matthias ; Bester, Helmut ; Li, Jianpei.
   In: RAND Journal of Economics.
   RePEc:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:4:p:859-883.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Investment in early education and job market signaling. (2020). D'Amato, Marcello ; Brighi, Luigi.
   In: Department of Economics (DEMB).
   RePEc:mod:dembwp:0179.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough. (2020). Guadalupi, Carla ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo.
    RePEc:ioe:doctra:547.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Choosing Between Growth and Glory. (2020). Daley, Brendan ; Belenzon, Sharon ; Chatterji, Aaron K.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:5:p:2050-2074.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad. (2020). To, Ted ; Harbaugh, Richmond.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:87:y:2020:i:c:p:43-55.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Higher education fees as signals. (2019). Bosworth, Steven.
    In: Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2019-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. A Simple Model of Competitive Testing. (2019). Ginzburg, Boris.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:99463.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. A Simple Model of Competitive Testing. (2019). Ginzburg, Boris.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:94605.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Supplier Diversification Under Buyer Risk. (2019). Trichakis, Nikolaos ; Chod, Jiri ; Tsoukalas, Gerry.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:7:p:3150-3173.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns, and Inequality. (2019). Grillo, Edoardo ; Gallice, Andrea.
    In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:scandj:v:121:y:2019:i:4:p:1620-1646.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Signaling versus costly information acquisition. (2018). Lang, Matthias ; Bester, Helmut ; Li, Jianpei.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201811.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Signaling versus Auditing. (2018). Lang, Matthias ; Bester, Helmut ; Li, Jianpei.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7183.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Test design under voluntary participation. (2017). Rosar, Frank.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:632-655.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. A Signaling Model of University Selection. (2016). Bozin, Vladimir ; Anic, Ivan ; Uroevic, Branko.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5741.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Acquired Skills and Learned Abilities: Wage Dynamics of Blue-collar Workers in Internal Labor Markets. (2015). Nakabayashi, Masaki.
    In: ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F).
    RePEc:itk:issdps:f153.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. A spillover‐based theory of credentialism. (2014). Bidner, Chris.
    In: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique.
    RePEc:wly:canjec:v:47:y:2014:i:4:p:1387-1425.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Locational signaling and agglomeration. (2014). Berliant, Marcus ; Chia-Ming, Yu.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:55410.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Market signaling with grades. (2014). Daley, Brendan ; Green, Brett.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:114-145.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns. (2014). Ordonez, Guillermo ; Hellwig, Christian ; Atkeson, Andrew ; Ordoez, Guillermo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10080.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Locational signaling and agglomeration. (2012). Yu, Chia-Ming ; Berliant, Marcus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:41838.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns. (2012). Ordonez, Guillermo ; Hellwig, Christian ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17898.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-10-04 07:08:23 || Missing content? Let us know