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Bargaining and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study. (2020). Lim, Wooyoung ; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian ; Kim, Jeongbin.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8683.

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