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1. Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Global Games Approach. (2022). Szkup, Michal.
   In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
   RePEc:red:issued:19-127.

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2. Preventing Self-fulfilling debt crises. (2017). Szkup, Michal.
   In: MPRA Paper.
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3. Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. (2017). Troyan, Peter.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:319-345.

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4. Preventing Self-Fulfilling Crises. (2015). Szkup, Michal.
   In: 2015 Meeting Papers.
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5. Supplement to Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model. (2012). Ghossoub, Mario.
   In: MPRA Paper.
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6. The Newsboy Model: Changes in Risk and Price. (2005). Ibarra - Salazar, Jorge ; Ibarra-Salazar, Jorge.
   In: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
   RePEc:kap:geneva:v:30:y:2005:i:1:p:99-109.

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7. Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information. (2002). McAdams, David.
   In: Working papers.
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8. Monotone Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty. (2002). Athey, Susan.
   In: Scholarly Articles.
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9. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. (2002). Matthews, Steven ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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10. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time. (2002). Matthews, Steven.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000095.

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11. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. (2002). Matthews, Steven ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
    In: Penn CARESS Working Papers.
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12. The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems. (2001). Levin, Jonathan ; Athey, Susan.
    In: Working Papers.
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13. LOCATION, LAND QUALITY, AND RENTAL VOLATILITY. (2001). Saak, Alexander ; Hennessy, David.
    In: 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL.
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14. Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle. (2000). Echenique, Federico.
    In: GE, Growth, Math methods.
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15. LeChatelier Effects for the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty. (2000). Snow, Arthur.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:66:y:2000:i:3:p:715-728.

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16. Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle.. (2000). Echenique, Federico.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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17. Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle. (2000). Echenique, Federico.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
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18. Private Information and Trade Timing. (2000). Smith, Lones.
    In: American Economic Review.
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19. Comparative Statics by Adaptative Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle. (1999). Echenique, Federico.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo (working papers).
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20. An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories About Complimentarity in Organizational Design. (1998). Athey, Susan ; Stern, Scott.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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21. An empirical framework for testing theories about complementarity in orgaziational design. (1998). Athey, Susan ; Athey, Susan., .
    In: Working papers.
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22. The short- and long-run comparative statics of uncertainty. (1997). Hennessy, David.
    In: Economics Letters.
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