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2. The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models. (2009). Yuan, Huiping ; Miller, Stephen ; Chen, Langnan.
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3. Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific. (2009). Hossain, Akhand Akhtar.
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5. The advantage of transparency in monetary policy instruments. (2006). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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6. Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time-Dependent Pricing. (2005). Carvalho, Carlos ; Bonomo, Marco.
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7. Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility. (2005). Carvalho, Carlos ; Bonomo, Marco.
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8. Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement. (2005). bilbiie, florin ; Stasavage, David.
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9. Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices. (2005). Warin, Thierry.
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10. Emerging Economies, Turnover Rates and Inflation Variability: A Comparison of Generalized Maximum Likelihood and SUR Models. (2005). .
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11. Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Institutional Quality. (2005). Wei, Shang-Jin ; Huang, Haizhou.
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12. Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique. (2005). Geraats, Petra.
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13. Commitment of Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences. (2004). D'Amato, Marcello.
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14. The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy. (2004). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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15. The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy. (2004). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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17. Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts. (2004). Geraats, Petra.
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18. Expectations, and Credibility in a Model of Monetary Policy. (2003). Stiver, John.
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19. The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy. (2003). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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20. Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Corruption. (2003). Wei, Shang-Jin ; Huang, Haizhou.
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21. Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?. (2002). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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22. Precommitment, Transparency and Monetary Policy. (2001). Geraats, Petra.
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23. Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence. (2001). Bibow, Jörg.
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24. The Advantage of Transparent Instruments of Monetary Policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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25. Monetary Policy Regimes and Beliefs. (2001). Gomme, Paul ; Andolfatto, David.
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26. Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function. (2000). Karunaratne, Neil D..
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27. Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts. (2000). Geraats, Petra.
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28. Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve. (2000). Haldane, Andrew ; Read, Vicky .
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29. Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers and Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Regimes. (1999). Ratti, Ronald.
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30. Expectations, Credibility, and Time-Consistent Monetary Policy. (1999). Ireland, Peter.
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31. Does talk matter after all? Inflation targeting and central bank behavior. (1999). Posen, Adam ; Kuttner, Kenneth.
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32. Optimal discretion. (1999). Orphanides, Athanasios ; Lengwiler, Yvan.
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33. Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations. (1999). Sibert, Anne.
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34. Expectations, Credibility, and Time-Consistent Monetary Policy. (1999). Ireland, Peter.
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35. Capital flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility. (1998). van Wincoop, Eric ; Bacchetta, Philippe.
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36. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility. (1998). van Wincoop, Eric ; Bacchetta, Philippe.
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37. Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals. (1998). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
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38. Federal Reserve credibility and inflation scares. (1998). Lansing, Kevin ; Huh, Chan G..
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39. Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy. (1998). Ireland, Peter.
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40. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting and Volatility. (1998). van Wincoop, Eric ; Bacchetta, Philippe.
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46. Sustainable plans and mutual default. (1989). Kehoe, Patrick ; Chari, Varadarajan.
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47. Trade Policy under Endogenous Credibility. (1987). Kletzer, Kenneth ; Engel, Charles.
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48. Monopolistic Competition, Credibility and the Output Costs of Disinflation Programs: An Analysis of Price Controls. (1987). van Wijnbergen, Sweder.
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50. Zero Inflation Targets: Central Bank Commitment and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. (). Scarth, William M. ; Stemp, Peter J..
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