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1. Computational ability in games: Individual difference and dynamics. (2017). Zhu, Enqiang ; Liu, Chanjuan.
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2. Quantum version of Aumann’s approach to common knowledge: Sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree. (2015). Khrennikov, Andrei.
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3. Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups. (2012). Kocher, Martin ; Kausel, Edgar ; Kugler, Tamar.
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4. A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals. (2012). Bonanno, Giacomo.
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5. Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction. (2011). Roy, Olivier ; van Benthem, Johan ; Pacuit, Eric.
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6. Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games. (2011). Bonanno, Giacomo.
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7. Experimental economics: Where next?. (2010). Binmore, Ken ; Shaked, Avner.
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8. On the foundation of stability. (2009). Luo, Xiao.
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9. Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players. (2009). List, John ; Levitt, Steven ; Sadoff, Sally E..
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10. The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information. (2009). Luo, Xiao.
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11. Conditional cooperation in a sequential move game. (2008). sbriglia, patrizia ; Farina, Francesco.
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12. Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction. (2008). Perea, Andrés.
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13. Non-cooperative game theory. (2008). Bonanno, Giacomo.
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14. Cooperation as self-interested reciprocity in the Centipede. (2007). sbriglia, patrizia ; Farina, Francesco.
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15. Iterated strict dominance in general games. (2007). Chen, Yi-Chun ; Luo, Xiao.
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16. Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games. (2007). Chen, Yi-Chun ; Luo, Xiao.
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17. Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games. (2006). Perea, Andrés.
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18. The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas. (2006). Rapoport, Amnon ; Parco, James ; Murphy, Ryan.
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19. Counterfactuals in wonderland. (2005). Samet, Dov.
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20. A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability. (2004). Chen, Yi-Chun ; Luo, Xiao.
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21. Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction. (2003). Clausing, Thorsten .
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22. Noncompetition Clauses: Unreasonable or Efficient?. (2003). .
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23. Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games. (2003). Kliemt, Hartmut ; Güth, Werner ; Guth, Werner ; Berninghaus, Siegfried .
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24. A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games. (2003). Bonanno, Giacomo.
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25. Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game. (2003). Rapoport, Amnon ; Parco, James ; Stein, William E. ; Nicholas, Thomas E..
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26. Belief system foundations of backward induction. (2002). Quesada, Antonio.
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27. On the epistemic foundation for backward induction. (2002). Asheim, Geir.
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28. Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning. (2002). Siniscalchi, Marciano ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
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29. Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison. (2002). Yavas, Abdullah ; Sefton, Martin ; Katok, Elena.
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30. Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction. (2002). Hart, Sergiu.
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31. Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces” Game. (2001). Weber, Roberto.
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32. On expressing maximum information in extensive games. (2001). Quesada, Antonio.
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33. Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information. (2001). Luo, Xiao ; Ma, Chenghu.
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34. Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors: A Survey. (2000). Koessler, Frederic.
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35. Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games. (2000). Asheim, Geir.
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36. Deductive reasoning in extensive games. (2000). Dufwenberg, Martin ; Asheim, Geir.
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37. Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps. (2000). Ewerhart, Christian.
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38. Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information. (2000). Ma, Chenghu.
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39. Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction. (2000). Rothe, Jorn .
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40. Proper Consistency. (2000). Asheim, Geir.
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41. On the epistemic foundation for backward induction. (1999). Asheim, Geir.
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42. An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability. (1999). Siniscalchi, Marciano ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
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43. Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games. (1999). Siniscalchi, Marciano ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
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44. Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem. (1998). Brams, Steven ; Kilgour, D..
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45. On the Centipede Game. (1998). Aumann, Robert.
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46. A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction. (1997). Winter, Eyal ; Balkenborg, Dieter.
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47. Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees. (1997). Reny, Philip ; Kohlberg, Elon.
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48. Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium. (1996). Hillas, John ; Kohlberg, Elon.
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49. Field Centipedes. (). Volij, Oscar ; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio.
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50. Rationality and Backward Induction. (). Binmore, Ken.
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