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1. Endogenous claims and collective production: an experimental study on the timing of profit-sharing negotiations and production. (2019). Baranski, Andrzej.
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2. Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. (2016). Montero, Maria.
   In: Discussion Papers.
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3. The Political Economy of Government Debt. (2016). Passalacqua, A ; Alesina, A.
   In: Handbook of Macroeconomics.
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4. Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining. (2015). Vanberg, Christoph ; MILLER, LUIS.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:288-302.

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5. Legislative bargaining with teams. (2015). Kagel, John ; Bradfield, Anthony J.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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6. How Individual Preferences are Aggregated in Groups: An Experimental Study. (2014). Pathak, Parag ; Greiner, Ben ; Ambrus, Attila.
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7. The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification. (2014). Okada, Akira.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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8. Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining. (2014). Vanberg, Christoph ; MILLER, LUIS.
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9. Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences. (2013). Kawamori, Tomohiko.
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10. Do ENDAs End Discrimination for Behaviorally Gay Men?. (2013). Martell, Michael.
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11. A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting. (2013). Dahm, Matthias ; Glazer, Amihai.
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12. Fair Division in Unanimity Bargaining with Subjective Claims. (2013). Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Horn, Kristian ; Gantner, Anita.
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13. Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining. (2013). McLaren, John ; Karabay, Bilgehan ; Celik, Levent.
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14. The Size and Scope of Government in the US States: Does Party Ideology Matter?. (2013). Potrafke, Niklas ; Bjørnskov, Christian ; Bjornskov, Christian.
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15. Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? US Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget. (2012). testa, cecilia ; Rizzo, Leonzio ; Larcinese, Valentino.
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16. Introduction to the symposium in political economy. (2012). Squintani, Francesco.
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17. Achieving political acceptability for new transport infrastructure in congested urban regions. (2012). Westin, Jonas ; Raux, Charles ; Proost, Stef ; Basck, Pierre ; Franklin, Joel P..
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18. A Model of Equilibrium Institutions. (2012). Sheedy, Kevin ; guimaraes, bernardo.
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19. Executive veto power and credit claiming. (2011). Indridason, Indridi.
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20. Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes. (2011). casella, alessandra.
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21. Representation and regional redistribution in federations. (2010). Dragu, Tiberiu ; Rodden, Jonathan.
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22. The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games. (2010). Okada, Akira.
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23. Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games. (2010). Anesi, Vincent.
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24. Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way. (2009). Breitmoser, Yves.
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25. Electoral systems and the distortion of voters preferences. (2009). Piolatto, Amedeo.
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26. Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games. (2009). Munoz-Garcia, Felix ; Duffy, John.
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27. Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining. (2009). Schofield, Norman ; Ozdemir, Ugur.
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28. Energy polarization and popular representation: Evidence from the Russian Duma. (2009). Torgler, Benno ; Grigoriadis, Theocharis.
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29. Bargaining over public goods. (2008). Martinelli, Cesar ; Eeckhout, Jan ; Dávila, Julio.
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30. Vote-Buying and Growth. (2008). Gersbach, Hans ; Muhe, Felix .
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31. The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution. (2008). Jehiel, Philippe.
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32. Communication and bargaining in the spatial model. (2007). Meirowitz, Adam.
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33. Political institutions and economic growth. (2007). Renstrom, Thomas ; Marsiliani, Laura.
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34. A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings. (2007). Slavov, Sita ; Bernheim, B. Douglas.
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35. The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?. (2007). Merrill, Samuel ; Adams, James.
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36. Blame-game politics in a coalition government. (2007). Dellis, Arnaud.
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37. Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies. (2005). Glazer, Amihai ; Chaturvedi, Ashish .
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38. Discounting and efficiency in coalitional bargaining with random proposers. (2005). Kawamori, Tomohiko.
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39. Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation. (2004). Oak, Mandar ; Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha.
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40. Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects. (2004). Knight, Brian.
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41. An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Diermeier, Daniel.
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42. Bargaining over Randomly Generated Offers: A new Perspective on Multi-Party Bargaining. (2004). Jehiel, Philippe.
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43. Downsian competition in the absence of a Condorcet winner. (2003). Roine, Jesper.
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44. Voting on monetary policy in the Council of the European Central Bank. (2003). MONTICELLI, Carlo .
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45. Crises, institutions politiques et réformes politiques : le bon, le mauvais et laffreux. (2003). Tommasi, Mariano.
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46. Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations. (2002). Klimenko, Mikhail.
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47. Agenda control in coalition formation.. (1999). Rottier, Stephane ; Bloch, Francis.
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48. Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity. (1998). Page, Scott E..
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49. Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America. (1998). Stein, Ernesto ; Hausmann, Ricardo ; Rudolf Hommes Author-X-Name_First: Rudolf Author-X, ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, ; Ernesto H. Stein Author-X-Name_First: Ernesto H. A, ; Alberto Alesina Author-X-Name_First: Alberto Autho, .
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50. Negotiations in multi-issue committees. (1997). Winter, Eyal.
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51. Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality. (1996). Fafchamps, Marcel.
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52. Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment. (1996). Merlo, Antonio.
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53. Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework. (1989). Aizenman, Joshua ; Borensztein, Eduardo R..
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