Akhmedov, A. ; Zhuravskaya, E. Opportunistic political cycles: test in a Young democracy setting. 2004 Q. J. Econ.. 119 1301-1338
Alesina, A. ; Cohen, G. ; Roubini, N. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. 1997 MIT Press: Cambridge, MA
- Alesina, A. ; Paradisi, M. Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities. 2015 :
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Alfada, A. Does fiscal decentralization encourage corruption in local governments? Evidence from Indonesia. 2019 J. Financ. Risk Manag.. 12 118-
- Banfield, E.C. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. 1958 Free Press: New York
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bednarczuk, M.E. The “budget-maximizing bureaucrat” around the world: the budgetary preferences of public employees across countries. 2022 Public Financ. Manag.. 21 -
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Benito, B. ; Bastida, F. ; Vicente, C. Creating room for manoeuvre: a strategy to generate political budget cycles under fiscal rules. 2013 Kyklos. 66 467-496
Bertoni, M., Brunello, G., Cappellari, L., de Paola, M., 2023. The long-run earnings effects of winning a mayoral election. Mimeo.
Blaufus, K. ; Chirvi, M. ; Huber, H.P. ; Maiterth, R. ; Sureth-Sloane, C. Tax misperception and its effects on decision making–literature review and behavioral taxpayer response model. 2022 Eur. Account. Rev.. 31 111-144
Bobonis, G.J. ; Fuertes, L.R.C. ; Schwabe, R. Monitoring corruptible politicians. 2016 Am. Econ. Rev.. 106 2371-2405
Bordignon, M. ; Grembi, V. ; Piazza, S. Who do you blame in local finance? Analysis of municipal financing in Italy. 2015 :
Bordignon, M. ; Nannicini, T. ; Tabellini, G. Moderating political extremism: single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule. 2016 Am. Econ. Rev.. 106 2349-2370
Braendle, T. Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament. 2015 Public Choice. 162 1-24
Brent, D.A. ; Ward, M.B. Price perceptions in water demand. 2019 J. Environ. Econ. Manag.. 98 -
Brollo, F. ; Troiano, U. What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil. 2016 J. Dev. Econ.. 122 28-45
- Buchanan, J.M. ; Tullock, G. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. 1965 University of Michigan Press:
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Calonico, S. ; Cattaneo, M.D. ; Farrell, M.H. On the effect of bias estimation on coverage accuracy in nonparametric inference. 2018 J. Am. Stat. Assoc.. 113 767-779
Calonico, S. ; Cattaneo, M.D. ; Farrell, M.H. ; Titiunik, R. Regression Discontinuity Designs using Covariates. 2018 :
Campbell, R. ; Cowley, P. Attitudes to moonlighting politicians: evidence from the United Kingdom. 2015 J. Exp. Polit. Sci.. 2 63-72
Daniele, G. ; Giommoni, T. Corruption under Austerity. 2021 :
Diermeier, D. ; Keane, M. ; Merlo, A. A political economy model of congressional careers. 2005 Am. Econ. Rev.. 95 347-373
- Dolan, J. The budget-minimizing bureaucrat? Empirical evidence from the senior executive service. 2002 Public Adm. Rev.. 62 42-50
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Drazen, A. ; Eslava, M. Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition: theory and evidence. 2010 J. Dev. Econ.. 92 39-52
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Eggers, A.C., Hainmueller, J., 2009. The value of political power: Estimating returns to office in post-war British politics. Harvard University. Mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Fafchamps, M. ; Labonne, J. Family networks and distributive politics. 2020 J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.. 18 1697-1725
Ferguson, T. ; Voth, H.J. Betting on Hitler—the value of political connections in Nazi Germany. 2008 Q. J. Econ.. 123 101-137
Ferraz, C. ; Finan, F. Electoral accountability and corruption: evidence from the audits of local governments. 2011 Am. Econ. Rev.. 101 1274-1311
Ferraz, C. ; Finan, F. Motivating Politicians: the Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance. 2009 :
Fisman, R. ; Gatti, R. Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries. 2002 J. Public Econ.. 83 325-345
Fisman, R. ; Harmon, N.A. ; Kamenica, E. ; Munk, I. Labor supply of politicians. 2015 J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.. 13 871-905
Gagliarducci, S. ; Manacorda, M. Politics in the family: nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms. 2020 Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ.. 12 67-95
Gagliarducci, S. ; Nannicini, T. Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection. 2013 J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.. 11 369-398
Gagliarducci, S. ; Nannicini, T. ; Naticchioni, P. Moonlighting politicians. 2010 J. Public Econ.. 94 688-699
Gelman, A. ; Imbens, G. Why high-order polynomials should not be used in regression discontinuity designs. 2014 :
- Geys, B. ; Mause, K. Moonlighting politicians: a survey and research agenda. 2013 J. Legis. Stud.. 19 76-97
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Gideon, M. Do individuals perceive income tax rates correctly?. 2017 Public Finance Rev.. 45 97-117
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Giommoni, T. Does progressivity always lead to progress? The impact of local redistribution on tax manipulation. 2019 :
Grembi, V. ; Nannicini, T. ; Troiano, U. Do fiscal rules matter?. 2016 Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ.. 8 1-30
Harari, M. ; Tabellini, G. The effect of culture on the functioning of institutions: evidence from European regions. 2009 CESifo DICE Report. 7 13-19
Kleven, H.J. ; Knudsen, M. ; Kreiner, C. ; Pedersen, S. ; Saez, E. Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark. 2011 Econometrica. 79 8-
Kneebone, R. ; McKenzie, K. Electoral and partisan cycles in fiscal policy: an examination of Canadian provinces. 2001 Int. Tax Public Finance. 8 753-774
Kotakorpi, K. ; Poutvaara, P. Pay for politicians and candidate selection: an empirical analysis. 2011 J. Public Econ.. 95 877-885
Kotakorpi, K. ; Poutvaara, P. ; Terviö, M. Returns to office in national and local politics: a bootstrap method and evidence from Finland. 2017 J. Law Econ. Organ.. 33 413-442
- Mamdani, M. Customary law: theory of decentralized despotism. 1996 En : Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton University Press: New Jersey
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Marattin, L. ; Nannicini, T. ; Porcelli, F. Revenue vs Expenditure Based Fiscal Consolidation: the Pass-Through from Federal Cuts to Local Taxes. 2019 :
Mocan, N. ; Altindag, D.T. Salaries and work effort: an analysis of the European Union parliamentarians. 2013 Econ. J.. 123 1130-1167
- Moynihan, D.P. Does public service motivation lead to budget maximization? Evidence from an experiment. 2013 Int. Public Manag. J.. 16 179-196
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Niskanen, W.A. The peculiar economics of bureaucracy. 1968 Am. Econ. Rev.. 58 293-305
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Palguta, J. ; Pertold, F. Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: evidence from a wage reform. 2021 J. Comp. Econ.. 49 1020-1047
Parker, G.R. The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: who gets rents in legislatures and why?. 1992 Public Choice. 73 167-181
Parker, G.R. ; Parker, S.L. Earning through learning in legislatures. 2009 Public Choice. 141 319-333
Persson, T. ; Tabellini, G. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. 2002 MIT Press:
- Putnam, R. Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. 1993 Princeton University Press: Princeton
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Rees-Jones, A. ; Taubinsky, D. Measuring “schmeduling”. 2020 Rev. Econ. Stud.. 87 2399-2438
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Rose, S. Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?. 2006 Public Choice. 128 407-431
Rubolino, E. ; Giommoni, T. Taxation and Mobility: Evidence from Tax Decentralization in Italy. 2023 :
Saez, E. Do taxpayers bunch at kink points?. 2010 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Policy. 2 180-212
Shaffer, B. Misunderstanding nonlinear prices: evidence from a natural experiment on residential electricity demand. 2020 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Policy. 12 433-461
Stantcheva, S. Understanding tax policy: how do people reason?. 2021 Q. J. Econ.. 136 2309-2369