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1. Terrorism and Employment: Evidence from Successful and Failed Terror Attacks. (2015). Brodeur, Abel.
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2. Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy. (2015). Sakurai, Sergio ; Klein, Fabio Alvim .
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:21-36.

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3. Technology Diffusion: Measurement, Causes and Consequences. (2014). Mestieri, Martí ; Comin, Diego.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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4. Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies. (2014). , Andreasbernecker.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4564.

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5. Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence. (2013). de Haan, Jakob ; Klomp, Jeroen.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:3:p:387-410.

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6. Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence. (2009). Sabani, Laura ; Marchesi, Silvia ; Dreher, Axel.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:mib:wpaper:151.

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7. Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence. (2009). Sabani, Laura ; Marchesi, Silvia ; Dreher, Axel.
   In: KOF Working papers.
   RePEc:kof:wpskof:09-218.

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8. On good government. (2009). .
   In: The Review of Austrian Economics.
   RePEc:kap:revaec:v:22:y:2009:i:2:p:127-130.

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9. Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence. (2009). Sabani, Laura ; Marchesi, Silvia ; Dreher, Axel.
   In: Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:got:iaidps:183.

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10. Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments. (2009). Martinez, Leonardo.
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11. Political Stability and Fiscal Policy - Time Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849. (2009). Schaltegger, Christoph ; Feld, Lars.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2691.

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12. Fiscal Rules and the Opportunistic Behaviour of the Incumbent Politician: Evidence from Italian Municipalities. (2009). SANTOLINI, RAFFAELLA ; Bartolini, David.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2605.

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13. Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence. (2009). Sabani, Laura ; Marchesi, Silvia ; Dreher, Axel.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2574.

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14. Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection. (2008). Nannicini, Tommaso ; Gagliarducci, Stefano.
    In: Working Papers.
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15. Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects. (2008). Mörk, Eva ; Dahlberg, Matz ; Mork, Eva.
    In: Working Paper Series.
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16. A theory of political cycles. (2008). Martinez, Leonardo.
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17. A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College. (2008). Petropoulou, Dimitra ; Muûls, Mirabelle ; Muuls, Mirabelle.
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
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18. A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College. (2007). Petropoulou, Dimitra ; Muûls, Mirabelle ; Muuls, Mirabelle.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
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19. The political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of India: An empirical investigation. (2006). Chaudhuri, Kausik ; Dasgupta, Sugato.
    In: Journal of Development Studies.
    RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:42:y:2006:i:4:p:640-661.

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20. Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for Sale. (2006). Trefler, Daniel ; Nunn, Nathan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12164.

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21. Party Alternation, Divided Government, and Fiscal Performance within U.S. States. (2006). Escaleras, Monica ; Calcagno, Peter.
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22. The elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal contraints. (2005). Pappa, Evi ; Canova, Fabio.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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23. Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks. (2005). Pappa, Evi ; Canova, Fabio.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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24. Choix d’imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales : un test sur les départements français. (2005). Paty, Sonia ; Leprince, Matthieu ; Reulier, Emmanuelle.
    In: Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain).
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25. Choix dimposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales. Un test sur les départements français. (2005). Paty, Sonia ; Leprince, Matthieu ; Reulier, Emmanuelle.
    In: Recherches économiques de Louvain.
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26. Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints. (2004). Pappa, Evi ; Canova, Fabio.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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27. How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy. (2004). Sturm, Daniel ; List, John.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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28. The power of the purse: what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?. (2004). testa, cecilia ; Rizzo, Leonzio ; Larcinse, Valentino.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings.
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29. Constitutions and Economic Policy. (2004). Tabellini, Guido ; Persson, Torsten.
    In: Journal of Economic Perspectives.
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30. Decentralization and Political Institutions. (2004). Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina ; Enikolopov, Ruben.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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31. FISCAL INTERACTIONS AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. (2003). redoano, michela.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
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32. Tax Capacity Disparities and Fiscal Equalization: The Case of Spanish Local Governments. (2003). Esteller-Moré, Alejandro ; Vilalta, Maite ; Castells, Antoni.
    In: Public Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0310006.

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33. Chasing the Smokestack: Strategic Policymaking With Multiple Instruments. (2003). Millimet, Daniel ; List, John ; Fredriksson, Per.
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34. Do Parties Matter for Fiscal Policy Choices? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach. (2003). Pettersson-Lidbom, Per.
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35. Price Dispersions in Monetary Unions: The Role of Fiscal Shocks. (2003). Pappa, Evi ; Canova, Fabio.
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36. Are Politicians Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?. (2002). Fisman, Raymond ; Di Tella, Rafael.
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37. Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle. (2002). Lockwood, Ben ; le Borgne, Eric.
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38. In Search for Yardstick Competition: Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities. (2002). Revelli, Federico ; cerniglia, floriana ; bordignon, massimo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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39. The Political Economy of Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information. (2001). Dhami, Sanjit.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
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40. Does decentralization increase responsiveness to local needs? - evidence from Bolivia. (2001). Faguet, Jean-Paul.
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41. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. (2001). Burgess, Robin ; Besley, Timothy.
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42. Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?.. (2000). Lockwood, Ben ; le Borgne, E..
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
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43. Political cycles in a developing economy - effect of elections in Indian States. (2000). Khemani, Stuti.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
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44. Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview. (2000). Berganza, Juan Carlos.
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45. Scapegoats and Transparency in Organizations. (2000). Segendorff, Bjorn.
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46. A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats. (2000). Segendorff, Bjorn.
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47. Do Parties Matter for Fiscal Policy Choices. (2000). Pettersson, Per.
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48. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. (2000). Burgess, Robin ; Besley, Timothy.
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49. What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs?. (1998). Svensson, Jakob ; Dollar, David.
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50. Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Policeon Crime. (1995). Levitt, Steven.
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