1. Reputation and the “need for enemies”. (2021). villieu, patrick ; Menuet, Maxime.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01289-7.

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2. On the incentive effects of job rotation. (2017). Katolnik, Svetlana ; Hakenes, Hendrik.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:98:y:2017:i:c:p:424-441.

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3. What is a good reputation? Career concerns with heterogeneous audiences. (2014). Bar-Isaac, Heski ; Deb, Joyee.
   In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
   RePEc:eee:indorg:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:44-50.

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4. Specialized Careers. (2014). Hörner, Johannes ; Bar-Isaac, Heski ; Horner, Johannes.
   In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
   RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:23:y:2014:i:3:p:601-627.

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5. Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters. (2012). Deb, Joyee ; Bar-Isaac, Heski.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ste:nystbu:12-08.

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6. Career Tournaments. (2010). Casas-Arce, Pablo.
   In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
   RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:667-698.

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15. [23] MacDonald, Glenn, A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information, American Economic Review, LXXII (1982), 1038-1055.

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17. [25] , A theory of political cycles, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Manuscript, 2005.
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1. The economics of politics: patronage and political selection in Italy. (2020). Quaresima, Federico ; Fiorillo, Fabio.
   In: Economics of Governance.
   RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:21:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10101-019-00231-5.

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2. Democratization and Civic Capital. (2012). pinotti, paolo ; Guiso, Luigi.
   In: EIEF Working Papers Series.
   RePEc:eie:wpaper:1202.

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3. Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia. (2012). Gancia, Gino ; Bonfiglioli, Alessandra.
   In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
   RePEc:aub:autbar:915.12.

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4. The political cost of reforms (preliminar version of working paper number 1360: Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia). (2011). Gancia, Gino ; Bonfiglioli, Alessandra.
   In: Economics Working Papers.
   RePEc:upf:upfgen:1250.

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5. The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880. (2011). Snyder, James ; Querubin, Pablo ; James M. Snyder, Jr., .
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17634.

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6. A Political Theory of Populism. (2011). Sonin, Konstantin ; Egorov, Georgy ; Acemoglu, Daron.
   In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000001179.

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7. Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?. (2011). Enikolopov, Ruben.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0165.

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8. Democratization and Civic Capital in Italy. (2011). pinotti, paolo ; Guiso, Luigi.
   In: Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers).
   RePEc:bdi:workqs:qse_23.

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9. The Political Cost of Reforms. (2011). Gancia, Gino ; Bonfiglioli, Alessandra.
   In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
   RePEc:aub:autbar:847.10.

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10. Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?. (2011). Enikolopov, Ruben.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0165.

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11. The Good, the Bad, and the Different: Can Gender Quotas Raise the Quality of Politicians?. (2010). Tavares, Jose ; Júlio, Paulo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7917.

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12. The Labor Market of Italian Politicians. (2010). Merlo, Antonio ; Mattozzi, Andrea ; Galasso, Vincenzo ; Landi, A.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001737.

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13. Tort Reform and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from State-by-State Variation in Non-Economic Damages Caps. (2010). Cotet, Anca.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bsu:wpaper:200901.

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14. Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians. (2010). Merlo, Antonio ; Keane, Michael.
    In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:3:p:186-215.

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15. Competition of politicians for wages and office. (2009). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:51-71.

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16. Competition of politicians for wages and office. (2009). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:32:y:2009:i:4:p:533-553.

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17. Identification of Stochastic Sequential Bargaining Models. (2009). Merlo, Antonio ; Tang, Xun.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:09-037.

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18. the Labor Market of Italian Politicians, Second Version. (2009). Merlo, Antonio ; Mattozzi, Andrea ; Landi, Massimiliano ; Galasso, Vincenzo.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:09-024.

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19. Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments. (2009). Martinez, Leonardo.
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:fip:fedrwp:06-01.

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20. Fiscal policy instruments and the political economy of designing programs to reach the poorest. (2009). Ahmad, Ehtisham.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:38344.

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21. Higher Vote Thresholds for Incumbents, Effort and Selection. (2009). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7320.

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22. The Labor Market of Italian Politicians. (2008). Merlo, Antonio ; Mattozzi, Andrea ; Landi, Massimiliano ; Galasso, Vincenzo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:siu:wpaper:15-2008.

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23. A theory of political cycles. (2008). Martinez, Leonardo.
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:fip:fedrwp:05-04.

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24. The Labor Market of Italian Politicians. (2008). Merlo, Antonio ; Mattozzi, Andrea ; Landi, Massimiliano ; Galasso, Vincenzo.
    In: Labor Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:eab:laborw:22461.

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25. Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians. (2007). Merlo, Antonio ; Keane, Michael.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:07-016.

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26. Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries. (2007). Pande, Rohini.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp07-020.

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27. Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries. (2007). Pande, Rohini.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6273.

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28. Political Economy of Mechanisms. (2007). Tsyvinski, Aleh ; Golosov, Mikhail ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000886.

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29. A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections. (2006). Merlo, Antonio ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:06-021.

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30. Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns. (2006). Martinez, Leonardo ; Foerster, Andrew.
    In: Economic Quarterly.
    RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2006:i:win:p:79-91:n:v.92no.1.

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31. Political Dynasties. (2006). Dal Bó, Pedro ; Bo, Pedro Dal ; Snyder, Jason.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-15.

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32. Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues. (2005). Merlo, Antonio.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:05-033.

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33. Political Careers or Career Politicians?. (2005). Merlo, Antonio ; Mattozzi, Andrea.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:05-032.

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34. A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers. (2005). Merlo, Antonio ; Keane, Michael ; Diermeier, Daniel.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:1:p:347-373.

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35. Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence. (2004). Besley, Timothy.
    In: Journal of the European Economic Association.
    RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:2:y:2004:i:2-3:p:193-215.

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36. Endogenous Lobbying. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Felli, Leonardo.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:04-043.

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37. A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Keane, Michael ; Diermeier, Daniel.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:04-038.

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38. Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:04-014.

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39. A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Keane, Michael ; Diermeier, Daniel.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1387.

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40. Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model. (2004). Moro, Andrea ; Mitchell, Matthew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10748.

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41. Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation. (2004). Oak, Mandar ; Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.98.

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42. Bad politicians. (2004). Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:88:y:2004:i:3-4:p:759-782.

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43. Paying politicians. (2004). Polborn, Mattias K ; Messner, Matthias.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:88:y:2004:i:12:p:2423-2445.

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44. Term Limits and Electoral Accountability. (2004). Sturm, Daniel ; Smart, Michael.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4272.

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45. Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition. (2004). Dur, Robert ; Beniers, Klaas.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1228.

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46. Paying Politicians. (2003). Polborn, Mattias K ; Messner, Matthias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:246.

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