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2. Bayesian stable states. (2024). Chen, Yi-Chun ; Hu, Gaoji.
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3. Incontestable Assignments. (2024). Haeringer, Guillaume ; van der Linden, Martin ; Decerf, Benoit.
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4. Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition. (2021). Artemov, Georgy.
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5. How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field. (2021). Kübler, Dorothea ; Klaus, Bettina ; Basteck, Christian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
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6. Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties. (2020). Li, Mengling.
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7. Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse. (2020). Stroh-Maraun, N ; Hoyer, B.
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8. Modelling the expected probability of correct assignment under uncertainty. (2020). Rudnick, Ze'Ev ; Dvir, Tom ; Peres, Renana.
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9. Self-selection in school choice. (2019). Chen, LI ; Pereyra, Juan Sebastian.
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11. Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance. (2018). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
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13. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. (2017). Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ; Hoyer, Britta.
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1. A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities. (2017). Pycia, Marek ; Miralles, Antonio ; HE, YingHua ; Yan, Jianye.
   In: TSE Working Papers.
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2. Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing. (2017). HE, YingHua.
   In: TSE Working Papers.
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3. Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory. (2016). Zhong, Xiaohan ; Zheng, Jie ; Lien, Jaimie W.
   In: Experimental Economics.
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4. Enrollment manipulations in school choice. (2016). AFACAN, MUSTAFA.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:63:y:2016:i:c:p:119-125.

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5. A theory of school choice lotteries. (2015). Unver, Utku ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
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6. Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement. (2015). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
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7. School Choice Mechanisms, Peer Effects and Sorting. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Martínez-Mora, Francisco ; Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Martinez-Mora, Francisco.
   In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
   RePEc:lec:leecon:15/01.

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8. The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice. (2015). van der Klaauw, Bas ; Oosterbeek, Hessel ; Gautier, Pieter ; De Haan, Monique.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9118.

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9. Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Hafalir, Isa.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:253-270.

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10. Matching markets under (in)complete information. (2015). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:295-314.

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11. A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. (2015). Sawa, Ryoji ; Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1-27.

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12. The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. (2015). van der Klaauw, Bas ; Oosterbeek, Hessel ; Gautier, Pieter ; De Haan, Monique.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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13. Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives. (2015). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Fu, Chao.
    In: Working Papers.
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14. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2015). Calsamiglia, Caterina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:810.

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15. Catchment Areas and Access to Better Schools. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:631.

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16. Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment. (2015). Vorsatz, Marc ; Pais, Joana ; Klijn, Flip.
    In: Working Papers.
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17. Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: Three impossibility results. (2014). Nesterov, Alexander.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2014211.

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18. The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice. (2014). Hakimov, Rustamdjan ; Kesten, Onur.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2014210.

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19. The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach. (2014). Unver, Utku ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:55:y:2014:i:3:p:515-544.

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20. A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance. (2014). Harless, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:61417.

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21. Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism. (2014). Somaini, Paulo ; Agarwal, Nikhil.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20775.

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22. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8202.

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23. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Güell, Maia ; Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedmwp:712.

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24. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
    In: Studies on the Spanish Economy.
    RePEc:fda:fdaeee:eee2014-15.

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25. Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia ; Fu, Chao.
    In: Working Papers.
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26. Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China. (2014). Wu, Binzhen ; Zhong, Xiaohan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:196-215.

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27. College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective. (2014). ZHU, MIN.
    In: China Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:chieco:v:30:y:2014:i:c:p:618-631.

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28. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10011.

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29. Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium. (2014). Kamecke, Ulrich.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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30. Fairness and Efficiency in a Random Assignment: Three Impossibility Results. (2014). Nesterov, Alexander.
    In: BDPEMS Working Papers.
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31. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms. (2013). Chen, Yan ; Onur, Kesten .
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013205.

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32. Effective affirmative action in school choice. (2013). Yenmez, M. Bumin ; Hafalir, Isa ; Yildirim, Muhammed Ali.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1135.

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33. An analysis of the German university admissions system. (2013). Westkamp, Alexander.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:561-589.

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34. Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment. (2013). Vorsatz, Marc ; Pais, Joana ; Klijn, Flip.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:16:y:2013:i:1:p:1-22.

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35. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
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36. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
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37. Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result. (2013). Kumano, Taro.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:23-29.

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38. Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model. (2013). Papi, Mauro.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:385-389.

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39. Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand. (2013). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:1-14.

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40. On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems. (2012). Kesten, Onur.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:3:p:677-693.

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41. The Friends Factor: How Students Social Networks Affect Their Academic Achievement and Well-Being?. (2012). Sand, Edith ; Lavy, Victor.
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42. Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. (2012). Troyan, Peter.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:936-947.

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43. Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice. (2012). Ballester, Miguel ; Apesteguia, Jose.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:172-174.

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44. Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice. (2011). Ballester, Miguel ; Apesteguia, Jose.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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45. School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. (2011). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16783.

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46. Admissions Reform at Chicagos Selective High Schools: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation. (2011). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: EcoMod2011.
    RePEc:ekd:002625:2954.

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47. School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation. (2011). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:784.

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48. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1954-78.

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49. Welfare-Maximizing Assignment of Agents to Hierarchical Positions. (). Miralles, Antonio ; Hafalir, Isa.
    In: GSIA Working Papers.
    RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:-1137660315.

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50. Welfare of Naive and Sophisticated Players in School Choice. (). Ballester, Miguel ; Apesteguia, Jose.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:575.

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