1. Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis. (2023). Vorsatz, Marc ; Klijn, Flip ; Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge.
   In: Social Choice and Welfare.
   RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:61:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01458-2.

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2. Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach. (2022). Wiratchotisatian, Pitchaya ; Yekta, Hoda Atef ; Trapp, Andrew C.
   In: INFORMS Journal on Computing.
   RePEc:inm:orijoc:v:34:y:2022:i:6:p:3325-3343.

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3. School Choice. (2022). Andersson, Tommy ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2022_004.

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4. A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources. (2022). Bu, Nanyang.
   In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
   RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:120:y:2022:i:c:p:1-7.

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5. Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem. (2021). Feizi, Mehdi ; Ramezanian, Rasoul.
   In: Review of Economic Design.
   RePEc:spr:reecde:v:25:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00246-7.

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6. Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem. (2021). Feizi, Mehdi ; Ramezanian, Rasoul.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:92:y:2021:i:c:p:60-65.

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7. Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. (2021). Mennle, Timo ; Seuken, Sven.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s002205312030137x.

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8. Constrained School Choice: An Experimental QRE Analysis. (2021). Vorsatz, Marc ; Klijn, Flip ; Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:1270.

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9. Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices. (2020). Klaus, Bettina ; Nichifor, Alexandru.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:70:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01223-6.

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10. Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism. (2020). Yenmez, M. Bumin ; Dogan, Battal ; Doan, Battal.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
    RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00172-6.

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11. Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices. (2019). Klaus, Bettina ; Nichifor, Alexandru.
    In: Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie.
    RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.04.

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12. The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments. (2019). Hammond, Robert ; Dur, Umut ; Morrill, Thayer.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-018-9594-z.

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13. Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants. (2019). Schlegel, Jan Christoph ; Klaus, Bettina ; Karakaya, Mehmet.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0022053119300997.

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14. Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility. (2019). Kesten, Onur ; Kurino, Morimitsu.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:120-143.

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15. How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field. (2018). Kübler, Dorothea ; Klaus, Bettina ; Basteck, Christian ; Bastek, Christian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2018205.

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16. How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field. (2018). Kübler, Dorothea ; Klaus, Bettina ; Basteck, Christian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:rco:dpaper:114.

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17. How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field. (2018). Kübler, Dorothea ; Klaus, Bettina ; Basteck, Christian ; Kuebler, Dorothea.
    In: Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie.
    RePEc:lau:crdeep:18.06.

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18. Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application. (2018). Klaus, Bettina ; Dogan, Battal ; Doan, Battal.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:79:y:2018:i:c:p:140-156.

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19. Cognitive ability and games of school choice. (2018). Mantovani, Marco ; Basteck, Christian.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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20. Centralized Course Allocation. (2018). Triossi, Matteo ; Romero Medina, Antonio.
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21. Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited. (2017). Bo, Inacio ; Heller, C-Philipp.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-016-1024-6.

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22. New axioms for deferred acceptance. (2017). Chen, Yajing.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-016-1010-z.

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23. Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice. (2017). Jaramillo, Paula.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0954-3.

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24. Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices. (2017). Klaus, Bettina ; Nichifor, Alexandru.
    In: Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie.
    RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.07.

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25. When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?. (2017). Dur, Umut ; AFACAN, MUSTAFA.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:16-24.

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26. Incompatibility between stability and consistency. (2017). Dur, Umut ; AFACAN, MUSTAFA.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:135-137.

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27. School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms. (2017). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo.
    RePEc:col:000092:015501.

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28. School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms. (2017). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
    In: Documentos CEDE.
    RePEc:col:000089:015611.

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29. School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms. (2017). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:957.

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30. New axioms for immediate acceptance. (2016). Chen, Yajing.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:20:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-016-0194-0.

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31. Making just school assignments. (2015). Morrill, Thayer.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:92:y:2015:i:c:p:18-27.

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32. Size versus fairness in the assignment problem. (2015). Moulin, Herve ; Bogomolnaia, Anna.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:119-127.

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33. The strategic sincerity of Approval voting. (2014). Nuñez, Matias ; Nuez, Matias.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:157-189.

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34. Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange. (2014). Velez, Rodrigo.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:125-156.

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35. A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance. (2014). Harless, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:61417.

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36. Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice. (2014). Jaramillo, Paula.
    In: Documentos CEDE.
    RePEc:col:000089:012343.

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1. Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences. (2018). Fisher, James.
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2. A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities. (2017). Pycia, Marek ; Miralles, Antonio ; HE, YingHua ; Yan, Jianye.
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3. Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing. (2017). HE, YingHua.
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4. Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory. (2016). Zhong, Xiaohan ; Zheng, Jie ; Lien, Jaimie W.
   In: Experimental Economics.
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5. Enrollment manipulations in school choice. (2016). AFACAN, MUSTAFA.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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6. A theory of school choice lotteries. (2015). Unver, Utku ; Kesten, Onur.
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7. Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement. (2015). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
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8. School Choice Mechanisms, Peer Effects and Sorting. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Martínez-Mora, Francisco ; Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Martinez-Mora, Francisco.
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9. The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice. (2015). van der Klaauw, Bas ; Oosterbeek, Hessel ; Gautier, Pieter ; De Haan, Monique.
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10. Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Hafalir, Isa.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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11. Matching markets under (in)complete information. (2015). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
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12. A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. (2015). Sawa, Ryoji ; Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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13. The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. (2015). van der Klaauw, Bas ; Oosterbeek, Hessel ; Gautier, Pieter ; De Haan, Monique.
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14. Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives. (2015). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Fu, Chao.
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15. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2015). Calsamiglia, Caterina.
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16. Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; HE, YingHua ; Yan, Jianye.
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17. Catchment Areas and Access to Better Schools. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
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18. Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment. (2015). Vorsatz, Marc ; Pais, Joana ; Klijn, Flip.
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20. The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice. (2014). Hakimov, Rustamdjan ; Kesten, Onur.
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21. The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach. (2014). Unver, Utku ; Kojima, Fuhito.
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22. A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance. (2014). Harless, Patrick.
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23. Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism. (2014). Somaini, Paulo ; Agarwal, Nikhil.
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24. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
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25. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Güell, Maia ; Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
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26. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
    In: Studies on the Spanish Economy.
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27. Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia ; Fu, Chao.
    In: Working Papers.
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28. Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China. (2014). Wu, Binzhen ; Zhong, Xiaohan.
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29. College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective. (2014). ZHU, MIN.
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30. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
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31. Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium. (2014). Kamecke, Ulrich.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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32. Fairness and Efficiency in a Random Assignment: Three Impossibility Results. (2014). Nesterov, Alexander.
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33. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms. (2013). Chen, Yan ; Onur, Kesten .
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
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34. Effective affirmative action in school choice. (2013). Yenmez, M. Bumin ; Hafalir, Isa ; Yildirim, Muhammed Ali.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
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35. An analysis of the German university admissions system. (2013). Westkamp, Alexander.
    In: Economic Theory.
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36. Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment. (2013). Vorsatz, Marc ; Pais, Joana ; Klijn, Flip.
    In: Experimental Economics.
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37. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*. (2013). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
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38. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
    In: Working Papers.
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39. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
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40. Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result. (2013). Kumano, Taro.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:23-29.

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41. Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model. (2013). Papi, Mauro.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:385-389.

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42. Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand. (2013). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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43. The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard. (2012). Cantillon, Estelle ; Budish, Eric.
    In: ULB Institutional Repository.
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44. Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching. (2012). HE, YingHua ; Yan, Jianye.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
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45. On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems. (2012). Kesten, Onur.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:3:p:677-693.

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46. The Friends Factor: How Students Social Networks Affect Their Academic Achievement and Well-Being?. (2012). Sand, Edith ; Lavy, Victor.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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47. Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. (2012). Troyan, Peter.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:936-947.

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48. Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice. (2012). Ballester, Miguel ; Apesteguia, Jose.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:172-174.

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49. A Theory of School-Choice Lotteries. (2012). Unver, Utku ; Kesten, Onur.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
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50. Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice. (2011). Ballester, Miguel ; Apesteguia, Jose.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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51. School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. (2011). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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52. Admissions Reform at Chicagos Selective High Schools: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation. (2011). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: EcoMod2011.
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53. School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation. (2011). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
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54. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets. (2010). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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55. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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56. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1954-78.

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57. Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation. (2008). Niederle, Muriel ; Featherstone, Clayton.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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58. Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms. (2008). Che, Yeon-Koo ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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59. Welfare-Maximizing Assignment of Agents to Hierarchical Positions. (). Miralles, Antonio ; Hafalir, Isa.
    In: GSIA Working Papers.
    RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:-1137660315.

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60. Welfare of Naive and Sophisticated Players in School Choice. (). Ballester, Miguel ; Apesteguia, Jose.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:575.

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61. Pseudomarkets with Priorities in Large Random Assignment Economies. (). Miralles, Antonio.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:537.

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