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2. Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab. (2021). Kesten, Onur ; Hammond, Robert ; Dur, Umut.
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4. School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan. (2019). Okumura, Yasunori.
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1. Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis. (2017). Chen, Yan ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/689773.

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2. Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement. (2015). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
   In: QM&ET Working Papers.
   RePEc:ris:qmetal:2014_001.

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3. Catchment Areas and Access to Better Schools. (2015). Miralles, Antonio ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:631.

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4. The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach. (2014). Unver, Utku ; Kojima, Fuhito.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:55:y:2014:i:3:p:515-544.

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5. Course Allocation via Stable Matching. (2014). Bichler, Martin ; Aziz, Haris ; Diebold, Franz ; Matthes, Florian ; Schneider, Alexander.
   In: Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK.
   RePEc:spr:binfse:v:6:y:2014:i:2:p:97-110.

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6. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8202.

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7. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Güell, Maia ; Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:fip:fedmwp:712.

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8. Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China. (2014). Wu, Binzhen ; Zhong, Xiaohan.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:196-215.

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9. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10011.

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10. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms. (2013). Chen, Yan ; Onur, Kesten .
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013205.

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11. An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems. (2013). Kongo, Takumi.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:461-478.

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12. An analysis of the German university admissions system. (2013). Westkamp, Alexander.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:561-589.

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13. The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice. (2013). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag ; Kominers, Scott ; Dur, Umut ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18981.

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14. Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets. (2013). Knoblauch, Vicki ; Boudreau, James.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:74:y:2013:i:4:p:565-589.

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15. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00860931.

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16. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gat:wpaper:1327.

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17. Another success for game theory: Nobel laureates in economic sciences in 2012. (2013). Stankiewicz, Waclaw .
    In: Ekonomia i Prawo.
    RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:12:y:2013:i:1:p:163-183.

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18. On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. (2012). .
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2012202.

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19. The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard. (2012). Cantillon, Estelle ; Budish, Eric.
    In: ULB Institutional Repository.
    RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/99376.

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20. Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach. (2012). Narita, Yusuke ; Hatfield, John William ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sip:dpaper:12-036.

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21. Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference : Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities. (2012). Klaus, Bettina ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:15-2012.

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22. Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities. (2012). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Kominers, Scott ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:806.

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23. A Theory of School-Choice Lotteries. (2012). Unver, Utku ; Kesten, Onur.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:737.

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24. On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Romero-Medina, Antonio.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28831.

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25. School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds. (2011). Yenmez, M. Bumin ; Hafalir, Isa ; Ehlers, Lars ; Yildirim, Muhammed A..
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2011.

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26. Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking. (2011). Ehlers, Lars ; Westkamp, Alexander.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2011.

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27. Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach. (2011). Narita, Yusuke ; Hatfield, John William ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hka:wpaper:2011-018.

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28. ERSAMUS Student Exchange Programs: How to place students?. (2011). Mumcu, Ayşe ; Akkaya, Ekrem .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bou:wpaper:2011/02.

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29. The Price of Stability in Matching Markets. (2010). Knoblauch, Vicki ; Boudreau, James.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2010-16.

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30. Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program. (2010). Kamada, Yuichiro ; Fuhito, Kojita .
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-011.

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31. A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai. (2010). Kóczy, László ; Koczy a., Laszlo, .
    In: Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).
    RePEc:ksa:szemle:1148.

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32. Expanding “Choice” in School Choice. (2010). Yasuda, Yosuke ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000062.

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33. The Boston School-Choice Mechanism. (2010). Unver, Utku ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:729.

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34. Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study. (2010). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1860-74.

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35. What Have We Learned from Market Design?. (2009). Roth, Alvin E..
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:8185.

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36. Központi felvételi rendszerek. Taktikázás és stabilitás. (2009). Kóczy, László ; Koczy a., Laszlo, .
    In: Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).
    RePEc:ksa:szemle:1096.

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37. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1954-78.

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38. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets. (2009). Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:3:p:608-27.

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39. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures. (2008). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:3:p:357-365.

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40. Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:537-569.

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41. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579651.

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42. What`s the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. (2007). Erdil, Aytek ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:349.

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43. What Have We Learned From Market Design?. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13530.

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44. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13225.

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45. Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany. (2007). Kübler, Dorothea ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Braun, Sebastian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3261.

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46. Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany. (2007). Kübler, Dorothea ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Braun, Sebastian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-070.

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47. Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off. (2007). Kübler, Dorothea ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp759.

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48. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000283.

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49. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2006). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12702.

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50. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2006). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000629.

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