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School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms. (2021). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:95:y:2021:i:c:s0304406821000343.

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