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8. Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism. (2021). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
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47. The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona. (2014). Calsamiglia, Caterina ; Guell, Maia.
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48. Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets. (2014). Wolthoff, Ronald ; Visschers, Ludo ; Lester, Benjamin.
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