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2. The political economy of public education. (2019). Dotti, Valerio.
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3. Escaping the “Teenage” Years: The Politics of Rigor and the Evolution of Private Environmental Standards. (2018). Guisinger, Amy ; Kruuse, Mikkel ; Jespersen, Kristjan ; Ruysschaert, Denis ; Gallemore, Caleb.
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4. The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods. (2014). Dotti, Valerio.
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5. How to win a large election. (2013). Mandler, Michael.
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6. The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition. (2012). Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume.
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7. The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition. (2012). Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume.
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8. Campaign allocations under probabilistic voting. (2011). Slutsky, Steven ; Fletcher, Deborah.
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9. Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking. (2010). Slutsky, Steven ; Fletcher, Deborah.
   In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:22.

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10. Centrists Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints. (2008). Ergun, Selim.
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11. Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters. (2007). Patty, John.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:149-173.

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12. Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections. (2007). Franck, Raphael ; Epstein, Gil.
    In: Public Choice.
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13. Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters. (2005). Patty, John W..
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14. Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models. (2005). Patty, John Wiggs.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:51:y:2005:i:2:p:523-536.

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15. How to gerrymander: A formal analysis. (1998). Sherstyuk, Katerina.
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16. The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems. (1998). Winer, Stanley ; Hettich, Walter ; Warskett, George.
    In: International Tax and Public Finance.
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19. Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies. (1984). Samuelson, Larry.
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21. Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests. (1981). Dutter, Lee .
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22. Dynamic models of the voters decision calculus: Incorporating retrospective considerations into rational-choice models of individual voting behavior. (1979). Zechman, Martin .
    In: Public Choice.
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