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2. A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies. (2018). Tejada, Oriol ; Gersbach, Hans.
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4. History-bound Reelections. (2015). Gersbach, Hans.
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5. Do Consumers Preferences Really Matter? - A Note on Spatial Competition with Restricted Strategies. (2014). Büchel, Berno ; Klein, Jan.
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6. Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds. (2012). Morelli, Massimo ; Cunningham, Thomas ; Caselli, Francesco ; de Barreda, Ines Moreno.
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7. Defensive Politics. (2012). Wesep, Edward .
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8. Signalling, incumbency advantage, and optimal reelection rules. (2012). Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Cunningham, Tom ; Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco.
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9. Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds. (2012). Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco ; Cunningham, Tom ; de Barreda, Ines Moreno.
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10. Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules. (2012). Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco ; Cunningham, Tom.
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11. Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing. (2009). Muller, Markus.
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13. Centrists Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints. (2008). Ergun, Selim.
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15. Vote-share Contracts and Democracy. (2007). Gersbach, Hans.
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1. Conflicted voters: A spatial voting model with multiple party identifications. (2020). Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha ; Ferreira, Joo V.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02909682.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. The political economy of public education. (2019). Dotti, Valerio.
   In: Research in Economics.
   RePEc:eee:reecon:v:73:y:2019:i:1:p:35-52.

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3. Escaping the “Teenage” Years: The Politics of Rigor and the Evolution of Private Environmental Standards. (2018). Guisinger, Amy ; Kruuse, Mikkel ; Jespersen, Kristjan ; Ruysschaert, Denis ; Gallemore, Caleb.
   In: Ecological Economics.
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4. The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods. (2014). Dotti, Valerio.
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5. How to win a large election. (2013). Mandler, Michael.
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6. The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition. (2012). Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume.
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7. The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition. (2012). Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume.
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8. Campaign allocations under probabilistic voting. (2011). Slutsky, Steven ; Fletcher, Deborah.
   In: Public Choice.
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9. Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking. (2010). Slutsky, Steven ; Fletcher, Deborah.
   In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
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10. Centrists Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints. (2008). Ergun, Selim.
    In: ThE Papers.
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11. Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters. (2007). Patty, John.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:149-173.

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12. Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections. (2007). Franck, Raphael ; Epstein, Gil.
    In: Public Choice.
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13. Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters. (2005). Patty, John W..
    In: Public Economics.
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14. Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models. (2005). Patty, John Wiggs.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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15. How to gerrymander: A formal analysis. (1998). Sherstyuk, Katerina.
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16. The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems. (1998). Winer, Stanley ; Hettich, Walter ; Warskett, George.
    In: International Tax and Public Finance.
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17. The spatial theory of elections: an analysis of voters predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space. (1994). Tanner, Thomas Cole.
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18. A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections. (1989). Hinich, Melvin ; Enelow, James.
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19. Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies. (1984). Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Public Choice.
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20. Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking. (1982). Koford, Kenneth.
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22. Dynamic models of the voters decision calculus: Incorporating retrospective considerations into rational-choice models of individual voting behavior. (1979). Zechman, Martin .
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