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Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence. (2013). Rizzolli, Matteo ; Saraceno, Margherita.
In: Public Choice.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:395-411.

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  19. Adjudication: Type-I and Type-II Errors. (2016). Rizzolli, Matteo.
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  29. Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?. (2014). CHOPARD, Bertrand ; Roussey, Ludivine ; Marion, Edwige.
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  34. In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures. (2012). Rizzolli, Matteo ; Nicita, Antonio.
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    RePEc:bdr:borrec:594.

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  30. Better that X guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer. (2009). Saraceno, Margherita ; Rizzolli, Matteo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mib:wpaper:168.

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  31. Determinants of software piracy: economics, institutions, and technology. (2009). Nelson, Michael ; Goel, Rajeev.
    In: The Journal of Technology Transfer.
    RePEc:kap:jtecht:v:34:y:2009:i:6:p:637-658.

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  32. An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers. (2009). Bac, Mehmet.
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:27:y:2009:i:3:p:233-256.

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  33. Principles of Conflict Economics. (2009). Carter, John R ; Anderton, Charles H.
    In: Cambridge Books.
    RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521698658.

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  34. SPESA PUBBLICA E CRIMINALITÀ ORGANIZZATA IN ITALIA EVIDENZA EMPIRICA SU DATI PANEL NEL PERIODO 1997-2003. (2008). Caruso, Raul.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:6861.

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  35. Assessing Urban Crime And Its Control: An Overview. (2008). Cook, Philip J.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13781.

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  36. What Do Economists Know About Crime?. (2008). Miron, Jeffrey ; Dills, Angela ; Summers, Garrett.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13759.

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  37. Repeat criminal victimization and income inequality In Brazil. (2008). Lavor, Sylvia Cristina ; Carvalho, Jose Raimundo.
    In: Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting].
    RePEc:anp:en2008:200807180945460.

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  38. Crime and Partnerships. (2008). Svarer, Michael.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:aah:aarhec:2008-06.

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  39. The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions. (2007). Germani, Anna Rita.
    In: Quaderni DSEMS.
    RePEc:ufg:qdsems:22-2007.

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  40. Estimating Systematic Continuous-time Trends in Recidivism using a Non-Gaussian Panel Data Model. (2007). Ooms, Marius ; Lucas, Andre ; Koopman, Siem Jan ; van Montfort, Kees ; André Lucas, ; van der Geest, Victor.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070027.

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  41. Education and Crime over the Life Cycle. (2007). Gallipoli, Giovanni ; Fella, Giulio.
    In: Working Paper series.
    RePEc:rim:rimwps:15_07.

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  42. Reducing traffic fatalities in the American States by upgrading seat belt use laws to primary enforcement. (2006). Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., ; Houston, David J..
    In: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.
    RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:25:y:2006:i:3:p:645-659.

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  43. Trust and Recidivism; the Partial Success of Corporate Leniency Program in the Laboratory. (2006). Soetevent, Adriaan ; Hinloopen, Jeroen.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060067.

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  44. El mercado de bienes ilegales: el caso de la droga. (2006). Murphy, Kevin ; Grossman, Michael.
    In: Revista de Economía Institucional.
    RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:8:y:2006:i:15:p:17-42.

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  45. Analysis of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Laws. (2006). Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Kort, Peter.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:17227.

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  46. Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending. (2005). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11498.

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  47. Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement. (2004). Tuinstra, Jan ; Schinkel, M. P..
    In: CeNDEF Working Papers.
    RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:04-07.

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  48. Bank supervision and corporate finance. (2003). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3042.

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  49. Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law. (2003). Shavell, Steven.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9698.

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  50. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. (2003). Shavell, Steven.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9694.

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  51. The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulation in Italy. Evidence from Stock-Price Run-Ups Around Announcements of Corporate Control Transactions. (2003). .
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:16:y:2003:i:2:p:199-218.

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  52. Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations. (2001). Winter, Soeren ; Søren C. Winter, ; May, Peter J..
    In: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.
    RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:20:y:2001:i:4:p:675-698.

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  53. Financial penalties as an alternative criminal sanction: Evidence from panel data. (2001). Cherry, Todd.
    In: Atlantic Economic Journal.
    RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:450-458.

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  54. Violence and the U.S. Prohibition of Drugs and Alcohol. (1999). Miron, Jeffrey.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6950.

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  55. Market Wages and Youth Crime. (1997). Grogger, Jeffrey.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5983.

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  56. Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack. (1997). Levitt, Steven ; Ayres, Ian.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5928.

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  57. Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey Of Empirical Evidence, Revised Version. (). Jegen, Reto ; Frey, Bruno.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:049.

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