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A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis. (2019). Thomas, Charles.
In: Review of Industrial Organization.
RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09724-3.

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Citations received by this document

  1. When Fewer Bids Increase Competition: Buyer Surplus Enhancing Mergers in Single-Award Procurement Auctions. (2025). Pezzuto, Roberto ; Ferrarese, Walter ; Albano, Gian Luigi.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
    RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:607.

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  2. Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus. (2021). Thomas, Charles.
    In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
    RePEc:bla:jindec:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:730-741.

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  3. Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs—Introduction to the Special Issue. (2019). Martin, Stephen.
    In: Review of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09715-4.

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  4. Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus. (2017). Thomas, Charles.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-07.

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References

References cited by this document

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  60. Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions. (2011). Krasnokutskaya, Elena ; Seim, Katja.
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  61. On the probability of breakdown in participation games. (2009). Heijnen, Pim.
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  62. Transparency and product variety. (2009). Schultz, Christian.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:165-168.

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