create a website

Financing Start-ups: Advising vs. Competing. (2001). Boccard, Nicolas.
In: CSEF Working Papers.
RePEc:sef:csefwp:64.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 0

Citations received by this document

Cites: 15

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

    This document has not been cited yet.

References

References cited by this document

  1. [1] Aghion P. and P. Bolton (1992), An `Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies, LIX , pp 473-494.

  2. [10] Kaplan S. and P. Stromberg (2000), Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2421

  3. [11] Khalil F. and B. Parigi (1998), Loan Size as a Commitment Device, International Economic Review, 39, pp 135-150.

  4. [12] Petersen M. and R. Rajan (1994), The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance, 49, p 3-35

  5. [13] Petersen M. and R. Rajan (1995), The effect of credit market competition on lending relations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, p 407-37

  6. [14] Prowse 5. (1998), Angel investors and the market for angel investments, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, p 785-92

  7. [15] Salop 5. (1979), Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, p 141-56. 24

  8. [2] Aghion P., Dewatripont M. and P. Rey (1998), Agency cost, firm behavior and the nature of competition, mimeo IDEI

  9. [3] Aghion P. and J. Tirole (1997), Formal and real authority in organizations, Journal of Political Economy, 105, p 1-29. 23

  10. [4] Berger A. and G. Udell (1998), The economics of small business finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, p 613-73
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. [5] Bolton P. and D.Scharfstein (1990), A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting, American Economic Review, LXXX, pp 93-106.

  12. [6] Burkart M., D. Gromb and F. Panunzi (1997), Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, p 693-728.

  13. [7] Gale D. and M. Hellwig (1989), Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt, International Economic Studies, 30, pp 3-31.

  14. [8] Hart 0. and J. Moore (1994), A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, p 841-879.

  15. [9] HOlmstrom B. and J. Tirole (1997), Financial intermediation, loanable funds and the real sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, p 663-92.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Self-Serving Behavior in Price-Quality Competition. (2013). Halbheer, Daniel ; Bertini, Marco ; Koenigsberg, Oded.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79842.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Banks versus venture capital when the venture capitalist values private benefits of control. (2010). Inci, Eren ; Barlo, Mehmet.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:25566.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority. (2010). Englmaier, Florian ; Singh, Ravi ; Filipi, Ales .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2979.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes. (2008). Guriev, Sergei.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0118.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. You cant make an omelette without breaking eggs: the impact of venture capitalists on executive turnover. (2007). Heger, Diana ; Tykvova, Tereza.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5490.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?. (2007). Weill, Laurent ; BLAZY, Régis.
    In: Working Papers CEB.
    RePEc:sol:wpaper:07-012.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?. (2007). Weill, Laurent ; BLAZY, Régis.
    In: DULBEA Working Papers.
    RePEc:dul:wpaper:07-06rs.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. When Should Control Be Shared?. (2007). Milgrom, Paul ; Singh, Ravi.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000050.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts. (2006). Muehlheusser, Gerd.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2367.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. The Division of Ownership in New Ventures. (2006). Fabel, Oliver ; Demougin, Dominique.
    In: SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-047.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Household debt sustainability: what explains household non-performing loans? An empirical analysis. (2006). Rinaldi, Laura ; Sanchis-Arellano, Alicia .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2006570.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments. (2006). Evans, Robert.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0627.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights. (2005). Bester, Helmut.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:69.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation. (2005). Cole, Harold ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11083.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Financial Distress and Reputational Concerns. (2005). .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gat:wpaper:0509.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Banks, markets, and efficiency. (2005). Martin, Antoine ; Fecht, Falko.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:210.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Relationship Banking in post Bubble Japan: Co-existence of soft-and hard budget constraint. (2005). Hideaki, Miyajima ; Yasuhiro, Arikawa.
    In: Discussion papers.
    RePEc:eti:dpaper:05015.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights. (2005). Bester, Helmut.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5391.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Financial constraints and capacity adjustment in the United Kingdom: evidence from a large panel of survey data. (2005). von Kalckreuth, Ulf ; Murphy, Emma.
    In: Bank of England working papers.
    RePEc:boe:boeewp:260.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity. (2004). Kraft, Kornelius ; Czarnitzki, Dirk.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2362.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Macroeconomic Volatility and endogenous debt maturity choice. (2004). Kharroubi, Enisse.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc04:22.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. On the governance of start-ups. (2004). Ambec, Stefan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200406.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. The Determinants of Debt and (Private-) Equity Financing in Young Innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany. (2004). Werwatz, Axel ; Schäfer, Dorothea ; Zimmermann, Volker.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp411.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Ledger Provision in Hog Marketing Contracts. (2003). Hennessy, David ; Lien, Donald.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:10645.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley. (2003). Takizawa, Hirokazu.
    In: Discussion papers.
    RePEc:eti:dpaper:03009.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Les leviers de contrôle des actionnaires majoritaires. (2002). Szafarz, Ariane ; Chapelle, Ariane ; Biebuyck, Thibault.
    In: Working Papers CEB.
    RePEc:sol:wpaper:03-001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. (2002). Matthews, Steven ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3487.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Information and Control in Alliances and Ventures. (2002). Dessein, Wouter.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3418.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure. (2002). Inderst, Roman ; Muller, Holger M.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3203.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison. (2002). Zingales, Luigi ; Dyck, Isaac.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3177.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Legal rules, governance structures and financial systems.. (2001). Jovanovic, Aleksandra.
    In: ICER Working Papers.
    RePEc:icr:wpicer:19-2001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?. (2001). Renneboog, Luc ; Mayer, Colin ; Franks, Julian R.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2949.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?. (2001). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2881.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Capital Structure and Risk Management. (2001). Gobert, Karine.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-51.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?. (2001). Cestone, Giacinta.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:480.01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. .

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Haftungsregeln und Innovation. (2000). Kraft, Kornelius ; Czarnitzki, Dirk.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5321.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability. (2000). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:00-1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. In Search of New Foundations. (2000). Zingales, Luigi.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2551.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company. (2000). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_292.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors. (1999). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:99-8.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Corporate Governance. (1999). Tirole, Jean.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2086.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses. (1999). Choi, Jay Pil.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_188.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. An Information Theoretic Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance. (1998). Aoki, Masahiko.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:stanec:99004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Universal banking, allocation of control rights, and corporate finance in Germany. (1998). Emmons, William ; Schmid, Frank A..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1998-001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Influence activity and the organization of research and development. (1997). Cassiman, Bruno.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:264.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Bank regulation and the network paradigm : policy implications for developing and transition economies. (1996). Honohan, Patrick ; Vittas, Dimitri.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1631.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Solutions au stress financier : Un survol de la littérature. (1996). Martel, Jocelyn.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:96s-03.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Efficiency of Bankrupt Firms and Industry Conditions: Theory and Evidence. (1996). Phillips, Gordon ; Maksimovic, Vojislav.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cen:wpaper:96-12.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. (1992). Moore, John ; Hart, Oliver ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4097.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-09-26 19:12:50 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Last updated August, 3 2024. Contact: Jose Manuel Barrueco.