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2. Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model. (2023). Tonin, Simone ; Codognato, Giulio ; Pavan, Giorgia ; Busetto, Francesca.
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3. Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity. (2022). Bianchi, Milo ; Dana, Rose-Anne ; Jouini, Elyes.
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4. Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager. (2022). Bianchi, Milo ; Dana, Rose-Anne ; Jouini, Elyes.
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5. Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager. (2022). Bianchi, Milo ; Jouini, Elyes ; Dana, Rose-Anne.
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6. Equilibrium CEO Contract with Belief Heterogeneity. (2021). Bianchi, Milo ; Dana, Rose-Anne ; Jouini, Elyes.
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7. Shareholder Heterogeneity, Asymmetric Information, and the Equilibrium Manager. (2021). Bianchi, Milo ; Dana, Rose-Anne ; Jouini, Elyes.
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8. Indeterminacy of Cournot–Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets. (2021). Zierhut, Michael.
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9. Existence and multiplicity of temporary equilibria under nominal price rigidities. (2016). Dreze, Jacques.
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10. Expectational bottlenecks and the emerging of new organizational forms. (2014). Bogliacino, Francesco ; Rampa, Giorgio.
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11. A bargaining theory of the firm. (2013). Predtetchinski, Arkadi ; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Britz, Volker.
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12. Expectational Bottlenecks and the Emerging of New Organizational Forms. (2012). Bogliacino, Francesco ; Rampa, Giorgio.
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14. Production externalities: internalization by voting. (2011). Tvede, Mich ; Cres, Herve.
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11. Household debt sustainability: what explains household non-performing loans? An empirical analysis. (2006). Rinaldi, Laura ; Sanchis-Arellano, Alicia .
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12. Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments. (2006). Evans, Robert.
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20. Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity. (2004). Kraft, Kornelius ; Czarnitzki, Dirk.
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23. The Determinants of Debt and (Private-) Equity Financing in Young Innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany. (2004). Werwatz, Axel ; Schäfer, Dorothea ; Zimmermann, Volker.
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