1. Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests. (2024). Zhao, Hangcheng ; Kuang, Zhonghong ; Zheng, Jie.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:218-243.

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2. Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations. (2024). Chen, BO.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:204-222.

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3. Simple equilibria in general contests. (2022). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Bastani, Spencer ; Gurtler, Oliver.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:134:y:2022:i:c:p:264-280.

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4. A general framework for studying contests. (2020). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Bastani, Spencer ; Gurtler, Oliver.
   In: VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224601.

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5. Advertising and Voter Data in Asymmetric Political Contests. (2020). Wagman, Liad ; Sharma, Priyanka.
   In: Information Economics and Policy.
   RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:52:y:2020:i:c:s0167624519300022.

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6. A General Framework for Studying Contests. (2020). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Bastani, Spencer ; Grtler, Oliver.
   In: ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series.
   RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:005.

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7. A general framework for studying contests. (2019). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Bastani, Spencer ; Gurtler, Oliver.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:97363.

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8. A General Framework for Studying Contests. (2019). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Bastani, Spencer ; Gurtler, Oliver.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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9. Signaling with costly acquisition of signals. (2018). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
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10. RANKING DISCLOSURE POLICIES IN ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS. (2018). Lu, Jingfeng ; Wang, Zhe ; Ma, Hongkun.
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11. TO DETER OR TO MODERATE? ALLIANCE FORMATION IN CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. (2018). Morath, Florian ; Konrad, Kai.
    In: Economic Inquiry.
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12. The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests. (2017). Moreno, Diego ; Einy, Ezra ; Shitovitz, Benyamin.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:63:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0974-3.

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13. A tug-of-war team contest. (2017). Hafner, Samuel.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:372-391.

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14. The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions. (2014). Seel, Christian.
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1. Contests on Networks. (2017). Rietzke, David ; Matros, Alexander.
   In: Working Papers.
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2. Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology. (2017). Wang, Zhewei ; Lu, Jingfeng ; Shen, BO.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:25-35.

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3. Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction. (2017). Ewerhart, Christian.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:195-211.

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4. An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information. (2017). Gallice, Andrea.
   In: European Journal of Operational Research.
   RePEc:eee:ejores:v:256:y:2017:i:2:p:673-684.

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5. Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power. (2017). Lu, Jingfeng ; Feng, Xin.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:61-64.

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6. Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players. (2017). Ewerhart, Christian.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:167-170.

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7. Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules. (2017). Troumpounis, Orestis ; Chowdhury, Subhasish ; Balart, Pau.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:126-130.

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8. Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction. (2016). Ewerhart, Christian.
   In: ECON - Working Papers.
   RePEc:zur:econwp:186.

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9. Would you trust lobbies?. (2016). Rouillon, Sébastien ; Fauvet, Pierre.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:167:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0336-5.

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10. Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests. (2016). Wasser, Cédric ; Franke, Jörg ; Leininger, Wolfgang.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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11. Contests with endogenous entry. (2015). Lu, Jingfeng ; Jiao, Qian ; Fu, Qiang.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:2:p:387-424.

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12. Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests. (2015). Ewerhart, Christian.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:60:y:2015:i:1:p:59-71.

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13. The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. (2015). Kovenock, Dan ; Klose, Bettina.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:59:y:2015:i:1:p:1-19.

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14. To deter or to moderate? Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information. (2015). Morath, Florian ; Konrad, Kai.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2015-15.

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15. The theory of contests: a unified model and review of the literature. (2015). van Long, Ngo.
    In: Chapters.
    RePEc:elg:eechap:15325_3.

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16. The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints. (2015). Hernando-Veciana, Angel ; Beker, Pablo.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:234-261.

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17. Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auctions. (2014). Ewerhart, Christian.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:155.

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18. Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests. (2014). Ewerhart, Christian.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:143.

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19. Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction. (2014). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Mealem, Yosef.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:2:p:437-464.

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20. Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes. (2014). Esteve González, Patricia ; Dahm, Matthias.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-08.

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21. Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem. (2014). Franke, Jörg ; Leininger, Wolfgang ; Kanzow, Christian ; Schwartz, Alexandra.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:116-126.

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22. Rent-seeking mechanism for safety supervision in the Chinese coal industry based on a tripartite game model. (2014). Feng, Qun ; Cao, Jing ; Chen, Hong.
    In: Energy Policy.
    RePEc:eee:enepol:v:72:y:2014:i:c:p:140-145.

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23. Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints. (2013). Hernando-Veciana, Angel ; Beker, Pablo.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:1017.

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24. Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes. (2013). Esteve González, Patricia ; Dahm, Matthias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/222197.

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25. Information acquisition in conflicts. (2013). Morath, Florian ; Munster, Johannes.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:99-129.

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26. Caps on Coasean Transfers. (2013). Ohndorf, Markus ; MacKenzie, Ian.
    In: Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:qld:uq2004:485.

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27. The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature. (2013). van Long, Ngo.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:161-181.

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28. Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests. (2013). Kirkegaard, Rene.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:3:p:261-266.

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29. The lottery Blotto game. (2013). Osório, António ; Osorio, Antonio.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:164-166.

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30. Tullock contests under committee administration. (2013). Li, Simiao.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00398.

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31. Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests. (2013). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Mealem, Yosef.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4518.

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32. Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups. (2012). Murray, Cameron.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:42070.

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33. A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction. (2012). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:41654.

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34. The lifeboat problem. (2012). Konrad, Kai ; Kovenock, Dan.
    In: Munich Reprints in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenar:13962.

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35. The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests. (2012). Schweinzer, Paul ; Segev, Ella.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:69-82.

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36. Information alliances in contests with budget limits. (2012). Konrad, Kai.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:3:p:679-693.

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37. Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests. (2012). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil ; Mealem, Yosef.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7032.

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38. A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-Pay Auction. (2012). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gue:guelph:2012-11.

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39. The lifeboat problem. (2012). Konrad, Kai ; Kovenock, Dan.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:552-559.

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40. Contest for power in organizations. (2012). Gregor, Martin.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:280-283.

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41. A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-pay Auction. (2012). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3976.

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42. Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests. (2012). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Mealem, Yosef.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3831.

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43. Equity and Effectiveness of Optimal Taxation in Contests under an All-Pay Auction. (2012). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Mealem, Yosef.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3712.

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44. The lifeboat problem. (2011). Konrad, Kai ; Kovenock, Dan.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project The Future of Fiscal Federalism.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011106.

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45. The Lifeboat Problem. (2011). Konrad, Kai ; Kovenock, Dan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mpi:wpaper:the_lifeboat_problem.

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46. Monopoly vs. competition in light of extraction norms. (2011). Tobol, Yossef (Yossi) ; Nitzan, Shmuel ; Koziashvili, Arkadi .
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:3:p:561-567.

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47. Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes. (2011). Roberson, Brian ; Kovenock, Dan.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:728-739.

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48. Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests. (2011). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil ; Mealem, Yosef.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:biu:wpaper:2011-29.

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49. Information alliances in contests with budget limits. (2010). Konrad, Kai.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project The Future of Fiscal Federalism.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii201021.

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50. Dynamic contests. (2010). Konrad, Kai.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project The Future of Fiscal Federalism.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii201010.

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