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1. Designing Social Learning. (2025). Starkov, Egor ; Smirnov, Aleksei.
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2. Belief inducibility and informativeness. (2024). Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Kerman, Toygar T ; Karos, Dominik.
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3. Organizing data analytics. (2024). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
   In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
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4. Changing Simplistic Worldviews. (2024). Senkov, Maxim ; Kerman, Toygar T.
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5. Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender. (2024). Jiang, Shaofei.
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6. Changing Simplistic Worldviews. (2024). Senkov, Maxim ; Kerman, Toygar T.
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7. Slow persuasion. (2023). Escudé, Matteo ; Escude, Matteo ; Sinander, Ludvig.
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9. Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification. (2023). Hauser, Daniel N ; Bohren, Aislinn J.
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10. The Case for Lobbying Transparency. (2023). Zerbini, Antoine.
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11. Polarizing Persuasion. (2023). Anderson, Axel ; Pkhakadze, Nikoloz.
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12. Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition. (2023). Matyskova, Ludmila ; Montes, Alfonso.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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13. Setting an exam as an information design problem. (2023). Shimoji, Makoto.
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14. Data Provision to an Informed Seller. (2023). Smolin, Alex ; ICHIHASHI, SHOTA.
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15. Persuasion and Welfare. (2023). Smolin, Alex ; Doval, Laura.
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16. Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure. (2022). Farhadi, Farzaneh ; Teneketzis, Demosthenis.
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17. Optimally Biased Expertise. (2022). Starkov, Egor ; Senkov, Maxim ; Matveenko, Andrei ; Ilinov, Pavel.
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18. Optimally Biased Expertise. (2022). Starkov, Egor ; Senkov, Maxim ; Matveenko, Andrei ; Ilinov, Pavel.
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19. An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion. (2021). Jakobsen, Alexander M.
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20. Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective. (2021). Smolin, Alex ; Doval, Laura.
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21. Resisting persuasion. (2021). Xefteris, Dimitrios ; Tsakas, Nikolas.
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22. Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver. (2021). Weng, Xi ; Hu, JU.
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23. Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms. (2021). Ivanov, Maxim.
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24. Learning from like-minded people. (2021). Meng, Delong.
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25. Form of Preference Misalignment Linked to State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion. (2021). Senkov, Maxim ; Rehak, Rastislav.
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26. Con?dence Management in Tournaments. (2020). Wu, Zenan ; Deng, Shanglyu ; Fu, Qiang ; Fang, Hanming.
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27. Confidence Management in Tournaments. (2020). Fu, Qiang ; Fang, Hanming ; Deng, Shanglyu ; Wu, Zenan.
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28. Information Design with Agency. (2020). Perez, Eduardo ; Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo ; Vigier, Adrien.
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29. Information Design with Agency. (2020). Perez, Eduardo ; Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo ; Vigier, Adrien.
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30. Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment. (2020). Negrelli, Sara.
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33. Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation. (2019). Coricelli, Giorgio ; Aristidou, Andreas ; Vostroknutov, Alexander.
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35. Ambiguous persuasion. (2019). Li, Ming ; Beauchene, Dorian.
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37. Noisy Persuasion. (2018). Tsakas, Nikolas.
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38. Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets. (2018). Lu, Jay ; Board, Simon.
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39. Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval. (2018). Ozerturk, Saltuk.
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40. On the value of persuasion by experts. (2018). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
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41. On the value of persuasion by experts. (2018). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
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42. Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition. (2018). Matyskova, Ludmila.
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43. Resisting Persuasion. (2017). Xefteris, Dimitrios ; Tsakas, Nikolas.
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45. Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender. (2017). Hedlund, Jonas.
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46. Test design under voluntary participation. (2017). Rosar, Frank.
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47. Rationalizable Persuasion. (2016). Shimoji, Makoto.
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48. When to Drop a Bombshell. (2016). Kolotilin, Anton ; Holden, Richard ; Gratton, Gabriele.
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49. Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships. (2016). Lewis, Tracy R ; Boleslavsky, Raphael.
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50. Political disagreement and information in elections. (2016). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
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