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1. Designing Social Learning. (2025). Starkov, Egor ; Smirnov, Aleksei.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2405.05744.

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2. Belief inducibility and informativeness. (2024). Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Kerman, Toygar T ; Karos, Dominik.
   In: Theory and Decision.
   RePEc:kap:theord:v:96:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-023-09963-7.

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3. Organizing data analytics. (2024). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
   In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
   RePEc:ehl:lserod:120780.

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4. Changing Simplistic Worldviews. (2024). Senkov, Maxim ; Kerman, Toygar T.
   In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
   RePEc:cer:papers:wp773.

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5. Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender. (2024). Jiang, Shaofei.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2401.14087.

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6. Changing Simplistic Worldviews. (2024). Senkov, Maxim ; Kerman, Toygar T.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2401.02867.

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7. Slow persuasion. (2023). Escudé, Matteo ; Escude, Matteo ; Sinander, Ludvig.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:5175.

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8. Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations. (2023). Teteryatnikova, Mariya ; Antsygina, Anastasia.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:75:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-022-01422-8.

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9. Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification. (2023). Hauser, Daniel N ; Bohren, Aislinn J.
   In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:pen:papers:23-007.

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10. The Case for Lobbying Transparency. (2023). Zerbini, Antoine.
    In: SocArXiv.
    RePEc:osf:socarx:w6vam.

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11. Polarizing Persuasion. (2023). Anderson, Axel ; Pkhakadze, Nikoloz.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~23-23-04.

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12. Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition. (2023). Matyskova, Ludmila ; Montes, Alfonso.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:211:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000741.

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13. Setting an exam as an information design problem. (2023). Shimoji, Makoto.
    In: International Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:19:y:2023:i:3:p:559-579.

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14. Data Provision to an Informed Seller. (2023). Smolin, Alex ; ICHIHASHI, SHOTA.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2204.08723.

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15. Persuasion and Welfare. (2023). Smolin, Alex ; Doval, Laura.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2109.03061.

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16. Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure. (2022). Farhadi, Farzaneh ; Teneketzis, Demosthenis.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:12:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-021-00392-1.

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17. Optimally Biased Expertise. (2022). Starkov, Egor ; Senkov, Maxim ; Matveenko, Andrei ; Ilinov, Pavel.
    In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
    RePEc:cer:papers:wp736.

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18. Optimally Biased Expertise. (2022). Starkov, Egor ; Senkov, Maxim ; Matveenko, Andrei ; Ilinov, Pavel.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2209.13689.

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19. An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion. (2021). Jakobsen, Alexander M.
    In: Econometrica.
    RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:5:p:2081-2116.

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20. Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective. (2021). Smolin, Alex ; Doval, Laura.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:125927.

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21. Resisting persuasion. (2021). Xefteris, Dimitrios ; Tsakas, Nikolas.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01339-0.

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22. Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver. (2021). Weng, Xi ; Hu, JU.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01299-5.

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23. Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms. (2021). Ivanov, Maxim.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01277-x.

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24. Learning from like-minded people. (2021). Meng, Delong.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:126:y:2021:i:c:p:231-250.

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25. Form of Preference Misalignment Linked to State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion. (2021). Senkov, Maxim ; Rehak, Rastislav.
    In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
    RePEc:cer:papers:wp708.

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26. Con?dence Management in Tournaments. (2020). Wu, Zenan ; Deng, Shanglyu ; Fu, Qiang ; Fang, Hanming.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:20-017.

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27. Confidence Management in Tournaments. (2020). Fu, Qiang ; Fang, Hanming ; Deng, Shanglyu ; Wu, Zenan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27186.

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28. Information Design with Agency. (2020). Perez, Eduardo ; Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo ; Vigier, Adrien.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03874017.

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29. Information Design with Agency. (2020). Perez, Eduardo ; Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo ; Vigier, Adrien.
    In: SciencePo Working papers Main.
    RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03874017.

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30. Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment. (2020). Negrelli, Sara.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:67-85.

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31. Dynamic information design. (2020). Vasal, Deepanshu.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2005.07267.

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32. Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications. (2020). Suen, Wing ; Kartik, Navin ; Lee, Frances.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2005.05714.

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33. Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation. (2019). Coricelli, Giorgio ; Aristidou, Andreas ; Vostroknutov, Alexander.
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019012.

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34. Pivotal persuasion. (2019). Wang, Yun ; Li, Fei ; Gupta, Seher ; Chan, Jimmy.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:178-202.

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35. Ambiguous persuasion. (2019). Li, Ming ; Beauchene, Dorian.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:312-365.

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36. Information Design with Agency. (2019). Vigier, Adrien ; Perez, Eduardo ; Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13868.

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37. Noisy Persuasion. (2018). Tsakas, Nikolas.
    In: University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:ucy:cypeua:11-2018.

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38. Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets. (2018). Lu, Jay ; Board, Simon.
    In: Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/699211.

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39. Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval. (2018). Ozerturk, Saltuk.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:174:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0485-1.

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40. On the value of persuasion by experts. (2018). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:86370.

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41. On the value of persuasion by experts. (2018). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:103-123.

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42. Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition. (2018). Matyskova, Ludmila.
    In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
    RePEc:cer:papers:wp614.

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43. Resisting Persuasion. (2017). Xefteris, Dimitrios ; Tsakas, Nikolas.
    In: University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:ucy:cypeua:07-2017.

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44. Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion. (2017). Dinev, Nikolay.
    In: Economics Series.
    RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:334.

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45. Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender. (2017). Hedlund, Jonas.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:167:y:2017:i:c:p:229-268.

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46. Test design under voluntary participation. (2017). Rosar, Frank.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:632-655.

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47. Rationalizable Persuasion. (2016). Shimoji, Makoto.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:yor:yorken:16/08.

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48. When to Drop a Bombshell. (2016). Kolotilin, Anton ; Holden, Richard ; Gratton, Gabriele.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-13.

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49. Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships. (2016). Lewis, Tracy R ; Boleslavsky, Raphael.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:110-134.

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50. Political disagreement and information in elections. (2016). Câmara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo ; Camara, Odilon.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:100:y:2016:i:c:p:390-412.

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