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1. The curse of spanning over millennium: Confucian culture and corruption in China. (2024). Zhang, YU ; Cheng, Bowen.
   In: Economics of Transition and Institutional Change.
   RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:32:y:2024:i:2:p:473-500.

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2. From Two Heads to One: The Short-Run Effects of the Recentralization of Political Power in Rural China. (2024). Marie, Olivier ; Ye, Zihan ; Zou, Xiaopeng ; Post, Thomas.
   In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240040.

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3. The Relevant Third: Threat of Coalition and Economic Development. (2024). Chatterjee, Somdeep ; Maitra, Pushkar ; Manchanda, Manhar.
   In: Monash Economics Working Papers.
   RePEc:mos:moswps:2024-13.

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4. Economic Decentralization and High-Quality Urban Development: Perspective from Local Effect and Spatial Spillover in 276 Prefecture-Level Cities in China. (2024). Bai, Liru ; Li, Yiming.
   In: Sustainability.
   RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:22:p:9874-:d:1519432.

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5. The impact of recentralization reform on corruption: evidence from a quasi‐natural experiment. (2024). Nguyen, Ngoc Minh ; Luu, Hiep Ngoc ; Le, Dam Duc ; Dao, Khoi Trong.
   In: Kyklos.
   RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:77:y:2024:i:1:p:118-148.

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6. Information and communications technology development, interorganizational networks, and public sector corruption in Africa. (2023). Ma, Siyuan ; Nkakleu, Raphael ; Danowski, James ; Biboum, Altante Desiree ; van Klyton, Aaron ; Peng, Tai-Quan Winson.
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   RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:57:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s11135-022-01508-4.

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7. Public spending and economies of scale in partial fiscal decentralized governments: The case of Chile. (2023). Paredes, Dusan ; Chavez, Alicia.
   In: Socio-Economic Planning Sciences.
   RePEc:eee:soceps:v:87:y:2023:i:pb:s0038012123000903.

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8. Does increased credibility of elections lead to higher political competition? Evidence from India. (2023). Ojha, Manini ; Chatterjee, Somdeep ; Roy, Sanket ; Mookerjee, Mehreen.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:77:y:2023:i:c:s0176268022000763.

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9. Effects of public sector wages on corruption: Wage inequality matters. (2023). Lokshin, Michael ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Kolchin, Vladimir ; Demirgu-Kunt, Asli.
   In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
   RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:51:y:2023:i:3:p:941-959.

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10. Does administrative decentralization promote outward foreign direct investment and productivity? Evidence from China. (2023). Li, Lei ; Luo, Changtuo.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:124:y:2023:i:c:s0264999323001086.

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11. Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties. (2023). Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ; Hankla, Charles ; Shrestha, Kshitiz ; Martinezvazquez, Jorge.
    In: Economics and Politics.
    RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:35:y:2023:i:1:p:411-439.

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12. Uncertainty, entrepreneurship, and the organization of corruption. (2022). Wang, Yuan.
    In: Small Business Economics.
    RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:58:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11187-020-00402-3.

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13. Partisan alignment and political corruption: Evidence from a new democracy. (2022). Stoecker, Alexander.
    In: World Development.
    RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:152:y:2022:i:c:s0305750x21004204.

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14. Love is blind: partisan alignment and political corruption in Spain. (2021). Rode, Martin ; Borrella-Mas, Miguel Angel.
    In: SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association.
    RePEc:spr:series:v:12:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s13209-021-00228-6.

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15. Partisan Alignment and Political Corruption: Evidence from a New Democracy. (2021). Stoecker, Alexander.
    In: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge.
    RePEc:sie:siegen:192-21.

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16. Partisan Alignment and Political Corruption: Evidence from a New Democracy. (2021). Stoecker, Alexander.
    In: MAGKS Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:magkse:202101.

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17. Bribery, hold‐up, and bureaucratic structure. (2021). Rablen, Matthew ; Bennett, John.
    In: Economic Inquiry.
    RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:3:p:880-903.

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18. Environmental Regulation in a Transitional Political System: Delegation of Regulation and Perceived Corruption in South Africa. (2019). Naso, Pedro.
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19. Does Fiscal Decentralization Encourage Corruption in Local Governments? Evidence from Indonesia. (2019). Alfada, Anisah.
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20. Accounting practice, fiscal decentralization and corruption. (2019). Changwony, Frederick Kibon ; Paterson, Audrey S.
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21. The Role of Natural Resources on Moderating the Relationship between Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from Indonesia. (2019). Harto, Puji ; Ghozali, Imam ; Ratmono, Dwi ; Ulum, Akhmad Samsul ; Rohman, Abdul.
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22. The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Publicly Provided Services and Labor Markets. (2019). Martino, Enrica ; Giorcelli, Michela ; Bianchi, Nicola.
    In: CHILD Working Papers Series.
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23. The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non‐linear Hypothesis. (2019). cantabene, claudia ; Baraldi, Anna Laura ; Alfano, Maria Rosaria.
    In: German Economic Review.
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24. Predicting Public Corruption with Neural Networks: An Analysis of Spanish Provinces. (2018). López-Iturriaga, Félix ; Sanz, Ivan Pastor ; Lopez-Iturriaga, Felix J.
    In: Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement.
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25. Fiscal centralization: a remedy for corruption?. (2018). Rosselló Villalonga, Joan.
    In: SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association.
    RePEc:spr:series:v:9:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s13209-018-0184-2.

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26. Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure. (2018). Rablen, Matthew ; Bennett, John.
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27. Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure. (2018). Rablen, Matthew ; Bennett, John.
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28. Decentralization and fuel subsidies. (2018). Kotsogiannis, Christos ; ferraresi, massimiliano ; Rizzo, Leonzio.
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29. Size, Determinants, and Consequences of Corruption in Chinas Provinces: The MIMIC Approach. (2018). schneider, friedrich ; Sun, Qunli ; Chen, Hailin.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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30. DOES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AFFECT INFRASTRUCTURE QUALITY? AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. STATES. (2018). Calcagno, Peter ; Escaleras, Monica.
    In: Contemporary Economic Policy.
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31. Fiscally Responsible Mafia-clans. (2017). TURATI, Gilberto ; Piacenza, Massimiliano ; Pellegrino, Simone ; bordignon, massimo ; Beraldo, Sergio.
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32. Government decentralization as a commitment in non-democracies. (2017). Gradstein, Mark.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
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33. Partisan Alignment and Political Corruption. Theory and Evidence from Spain Job Market Paper. (2015). Borrella, Miguel Angel .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
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34. Devolutionary delusions? The effect of decentralization on corruption.. (2014). Wiig, Arne ; Somville, Vincent ; Kolstad, Ivar.
    In: CMI Working Papers.
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35. Government Decentralization as a Commitment. (2014). Gradstein, Mark.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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