This document has not been cited yet.

1. Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., and Pearce, D. (1991). Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships. Econometrica, 59(6):1713–1733.

2. Ahn, T.-K., Isaac, R., and Salmon, T. C. (2008). Endogenous Group Formation. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(2):171–194.

3. Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. The American Economic Review, 62(5):777–795.

4. Bigoni, M., Potters, J., and Spagnolo, G. (2011). Flexibility and Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring. Working paper.

5. Charness, G. and Yang, C.-L. (2010). Public goods provision with voting for exclusion, exit, and mergers: an experiment. Unpublished Manuscript.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
6. Chaudhuri, A., Schotter, A., and Sopher, B. (2001). Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice. CV Starr Center for Applied Economics, No. 2001-11.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

7. Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., and Putterman, L. (2005). Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 89(8):1421–1435.

8. Croson, R., Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T., and Morales, A. J. (2015). Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 114:13–26.

9. Devetag, G. and Ortmann, A. (2007). When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory. Experimental Economics, 10(3):331– 344.

10. Güth, W., Levati, M. V., Sutter, M., and Van Der Heijden, E. (2007). Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5-6):1023–1042.

11. Gneezy, U. and Potters, J. (1997). An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2):631–645.

12. Goeree, J. K. and Holt, C. A. (2005). An experimental study of costly coordination. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2):349–364.

13. Green, E. J. and Porter, R. H. (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica, 52(1):87–100.

14. Harsanyi, J. C. and Selten, R. (1988). A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. The MIT Press.

15. Ichino, A. and Riphahn, R. T. (2005). The effect of employment protection on worker effort: Absenteeism during and after probation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(1):120–143.

16. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305–360.

17. Knez, M. and Camerer, C. (1994). Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in ’Weakest-Link’ Games. Strategic Management Journal, 15(SI):101–119.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

18. Lazear, E. P. (2004). The peter principle: A theory of decline. Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1):S141–S163.

19. Maier-Rigaud, F. P., Martinsson, P., and Staffiero, G. (2010). Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 73(3):387–395.

20. Masclet, D. (2003). Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment. International Journal of Manpower, 24(7):867–887.

21. Page, T., Putterman, L., and Unel, B. (2005). Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency. The Economic Journal, 115(506):1032–1053.

22. Reeder, G. D. and Spores, J. M. (1983). The attribution of morality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(4):736–745.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

23. Riedl, A., Rohde, I. M. T., and Strobel, M. (2011). Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games. CESifo Working Paper Series, No. 3685.

24. Salanié, B. (1997). The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. The MIT Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
25. Salmon, T. C. and Weber, R. A. (2011). Maintaining Efficiency While Integrating Entrants From Lower-Performing Environments: An Experimental Study. University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper, No. 35.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

26. Seale, D. A. and Rapoport, A. (1997). Sequential Decision Making with Relative Ranks: An Experimental Investigation of the “Secretary Problem”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69(3):221–236.

27. Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., and Beil, R. O. (1990). Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure. The American Economic Review, 80(1):234–248.

28. Weber, R. A. (2006). Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups. The American Economic Review, 96(1):114–126.

1. Mechanisms for Repeated Trade. (2015). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Toikka, Juuso.
   In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
   RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:4:p:252-93.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting. (2012). Zhao, Rui.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:964-983.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons. (2012). Daley, Brendan ; Green, Brett.
   In: Econometrica.
   RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:4:p:1433-1504.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Olszewski, Wojciech.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:86-99.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices. (2011). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Harrington, Joseph E..
   In: American Economic Review.
   RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:6:p:2425-49.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Explicit formulas for repeated games with absorbing states. (2010). Laraki, Rida.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:53-69.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Relational Incentive Contracts. (2010). Malcomson, James.
   In: Economics Series Working Papers.
   RePEc:oxf:wpaper:508.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Building Social Capital Through Microfinance. (2010). Pande, Rohini ; Feigenberg, Benjamin ; Field, Erica Marie .
   In: Scholarly Articles.
   RePEc:hrv:hksfac:4449105.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Information feedback in a dynamic tournament. (2010). Aoyagi, Masaki.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:242-260.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time. (2009). Osório, António ; Osorio-Costa, Antonio M..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:13105.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty. (2009). Osório, António ; Osorio-Costa, Antonio M..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:13104.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence. (2009). Frechette, Guillaume ; Aoyagi, Masaki.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1135-1165.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Folk theorem with communication. (2009). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:120-134.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring. (2009). Smith, Lones ; Cherry, Josh .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000284.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships. (2008). Sekiguchi, Tadashi ; Ohta, Katsunori ; Kobayashi, Hajime.
    In: KIER Working Papers.
    RePEc:kyo:wpaper:650.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals. (2008). Zheng, Bingyong.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:406-416.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games. (2008). Takizawa, Shinichiro .
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:165-168.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. (2007). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:06-189.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Folk Theorem with Communication. (2007). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000351.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Repeated Games with Frequent Signals. (2007). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Drew, Fudenberg.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000009.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. (2007). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:699152000000000028.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring. (2007). Sannikov, Yuliy ; Fong, Kyna.
    In: Department of Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt8vz4q9tr.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts. (2006). Macleod, W. Bentley.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1978.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration. (2006). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000285.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts. (2006). Macleod, W. Bentley.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1730.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations. (2005). Fuchs, William.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511007.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations. (2005). Fuchs, William.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sip:dpaper:04-012.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. A folk theorem for minority games. (2005). Scarsini, Marco ; Renault, Jérôme ; Scarlatti, Sergio.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:2:p:208-230.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production. (2005). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Sannikov, Yuliy.
    In: Research Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:stabus:1887.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. The Demand for Information: More Heat than Light. (2005). Smith, Lones ; Moscarini, Giuseppe ; Keppo, Jussi.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1498.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Folk Theorem with Communication. (2005). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: UCLA Economics Online Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclaol:366.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Strategy-contingent discounting in repeated PD-games. (2004). Koppel, Oliver.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:85:y:2004:i:3:p:309-314.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Uncertainty of time intervals and possibility of collusion in infinitely repeated games. (2004). Kawamori, Tomohiko.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:83:y:2004:i:3:p:355-358.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Partnership in a Dynamic Production System. (2004). Taylor, Terry A. ; Plambeck, Erica L..
    In: Research Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:stabus:1892.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai). (2004). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: UCLA Economics Online Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclaol:318.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori). (2004). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: UCLA Economics Online Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclaol:281.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies. (2004). Obara, Ichiro ; Kandori, Michihiro.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000055.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies*. (2003). Obara, Ichiro ; Kandori, Michihiro.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclawp:826.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Relational Incentive Contracts. (2003). Levin, Jonathan.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:3:p:835-857.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. (2002). Kandori, Michihiro.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:1-15.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks, and Welfare. (2001). Schmedders, Karl ; Kubler, Felix.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:v:4:y:2001:i:4:p:747-766.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion. (2001). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:98:y:2001:i:1:p:158-178.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Financial accounting information and corporate governance. (2001). BUSHMAN, ROBERT M. ; SMITH, ABBIE J..
    In: Journal of Accounting and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:32:y:2001:i:1-3:p:237-333.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited. (2000). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1449.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. The negotiation of sustainable tariffs. (1999). Furusawa, Taiji.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:48:y:1999:i:2:p:321-345.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete. (1998). Serrano, Roberto ; Zapater, Inigo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:22:y:1998:i:2:p:343-363.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. Infinitely-repeated games with endogenous discounting. (1996). Neilson, William ; Winter, Harold.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:52:y:1996:i:2:p:163-169.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. A note on the equivalence of time consistency and subgame perfection in stochastic games. (1995). Asilis, Carlos.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:2:p:245-251.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation. (1992). Thursby, Marie ; Kovenock, Dan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4071.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games. (1989). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:920.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-09-07 17:09:37 || Missing content? Let us know