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2. Banks versus venture capital when the venture capitalist values private benefits of control. (2010). Inci, Eren ; Barlo, Mehmet.
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4. Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes. (2008). Guriev, Sergei.
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5. You cant make an omelette without breaking eggs: the impact of venture capitalists on executive turnover. (2007). Heger, Diana ; Tykvova, Tereza.
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6. The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?. (2007). Weill, Laurent ; BLAZY, Régis.
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9. Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts. (2006). Muehlheusser, Gerd.
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