Abusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malware
From router to end-user
Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab
CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference
What is DNS?What is DNS?
And why can it be abused?
What is DNS?
DNS – Domain Name System
DNS translates domain names
meaningful to humans into the
numerical identifiers associated
with networking equipment for
the purpose of locating and
addressing these devicesaddressing these devices
worldwide
DNS is a "phone book"
for the Internet
Examples:
kaspersky.com -> 91.103.64.6
google.com -> 209.85.149.104
Why can DNS be abused?
• Technical side
• Open, distributed design
• Lots of nodes
• Everybody can start one
• Usage of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
• Unreliable (no concept of acknowledgment, retransmission or timeout)
• Not ordered (if two messages are sent to the same recipient, the order in which they
arrive cannot be predicted)arrive cannot be predicted)
• Human factor
• Not well-qualified network administrators
• Network security holes
• Default hardware configurations
• etc.
• End-users themselves
• The most easy object to abuse!
How can DNS be abused?How can DNS be abused?
Real-world examples
How can DNS be abused?
Instead of going into cool theoretical stuff about techniques of exploiting
DNS itself, I would rather show some real-world examples of attacks and
malicious programs related to DNS.
Abusing DNS
Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using ‘hosts’ file
That’s how normal ‘hosts’ file looks like
And that’s an infected example
Abusing DNS
Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using relocated ‘hosts’ file
That’s where ‘hosts’ file should be located
But it can be relocated and infected
And original ‘hosts’ file remains unchanged
Abusing DNS
Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using network registry settings
That’s how ‘NameServer’ option should look like
But it can be manually changed..But it can be manually changed..
And immediately updated
Abusing DNS
More advanced example: Rorpian case
• First of all, malware gets on user’s PC via removable media
• Then, the magic begins
• Malware configures user’s system as DHCP server and starts listening to the
local network
• If the system is already infected, manually sets the DNS server to Google’s
one (8.8.8.8)
• When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP
Malware infection from any visited resource!
• When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP
server attempts to answer before official one
• If the attempt was successful, another computer’s DNS will be changed to malicious
one
• Which leads to..
Abusing DNS
More high-level threat: hacking the routers
• Main security issues
• weak default passwords or no password change enforcement
• insecure default configuration
• firmware vulnerabilities & services implementation errors
• lack of awareness
Abusing DNS
How to hack million of routers?
Overhyped?
PAGE 12 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011
Not at all.
Abusing DNS
Example: 2Wire case
Abusing DNS
Example: D-Link & Tsunami case
Malware goes even inside the router itself!Malware goes even inside the router itself!
Abusing DNS
Examples: it’s only the beginning
Abusing DNS
Even more high-level threat: hacking the DNS servers
PAGE 16 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011
Abusing DNS
Last example: mysterious google-analytics.com case
• Several months ago by Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) we received tons of
notifications of javascript Iframer malware planted on http://google-
analytics.com/ga.js
• ga.js downloaded from google-analytics.com was clean
• But when we got some file from users.. It was infected!
It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS
• First version redirects user to domain name quehduid.com, which wasn’t even
registered!
• But still, we received notifications about exploits downloaded using this domain
• Analyzed tons of malware which could be connected to this case
• Found nothing common to DNS poisoning/hijacking
• But found some interesting geographic pattern between versions
It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS
in these countries, isn’t it?
ConclusionsConclusions
Conclusions
Summing it up
• DNS can be is hijacked/poisoned on every layer of network organization
structure
• Users
• Routers
• DNS servers
• DNS was not originally designed with security in mind
• Thus has number of security issues• Thus has number of security issues
• There are some technical things that can make it more secure
• Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) - cryptographically signed
responses
• OpenDNS - misspelling correction, phishing protection, content filtering, blocks bad
IPs, stops bots from 'phoning home'
• Google Public DNS - basic validity checking, adding entropy to requests, removing
duplicate queries, rate-limiting queries
Conclusions
Summing it up
• From user side, more things can be done
• Again and again, strong passwords
• Hardening default hardware settings
• Systematic updates of both firmware and software
• Remote control through VPN
• From hardware vendors side
• Unique default passwords for devices
• Secure default settings (disable or limit remote access!)
• Emphasis on firmware security
• From security vendors side
• Miscellaneous checking for security (passwords, default settings,
vulnerabilities etc.)
• Inform user on possible security holes
Thank YouThank You
Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky LabEvgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab
CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference

More Related Content

PDF
DDoS Attacks
PDF
Ecase direct servlet acess v1
PPTX
Vulnerability and Penetration Testing
PPTX
External to DA, the OS X Way
PDF
CNIT 40: 1: The Importance of DNS Security
PPT
Attacking Automatic Wireless Network Selection
PPTX
Attack on computer
PDF
Network Forensics: Packet Analysis Using Wireshark
DDoS Attacks
Ecase direct servlet acess v1
Vulnerability and Penetration Testing
External to DA, the OS X Way
CNIT 40: 1: The Importance of DNS Security
Attacking Automatic Wireless Network Selection
Attack on computer
Network Forensics: Packet Analysis Using Wireshark

What's hot (20)

PPTX
Denial of service attack
PDF
Introduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
PPTX
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
PPTX
Destributed denial of service attack ppt
PPTX
Applied Detection and Analysis Using Flow Data - MIRCon 2014
PPTX
Exploiting appliances presentation v1.1-vids-removed
PPT
Denail of Service
PPTX
Dos attack
PDF
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
PDF
Datafoucs 2014 on line digital forensic investigations damir delija 2
PPTX
5 Ways To Fight A DDoS Attack
PDF
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
PPTX
DNS Security WebTitan Web Filter - Stop Malware
PPT
Malware and Modern Propagation Techniques
PDF
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
PPT
Digital Immunity -The Myths and Reality
PDF
EnCase Enterprise Basic File Collection
PPTX
Forensic Analysis - Empower Tech Days 2013
PDF
Ddos- distributed denial of service
Denial of service attack
Introduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
Destributed denial of service attack ppt
Applied Detection and Analysis Using Flow Data - MIRCon 2014
Exploiting appliances presentation v1.1-vids-removed
Denail of Service
Dos attack
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
Datafoucs 2014 on line digital forensic investigations damir delija 2
5 Ways To Fight A DDoS Attack
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
DNS Security WebTitan Web Filter - Stop Malware
Malware and Modern Propagation Techniques
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
Digital Immunity -The Myths and Reality
EnCase Enterprise Basic File Collection
Forensic Analysis - Empower Tech Days 2013
Ddos- distributed denial of service
Ad

Viewers also liked (7)

PDF
The Art of the Pitching
PDF
5 (Ridiculously) Simple Steps to Creating Your Employment Brand | CAREEREALISM
PDF
Pitch Deck Templates for Startups
PPTX
Recruitment: Candidate Experience and Storytelling Lessons from Hollywood
PPTX
Smart city
PPTX
10 Project Proposal Writing
PDF
UX, ethnography and possibilities: for Libraries, Museums and Archives
The Art of the Pitching
5 (Ridiculously) Simple Steps to Creating Your Employment Brand | CAREEREALISM
Pitch Deck Templates for Startups
Recruitment: Candidate Experience and Storytelling Lessons from Hollywood
Smart city
10 Project Proposal Writing
UX, ethnography and possibilities: for Libraries, Museums and Archives
Ad

Similar to abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-卡巴斯基实验室资深病毒分析师 evgeny aseev (20)

PPTX
Grey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
PDF
Dns firewalls null-may2020
PDF
DNS Security
PPTX
THOTCON - The War over your DNS Queries
PDF
Day 2 Dns Cert 4c Malicious Use
PPT
Dmk bo2 k8_ccc
PDF
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
PDF
DNS in IR: Collection, Analysis and Response
PPTX
Distributed Sensor Data Contextualization for Threat Intelligence Analysis
PDF
@dtmsecurity Mitre ATT&CKcon - Playing Devil's Advocate to Security Initiativ...
PPTX
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PPTX
Botnets Attacks.pptx
PDF
NANOG 84: DNS Openness
PPTX
DNS Security, is it enough?
PDF
DNS – Strategies for Reducing Data Leakage & Protecting Online Privacy – Hack...
PPTX
Using GreyNoise to Quantify Response Time of Cloud Provider Abuse Teams
PDF
DNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
PPTX
Types of Attack in Information and Network Security
PPTX
OFFENSIVE: Exploiting DNS servers changes BlackHat Asia 2014
PDF
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
Grey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
Dns firewalls null-may2020
DNS Security
THOTCON - The War over your DNS Queries
Day 2 Dns Cert 4c Malicious Use
Dmk bo2 k8_ccc
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
DNS in IR: Collection, Analysis and Response
Distributed Sensor Data Contextualization for Threat Intelligence Analysis
@dtmsecurity Mitre ATT&CKcon - Playing Devil's Advocate to Security Initiativ...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
Botnets Attacks.pptx
NANOG 84: DNS Openness
DNS Security, is it enough?
DNS – Strategies for Reducing Data Leakage & Protecting Online Privacy – Hack...
Using GreyNoise to Quantify Response Time of Cloud Provider Abuse Teams
DNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
Types of Attack in Information and Network Security
OFFENSIVE: Exploiting DNS servers changes BlackHat Asia 2014
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
Hybrid model detection and classification of lung cancer
PDF
August Patch Tuesday
PDF
DP Operators-handbook-extract for the Mautical Institute
PDF
Unlock new opportunities with location data.pdf
PDF
Getting started with AI Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
PDF
ENT215_Completing-a-large-scale-migration-and-modernization-with-AWS.pdf
PDF
Taming the Chaos: How to Turn Unstructured Data into Decisions
PDF
STKI Israel Market Study 2025 version august
PPTX
O2C Customer Invoices to Receipt V15A.pptx
PDF
A Late Bloomer's Guide to GenAI: Ethics, Bias, and Effective Prompting - Boha...
PPTX
Tartificialntelligence_presentation.pptx
PDF
Getting Started with Data Integration: FME Form 101
PPT
Geologic Time for studying geology for geologist
PDF
Five Habits of High-Impact Board Members
PDF
DASA ADMISSION 2024_FirstRound_FirstRank_LastRank.pdf
PDF
Architecture types and enterprise applications.pdf
PPTX
The various Industrial Revolutions .pptx
PDF
Video forgery: An extensive analysis of inter-and intra-frame manipulation al...
PDF
A novel scalable deep ensemble learning framework for big data classification...
PDF
Univ-Connecticut-ChatGPT-Presentaion.pdf
Hybrid model detection and classification of lung cancer
August Patch Tuesday
DP Operators-handbook-extract for the Mautical Institute
Unlock new opportunities with location data.pdf
Getting started with AI Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
ENT215_Completing-a-large-scale-migration-and-modernization-with-AWS.pdf
Taming the Chaos: How to Turn Unstructured Data into Decisions
STKI Israel Market Study 2025 version august
O2C Customer Invoices to Receipt V15A.pptx
A Late Bloomer's Guide to GenAI: Ethics, Bias, and Effective Prompting - Boha...
Tartificialntelligence_presentation.pptx
Getting Started with Data Integration: FME Form 101
Geologic Time for studying geology for geologist
Five Habits of High-Impact Board Members
DASA ADMISSION 2024_FirstRound_FirstRank_LastRank.pdf
Architecture types and enterprise applications.pdf
The various Industrial Revolutions .pptx
Video forgery: An extensive analysis of inter-and intra-frame manipulation al...
A novel scalable deep ensemble learning framework for big data classification...
Univ-Connecticut-ChatGPT-Presentaion.pdf

abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-卡巴斯基实验室资深病毒分析师 evgeny aseev

  • 1. Abusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malware From router to end-user Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference
  • 2. What is DNS?What is DNS? And why can it be abused?
  • 3. What is DNS? DNS – Domain Name System DNS translates domain names meaningful to humans into the numerical identifiers associated with networking equipment for the purpose of locating and addressing these devicesaddressing these devices worldwide DNS is a "phone book" for the Internet Examples: kaspersky.com -> 91.103.64.6 google.com -> 209.85.149.104
  • 4. Why can DNS be abused? • Technical side • Open, distributed design • Lots of nodes • Everybody can start one • Usage of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) • Unreliable (no concept of acknowledgment, retransmission or timeout) • Not ordered (if two messages are sent to the same recipient, the order in which they arrive cannot be predicted)arrive cannot be predicted) • Human factor • Not well-qualified network administrators • Network security holes • Default hardware configurations • etc. • End-users themselves • The most easy object to abuse!
  • 5. How can DNS be abused?How can DNS be abused? Real-world examples
  • 6. How can DNS be abused? Instead of going into cool theoretical stuff about techniques of exploiting DNS itself, I would rather show some real-world examples of attacks and malicious programs related to DNS.
  • 7. Abusing DNS Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using ‘hosts’ file That’s how normal ‘hosts’ file looks like And that’s an infected example
  • 8. Abusing DNS Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using relocated ‘hosts’ file That’s where ‘hosts’ file should be located But it can be relocated and infected And original ‘hosts’ file remains unchanged
  • 9. Abusing DNS Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using network registry settings That’s how ‘NameServer’ option should look like But it can be manually changed..But it can be manually changed.. And immediately updated
  • 10. Abusing DNS More advanced example: Rorpian case • First of all, malware gets on user’s PC via removable media • Then, the magic begins • Malware configures user’s system as DHCP server and starts listening to the local network • If the system is already infected, manually sets the DNS server to Google’s one (8.8.8.8) • When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP Malware infection from any visited resource! • When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP server attempts to answer before official one • If the attempt was successful, another computer’s DNS will be changed to malicious one • Which leads to..
  • 11. Abusing DNS More high-level threat: hacking the routers • Main security issues • weak default passwords or no password change enforcement • insecure default configuration • firmware vulnerabilities & services implementation errors • lack of awareness
  • 12. Abusing DNS How to hack million of routers? Overhyped? PAGE 12 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011 Not at all.
  • 14. Abusing DNS Example: D-Link & Tsunami case Malware goes even inside the router itself!Malware goes even inside the router itself!
  • 15. Abusing DNS Examples: it’s only the beginning
  • 16. Abusing DNS Even more high-level threat: hacking the DNS servers PAGE 16 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011
  • 17. Abusing DNS Last example: mysterious google-analytics.com case • Several months ago by Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) we received tons of notifications of javascript Iframer malware planted on http://google- analytics.com/ga.js • ga.js downloaded from google-analytics.com was clean • But when we got some file from users.. It was infected! It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS • First version redirects user to domain name quehduid.com, which wasn’t even registered! • But still, we received notifications about exploits downloaded using this domain • Analyzed tons of malware which could be connected to this case • Found nothing common to DNS poisoning/hijacking • But found some interesting geographic pattern between versions It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS in these countries, isn’t it?
  • 19. Conclusions Summing it up • DNS can be is hijacked/poisoned on every layer of network organization structure • Users • Routers • DNS servers • DNS was not originally designed with security in mind • Thus has number of security issues• Thus has number of security issues • There are some technical things that can make it more secure • Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) - cryptographically signed responses • OpenDNS - misspelling correction, phishing protection, content filtering, blocks bad IPs, stops bots from 'phoning home' • Google Public DNS - basic validity checking, adding entropy to requests, removing duplicate queries, rate-limiting queries
  • 20. Conclusions Summing it up • From user side, more things can be done • Again and again, strong passwords • Hardening default hardware settings • Systematic updates of both firmware and software • Remote control through VPN • From hardware vendors side • Unique default passwords for devices • Secure default settings (disable or limit remote access!) • Emphasis on firmware security • From security vendors side • Miscellaneous checking for security (passwords, default settings, vulnerabilities etc.) • Inform user on possible security holes
  • 21. Thank YouThank You Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky LabEvgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference