A QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOL FOR ACCESS CONTROL IN BIG DATA

International Journal on Cryptography and Information Security (IJCIS), Vol. 8, No.2, June 2018
DOI:10.5121/ijcis.2018.81021 1
A QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOL FOR
ACCESS CONTROL IN BIG DATA
Abiodun O. Odedoyin 1
, Helen O. Odukoya 2
and Ayodeji O. Oluwatope3
1
Information Technology and Communications Unit, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-
Ife, Nigeria.
2,3
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Obafemi Awolowo University,
Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
ABSTRACT
Modern cryptography targeted towards providing data confidentiality still pose some limitations. The
security of public-key cryptography is based on unproven assumptions associated with the hardness
/complicatedness of certain mathematical problems. However, public-key cryptography is not
unconditionally secure: there is no proof that the problems on which it is based are intractable or even that
their complexity is not polynomial. Therefore, public-key cryptography is not immune to unexpectedly
strong computational power or better cryptanalysis techniques. The strength of modern cryptography is
being weakened and with advances of big data, could gradually be suppressed. Moreover, most of the
currently used public-key cryptographic schemes could be cracked in polynomial time with a quantum
computer. This paper presents a renewed focus in fortifying the confidentiality of big data by proposing a
quantum-cryptographic protocol. A framework was constructed for realizing the protocol, considering
some characteristics of big data and conceptualized using defined propositions and theorems.
KEYWORDS
Quantum cryptography, protocols, access controls, confidentiality, big data.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to [1], there are three distinct master categories of access controls namely "Physical",
"Administrative" and "Technical" access controls. These categories define the main objectives of
proper security implementation. Technical access controls encompass technologies as encryption,
smart cards, network authentication, access control lists (ACLs), file integrity auditing software
etc. This research study dwells within the use of technical access control, specifically using
encryption, often used to protect data as a means of implementation. Thus, the entrance of
cryptography which is the study and practice of encryption and decryption. Cryptography is also
defined as the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third
parties called adversaries [2]. Cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols that
prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages [3]. Four basic types of modern
cryptography have been identified namely symmetric, asymmetric, hybrid cryptography and hash
functions. This is shown in Table 1. The security of contemporary cryptographic systems being
used in public communications channels is based on the secrecy of the key(s) which is being
shared or exchanged among a set of legitimate users. For secure key establishment, an
unauthorized user should not know or gain access to the key. This notion of secure key
establishment in public key cryptography is based on unproven assumptions associated with the
hardness/complicatedness of certain mathematical problems (meaning no algorithms are known
to solve the problems in efficient time) [4].

2
Table 1. Overview of Modern Cryptography.
There is a large gap created between the speed that the legitimate users compute the key and the
speed which with the intruder finds out its value. The computing resources needed to solve these
problems become totally unachievable when long enough keys are used. This is termed “provable
computational security” and is tightly associated with the opponent’s computational power.
Public-key cryptography is however not unconditionally secure: there is no proof that the
problems on which it is based are intractable or that their complexity is not polynomial [8].
Traditional (pre-computer) cryptography, categorized as earlier methods of encryption and
decryption, whose roots were found in Roman and Egyptian civilizations, which include
Hieroglyph, Caesar Shift Cipher [9], Steganography, Vigenere Coding and Enigma rotor machine

3
had major drawbacks. They manipulated traditional characters, i.e., symbols, letters, and digits
directly and used substitution and/or transposition techniques. Thus, these methods were
relatively easy to break especially for those who could read and write. Along with numerous
German operator errors, the Enigma rotor machine had several built in weaknesses that allied
cryptographers exploited. The major weakness was that it's substitution algorithm did not allow
any letter to be mapped to itself. This allowed the allied cryptographers to decrypt a vast number
of ciphered messages sent by Nazi Germans[10]. Steganography [11], which is a bit different
from the list, embeds data into other media in an unnoticeable way, instead of employing
encryption. Mediums used for steganography include objects such as picture, audio, video files,
web pages, communication protocols, data streams and many more. A major discovery of
steganography implementations is that it carries with it significant trade-off decisions. Some
limitations include that messages are hard to recover if used medium is subject to attack such as
translation and rotation. Also significant damage may be made to medium used, thus the message
becomes difficult to recover. In other ways some of the embedded data are relatively easy to
detect while, some media may become distorted making the message become easily lost if such
media are subjected to compression such as JPEG. This research study proposes a quantum
cryptographic protocol for big data. In contrast to several other related work, the protocol would
be adapted for big data taking into consideration, major characteristics of big data. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of some major protocols used in
public communication. Section 3 presents the proposed scheme and finally, Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2. OVERVIEW OF PROTOCOLS USED IN COMMUNICATION
For a long time cryptographic protocols like Telnet, FTP, the old UNIX utilities, rlogin, rsh and
rcp have been used but they do not provide a secure way for the interchange of data in public
networks as each tends to be used in different areas, thus they are considered weak. The growth
and broad expansion of the World Wide Web has changed its intended use from the beginning. In
order to avoid hackers & eavesdroppers stealing personal information, people demand web
security, which is mainly provided majorly through two methods : Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) -
(known now as Transport Layer Security - TLS) and Secure Shell (SSH) [12]. Over the years,
other cryptographic protocols have evolved for communicating through public networks such as
the internet and many are presently in use. Examples include Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)
and Kerberos. Though many of them overlap somewhat in functionality, each tends to still be
used in different areas. SSL and SSH are both public key cryptography tunnelling protocols, thus
the dependence on the use of mathematical techniques which involves the complexity of factoring
large numbers leading to the uncertainty problem that modern cryptography suffers from.
Though, both aim to secure confidential data in that they allow communication with remote
computers through an encrypted channel and can do file transfers, yet, they have different
applications in practice. Table 2 states a brief overview of some cryptographic protocols in use.

4
Table 2. Overview of Modern Cryptographic Protocols.
2.1. Quantum Cryptographic Protocols
Quantum Cryptography (QC) applies the phenomena of quantum physics (quantum mechanics)
to securing communications in the existence of adversaries. It uses photons and physics to
generate a cryptographic key which is used in the transmission of data between a sender and a
receiver using a suitable communication channel. QC is also known as Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) because it pertains to completely securing key distribution. Thus, while the strength of
modern digital cryptography is dependent on the computational difficulty of factoring large

5
numbers and processing power, quantum cryptography is completely dependent on the rules of
physics. Since the principle of physics will always hold true, quantum cryptography provides an
answer to the uncertainty problem that modern cryptography suffers from; it is no longer
necessary to make assumptions about the computing power of malicious attackers or the
development of a theorem to quickly solve the large integer factorization problem. Quantum
cryptography involves the use of specialized protocols used in quantum key distribution. A brief
review of some of these protocols are showcased in Table 3. Some of these protocols like BB84
[13], B92 [14] and SARG04 [15] are based on the Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle of securely
communicating a private key from one party to another for use in one-time pad encryption, while
others like E91 [16] and COW [17], are based on quantum entanglement. All these protocols are
implemented using either single photon sources, multi-photon sources or modifications of these
photon sources. In reality, a perfect single photon source does not exist. Instead, practical sources,
such as weak coherent state laser sources, are widely used for QKD. A serious security loophole
that exists when multi-photon sources are used is that they are susceptible to photon number
splitting (PNS) attacks. In order to minimize this effect, extremely weak laser sources are used
which results in a relatively low speed of QKD. This significantly limits the secure transmission
rate or the maximum channel length in practical QKD systems. A successful PNS attack requires
maintaining the bit error rate (BER) at the receiver's end, which cannot be accomplished with
multiple photon number statistics.

6
Table 1. Overview of major Quantum Cryptographic Protocols.

7
2.2. Implementations of Quantum Cryptography
Different systems have successfully implemented quantum cryptography technologies, but
limited to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The DARPA Quantum Network is an example of a
quantum cryptography implementation. In this network, the key is used for the first time in IPSec
based VPNs. It is used in the processing of traffic and key agreement protocol [20]. A virtual
private network uses a public network like the internet to connect to a private system, usually
something within the company. Basically, a VPN is a secure tunnel enabling those with
authorization to access internal servers and data. Cloud computing is all about connecting people
as well. Instead of using a private network, like a VPN does, the cloud uses online services by
connecting to a server, usually one provided by a third-party vendor. From there, businesses can
use the cloud to access enterprise applications, email services, storage space, and a host of other
options from where big data is being generated and that is why the cloud serves as the
infrastructure for big data. Another company is MagiQ Technologies, Inc. of Bosto. MagiQ’s
solution is called the Navajo QPN Security Gateway. The quantum-key distribution hardware box
is claimed by MagiQ to be the first commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD)
system. It comprises a 40 pound chassis that is mountable in a standard 19 inch rack unit.
Included in the unit are a photon transmitter and receiver, and the electronics and software
required for quantum key distribution. These “black boxes” that are used by remote parties are
connected by a fiber optic link that implements the BB84 quantum encryption code proposed by
Brassard and Bennet. The SEcure COmmunication based on Quantum Cryptography (SECOQC)
is an European project. The SECOQC offers networks with QKD with an emphasis on the
prototype with trusted repeater. The topology consists of 8 network links which are connected
point-to-point. They used three plug and play systems. The Tokyo QKD network is a star network
pattern linking various centers. It comprises of 3 layers: the quantum layer, key management
(KM) layer and the communication layer. Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a hub and
spoke network in 2011. The hub is used to route messages. Each node in the network has
quantum transmitters. The quantum messages are received only by the hub. The communication
commences when all the nodes issues a one-time pad which is received by the hub. Other
Companies that manufacture quantum cryptography systems include ID Quantique of Geneva,
Switzerland, Quintessence Labs (Canberra, Australia) and SeQureNet (Paris).
3. PROPOSED SCHEME
A conceptual perspective of the influx of data from varying data sources traversing networks
through communication channels was presented. The framework envisions different data sources
that generate increasing 'volume' of data. These data are heterogeneous (variety), comprising of
unstructured, semi-structured and structured data being transferred at varying speeds (velocity)
from one end to the other. Figure 1 displays the conceptual overview of big data in transmission.

8
Figure 1: Conceptual overview of the flow of big data
3.1. Formalization of the proposed protocol
The protocol was abstracted using notations and propositions and formalized using temporal
logic. Temporal logic was chosen because though, the meaning of the propositions were constant
in time, the truth values of the same propositions can vary in time. Abstraction on the other hand
means that the empirical observations, measurements etc. are translated into concepts and
generalized so that it focuses on the subject of discourse. The propositions suggested in this
research work are aimed at securing data during transmission. Notations used are as follows:
Alice (Sender) = A
Bob (Receiver) = B
Eve (Eavesdropper) = E
Message = unencrypted data = plaintext = PT
encrypted data = ciphertext = CT
Encryption Method = EM
Decryption Method = DM
Algorithm used = Cipher = CU
Protocol used = PU
Key = K
Known Key = Kn
Strength of Security Technique Implemented = STs
STs = (EM + DM) (CU, K, PU)
CT=EMk(PT)
PT = DMk(CT)
The propositions are stated thus:
α : Eve will always eavesdrop
β : Encrypted data will eventually be secured if Eve does not have access to it
δ : Encrypted data will be secured until Eve gains access to it
δa : Encrypted data will be secured
δb : Eve gains access to the encrypted data
λ : Eve will not gain access to the encrypted data forever

9
Representation of Propositions
i. α : Eve will always eavesdrop
Represented symbolically as:
(
= ( =
Read as: the statement α, will hold on all paths starting from the current sender to the receiver
such that at a particular point, the strength of the security technique implemented implies that
is a function of
ii. β : Encrypted data will eventually be secured if Eve does not have access to it
Represented symbolically as:
Read as: the statement β eventually has to hold provided the eavesdropper does not gain access to
the data.
iii. δ : Encrypted data will be secured until Eve gains access to it
This statement consists of two parts: δa - Encrypted data will be secured, δb - Eve gains access to
the encrypted data and it is represented symbolically as:
=
Read as : the statement holds at the current or future paths until the statement holds, at
which statement ceases to hold any longer. This expresses that the strength of the protocol
used in the implementation of the security framework is significant until the key is exposed or
known and this is a function of the security strength of the encrypted data.
iv. λ : Eve will not gain access to the encrypted data forever
Representation symbolically as:
□λ
=
Read as : the statement λ has to hold on the entire path from the sender to the receiver. This
expresses that the choice of the protocol used is a function of the effectiveness of the security
framework implemented.
3.2. Proposed protocol framework
Figure 2 presents the structure showcasing the three basic steps involved in implementing
quantum cryptography: Key Exchange, Key Sifting and Key Distillation and showcases a
schematic for the proposed framework. After sifting, the emitter and the receiver jointly process
the sifted key to distill a secure sequence of bits called the secret key. The process consists of
three steps: error correction, privacy amplification and authentication. QKD protocols define only
the first two steps namely the raw key exchange and the key sifting.

10
Figure 3: Schematic for the protocol framework
The proposed protocol employs the "No Cloning Theorem". The one-time pad is proposed to be
selected as the encryption algorithm for the purpose of this research work. The sender and
receiver must each have a copy of the same pad (a bunch of completely random numbers), which
must be transmitted over a secure line. The pad is used as a symmetric key; however, once the
pad is used, it is destroyed. Steps involved in achieving the proposed protocol include that:
i. The patterns of communication and data transmission in big data was considered - Client-
server, peer-to-peer and/or hierarchical communication patterns which determines one-to-one,
multicast or broadcast patterns of transmission.
ii. Selected characteristics of big data was considered.
iii. The format for encryption was highlighted and outlined taking into consideration the
selected algorithm, processing of the plaintext;block or stream, sequences of the communication
rules thus, resulting into message structure, key generation and the outcome of the process.
In this framework, the proposed protocol uses the main idea of decoy states which is that Alice
changes at random, the characteristics of some extra pulses (decoy states) sent to Bob, revealing
this information only at the end of the transmission. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot adjust her
attack to each pulse shared. The main idea behind decoy states is that it solves the multi-photon
issue which is a security loophole for Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack which in a bid to
minimize, the sender has to use an extremely weak laser source, resulting in a relatively low
speed of QKD. Decoy state QKD uses a few different photon intensities instead of one.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a quantum cryptographic protocol is proposed for access control in big data. This
protocol is active in the key exchange and key sifting steps. The flow of big data was
conceptualized and a general formalization was done for the protocol. A framework was borne
out of the steps involved in quantum cryptography for the realization of the protocol. This
research is an on-going work which promises a protocol for access control in big data. Further
aspect of this research work to be carried out include protocol verification, simulation and
evaluation.

11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors are grateful to all who have contributed to the success of this project. Special thanks
to Stephen Olabode Odedoyin, a postgraduate research student of the Department of Economics,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife for his contributions, technical
information and support during the course of the research work.
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AUTHORS
Abiodun O. Odedoyin, is currently a network engineer with the Information Technology
and Communications Unit (INTECU), Obafemi Awolowo University and a PhD. sstudent
in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, within the same University. Her
research interests include Network Security, Quantum Cryptography, Big data and
Network Monitoring.
Oluwatoyin H. Odukoya Ph. D (Computer Science) is a lecturer at the Department of
Computer Science and Engineering, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. Her research
interest include security and usability of computer/software systems.
Ayodeji, O. Oluwatope Ph.D (Computer Science) is an Associate Professor of Computer
Science and Engineering, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He is the
Lead Researcher, Network Utility Maximisation Group, Comnet Lab., Department of
Computer Science & Engineering, OAU., Ile-Ife. His research interests include network
protocol performance modelling, network security and reconfigurable computing.

A QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOL FOR ACCESS CONTROL IN BIG DATA

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