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Addressing the Top 3
Real-world Security
Challenges for Your
IBM i Systems
Carol Woodbury | CISSP, CRISC, PCIP
DXR Security
Bill Hammond | Director, Product Marketing
Precisely
Today’s Topics
• Value of Your Data
• Top Three Security Challenges
• How Precisely Can Help
© DXRSecurity, All Rights Reserved.
Carol Woodbury
CISSP, CRISC, PCIP
Addressing the Top 3 Real-world Security
Challenges for Your IBM i Systems
Goals
Understand the benefits of implementing multiple
layers of defense (defense in depth)
Determine the value and risk level of your data
Develop a plan to implement as many layers as
needed to reduce risk to acceptable level
Not all Data is Created Equal
 Data has value to an
organization
 Most people think that means
data under regulatory
requirements
 Data unique to the organization
may have even more value
 Inventory
 Pricing
 Vendor list
 Monthly sales
What’s the Cost of the Data …
 Not being accurate?
 Not being available?
 Being stolen?
 Used by a competitor
 Sold on the Dark Web
 Being posted on the Internet?
Previous answers determine Value
Implement multiple layers of defense
based on Value of the data to your
organization
Scenario #1
Scenario #1: Protecting Against the Accidental Error
 Company A has multiple warehouses in different regions,
each with their own sales figures
 Employee in Warehouse 200 wrote an application using
ODBC to download his sales figures to a spreadsheet
 Company A was ok with this, just didn’t want employee to
accidentally upload the spreadsheet back to IBM i.
Acknowledge that Accidental Errors Occur
 Insiders
 Malicious insider – 14%
 Credential theft – 23%
 Negligence – 63%
 Ponemon Institute The Cost of
Insider Threats – 2020
 https://www.ibm.com/security/digita
l-assets/services/cost-of-insider-
threats/#/
Stats
Prevalence Cost
(Annualized)
Remediation /
Incident
Negligence 63% $4.58M $300K
Criminal insider 14% $4.08M $757K
Stolen credentials 23% $2.79 M $872K
Source: 2020 Ponemon Institute The Cost of Insider Threats
Layers of Defense Implemented
 Implemented IBM i object level
security, setting *PUBLIC to
*USE, granting more authority
for profiles running processes
that wrote to these files
 Removed users from group that
owned the application
 Reduced number of users with
*ALLOBJ
 Authority required can be
discovered via Authority
Collection
Scenario #2
Scenario #2: Malware
Two types of malware affect IBM i:
 Resident (Stored) in the IFS
 Coming in via a file share
 https://www.securityweek.com/industry
-reactions-ransomware-attack-colonial-
pipeline
 https://www.securityweek.com/fbi-
confirms-revil-ransomware-involved-
jbs-attack
 https://www.securityweek.com/white-
house-urges-private-companies-help-
fight-against-ransomware
Addressing the Top 3 Real-world Security Challenges for Your IBM i Systems
File Shares
Worst possible scenario is to have a Read/Write share to root
Who Can Use a File Share?
 Unlike Windows, there is no permission on the share itself
 What the malware can do will depend on
 How the share is defined – Read only or Read/Write
 The user’s authority to the directory and objects in the directory
 Goals:
 Remove unused shares
 If required, reduce to Read only when possible
Share Permissions
Read share
Share
Permission
What can be
Accomplished
If user has at least *READ authority,
contents can be read
Contents cannot be updated regardless
of user’s authority to the object
Read/Write share If user has at least *READ authority,
contents can be read
If user has at least *W (write) authority,
contents can be modified
User must have sufficient authority for
the operation being attempted (either a
read or a write)
To Reduce the Risk Of Malware
 Educate your users!
 Back-ups
 Do them!
 Verify them!
 Store them separately
 Shares
 DO NOT SHARE ROOT !!!! (or QSYS.lib)
 Remove unnecessary shares
 Set shares to Read-only where possible
 Secure shared objects
If Infected …
 Pull out your incident response plan !
 Determine if you’re still under attack or if it’s contained
 Determine if you can resolve yourself or need to call in experts
 Determine if you need to notify law enforcement
 If ransomware, determine if ransom will be paid
Quality and availability of your back-ups may determine
whether you can recover from a malware attack
Real Scenario
Dear MsWoodbury,
I was forwarded your info. As of last night, we are being held hostage.We've
been in touch with the FBI and IBM.We have a ransom note on our servers. I can
be reached at xxx-xxx-xxxx
- via LinkedIn and Voicemail
24
Layers of Defense Implemented
 Develop incident response plan
 Clean up file shares
 Implement object level security on
appropriate directories
 Use an exit program to control who
can use the NetServer server
 Reduce the number of profiles with
*ALLOBJ special authority
 Encrypt critical/sensitive
information
 MFA
Scenario #3
Scenario #3: Malicious Attack
 Can occur from a variety of sources
 Malicious insider
 Nation-state attacks
 Competitors
 Attacker exploiting a vulnerability
 Microsoft Exchange Server
 https://www.afr.com/technology/thousands-of-aussie-businesses-hit-by-
microsoft-security-flaws-20210308-p578rc
 Malware
 Current ransomware exploits do recon on the network prior to encrypting files
and/or use credentials purchased on the dark web
 https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/doj-seizes-colonial-pipeline-
ransom-payment
Why Multiple Layers of Defense?
 Colonial was attacked using a VPN without MFA using a
profile that wasn’t in use with a password that is suspected
to have been purchased on the dark web.
 Layers:
 Client education – don’t use the same password everywhere!
 Password management – change passwords regularly even for
service accounts
 Profile management – delete or at least disable inactive profiles
 Require MFA
 Any one of these could have prevented access!
Protect Data
 Implement object level security
on critical data
 Reduce the number of users
with *ALLOBJ special authority
 Use RCAC to implement
additional privileges
 Encrypt critical data
 Use exit point software to further
restrict access (or at least log
access)
Encrypt all Sessions
 Internal communications are
often not encrypted
 WFH or WFS (Work from
Starbucks  ) not using a VPN
 Vulnerable to sniffing
Multi-factor Authentication (MFA)
 Requires two or more ‘factors’ to
authenticate (gain access to the
system)
 Something you know (password,
pin)
 Something you are (fingerprint,
facial recognition, optical scan)
 Something you have (token, bank
card)
 Recommended for at least
‘powerful’ profiles
 Helps prevent credential stuffing
Use IBM i to Alert to Trouble
 Are you sending IBM i
information to your SIEM? If
not, why not?
 See MC Press article for more
considerations
 https://www.mcpressonline.com/se
curity/ibm-i-os400-i5os/what-ibm-i-
information-should-i-be-sending-to-
my-siem
Monitor Audit Journal Entries to Detect an Attack
 PW
 ‘U’ entries where the User is “root” or “Admin” and attempt originates from outside of the
organization
 ‘P’ entries where many occur within a short period of time and for the well-known IBM i-
supplied profiles (QSYS, QSECOFR, QUSER, QSYSOPR, QPGMR, QSRV, QSRVBAS)
 JS
 Job start entries that originate from an unknown external IP address
 Job starts for unknown entries (such as QSECOFR)
 CP
 Password changes for QSECOFR and other IBM-supplied profiles
 Re-enablement of QSECOFR (if kept STATUS *DISABLED)
 VP
 Invalid password attempts via NetServer
Use Intrusion Detection
IM – Audit entries – Used to detect DDoS attacks and cryptomining malware
See
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_74/rzaub/rzaubkickoff.htm
>>> It takes tuning! <<<
Layers of Defense to Implement
 Protect the data
 Object level security
 Reduce *ALLOBJ
 RCAC
 Encryption
 Exit points
 Encrypt sessions
 MFA
 Use the audit journal
 SIEM
 Alerting
How many layers of defense is enough?
Must first answer:
What is the value of the data to your
organization?
What is the cost of it being inaccurate,
unavailable or stolen?
Focus!
Focus on the data which
is most valuable to the
organization!!!
Talking with Management
 Your suggestions for resolving
issues need to be high level
 Avoid technical terms
 Talking in terms of loss to the
business – operational risk and
how it can be prevented
 May have to explain to
management what (all) runs on
IBM i
 Again… in business terms
Talking with Management
 Your suggestions for resolving
issues need to be high level
 Avoid technical terms
 Talking in terms of loss to the
business – operational risk and
how it can be prevented
 May have to explain to
management what (all) runs on
IBM i
 Again… in business terms
Operational Risk
 Operational risk is caused by inadequate or failed internal
processes or controls and results in loss (e.g., time,
reputation, money)
 Example:
 We have data on one of our key servers – IBM i – that is
vulnerable to being infected with ransomware and I would like to
take steps to reduce that operational risk
Don’t get Overwhelmed!
With management, develop a plan
to address vulnerabilities
Do something!
Take a step – ANY step to reduce
your organization’s risk
For More
Information
RCAC Redpiece
 http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/redp5110.html?Open
Intrusion Detection
 https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_74/rzaub/rzau
bpdf.pdf?view=kc
IBM i Security Reference – PDF
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_74/rzarl/sc415302.
pdf?view=kc
 Chapters 2 and 3 – System Values
 Chapter 9 - Auditing
 Chapter 10 – Authority Collection
IBM i Security Administration and Compliance, 3nd edition, by Carol Woodbury,
2020.
DXR Security www.dxrsecurity.com
42
How Precisely Can Help
Assure Security
44
Compliance
Monitoring
• Assure Monitoring
and Reporting
• SIEM Integration
• Assure Db2 Data
Monitor
Access
Control
• Assure MFA
• Assure Elevated
Authority
Manager
• Assure System
Access Manager
Data
Privacy
• Assure Encryption
• Assure Secure File
Transfer
Malware
Prevention
• Assure MFA
• Assure Elevated
Authority
Manager
• Assure System
Access Manager
• Assure Monitoring
and Reporting
with SIEM
Integration
• Assure Encryption
Q & A
45
Thank You
46

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Addressing the Top 3 Real-world Security Challenges for Your IBM i Systems

  • 1. Addressing the Top 3 Real-world Security Challenges for Your IBM i Systems Carol Woodbury | CISSP, CRISC, PCIP DXR Security Bill Hammond | Director, Product Marketing Precisely
  • 2. Today’s Topics • Value of Your Data • Top Three Security Challenges • How Precisely Can Help
  • 3. © DXRSecurity, All Rights Reserved. Carol Woodbury CISSP, CRISC, PCIP Addressing the Top 3 Real-world Security Challenges for Your IBM i Systems
  • 4. Goals Understand the benefits of implementing multiple layers of defense (defense in depth) Determine the value and risk level of your data Develop a plan to implement as many layers as needed to reduce risk to acceptable level
  • 5. Not all Data is Created Equal  Data has value to an organization  Most people think that means data under regulatory requirements  Data unique to the organization may have even more value  Inventory  Pricing  Vendor list  Monthly sales
  • 6. What’s the Cost of the Data …  Not being accurate?  Not being available?  Being stolen?  Used by a competitor  Sold on the Dark Web  Being posted on the Internet?
  • 7. Previous answers determine Value Implement multiple layers of defense based on Value of the data to your organization
  • 9. Scenario #1: Protecting Against the Accidental Error  Company A has multiple warehouses in different regions, each with their own sales figures  Employee in Warehouse 200 wrote an application using ODBC to download his sales figures to a spreadsheet  Company A was ok with this, just didn’t want employee to accidentally upload the spreadsheet back to IBM i.
  • 10. Acknowledge that Accidental Errors Occur  Insiders  Malicious insider – 14%  Credential theft – 23%  Negligence – 63%  Ponemon Institute The Cost of Insider Threats – 2020  https://www.ibm.com/security/digita l-assets/services/cost-of-insider- threats/#/
  • 11. Stats Prevalence Cost (Annualized) Remediation / Incident Negligence 63% $4.58M $300K Criminal insider 14% $4.08M $757K Stolen credentials 23% $2.79 M $872K Source: 2020 Ponemon Institute The Cost of Insider Threats
  • 12. Layers of Defense Implemented  Implemented IBM i object level security, setting *PUBLIC to *USE, granting more authority for profiles running processes that wrote to these files  Removed users from group that owned the application  Reduced number of users with *ALLOBJ  Authority required can be discovered via Authority Collection
  • 14. Scenario #2: Malware Two types of malware affect IBM i:  Resident (Stored) in the IFS  Coming in via a file share  https://www.securityweek.com/industry -reactions-ransomware-attack-colonial- pipeline  https://www.securityweek.com/fbi- confirms-revil-ransomware-involved- jbs-attack  https://www.securityweek.com/white- house-urges-private-companies-help- fight-against-ransomware
  • 16. File Shares Worst possible scenario is to have a Read/Write share to root
  • 17. Who Can Use a File Share?  Unlike Windows, there is no permission on the share itself  What the malware can do will depend on  How the share is defined – Read only or Read/Write  The user’s authority to the directory and objects in the directory  Goals:  Remove unused shares  If required, reduce to Read only when possible
  • 18. Share Permissions Read share Share Permission What can be Accomplished If user has at least *READ authority, contents can be read Contents cannot be updated regardless of user’s authority to the object Read/Write share If user has at least *READ authority, contents can be read If user has at least *W (write) authority, contents can be modified User must have sufficient authority for the operation being attempted (either a read or a write)
  • 19. To Reduce the Risk Of Malware  Educate your users!  Back-ups  Do them!  Verify them!  Store them separately  Shares  DO NOT SHARE ROOT !!!! (or QSYS.lib)  Remove unnecessary shares  Set shares to Read-only where possible  Secure shared objects
  • 20. If Infected …  Pull out your incident response plan !  Determine if you’re still under attack or if it’s contained  Determine if you can resolve yourself or need to call in experts  Determine if you need to notify law enforcement  If ransomware, determine if ransom will be paid Quality and availability of your back-ups may determine whether you can recover from a malware attack
  • 21. Real Scenario Dear MsWoodbury, I was forwarded your info. As of last night, we are being held hostage.We've been in touch with the FBI and IBM.We have a ransom note on our servers. I can be reached at xxx-xxx-xxxx - via LinkedIn and Voicemail 24
  • 22. Layers of Defense Implemented  Develop incident response plan  Clean up file shares  Implement object level security on appropriate directories  Use an exit program to control who can use the NetServer server  Reduce the number of profiles with *ALLOBJ special authority  Encrypt critical/sensitive information  MFA
  • 24. Scenario #3: Malicious Attack  Can occur from a variety of sources  Malicious insider  Nation-state attacks  Competitors  Attacker exploiting a vulnerability  Microsoft Exchange Server  https://www.afr.com/technology/thousands-of-aussie-businesses-hit-by- microsoft-security-flaws-20210308-p578rc  Malware  Current ransomware exploits do recon on the network prior to encrypting files and/or use credentials purchased on the dark web  https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/doj-seizes-colonial-pipeline- ransom-payment
  • 25. Why Multiple Layers of Defense?  Colonial was attacked using a VPN without MFA using a profile that wasn’t in use with a password that is suspected to have been purchased on the dark web.  Layers:  Client education – don’t use the same password everywhere!  Password management – change passwords regularly even for service accounts  Profile management – delete or at least disable inactive profiles  Require MFA  Any one of these could have prevented access!
  • 26. Protect Data  Implement object level security on critical data  Reduce the number of users with *ALLOBJ special authority  Use RCAC to implement additional privileges  Encrypt critical data  Use exit point software to further restrict access (or at least log access)
  • 27. Encrypt all Sessions  Internal communications are often not encrypted  WFH or WFS (Work from Starbucks  ) not using a VPN  Vulnerable to sniffing
  • 28. Multi-factor Authentication (MFA)  Requires two or more ‘factors’ to authenticate (gain access to the system)  Something you know (password, pin)  Something you are (fingerprint, facial recognition, optical scan)  Something you have (token, bank card)  Recommended for at least ‘powerful’ profiles  Helps prevent credential stuffing
  • 29. Use IBM i to Alert to Trouble  Are you sending IBM i information to your SIEM? If not, why not?  See MC Press article for more considerations  https://www.mcpressonline.com/se curity/ibm-i-os400-i5os/what-ibm-i- information-should-i-be-sending-to- my-siem
  • 30. Monitor Audit Journal Entries to Detect an Attack  PW  ‘U’ entries where the User is “root” or “Admin” and attempt originates from outside of the organization  ‘P’ entries where many occur within a short period of time and for the well-known IBM i- supplied profiles (QSYS, QSECOFR, QUSER, QSYSOPR, QPGMR, QSRV, QSRVBAS)  JS  Job start entries that originate from an unknown external IP address  Job starts for unknown entries (such as QSECOFR)  CP  Password changes for QSECOFR and other IBM-supplied profiles  Re-enablement of QSECOFR (if kept STATUS *DISABLED)  VP  Invalid password attempts via NetServer
  • 31. Use Intrusion Detection IM – Audit entries – Used to detect DDoS attacks and cryptomining malware See https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_74/rzaub/rzaubkickoff.htm >>> It takes tuning! <<<
  • 32. Layers of Defense to Implement  Protect the data  Object level security  Reduce *ALLOBJ  RCAC  Encryption  Exit points  Encrypt sessions  MFA  Use the audit journal  SIEM  Alerting
  • 33. How many layers of defense is enough? Must first answer: What is the value of the data to your organization? What is the cost of it being inaccurate, unavailable or stolen?
  • 34. Focus! Focus on the data which is most valuable to the organization!!!
  • 35. Talking with Management  Your suggestions for resolving issues need to be high level  Avoid technical terms  Talking in terms of loss to the business – operational risk and how it can be prevented  May have to explain to management what (all) runs on IBM i  Again… in business terms
  • 36. Talking with Management  Your suggestions for resolving issues need to be high level  Avoid technical terms  Talking in terms of loss to the business – operational risk and how it can be prevented  May have to explain to management what (all) runs on IBM i  Again… in business terms
  • 37. Operational Risk  Operational risk is caused by inadequate or failed internal processes or controls and results in loss (e.g., time, reputation, money)  Example:  We have data on one of our key servers – IBM i – that is vulnerable to being infected with ransomware and I would like to take steps to reduce that operational risk
  • 38. Don’t get Overwhelmed! With management, develop a plan to address vulnerabilities Do something! Take a step – ANY step to reduce your organization’s risk
  • 39. For More Information RCAC Redpiece  http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/redp5110.html?Open Intrusion Detection  https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_74/rzaub/rzau bpdf.pdf?view=kc IBM i Security Reference – PDF https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/ssw_ibm_i_74/rzarl/sc415302. pdf?view=kc  Chapters 2 and 3 – System Values  Chapter 9 - Auditing  Chapter 10 – Authority Collection IBM i Security Administration and Compliance, 3nd edition, by Carol Woodbury, 2020. DXR Security www.dxrsecurity.com 42
  • 41. Assure Security 44 Compliance Monitoring • Assure Monitoring and Reporting • SIEM Integration • Assure Db2 Data Monitor Access Control • Assure MFA • Assure Elevated Authority Manager • Assure System Access Manager Data Privacy • Assure Encryption • Assure Secure File Transfer Malware Prevention • Assure MFA • Assure Elevated Authority Manager • Assure System Access Manager • Assure Monitoring and Reporting with SIEM Integration • Assure Encryption