Adsb aigd7

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND
OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
Edition 7.0 – September 2014
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
Edition 7.0 September 2014 2
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Arrangement of the AIGD .................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Document History and Management .................................................................................. 6
1.3 Copies ................................................................................................................................. 7
1.4 Changes to the AIGD.......................................................................................................... 7
1.5 Editing conventions ............................................................................................................ 7
1.6 AIGD Request for Change Form........................................................................................ 7
1.7 Amendment Record ............................................................................................................ 9
2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS............................................................ 10
2.1 Acronym List .................................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Glossary of Terms............................................................................................................. 11
3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS………………………………………………………... 12
4. ADS-B DATA.................................................................................................................. 13
5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 14
5.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 14
5.1.1 Planning ................................................................................................................... 14
5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination ..................................... 14
5.1.3 System compatibility ............................................................................................... 14
5.1.4 Integration................................................................................................................ 15
5.1.6 Coverage Predictions............................................................................................... 16
5.2 Implementation checklist.................................................................................................. 16
5.2.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................. 16
5.2.2 Activity Sequence.................................................................................................... 16
5.2.3 Concept Phase.......................................................................................................... 16
5.2.4 Design Phase............................................................................................................ 17
5.2.5 Implementation Phase.............................................................................................. 18
6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR
ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 19
6.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 19
6.2 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation.............................. 20
7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING............................................................ 23
7.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 23
7.2 Personnel Licensing and Training .................................................................................... 23
7.3 System Performance Criteria for an ATC separation service........................................... 23
7.4 ATC system validation ..................................................................................................... 24

7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines............................................................................. 24
7.4.2 System safety assessment .................................................................................... 24
7.4.3 Integration test ..................................................................................................... 24
7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals...................................................................................... 25
7.4.5 ATS System Integrity .......................................................................................... 25
7.5 System Monitoring ........................................................................................................... 25
7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS) ....................................................................... 25
7.5.2 The monitoring process ....................................................................................... 26
7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information ............................................................. 26
7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports....................................................................................... 25
7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report............................................................................... 27
7.5.6 Processing of Reports .......................................................................................... 27
7.6 APANPIRG....................................................................................................................... 28
7.7 Local Data Recording and Analysis ................................................................................. 28
7.7.1 Data recording ..................................................................................................... 28
7.7.2 Local data collection............................................................................................ 28
7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction .................................................. 28
7.8 ADS-B Problem Report.................................................................................................... 29
7.8.1 Report Form......................................................................................................... 29
7.8.2 Description of Fields ........................................................................................... 30
7.9 ADS-B Performance Report Form.................................................................................... 31
8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 32
8.1 Reliability ......................................................................................................................... 32
8.2 Availability ....................................................................................................................... 32
8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems................................. 33
A: System design ......................................................................................................... 33
B: Logistics strategy ................................................................................................... 34
C: Configuration Management.................................................................................... 35
D: Training & Competency plans................................................................................ 36
E: Data collection & Review....................................................................................... 36
9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES.......................................................... 37
9.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 37
9.2 ADS-B Regulations .......................................................................................................... 37
9.3 Factors to be considered when using ADS-B................................................................... 38
9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data..................................................................................... 38
9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance .......................................................................... 38
9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service ...................................................................... 38
9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data........................................................................................ 39
9.3.5 Synergy between GNSS and ADS-B ................................................................... 40

9.4 Reporting Rates ................................................................................................................ 41
9.4.1 General ................................................................................................................ 41
9.5 Separation ......................................................................................................................... 41
9.5.1 General................................................................................................................. 41
9.5.2 Identification Methods ......................................................................................... 41
9.5.3 ADS-B Separation................................................................................................ 41
9.5.4 Vertical Separation............................................................................................... 42
9.6 Air Traffic Control Clearance Monitoring ....................................................................... 42
9.6.1 General................................................................................................................. 42
9.6.2 Deviation from ATC clearances .......................................................................... 42
9.7 Alerting service................................................................................................................. 42
9.8 Position Reporting ............................................................................................................ 42
9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage .................................. 42
9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirement in ADS-B airspace.................................. 42
9.9 Phraseology....................................................................................................................... 43
9.9.1 Phraseology standard........................................................................................... 43
9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B................................................. 43
9.10 Flight Planning.................................................................................................................. 45
9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity ....................................... 45
9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements................................................................. 45
9.10.3 Setting Flight Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits ........................................... 46
9.11 Procedures to Handle Non-compliant ADS-B Aircraft or
Mis-leading ADS-B Transmissions.................................................................................. 47
9.12 Emergency Procedures .................................................................................................... 50
10. Security Issues Associated with ADS-B........................................................................ 51
10.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 51
10.2 Considerations .................................................................................................................. 51
Appendix 1 – An Example of Commissioning Checklist
Appendix 2 – Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis of ADS-B Avionics Performance

1. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2003 recommended that States recognize
ADS-B as an enabler of the global ATM concept bringing substantial safety and capacity benefits;
support the cost-effective early implementation of it; and ensuring it is harmonized, compatible and
interoperable with operational procedures, data linking and ATM applications.
The Twelve ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2012 endorsed the Aviation System Block
Upgrades (ASBU) to provide a framework for global harmonization and interoperability of seamless
ATM systems. Among the Block Upgrades, the Block 0 module “Initial Capability for Ground
Surveillance” recommends States to implement ADS-B which provides an economical alternative to
acquire surveillance capabilities especially for areas where it is technically infeasible or commercially
unviable to install radars.
This ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) provides guidance material
for the planning, implementation and operational application of ADS-B technology in the Asia and
Pacific Regions.
The procedures and requirements for ADS-B operations are detailed in the relevant States’ AIP. The
AIGD is intended to provide key information on ADS-B performance, integration, principles,
procedures and collaboration mechanisms.
The content is based upon the work to date of the APANPIRG ADS-B Study and Implementation Task
Force (SITF) and various ANC Panels developing provisions for the operational use of ADS-B.
Amendment to the guidance material will be required as new/revised SARPs and PANS are published.
1.1 ARRANGEMENT OF THE AIGD
The AIGD consists of the following Parts:
Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Acronyms and Glossary of Terms
Section 3 Reference Documents
Section 4 ADS-B Data
Section 5 ADS-B Implementation
Section 6 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B
Implementation
Section 7 System Integrity and Monitoring
Section 8 Reliability and Availability Considerations
Section 9 ADS-B Regulations and Procedures
Section 10 Security Issues Associated with ADS-B
1.2 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT
This document is managed by the APANPIRG. It was introduced as draft to the first Working Group
meeting of the ADS-B SITF in Singapore in October 2004, at which it was agreed to develop the draft to
an approved working document that provides implementation guidance for States. The first edition was
presented to APANPIRG for adoption in August 2005. It is intended to supplement SARPs, PANS and
relevant provisions contained in ICAO documentation and it will be regularly updated to reflect
evolving provisions.

1.3 COPIES
Paper copies of this AIGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be found at the
following web site: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx
Copy may be freely downloaded from the web site, or by emailing APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia
and Pacific Regional Office who will send a copy by return email.
1.4 CHANGES TO THE AIGD
Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC) Form
(see Section 1.6 below) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional
Office. The Regional Office will collate RFCs for consideration by the ADS-B Study and
Implementation Task Force.
When an amendment has been agreed by a meeting of the ADS-B Study and Implementation Task
Force then a new version of the AIGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in the
margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC, so a reader can see the origin of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted; e.g.:
Final approval for publication of an amendment to the AIGD will be the responsibility of APANPIRG.
1.5 EDITING CONVENTIONS
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1.6 AIGD REQUEST FOR CHANGE FORM
RFC Nr:
Please use this form when requesting a change to any part of this AIGD. This form may be photocopied
as required, emailed, faxed or e-mailed to ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office
+66 (2) 537-8199 or APAC@icao.int
1. SUBJECT:
2. REASON FOR CHANGE:
3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if necessary]

4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FA/X/E-MAIL:
6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:
Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date
7. ACTION REQUIRE :
8. AIGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :
9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

1.7 AMENDMENT RECORD
Amendment
Number
Date Amended by Comments
0.1 24 December 2004 W. Blythe
H. Anderson
Modified draft following contributions from
ADS-B SITF Working Group members.
Incorporated to TF/3 Working Paper #3.
0.2 (1.0) 24 March 2005 H. Anderson Final draft prepared at ADS-B SITF WG/3
0.3 (1.1) 03 June 2005 Nick King Amendments following SASP WG/WHL
meeting of May 2005
0.4 15 July 2005 CNS/MET SG/9 Editorial changes made
1.0 26 August 2005 APANPIRG/16 Adopted as the first Edition
2.0 25 August 2006 Proposed by
ADS-B SITF/5
and adopted by
APANPIRG/17
Adopted as the second Edition
3.0 7 September 2007 Proposed by
ADS-B SITF/6
and adopted by
APANPIRG/18
Adopted as the second amendment (3rd
edition)
ADS-B SITF/10
and adopted by
APANPIRG/22
Adopted amendment on consequential
change to the Flight Plan and additional
material on the reliability and availability
for ADS-B ground system
ADS-B SITF/11
and adopted by
APANPIRG/23
Included sample template on harmonization
framework
6.0 June 2013 Proposed by
ADS-B SITF/12
and adopted by
APANPIRG/24
Revamped to include the latest ADS-B
developments and references to guidance
materials on ADS-B implementation
7.0 September 2014 Proposed by
ADS-B SITF/13
and adopted by
APANPIRG/25
(i) Included guidance materials on
monitoring and analysis of ADS-B
equipped aircraft
(ii) Included guidance materials on synergy
between GNSS and ADS-B
(iii) Revised ATC Phraseology
(iv) Included clarification on Flight
Planning

2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS
2.1 ACRONYM LIST
ACID Aircraft Identification
ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
AIGD ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIT ADS-B Implementation Team
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
APANPIRG Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporate
ATC Air Traffic Control (or Air Traffic Controller)
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ATSP ATS Provider
ATSU ATS unit
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CDTI Cockpit Display Traffic Information
DAIW Danger Area Infringement Warning
FIR Flight Information Region
FLTID Flight Identification
FMS Flight Management System
FOM Figure of Merit used in ASTERIX messaging
GPS Global Positioning System (USA)
HPL Horizontal Protection Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTCA Medium Term Conflict Alert
MTTR Mean Time To Restore
NAC Navigation Accuracy Category
NIC Navigation Integrity Category
PRS Problem Reporting System
RAI Restricted Area Intrusion
RAM Route Adherence Monitoring
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RFC Request for Change
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SIL Surveillance Integrity Level
SITF Study and Implementation Task Force
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert

2.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ADS-B In An ADS-B system feature that enables the display of
real time ADS-B tracks on a situation display in the
aircraft cockpit.
ADS-B Out An ADS-B system feature that enables the frequent
broadcast of accurate aircraft position and vector
data together with other information.
Asterix 21 Eurocontrol standard format for data message
exchange
FOM (Figure of Merit) A numeric value that is used to determine the
accuracy and integrity of associated position data.
HPL (Horizontal Position Limit) The containment radius within which the true
position of the aircraft will be found for 95% of the
time (See DO229c).
NAC (Navigational Accuracy Category) Subfield used to announce the 95% accuracy limits
for the horizontal position data being broadcast.
NIC (Navigational Integrity Category) Subfield used to specify the containment radius
integrity associated with horizontal position data.
NUCp ( Navigation Uncertainty Category) A numeric value that announces the integrity of the
associated horizontal position data being broadcast.
SIL (Surveillance Integrity Level) Subfield used to specify the probability of the true
position lying outside the containment radius defined
by NIC without being alerted.

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Id Name of the document Reference Date Origin Domain
1 Annex 2: Rules of the Air Tenth Edition
Including
Amendment 43
dated 16/7/12
July 2005 ICAO
2 Annex 4: Aeronautical Chart Eleventh Edition
including
Amendment 56
dated 12/7/10
July 2009 ICAO
3 Annex 10: Aeronautical
Telecommunications, Vol. IV –
Surveillance Radar and Collision
Avoidance Systems
Fourth Edition
Including
Amendment 87
dated 12/7/10
July 2007 ICAO
4 Annex 11: Air Traffic Services Thirteenth Edition
including
Amendment 48
dated 16/7/12
July 2001 ICAO
5 Annex 15: Aeronautical
Information Services
Thirteen Edition July 2010 ICAO
6 PAN-ATM (Doc 4444/ATM501) Fifteen Edition
including
Amendment 4
applicable on
15/11/12
2007 ICAO
7 Manual on Airspace Planning
Methodology for the Determination
of Separation Minima (Doc
9689/AN953)
First Edition
including
Amendment 1
dated 30/8/02
1998 ICAO
8 Doc 9859 Safety Management
Manual (SMM)
Third Edition 2012 ICAO
9 ICAO Circular 326 AN/188
“Assessment of ADS-B and
Multilateration Surveillance to
Support Air Traffic Services and
Guidelines for Implementation”.
First Edition 2012 ICAO
10 Regional Supplementary
Procedures (Doc 7030)
Fifth Edition
including
Amendment 5
dated 22/7/11
2008 ICAO

4. ADS-B DATA
APANPIRG has decided to use 1090MHz Extended Squitter data link for ADS-B data exchange in the
Asia and Pacific Regions. In the longer term an additional link type may be required.
To ensure interoperability of ADS-B ground stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC) Regions, during
the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 version 0.23 (V0.23)
which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B ground stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At this
time, DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.
This baselined version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services, including
aircraft separation, can be provided. V0.23 can be used with DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B
avionics/ground stations to provide basic ATC operational services. However, V0.23 cannot fully
support the more advanced capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.
States intending to implement ADS-B surveillance and share ADS-B data with others might consider to
adopt a more updated version of ASTERIX in order to make use of the advanced capabilities offered by
DO260A and DO260B compliant avionics.
A guidance material on generation, processing and sharing of ASTERIX Cat. 21 ADS-B messages is
provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by
States.
In this guidance material, the ADS-B data contained inside ASTERIX Cat 21 are classified as Group 1
(mandatory), Group 2 (Desirable) and Group 3 (Optional). It is required to transmit all data that are
operationally desirable (Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data
that are mandatory (Group 1) in ASTERIX messages. Whether Group 3 optional data will need to be
transmitted or not should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B ground station
depending on specific operational needs.
It is considered necessary that all data that are mandatory in ASTERIX messages (i.e. Group 1 data
items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received from aircraft,
should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of optional data
items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement between the two
data sharing parties concerned.

5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.1.1 Planning
There are a range of activities needed to progress ADS-B implementation from initial concept
level to operational use. This section addresses the issues of collaborative decision making,
system compatibility and integration, while the second section of this chapter provides a
checklist to assist States with the management of ADS-B implementation activities.
5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination
5.1.2.1 Any decision to implement ADS-B by a State should include consultation with the
wider ATM community. Moreover, where ADS-B procedures or requirements will
affect traffic transiting between states, the implementation should also be coordinated
between States and Regions, in order to achieve maximum benefits for airspace users
and service providers.
5.1.2.2 An effective means of coordinating the various demands of the affected organizations is
to establish an implementation team. Team composition may vary by State or Region,
but the core group responsible for ADS-B implementation planning should include
members with multidiscipline operational expertise from affected aviation disciplines,
with access to other specialists where required.
5.1.2.3 Ideally, such a team should comprise representatives from the ATS providers, regulators
and airspace users, as well as other stakeholders likely to be influenced by the
introduction of ADS-B, such as manufacturers and military authorities. All identified
stakeholders should participate as early as possible in this process so that their
requirements can be identified prior to the making of schedules or contracts.
5.1.2.4 The role of the implementation team is to consult widely with stakeholders, identify
operational needs, resolve conflicting demands and make recommendations to the
various stakeholders managing the implementation. To this end, the implementation
team should have appropriate access to the decision-makers.
5.1.3 System compatibility
5.1.3.1 ADS-B has potential use in almost all environments and operations and is likely to
become a mainstay of the future ATM system. In addition to traditional radar-like
services, it is likely that ADS-B will also be used for niche application where radar
surveillance is not available or possible. The isolated use of ADS-B has the potential to
foster a variety of standards and practices that, once expanded to a wider environment,
may prove to be incompatible with neighbouring areas.
5.1.3.2 Given the international nature of aviation, special efforts should be taken to ensure
harmonization though compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs). The choice of systems to support ADS-B should consider not only the
required performance of individual components, but also their compatibility with other
CNS systems.

5.1.3.3The future concept of ATM encompasses the advantages of interoperable and seamless
transition across flight information region (FIR) boundaries and, where necessary, ADS-
B implementation teams should conduct simulations, trials and cost/benefit analysis to
support these objectives.
5.1.4 Integration
5.1.4.1 ADS-B implementation plans should include the development of both business and
safety cases. The adoption of any new CNS system has major implications for service
providers, regulators and airspace users and special planning should be considered for
the integration of ADS-B into the existing and foreseen CNS/ATM system. The
following briefly discusses each element.
5.1.4.2 Communication system
5.1.4.2.1 The communication system is an essential element within CNS. An air
traffic controller can now monitor an aircraft position in real time using
ADS-B where previously only voice position reports were available.
However, a communication system that will support the new services
that result from the improved surveillance may be necessary.
Consequently, there is an impact of the ongoing ADS-B related work on
the communication infrastructure developments.
5.1.4.3 Navigation system infrastructure
5.1.4.3.1 ADS-B is dependent upon the data obtained from a navigation system
(typically GNSS), in order to enable its functions and performance.
Therefore, the navigation infrastructure should fulfill the corresponding
requirements of the ADS-B application, in terms of:
a) Data items; and
b) Performance (e.g. accuracy, integrity, availability etc.).
5.1.4.3.2 This has an obvious impact on the navigation system development,
which evolves in parallel with the development of the surveillance
system.
5.1.4.4 Other surveillance infrastructure
5.1.4.4.1 ADS-B may be used to supplement existing surveillance systems or as
the principal source of surveillance data. Ideally, surveillance systems
will incorporate data from ADS-B and other sources to provide a
coherent picture that improves both the amount and utility of
surveillance data to the user. The choice of the optimal mix of data
sources will be defined on the basis of operational demands, available
technology, safety and cost-benefit considerations.
5.1.4.4.2 A guidance material on issues to be considered in ATC multi-sensor fusion
processing including integration of ADS-B data is provided on the ICAO
website http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx for reference by
States.

5.1.4.4.3 A guidance material on processing and displaying of ADS-B data at air
traffic controller positions is provided on the ICAO website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.
5.1.5 Coverage Predictions
5.1.5.1 Reliable and robust analysis and planning of ADS-B coverage to support seamless
ATM initiative requires accurate and reliable coverage modelling. States should ensure
that surveillance engineering/technical teams are provided with modelling tools to
provide accurate and reliable coverage predictions for ATM planning and analysis.
5.2 IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST
5.2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this implementation checklist is to document the range of activities that needs to be
completed to bring an ADS-B application from an initial concept to operational use. This checklist may
form the basis of the terms of reference for an ADS-B implementation team, although some activities
may be specific to individual stakeholders. An example of the checklist used by AirServices Australia
is given at Appendix 1.
5.2.2 Activity Sequence
The activities are listed in an approximate sequential order. However, each activity does not have to be
completed prior to starting the next activity. In many cases, a parallel and iterative process should be
used to feed data and experience from one activity to another. It should be noted that not all activities
will be required for all applications.
5.2.3 Concept Phase
a) construct operational concept:
1) purpose;
2) operational environment;
3) ATM functions; and
4) infrastructure;
b) identify benefits:
1) safety enhancements;
2) efficiency;
3) capacity;
4) environmental;
5) cost reductions;
6) access; and
7) other metrics (e.g. predictability, flexibility, usefulness);
c) identify constraints:
1) pair-wise equipage;
2) compatibility with non-equipped aircraft;

3) need for exclusive airspace;
4) required ground infrastructure;
5) RF spectrum;
6) integration with existing technology; and
7) technology availability;
d) prepare business case:
1) cost benefit analysis; and
2) demand and justification.
5.2.4 Design Phase
a) identify operational requirements:
1) security; and
2) systems interoperability;
b) identify human factors issues:
1) human-machine interfaces;
2) training development and validation;
3) workload demands;
4) role of automation vs. role of human;
5) crew coordination/pilot decision-making interactions; and
6) ATM collaborative decision-making;
c) identify technical requirements:
1) standards development;
2) data required;
3) functional processing;
4) functional performance; and
5) required certification levels;
d) equipment development, test, and evaluation:
1) prototype systems built to existing or draft standards/specifications;
2) developmental bench and flight tests; and
3) acceptance test parameters; and
4) select and procure technology;
e) develop procedures:
1) pilot and controller actions and responsibilities;
2) phraseologies;
3) separation/spacing criteria and requirements;
4) controller’s responsibility to maintain a monitoring function, if appropriate;
5) contingency procedures;
6) emergency procedures; and
7) develop AIP and Information documentation

f) prepare design phase safety case:
1) safety rationale;
2) safety budget and allocation; and
3) functional hazard assessment.
5.2.5 Implementation phase
a) prepare implementation phase safety case;
b) conduct operational test and evaluation:
1) flight deck and ATC validation simulations; and
2) flight tests and operational trials;
c) obtain systems certification:
1) aircraft equipment; and
2) ground systems;
d) obtain regulatory approvals:
1) flight operations; and
2) air traffic certification of use;
e) implementation transition:
1) Promulgate procedures and deliver training
2) continue data collection and analysis;
3) resolve any unforeseen issues; and
4) continue feedback into standards development processes;
f) performance monitoring to ensure that the agreed performance is maintained.
5.2.5.1 Once the implementation project is complete, ongoing maintenance and upgrading of
both ADS-B operations and infrastructure should continue to be monitored, through
the appropriate forums.

6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION
6.1 BACKGROUND
6.1.1 It is obvious that full benefits of ADS-B will only be achieved by its harmonized
implementation and seamless operations. During the 6th meeting of ADS-B SEA/WG in
February 2011, Hong Kong, China initiated to strengthen collaboration among
concerned States/Administrations for harmonized ADS-B implementation and seamless
operations along two ATS routes L642 and M771 with major traffic flow (MTF). An
ad-hoc workgroup comprising concerned CAAs/ANSPs from Hong Kong, China,
Mainland China, Vietnam and Singapore was subsequently formed to elaborate and
agree on a framework regarding implementation timelines, avionics standards, optimal
flight levels, and ATC and engineering handling procedures. As a coherent effort, ADS-
B implementation along ATS routes L642 and M771 has been harmonized while Hong
Kong, China and Singapore have published respective Aeronautical Information
Circulars and Airworthiness Notices on ADS-B mandates for these two routes with
effect on 12 December 2013.
6.1.2 It is considered that the above implementation framework for ATS routes L642/M771
would serve as a useful template for extension to other high density routes to harmonize
ADS-B implementation. Paragraph 6.2 shows the detailed framework.

6.2 TEMPLATE OF HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION
Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation along ATS Routes L642 and M771
No. What to harmonize What was agreed Issue / what needs to be further
discussed
1 Mandate Effective Singapore (SG), Hong Kong (HK), China (Sanya) :
12 Dec 2013
Vietnam (VN) : to be confirmed
2 ATC Operating Procedures No need to harmonize Refer to SEACG for consideration of the
impact of expanding ADS-B surveillance
on ATC Operating Procedures including
Large Scale Weather procedures.
3 Mandate Publish Date No need to harmonize To publish equipment requirements as
early as possible.
4 Date of Operational Approval No need to harmonize

5 Flight Level SG, HK, CN :
- At or Above FL290 (ADS-B airspace)
- Below FL290 (Non-ADS-B airspace)
VN to be confirmed
6 Avionics Standard (CASA/AMC2024) SG - CASA or AMC2024 or FAAAC No. 20-165
HK - CASA or AMC2024 or FAAAC No. 20-165
VN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAAAC No. 20-165
CN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAAAC No. 20-165
ADS-B Task Force agreed that DO260B
will be accepted as well.
SG, HK, and CN agreed their ADS-B GS
will accept DO260, DO260A and
DO260B by 1 July 2014 (Note 1)
7 Flight Planning Before 15 Nov 2012, as per AIDG
On or after 15 Nov 2012, as per new flight plan
format
8 Aircraft Approval
8a) Procedures if Aircraft Not Approved or
Aircraft without a Serviceable ADS-B
Transmitting Equipment before Flight
SG, HK, CN : FL280 and Below
VN to be confirmed

8b) Aircraft Approved but Transmitting Bad
Data (Blacklisted Aircraft)
For known aircraft, treat as non ADS-B aircraft. Share blacklisted aircraft among
concerned States/Administration
9 Contingency Plan
9a) Systemic Failure such as Ground System
/ GPS Failure
Revert back to current procedure.
9b) Avionics Failure or Approved Aircraft
Transmitting Bad Data in Flight
Provide other form of separation, subject to bilateral
agreement.
From radar/ADS-B environment to ADS-B only
environment, ATC coordination may be able to
provide early notification of ADS-B failure.
Address the procedure for aircraft
transiting from radar to ADS-B airspace
and from ADS-B to ADS-B airspace.
10 Commonly Agreed Route Spacing SEACG Need for commonly agreed minimal in-
trail spacing throughout.
Note 1: Also included two ADS-B GS supplied by Indonesia at Matak and Natuna
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) environment
is an integrated system including physical systems (hardware, software, and communication networks),
human elements (pilots, controllers and engineers), and the operational procedures for its applications.
ADS-B is a surveillance system that may be integrated with other surveillance technologies or may also
operate as an independent source for surveillance monitoring within the CNS/ATM system.
Because of the integrated nature of such system and the degree of interaction among its components,
comprehensive system monitoring is recommended. The procedures described in this section aim to
ensure system integrity by validation, identification, reporting and tracking of possible problems
revealed during system monitoring with appropriate follow-up actions.
These procedures do not replace the ATS incident reporting procedures and requirements, as specified
in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Appendix 4; ICAO’s Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426),
Chapter 3; or applicable State regulations, affecting the reporting responsibilities of parties directly
involved in a potential ATS incident.
7.2 PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING
Prior to operating any element of the ADS-B system, operational and technical personnel shall
undertake appropriate training as determined by the States, including compliance with the Convention
on International Civil Aviation where applicable.
Notwithstanding the above requirement and for the purposes of undertaking limited trials of the
ADS-B system, special arrangements may be agreed between the operator and an Air Traffic Services
Unit (ATSU).
7.3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR AN ATC SEPARATION SERVICE
A number of States have started to introduce ADS-B for the provision of Air Traffic Services, including
‘radar-like’ separation. The ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel (SASP) has completed
assessment on the suitability of ADS-B for various applications including provision of aircraft
separation based on comparison of technical characteristics between ADS-B and monopulse secondary
surveillance radar. It is concluded that that ADS-B surveillance is better or at least no worse than the
referenced radar, and can be used to provide separation minima as described in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444)
whether ADS-B is used as a sole means of ATC surveillance or used together with radar, subject to
certain conditions to be met. The assessment result is detailed in the ICAO Circular 326 AN/188
“Assessment of ADS-B and Multilateration Surveillance to Support Air Traffic Services and Guidelines
for Implementation”.
States intending to introduce ADS-B separation minima shall comply with provisions of PANS-ATM,
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030) and Annex 11 paragraph 3.4.1. States should adopt the
guidelines contained in this document unless conformance with
PANS-ATM specifications requires change.

7.4 ATC SYSTEM VALIDATION
7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines
To meet system integrity requirements, States should conduct a validation process that confirms
the integrity of their equipment and procedures. Such processes shall include:
a) A system safety assessment for new implementations is the basis for definitions of
system performance requirements. Where existing systems are being modified to utilize
additional services, the assessment demonstrates that the ATS Provider’s system will
meet safety objectives;
b) Integration test results confirming interoperability for operational use of airborne and
ground systems; and
c) Confirmation that the ATS Operation Manuals are compatible with those of adjacent
providers where the system is used across a common boundary.
7.4.2 System safety assessment
The objective of the system safety assessment is to ensure the State that introduction and
operation of ADS-B is safe. This can be achieved through application of the provisions of
Annex 11 paragraph 2.27 and PANS-ATM Chapter 2. The safety assessment should be
conducted for initial implementation as well as any future enhancements and should include:
a) Identifying failure conditions;
b) Assigning levels of criticality;
c) Determining risks/ probabilities for occurrence;
d) Identifying mitigating measures and fallback arrangements;
e) Categorising the degree of acceptability of risks; and
f) Operational hazard ID process.
Following the safety assessment, States should institute measures to offset any identified failure
conditions that are not already categorized as acceptable. This should be done to reduce the
probability of their occurrence to a level as low as reasonably practicable. This could be
accomplished through system automation or manual procedures.
Guidance material on building a safety case for delivery of an ADS-B separation service is
provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for
reference by States.
7.4.3 Integration test
States should conduct trials with suitably equipped aircraft to ensure they meet the operational
and technical requirements to provide an ATS. Alternatively, they may be satisfied by test
results and analysis conducted by another State or organization deemed competent to provide
such service. Where this process is followed, the tests conducted by another State or
organization should be comparable (i.e. using similar equipment under similar conditions).

Refer also to the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of
Separation Minima (Doc9689).
7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals
States should coordinate with adjacent States to confirm that their ATS Operation Manuals
contain standard operating procedures to ensure harmonization of procedures that impact across
common boundaries.
7.4.5 ATS System Integrity
With automated ATM systems, data changes, software upgrades, and system failures can affect
adjacent units. States shall ensure that:
a) A conservative approach is taken to manage any changes to the system;
b) Aircrew, aircraft operating companies and adjacent ATSU(s) are notified of any planned
system changes in advance, where that system is used across a common boundary;
c) ATSUs have verification procedures in place to ensure that following any system
changes, displayed data is both correct and accurate;
d) In cases of system failures or where upgrades (or downgrades) or other changes may
impact surrounding ATS units, ATSUs should have a procedure in place for timely
notification to adjacent units. Such notification procedures will normally be detailed in
Letters of Agreement between adjacent units; and
e) ADS-B surveillance data is provided with equal to or better level of protection and
security than existing surveillance radar data.
7.5 SYSTEM MONITORING
During the initial period of implementation of ADS-B technology, routine collection of data is necessary
in order to ensure that the system continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and
interoperability requirements, and that operational service delivery and procedures are working as
intended. The monitoring program is a two-fold process. Firstly, summarised statistical data should be
produced periodically showing the performance of the system. This is accomplished through ADS-B
Periodic Status Reports. Secondly, as problems or abnormalities arise, they should be identified,
tracked, analyzed and corrected and information disseminated as required, utilizing the ADS-B Problem
Report.
Guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of ADS-B Avionics Performance are given at
Appendix 2.
7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS)
The Problem Reporting System is tasked with the collection, storage and regular dissemination
of data based on reports received from ADS-B SITF members. The PRS tracks problem reports
and publish information from those reports to ADS-B SITF members. Problem resolution is the
responsibility of the appropriate ADS-B SITF members.
The PRS Administrator shall:

a) prepare consolidated problem report summaries for each ADS-B SITF meeting;
b) collect and consolidate ADS-B Problem Reports; and
c) maintain a functional website (with controlled access) to manage the problem reporting
function.
7.5.2 The monitoring process
When problems or abnormalities are discovered, the initial analysis should be performed by the
organization(s) identifying the problem. In addition, a copy of the problem report should be
entered in to the PRS which will assign a tracking number. As some problems or abnormalities
may involve more than one organization, the originator should be responsible for follow-up
action to rectify the problem and forward the information to the PRS. It is essential that all
information relating to the problem is documented and recorded and resolved in a timely
manner.
The following groups should be involved in the monitoring process and problem tracking to
ensure a comprehensive review and analysis of the collected data:
a) ATS Providers;
b) Organizations responsible for ATS system maintenance (where different from the ATS
provider);
c) Relevant State regulatory authorities;
d) Communication Service Providers being used;
e) Aircraft operators; and
f) Aircraft and avionics manufacturers.
7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information
It is important that information that may have an operational impact on other parties be
distributed by the authorised investigator to all authorised groups that are likely to be affected,
as soon as possible. In this way, each party is made aware of problems already encountered by
others, and may be able to contribute further information to aid in the solution of these
problems. The default position is that all states agree to provide the data which will be de-
identified for reporting and record keeping purposes.
7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports
Problem reports may originate from many sources, but most will fall within two categories;
reports based on observation of one or more specific events, or reports generated from the
routine analysis of data. The user would document the problem, resolve it with the appropriate
party and forward a copy of the report to the PRS for tracking and distribution. While one
occurrence may appear to be an isolated case, the receipt of numerous similar reports by the
PRS could indicate that an area needs more detailed analysis.

To effectively resolve problems and track progress, the problem reports should be sent to the
nominated point of contact at the appropriate organization and the PRS. The resolution of the
identified problems may require:
a) Re-training of system operators, or revision of training procedures to ensure compliance
with existing procedures;
b) Change to operating procedures;
c) Change to system requirements, including performance and interoperability; or
d) Change to system design.
7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report
The ATS Providers should complete the ADS-B Periodic Status Report annually and deliver the
report to the regional meeting of the ADS-B SITF. The Periodic Status Report should give an
indication of system performance and identify any trend in system deficiencies, the resultant
operational implications, and the proposed resolution, if applicable.
Communications Service Providers, if used, are also expected to submit Periodic Status Reports
on the performance of the networks carrying ADS-B data at the annual regional meeting of the
ADS-B SITF. These reports could also contain the details of planned or current upgrades to the
network.
7.5.6 Processing of Reports
Each group in the monitoring process should nominate a single point of contact for receipt of
problem reports and coordination with the other parties. This list will be distributed by the PRS
Administrator to all parties to the monitoring process.
Each State should establish mechanisms within its ATS Provider and regulatory authority to:
a) Assess problem reports and refer them to the appropriate technical or operational
expertise for investigation and resolution;
b) Coordinate with aircraft operators;
c) Develop interim operational procedures to mitigate the effects of problems until such
time as the problem is resolved;
d) Monitor the progress of problem resolution;
e) Prepare a report on problems encountered and their operational implications and
forward these to the PRS;
f) Prepare the ADS-B periodic status report at pre-determined times and forward these to
the Secretary of the annual meeting of the ADS-B SITF; and
g) Coordinate with any Communication Service Providers used.

7.6 APANPIRG
APANPIRG, with the assistance of its contributory bodies, shall oversee the monitoring process to
ensure the ADS-B system continues to meet its performance and safety requirements, and that
operational procedures are working as intended. The APANPIRG’S objectives are to:
a) review Periodic Status Reports and any significant Problem Reports;
b) highlight successful problem resolutions to ADS-B SITF members;
c) monitor the progress of outstanding problem resolutions;
d) prepare summaries of problems encountered and their operational implications; and
e) assess system performance based on information in the PRS and Periodic Status
Reports.
7.7 LOCAL DATA RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
7.7.1 Data recording
It is recommended that ATS Providers and Communication Service Providers retain the records
defined below for at least 30 days to allow for accident/incident investigation processes. These
records should be made available on request to the relevant State safety authority. Where data
is sought from an adjacent State, the usual State to State channels should be used.
These recordings shall be in a form that permits a replay of the situation and identification of
the messages that were received by the ATS system.
7.7.2 Local data collection
ATS providers and communications service providers should identify and record ADS-B system
component failures that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of controlled flights or
compromise service continuity.
7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction
ATS providers need to develop systems to :
a) detect ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults
b) advise the regulators and where appropriate the aircraft operators on the detected
ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults
c) devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults
Regulators need to develop and maintain systems to ensure that appropriate corrective actions
are taken to address identified faults.

7.8 ADS-B PROBLEM REPORT
7.8.1 Report Form
PRS #
Date UTC Time UTC
Registration Aircraft ID
Flight ID ICAO 24 Bit Code
Aircraft Type
Flight Sector/
Location
ATS Unit
Description / additional information
Originator
Originator Reference
number
Organization

7.8.2 Description of Fields
Field Meaning
Number A unique identification number assigned by the PRS
Administrator to this problem report. Organizations writing problem reports
are encouraged to maintain their own internal list of these problems for
tracking purposes. Once the problems have been reported to the PRS and
incorporated in the database, a number will be assigned by the PRS and used
for tracking by the ADS-B SITF.
Date UTC UTC date when the event occurred.
Time UTC UTC time (or range of times) at which the event occurred.
Registration Registration number (tail number) of the aircraft involved.
Aircraft ID (ACID) Coded equivalent of voice call sign as entered in FPL Field 7.
ICAO 24 Bit Code Unique aircraft address expressed in Hexadecimal form (e.g. 7432DB)
Flight ID (FLTID) The identification transmitted by ADS-B for display on a controller situation
display or a CDTI.
Flight
Sector/Location
The departure airport and destination airport for the sector being flown by
the aircraft involved in the event. These should be the ICAO identifiers of
those airports. Or if more descriptive, the location of the aircraft during the
event.
Originator Point of contact at the originating organization for this report (usually the
author).
Aircraft Type The aircraft model involved.
Organization The name of the organization (airline, ATS provider or communications
service provider) that created the report.
ATS Unit ICAO identifier of the ATC Center or Tower controlling the aircraft at the
time of the event.
Description This should provide as complete a description of the situation leading up to
the problem as is possible. Where the organization reporting the problem is
not able to provide all the information (e.g. the controller may not know
everything that happens on the aircraft), it would be helpful if they would
coordinate with the other parties to obtain the necessary information.
The description should include:
 A complete description of the problem that is being reported
 The route contained in the FMS and flight plan
 Any flight deck indications
 Any indications provided to the controller when the problem
occurred
 Any additional information that the originator of the problem report
considers might be helpful but is not included on the list above
If necessary to contain all the information, additional pages may be added. if
the originator considers it might be helpful, diagrams and other additional
information (such as printouts of message logs) may be appended to the
report.

7.9 ADS-B PERFORMANCE REPORT FORM
Originating Organization
Date of submission Originator
Report Period
TECHNICAL ISSUES
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
GENERAL COMMENTS

8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Reliability and Availability of ADS-B systems should normally be equivalent or better than the
reliability and availability of radar systems.
Guidance material on Reliability and Availability standards for ADS-B systems and supporting voice
communications systems are included in the document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance
Parameters” which is available on the ICAO APAC website at:
http://www.icao.int/APAC/Documents/edocs/cns/ADSB_ServicePer.pdf
The “Baseline ADS-B Performance Parameters” document contains three Tiers of service performance
parameters with different reliability and availability standards for each Tier. The appropriate Tier should
be selected for the type of ADS-B service intended:
(a) Tier 1 standards are for a high performance traffic separation service;
(b) Tier 2 standards are for a traffic situational awareness service with procedural separation; and
(c) Tier 3 standards are for a traffic advisory service (flight information service)
To achieve high operational availability of ADS-B systems to support aircraft separation services, it is
necessary to operate with duplicated/redundant systems. If one system fails, the service continues using
an unduplicated system. This is acceptable for a short period, whilst the faulty system is being repaired,
because the probability of a second failure during the short time window of repairing is low.
However, it is necessary to ensure that the repair does not take too long. A long repair time increases the
risk of an unexpected failure (loss of service continuity); which in turn, introduces potential loss of
service (low availability) and loss of aircraft operational efficiency and/or safety impacts.
8.1 Reliability
8.1.1 Reliability is a measure of how often a system fails and is usually measured as Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) expressed in hours. Continuity is a measure equivalent
to reliability, but expressed as the probability of system failure over a defined period. In
the context of this document, failure means inability to deliver ADS-B data to the ATC
centre. Ie: Failure of the ADS-B system rather than an equipment or component failure.
8.1.2 Poor system MTBF has a safety impact because typically it causes unexpected
transition from one operating mode to another. For example, aircraft within surveillance
coverage that are safely separated by a surveillance standard distance (say, 5 NM) are
unexpectedly no longer separated by a procedural standard distance (say 15 mins), due
to an unplanned surveillance outage.
8.1.3 In general, reliability is determined by design (see para 8.3 B below)
8.2 Availability
8.2.1 Availability is a measure of how often the system is available for operational use. It is
usually expressed as a percentage of the time that the system is available.

8.2.2 Poor availability usually results in loss of economic benefit because efficiencies are not
available when the ATC system is operating in a degraded mode (eg using procedural
control instead of say 5 NM separation).
8.2.3 Planned outages are often included as outages because the efficiencies provided to the
Industry are lost, no matter what the cause of the outage. However, some organisations
do not include planned outages because it is assumed that planned outages only occur
when the facility is not required.
8.2.4 Availability is calculated as
Availability (Ao) = MTBF/(MTBF+MDT)
where MTBF= Mean Time Between SYSTEM Failure
MDT = Mean Down Time for the SYSTEM
The MDT includes Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), Turn Around Time (TAT) for
spares, and Mean Logistic Delay Time (MLDT)
NB: This relates to the failure of the system to provide a service, rather than the time
between individual equipment failures. Some organisations use Mean Time Between
Outage (MTBO) rather than MTBF.
8.2.5 Availability is directly a function of how quickly the SYSTEM can be repaired. Ie:
directly a function of MDT. Thus availability is highly dependent on the ability & speed
of the support organisation to get the system back on-line.
8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems
A : System design can keep system failure rate low with long MTBF. Typical techniques are :
 to duplicate each element and minimise single points of failure. Automatic changeover or
parallel operation of both channels keeps system failure rates low. Ie: the system keeps
operating despite individual failures. Examples are :
o Separate communication channels between ADS-B ground station and ATC centre
preferably using different technologies or service providers eg one terrestrial and one
satellite
 Consideration of Human factors in design can reduce the number of system failures due to
human error. E.g. inadvertent switch off, incorrect software load, incorrect maintenance
operation.
 Take great care with earthing, cable runs and lightning protection to minimise the risks of
system damage
 Take great care to protect against water ingress to cables and systems
 Establish a system baseline that documents the achieved performance of the site that can be
later be used as a reference. This can shorten troubleshooting in future.
 System design can also improve the MDT by quickly identifying problems and alerting
maintenance staff. Eg Built in equipment test (BITE) can significantly contribute to
lowering MDT.

B: Logistics strategy aims to keep MDT very low. Low MDT depends on logistic support
providing short repair times. To achieve short repair times, ANSPs usually provide a range
of logistics, including the following, to ensure that the outage is less than a few days :
 ensure the procured system is designed to allow for quick replacement of faulty modules to
restore operations
 provide remote monitoring to allow maintainers to identify the faulty modules for transport
to site
 provide support tools to allow technicians to repair faulty modules or to configure/setup
replacement modules
 provide technicians training to identify & repair the faulty modules
 provide local maintenance depots to reduce the time it takes to access to the site
 provide documentation and procedures to “standardise” the process
 use an in-country spares pool to ensure that replacement modules are available within
reasonable times
 use a maintenance contract to repair faulty modules within a specified turnaround time.
I.e.: to replenish the spares pool quickly.
Whilst technical training and remote monitoring are usually considered by ANSPs, sometimes
there is less focus on spares support.
Difficulties can be experienced if States :
a) Fail to establish a spares pool – because procurement of spares at the time of failure can
bring extensive delays due to :
b) obtaining funds
c) obtaining approval to purchase overseas
d) obtaining approval to purchase from a “sole source”
e) difficulties and delays in obtaining a quotation
f) delays in delivery because the purchase was unexpected by the supplier
g) Fail to establish a module repair contract resulting in :
- long repair times
- unplanned expenditure
- inability for a supplier to repair modules because the supplier did not have adequate
certainty of funding of the work
Spares pool
ANSPs can establish, preferably as part of their acquisition purchase, adequate spares buffer
stock to support the required repair times. The prime objective is to reduce the time period that
the system operates un-duplicated. It allows decoupling of the restoration time from the module
repair time.
Module repair contract
ANSPs can also enter into a maintenance repair contract, preferably as part of their acquisition
purchase, to require the supplier to repair or replace and deliver failed modules within a
specified time – preferably with contractual incentives/penalties for compliance. Such support
contracts are best negotiated as part of the acquisition contract when competition between
vendors is at play to keep costs down. Sometimes it is appropriate to demand that the support
contractor also keep a certain level of buffer stock of spares “in country”.

It is strongly recommended that maintenance support is purchased under the same contract as
the acquisition contract.
The advantages of a module repair contract are :
- The price can be determined whilst in the competitive phase of acquisition
– hence avoids excessive costs
- The contract can include the supplier bearing all shipping costs
- Can be funded by a define amount per year, which support the budget
processes. If the costs are fixed, the supplier is encouraged to develop a
reliable system minimising module repairs.
- It avoids delays and funding issues at the time of the module failure
Other typical strategies are:
 Establish availability and reliability objectives that are agreed organization wide. In
particular agree System response times (SRT) for faults and system failure to ensure that
MDT is achieved. An agreed SRT can help organizations to decide on the required logistics
strategy including number, location and skills of staff to support the system.
 Establish baseline preventative maintenance regimes including procedures and performance
inspections in conjunction with manufacturer recommendations for all subsystems
 Use remote control & monitoring systems to identify faulty modules before travel to site.
This can avoid multiple trips to site and reduce the repair time
 Have handbooks, procedures, tools available at the site or a nearby depot so that travel time
does not adversely affect down time
 Have adequate spares and test equipment ready at a maintenance depot near the site or at the
site itself. Vendors can be required to perform analysis of the number of spares required to
achieve low probability of spare “stock out”
 Have appropriate plans to cope with system and component obsolescence. It is possible to
contractually require suppliers to regularly report on the ability to support the system and
supply components.
 Have ongoing training programs and competency testing to ensure that staff are able to
perform the required role
The detailed set of operational and technical arrangements in place and actions required to
maintain a system through the lifecycle are often documented in a Integrated Logistics Support
Plan.
C: Configuration Management aims to ensure that the configuration of the ground stations is
maintained with integrity. Erroneous configuration can cause unnecessary outages. Normally
configuration management is achieved by :
 Having clear organizational & individual responsibilities and accountabilities for system
configuration.
 Having clear procedures in place which define who has authority to change configuration
and records of the changes made including, inter alia

o The nature of the change including the reason
o Impact of the change & safety assessment
o An appropriate transition or cutover plan
o Who approved the change
o When the change was authorized and when the change was implemented
 Having appropriate test and analysis capabilities to confirm that new configurations are
acceptable before operational deployment.
 Having appropriate methods to deploy the approved configuration (Logistics of
configuration distribution). Suggested methods;
o Approved configuration published on intranet web pages
o Approved configuration distributed on approved media
D: Training & Competency plans aim to ensure that staff has the skills to safety repairs
Normally this is achieved by:
 Conduct of appropriate Training Needs Analysis (TNA) to identify the gap between trainee
skill/knowledge and the required skill/knowledge.
 Development and delivery of appropriate training to maintainers
 Competency based testing of trainees
 Ongoing refresher training to ensure that skills are maintained even when fault rates are low
E: Data collection & Review :
Regular and scheduled review should be undertaken to determine whether reliability/availability
objectives are being met. These reviews need to consider :
 Reports of actual achieved availability & reliability
 Data regarding system failures including “down time” needs to be captured and analysed so
the ANSP actually knows what is being (or not being) achieved.
 Any failure trends that need to be assessed. This requires data capture of the root cause of
failures
 Any environmental impacts on system performance, such coverage obstructions such as
trees, planned building developments, corrosion, RFI etc. Changes in infrastructure may
also be relevant including air conditioning (temperature/humidity etc) and power system
changes.
 System problem reports especially those that relate to software deficiencies (design)
 System and component obsolescence
 Staff skills and need for refresher training

9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
9.1 INTRODUCTION
ADS-B involves the transmission of specific data messages from aircraft and vehicle systems. These
data messages are broadcast at approximately 0.5 second intervals and received at compatible ground
stations that relay these messages to ATSU(s) for presentation on ATS situation displays. The
following procedures relate to the use of ADS-B data in ATS ground surveillance applications.
The implementation of the ADS-B system will support the provision of high performance surveillance,
enhancing flight safety, facilitating the reduction of separation minima and supporting user demands
such as user-preferred trajectories.
9.2 ADS-B REGULATIONS
As agreed at APANPRIG 22/8, States intending to implement ADS-B based surveillance services may
designate portions of airspace within their area of responsibility by:
(a) mandating the carriage and use of ADS-B equipment; or
(b) providing priority for access to such airspace for aircraft with operative ADS-B equipment over
those aircraft not operating ADS-B equipment.
In publishing ADS-B mandate/regulations, States should consider to :
 define the ADS-B standards applicable to the State. For interoperability and harmonization,
such regulations need to define both the standards applicable for the aircraft ADS-B position
source and the ADS-B transmitter.
 define the airspace affected by the regulations and the category of aircraft that the regulation
applies to.
 define the timing of the regulations allowing sufficient time for operators to equip. Experience
in Asia Pacific Regions is that major international carriers are having high equippage rates of
ADS-B avionics. However the equippage rates of ADS-B avionics for some regional fleets,
business jets and general aviation are currently low and more time will be required to achieve
high equippage rates.
 establish the technical and operational standards for the ground stations and air traffic
management procedures used for ADS-B separation services, including the associated voice
communications services.
States may refer to the APANPIRG Conclusion 22/36 on the template for ADS-B mandate/regulations
on provision of ADS-B based ground surveillance. Some States listed below have published their
ADS-B mandate/regulations on their web sites that could be used for reference.
(a) Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia
Civil Aviation Order 20.18 Amendment Order (No. 1) 2009, Civil Aviation Order 82.1 Amendment
Order (No. 1) 2009, Civil Aviation Order 82.3 Amendment Order (No. 2) 2009, Civil Aviation Order
82.5 Amendment Order (No. 2) 2009 and Miscellaneous Instrument CASA 41/09 – Direction – use of
ADS-B in foreign aircraft engaged in private operations in Australian territory
“http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012C00103/Download”

(b) Civil Aviation Department (CAD) of Hong Kong, China
Aeronautical Information Publication Supplement No. 13/13 dated 29 October 2013
“http://www.hkatc.gov.hk/HK_AIP/supp/A13-13.pdf”
(c) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)
Aeronautical Information Publication Supplment No. 254/13 dated 6 November 2013
“http://www.caas.gov.sg/caasWeb2010/export/sites/caas/en/Regulations/Aeronautical_Information/AIP
_Supplements/download/AIPSUP254-13.pdf”
(d) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
ADS–B Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, Final Rule
“http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-28/pdf/2010-12645.pdf”
9.3 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN USING ADS-B
9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data
The accuracy and integrity of pressure altitude derived level information provided by ADS-B
are equivalent to Mode C level data provided through an SSR sensor and subject to the same
operational procedures as those used in an SSR environment. Where the ATM system converts
ADS-B level data to display barometric equivalent level data, the displayed data should not be
used to determine vertical separation until the data is verified by comparison with a pilot
reported barometric level.
9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance
The ADS-B data from the aircraft will include a NUC/NIC/SIL categorization of the accuracy
and integrity of the horizontal position data. This figure is determined from
NIC/ NAC/ SIL values for DO260A/B compliant avionics and NUC values for DO260/ED102
compliant avionics.
In general, for 5NM separation, if the HPL value used to generate ADS-B quality indicators
(NUC or NIC) is greater than 2 nautical miles the data is unlikely to be of comparable quality to
that provided by a single monopulse SSR. ADS-B data should not be used for separation unless
a suitable means of determining data integrity is used.
The key minimum performance requirements for an ADS-B system to enable the use of a 3 NM
or 5 NM separation minimum in the provision of air traffic control is provided in the ICAO
Circular 326 (especially Appendix C).
ADS-B reports with low integrity may be presented on situation displays, provided the
controller is alerted (e.g. by a change in symbology and/or visual alert) to the change and the
implications for the provision of separation. An ANS Provider may elect not to display
ADS-B tracks that fail to meet a given position reporting performance criterion.
9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service
Early implementations of ADS-B are expected to use GNSS for position determination. As
such, availability of GNSS data has a direct influence on the provision of a surveillance service.
ATS Providers may elect to use a GNSS integrity prediction service to assist in determining the
future availability of useable ADS-B data. The integrity prediction service alerts users to
potential future loss or degradation of the ADS-B service in defined areas. When these alerts

are displayed, the system is indicating to its users that at some time in the future the ADS-B
positional data may be inadequate to support the application of ADS-B separation. It is
recommended that the prediction service is made available to each ATSU that is employing
ADS-B to provide a separation service, to ensure that air traffic controllers are alerted in
advance of any predicted degradation of the GNSS service and the associated reduction in their
ability to provide ADS-B separation to flights that are within the affected area. This is similar
to having advance warning of a planned radar outage for maintenance.
ADS-B should not be used to provide separation between aircraft that will be affected by an
expected period of inadequate position reporting integrity.
If an unpredicted loss of integrity occurs (including a RAIM warning report from aircrew) then;
(a) ADS-B separation should not be applied by ATC to the particular aircraft reporting
until the integrity has been assured; and
(b) The controller should check with other aircraft in the vicinity of the aircraft reporting
the RAIM warning, to determine if they have also been affected and establish
alternative forms of separation if necessary.
9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data
ADS-B Data-sharing for ATC Operations
Member States should consider the benefits of sharing ADS-B data received from aircraft
operating in the proximity of their international airspace boundaries with adjacent States that
have compatible technology in an effort to maximize the service benefits and promote
operational safety.
Data sharing may involve the use of the data to provide separation services if all the
requirements for delivery of separation services are satisfied, In some cases, States may choose
to use a lower standard that supports surveillance safety nets and situational awareness whilst
operations are conducted using procedural separation standards.
Any agreement on the sharing of surveillance data should be incorporated in Letters of
Agreement between the States concerned. Such agreements may also include the sharing of
VHF communication facilities.
A template for ADS-B data-sharing agreement is provided on the ICAO APAC website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.
ADS-B Data-sharing for Safety Monitoring
With endorsement of the methodology by both the ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel
(SASP) and the Regional Monitoring Agencies Coordination Group (RMACG), ADS-B data
can be used for calculating the altimetry system error (ASE) which is a measure of the height-
keeping performance of an aircraft. It is an ICAO requirement that aircraft operating in RVSM
airspace must undergo periodic monitoring on height-keeping performance. The existing
methods to estimate aircraft ASE include use of a portable device, the Enhanced GPS
Monitoring Unit, and ground-based systems called Height Monitoring Unit/Aircraft Geometric
Height Measurement Element. The use of ADS-B data for height-keeping performance
monitoring, on top of providing enhanced and alternative means of surveillance, will provide a

cost-effective option for aircraft operators. States are encouraged to share ADS-B data to
support the height-keeping performance monitoring of airframe.
Civil/Military ADS-B Data-sharing
Civil/military data sharing arrangements, including aircraft surveillance, were a key part of
civil/military cooperation in terms of tactical operational responses and increasing trust between
civil and military units.
Aircraft operating ADS-B technology transmit their position, altitude and identity to all
listeners, conveying information from co-operative aircraft that have chosen to equip and
publicly broadcast ADS-B messages. Thus there should be no defence or national security
issues with the use and sharing of such data.
Some military transponders may support ADS-B using encrypted DF19 messages, but these data
are normally not decoded or used at all by civil systems. In most cases today, tactical military
aircraft are not ADS-B equipped or could choose to disable transmissions. In future, increasing
numbers of military aircraft will be ADS-B capable, with the ability to disable these
transmissions. ADS-B data sharing should not influence the decision by military authorities to
equip or not equip with ADS-B. Moreover, it is possible for States to install ADS-B filters that
prevent data from sensitive flights being shared. These filters can be based on a number of
criteria and typically use geographical parameters to only provide ADS-B data to an external
party if aircraft are near the boundary.
A guidance material on advice to military authorities regarding ADS-B data sharing is provided
on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by
States.
9.3.5 Synergy of ADS-B and GNSS
States intending to implement GNSS/PBN or ADS-B should consider the efficiency of
implementing the other technology at the same time due to the inherent efficiencies in doing so.
GNSS systems provide navigation solutions to IFR aircraft for the conduct of enroute, terminal
and non-precision approaches. The use of GNSS/PBN can provide higher performance and
higher safety. Transition to GNSS can avoid significant ground infrastructure costs.
ADS-B systems provide surveillance based upon GNSS position source. ADS-B provides high
performance and high update surveillance for both air-air and ATC surveillance. Transition to
ADS-B can avoid the costs associated with ground based radar infrastructure. ADS-B system
installations rely on acceptable GNSS equipment being installed in the aircraft to provide the
position source and integrity.
If the fleet is equipped with ADS-B, they will already have most of the requirements to use
GNSS for navigation satisfied. Similarly, if aircraft have suitable GNSS on board, they will
have a position source to support ADS-B. It is noted however, that some care is needed to
ensure that the requirements of GNSS/PBN and surveillance are both satisfied.
There is significantly less cost for these systems to be installed in an aircraft at the same time. A
single installation of GNSS & ADS-B will involve :
 a single design activity instead of two
 a single downtime instead of two
 installation of the connection between GPS and ADS-B transponder
 a single test, certification and aircraft flight test

For the affected aviation community (ANSP, regulator and operator), the lessons learnt and
issues faced in both GNSS and ADS-B have significant commonality. This can lead to
efficiencies in Industry education and training.
9.4 Reporting Rates
9.4.1 General
The ADS-B system shall maintain a reporting rate that ensures at least an equivalent degree of
accuracy, integrity and availability as for a radar system that is used to provide a similar ATC
service. The standard reporting rate is approximately 0.5 second from the aircraft, but the rate
of update provided to the ATM system (for the situation display) may be less frequent (e.g. 5
seconds), provided the equivalency with radar is preserved.
9.5 SEPARATION
9.5.1 General
ADS-B data may be used in combination with data obtained by other means of surveillance
(such as radar, flight plan track, ADS-C) for the application of separation provided appropriate
minima as determined by the State are applied. It should be noted that the quality of
communications will have a bearing on the determination of appropriate minima.
All safety net features (MSAW, STCA, MTCA, RAM and DAIW/ RAI etc) should possess the
same responsiveness as equivalent radar safety net features.
9.5.2 Identification Methods
Some of the methods approved by ICAO for establishing identification with radar, may be
employed with ADS-B (see PANS-ATM chapter 8). One or more of the following
identification procedures are suggested:
a) direct recognition of the aircraft identification in an ADS-B label on a
situation display;
b) transfer of ADS-B identification;
c) observation of compliance with an instruction to TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT.
Note: In automated systems, the “IDENT” feature may be presented in different ways,
e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and associated label.
9.5.3 ADS-B Separation
ADS-B Separation minima has been incorporated by ICAO in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), and in
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).
In a mixed surveillance environment, States should use the larger separation standard applicable
between aircraft in the conflict pair being considered.

9.5.4 Vertical separation
9.5.4.1 Introduction
The ADS-B level data presented on the controllers situation display shall normally be
derived from barometric pressure altitude. In the event that barometric altitude is
absent, geometric altitude shall not be displayed on displays used for provision of air
traffic services. Geometric altitude may be used in ATM systems for other purposes.
9.5.4.2 Vertical tolerance standard
The vertical tolerances for ADS-B level information should be consistent with those
applied to Mode C level information.
9.5.4.3 Verification of ADS-B level information
The verification procedures for ADS-B level information shall be the same as those
employed for the verification of Mode C level data in a radar environment.
9.6 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCE MONITORING
9.6.1 General
ADS-B track data can be used to monitor flight path conformance with air traffic control
clearances.
9.6.2 Deviations from ATC clearances
The ATC requirements relating to monitoring of ADS-B traffic on the situation display should
be similar to those contained in PANS-ATM Ch.8.
9.7 ALERTING SERVICE
For ADS-B equipped aircraft, the provision of an alerting service should be based on the same criteria
as applied within a radar environment.
9.8 POSITION REPORTING
9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage
States should establish voice and/or CPDLC position reporting procedures consistent with those
applicable with radar for aircraft that have been identified by ATC.
9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirements in ADS-B airspace
ATSUs may promulgate in the AIP meteorological reporting requirements that apply within the
nominated FIR. The meteorological reporting data required and the transmission methods to be
used by aircrew shall be specified in AIP.

9.9 PHRASEOLOGY
9.9.1 Phraseology Standard
States should use common phraseology for both ADS-B and radar where possible, and should
note the requirement for ADS-B specific phraseology in some instances. States shall refer to
PANS ATM Chapter 12 for ADS-B phraseology:
ADS-B EQUIPMENT DEGRADATION
ADS-B OUT OF SERVICE (appropriate information as necessary).
TO REQUEST THE CAPABILITY OF THE ADS-B EQUIPMENT
a) ADVISE ADS-B CAPABILITY;
*b) ADS-B TRANSMITTER (data link);
*c) ADS-B RECEIVER (data link);
*d) NEGATIVE ADS-B.
* Denotes pilot transmission.
Note: For (b) and (c) – the options are not available for aircraft that are not equipped.
TO REQUEST RESELECTION OF AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION
REENTER FLIGHT IDENTIFICATION.
Note: For some aircraft, this option is not available in-flight
TERMINATION OF RADAR AND/OR ADS-B SERVICE
IDENTIFICATION LOST [reasons] (instructions).
TO REQUEST THE OPERATION OF THE MODE S OR ADS-B IDENT FEATURE
SQUAWK IDENT.
Note: For some standalone ADS-B equipage affecting General Aviation, the option of
“TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT” may be available
TO REQUEST AIRCRAFT SWITCHING TO OTHER TRANSPONDER OR TERMINATION
OF ADS-B TRANSMITTER OPERATION
a) SWITCH TO OTHER TRANSPONDER
b) STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION. SQUAWK (code) ONLY.
Note:
a) In many cases the ADS-B transmitter cannot be operated independently of the SSR
transponder and switching off the ADS-B transmission would also switch off the SSR
transponder operation
b) “STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION” applies only to aircraft that have the facility to
switch off the ADS-B transmission, while maintaining SSR operation.
9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B
It should be noted that independent operations of Mode S transponder and ADS-B will not be possible
in many aircraft (e.g. where ADS-B is solely provided by 1090 MHz extended squitter emitted from the
transponder). Additionally, some desirable but optional features of ADS-B transmitters may not be fitted

in some aircraft. Controller training on this issue, as it relates to the following examples of radio
telephony and/or CPDLC phraseology is recommended.
9.9.2.1 STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION or STOP SQUAWK
Issue: In most commercial aircraft, a common “transponder control head” is used for SSR transponder,
ACAS and ADS-B functionality. In this case, a pilot who complies with the instruction to stop operation
of one system will also need to stop operation of the other systems – resulting in a loss of surveillance
not intended or expected by the controller.
ATC need to be aware that an instruction to “Stop ADS-B Transmission” may require the pilot to switch
off their transponder that will then stop all other functions associated with the transponder operations
(such as ACARs etc). Pilots need to be aware of their aircraft’s equipment limitations, the
consequences of complying with this ATC instruction, and be aware of their company policy in regard
to this. As with any ATC instruction issued, the pilot should advise ATC if they are unable to comply.
Recommendation: It is recommended that the concatenated phrases STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION,
SQUAWK (code) ONLY or STOP SQUAWK, TRANSMIT ADSB ONLY are used. It is recommended
that controller training highlights the possible consequences of issuing these instructions and that pilot
training highlights the consequences of complying with this instruction. It is also recommended that
aircraft operators have a clearly stated policy on procedures for this situation. Should a pilot respond
with UNABLE then the controller should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not
remove the safety defences of the other surveillance technologies. This might include manual changes to
flight data, coordination with other controllers and/or change of assigned codes or callsigns.
9.9.2.2 STOP ADSB ALTITUDE TRANSMISSION [WRONG INDICATION or reason] and
TRANSMIT ADSB ALTITUDE
Issue: Most aircraft will not have separate control of ADSB altitude transmission. In such cases
compliance with the instruction may require the pilot to stop transmission of all ADSB data and/or
Mode C altitude – resulting in a loss of surveillance not intended or expected by the controller.
Recommendation: It is recommended that, should the pilot respond with UNABLE, the controller
should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not remove the safety defences of other
surveillance data. This might include a procedure that continues the display of incorrect level
information but uses pilot reported levels with manual changes to flight data and coordination with other
controllers.

9.9.2.3 TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT
Issue: Some aircraft may not be capable or the ADSB SPI IDENT control may be shared with the SSR
SPI IDENT function.
Recommendation: It is recommended that controllers are made aware that some pilots are unable to
comply with this instruction. An alternative means of identification that does not rely on the ADSB SPI
IDENT function should be used.
9.10 FLIGHT PLANNING
9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity
The aircraft identification (ACID) must be accurately recorded in section 7 of the ICAO Flight
Plan form as per the following instructions:
Aircraft Identification, not exceeding 7 characters is to be entered both in item 7 of the flight
plan and replicated exactly when set in the aircraft (for transmission as Flight ID) as follows:
Either,
a) The ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the
flight identification (e.g. KLM511, BAW213, JTR25), when:
in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the ICAO telephony designator for the
operating agency followed by the flight identification (e.g. KLM 511, SPEEDBIRD
213, HERBIE 25).
Or,
b) The registration marking of the aircraft (e.g. EIAKO, 4XBCD, OOTEK), when:
1) in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the registration marking alone
(e.g. EIAKO), or preceded by the ICAO telephony designator for the operating
agency (e.g. SVENAIR EIAKO),
2) the aircraft is not equipped with radio.
Note 1: No zeros, hyphens, dashes or spaces are to be added when the Aircraft
Identification consists of less than 7 characters.
Note 2: Appendix 2 to PANS-ATM refers. ICAO designators and telephony designators
for aircraft operating agencies are contained in ICAO Doc 8585.
9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements
9.10.2.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 10 – Surveillance Equipment and Capabilities
An appropriate ADS-B designator shall be entered in item 10 of the flight plan to indicate that the
flight is capable of transmitting ADS-B messages.
These are defined in ICAO DOC 4444 as follows:
B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability

B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4
During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the B1 and B2 descriptors
was recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may
take some time for formal adoption:
B1 ADS-B “out” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter
B2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter
States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.
9.10.2.2 ICAO Flight Plan Item 18 – Other Information
Where required by the appropriate authority the ICAO Aircraft Address (24 Bit Code) may be
recorded in Item 18 of the ICAO flight plan, in hexadecimal format as per the following example:
CODE/7C432B
States should note that use of hexadecimal code may be prone to human error and is
less flexible in regard to airframe changes for a notified flight.
9.10.2.3 Transponder Capabilities
When an aircraft is equipped with a mode S transponder, that transmits ADS-B messages,
according to ICAO Doc 4444, an appropriate Mode S designator should also be entered in item 10;
i.e.: either
o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and extended
squitter (ADS-B) capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, extended squitter
(ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability.
During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the E and L descriptors was
recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may take
some time for formal adoption:
o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and ADS-B
capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, ADS-B and
enhanced surveillance capability.
States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.
9.10.3 Setting Aircraft Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits
(a) Flight ID Principles
The aircraft identification (sometimes called the flight identification or FLTID) is the equivalent
of the aircraft callsign and is used in both ADS-B and Mode S SSR technology. Up to seven
characters long, it is usually set in airline aircraft by the flight crew via a cockpit interface. It

enables air traffic controllers to identify and aircraft on a display and to correlate a radar or
ADS-B track with the flight plan date. Aircraft identification is critical, so it must be entered
carefully. Punching in the wrong characters can lead to ATC confusing once aircraft with
another.
It is important that the identification exactly matches the aircraft identification (ACID) entered
in the flight notification.
Intuitive correlation between an aircraft’s identification and radio callsign enhances situational
awareness and communication. Airline aircraft typically use a three letter ICAO airline code
used in flight plans, NOT the two letter IATA codes.
(b) Setting Flight ID
The callsign dictates the applicable option below for setting ADS-B or Mode S Flight ID:
(i) the flight number using the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator if a
flight number callsign is being used (e.g. QFA1 for Qantas 1, THA54 for Thai 54).
(ii) the nationality and registration mark (without hyphen) of the aircraft if the callsign is
the full version of the registration (e.g .VHABC for international operations).
(iii) The registration mark alone of the aircraft if the callsign is the abbreviated version of
the registration (eg ABC for domestic operations).
(iv) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign approved by the ANSP or
regulator (e.g. SPTR13 for firespotter 3).
(v) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign in accordance with the operations
manual of the relevant recreational aircraft administrative organization (e.g. G123 for
Gyroplane 123).
9.11 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE NON-COMPLANT ADS-B AIRCAFT OR MIS-LEADING
ADS-B TRANSMISSIONS
ADS-B technology is increasingly being adopted by States in the Asia/Pacific Region. Asia/Pacific
Region adopted 1090 extended squitter technology. Reliance on ADS-B transmissions can be expected
to increase over the coming years.
Currently a number of aircraft are transmitting ADS-B data which is misleading or non-compliant with
the ICAO standards specified in Annex 10. Examples include:
a) aircraft broadcasting incorrect message formats;
b) aircraft broadcasting inertial positional data and occasionally indicating in the messages that the
data has high integrity when it does not;
c) using GPS sources that do not generate correct integrity data, whilst indicating in the messages
that the data has high integrity;
d) transmitting ADS-B data with changing (and incorrect) flight identity; and
e) transmitting ADS-B data with incorrect flight identity continuously.

If the benefits of ADS-B are to flow to the aviation industry, misleading and non-compliant ADS-B
transmissions need to be curtailed to the extent possible.
The transmission of a value of zero for the NUCp or the NIC or the SIL by an aircraft indicates a
navigational uncertainty related to the position of the aircraft or a navigation integrity issue that is too
significant to be used by air traffic controllers.
As such, the following procedure, stipulated in the Regional Supplementary Procedures Doc 7030, shall
be applicable in the concerned FIRs on commencement of ADS-B based surveillance services notified
by AIP or NOTAM:
If an aircraft operates within an FIR where ADS-B-based ATS surveillance service is provided, and
a) carries 1090 extended squitter ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with one of the
following:
1) EASA AMC 20-24; or
2) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia; or
3) installation in accordance with the FAA AC No. 20-165 – Airworthiness Approval of ADS; or
b) the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;
then:
a) except when specifically authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, the aircraft shall not fly unless
the equipment is:
1) deactivated; or
2) transmits only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or SIL
States may elect to implement a scheme to blacklist those non-compliant aircraft or aircraft consistently
transmitting mis-leading ADS-B information, so as to refrain the aircraft from being displayed to ATC.
A sample template is given below for reference by States to publish the procedures to handle non-
compliant ADS-B aircraft or misleading ADS-B transmissions in their ADS-B mandate/regulations:
After <insert earliest date that ADS-B may be used for any relevant operational purpose> if an aircraft
carries ADS-B transmitting equipment which does no comply with :
(a) EASA AMC 20-24; or
(b) the equivalent configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia; or
(c) Installation in accordance with the FAA AC No. 20-165 – Airworthiness Approval of ADS;
or the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;

the aircraft must not fly unless equipment is:
(a) deactivated; or
(b) set to transmit only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or SIL.
Note:
1. It is considered equivalent to deactivation if NUCp or NIC or SIL is set to continually transmit
only a value of zero.
2. Regulators should take appropriate action to ensure that such regulations are complied with.
3. ATC systems should discard ADS-B data when NUC or NIC or SIL =0.

9.12 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
ATC surveillance systems should provide for the display of safety-related alerts and warnings, including
conflict alert, minimum safe altitude warning, conflict prediction and unintentionally duplicated SSR
codes and aircraft identifications.
The ADS-B avionics may transmit emergency status messages to any ADS-B ground station within
coverage. The controller receiving these messages should determine the nature of the emergency,
acknowledge receipt if appropriate, and initiate any assistance required. An aircraft equipped with
ADS-B might operate the emergency and/or urgency mode as follows:
a) emergency;
b) no communications;
c) unlawful interference;
d) minimum fuel; and/or
e) medical.
Selection of an emergency transponder code (e.g. 7600) automatically generates an emergency
indication in the ADS-B message. However, some ADS-B transponders may only generate a generic
emergency indication. That means, the specific type of emergency, e.g., communication failure, is not
always conveyed to the controller in an ADS-B environment. The controller may only receive a generic
emergency indication irrespective of the emergency codes being selected by the pilot.
Due to limitations of some ADS-B transponders, procedures should be developed for ATC to confirm
the types of emergency with pilots based on operational needs of States.
Executive control responsibility
The responsibility for control of the flight rests with the ATSU within whose airspace the aircraft is
operating. However, if the pilot takes action contrary to a clearance that has already been coordinated
with another sector or ATSU and further coordination is not possible in the time available, the
responsibility for this action would rest with the pilot in command, and performed under the pilot’s
emergency authority.
Emergency procedures
The various circumstances surrounding each emergency situation preclude the establishment of exact
detailed procedures to be followed. The procedures outlined in PANS-ATM Chapter 15 provide a
general guide to air traffic services personnel and where necessary, should be adapted for the use of
ADS-B.

10. SECURITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ADS-B
10.1 INTRODUCTION
ADS-B technologies are currently “open systems” and the openness is an essential component of
successful use of ADS-B. It was also noted that ADS-B transmission from commercial aircraft is a “fact
of life” today. Many commercial aircraft are already equipped with ADS-B and have been transmitting
data for some time.
It was noted that there has been considerable alarmist publicity regarding ADS-B security. To a large
extent, this publicity has not considered the nature and complexity of ATC. Careful assessment of
security policies in use today for ADS-B and other technologies can provide a more balanced view.
10.2 CONSIDERATIONS
A list of ADS-B vulnerabilities categorised into threats to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability has
been reviewed and documented into the guidance material on security issues associated with ADS-B
provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” under “Restricted
Site” for reference by States. States could contact ICAO Regional Office to get access to the guidance
material. The following recommendations are made to States :
(a) While ADS-B is recognized as a key enabling technology for aviation with potential safety
benefits, it is recommended that States made aware of possible ADS-B security specific issues;
(b) It is recommended that States note that much of the discussion of ADS-B issues in the Press has
not considered the complete picture regarding the ATC use of surveillance data;
(c) For current ADS-B technology implementation, security risk assessment studies should be made
in coordination with appropriate national organisations and ANSPs to address appropriate
mitigation applicable in each operational environment, in accordance with ATM interoperability
requirements; and
(d) Future development of ADS-B technology, as planned in the SESAR master plan for example,
should address security issues. Studies should be made to identify potential encryption and
authentication techniques, taking into consideration the operational need of air to ground and air
to air surveillance applications. Distribution of encryption keys to a large number of ADS-B
receivers is likely to be problematic and solutions in the near and medium term are not
considered likely to be deployed worldwide. Internet based encryption strategies are not
deployable when ground stations are pass receivers.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SYSTEM MANAGEMENT MANUAL
CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
C-FORMS0348 Version 3: Effective 21 August 2012 Page 1 of 17
Form approved by: Branch Manager, Operational Integrity & Compliance
Commercial in Confidence
Commissioning Readiness
The requirement for this form is specified in the System Management Manual (Section 11.2 of V4), C-MAN0107
Project/Task Name SAP Project/Task ID: Sites or Locations affected:
Documentation prepared by: Date: Commissioning Date:
Affected System(s) System Criticality Change Consequence Level
Brief Description of Change:
Commissioning Readiness Endorsement
The endorsement of this form by the appropriate authorities as specified in the System Management Manual certifies that the
requirements detailed in this form (with the exception of the non-critical deficiencies
1
listed herein) have been completed prior to
the commissioning of the system change or new system.
Chief Engineer or Technical or Maintenance Authority
Name: Signature: Date:
Designation:
Designation:
Chief Operating/User Authority or Operating/User Authority
Designation:
Records Management Instructions
Place the completed Commissioning Readiness Form, together with any support documents on the Project file
Provide a copy of the completed Commissioning Readiness Form to P&E, Asset Lifecycle Manager, Planning and Integration
Note 1: Non-critical deficiencies (NCD) are those outstanding technical and operational issues that do not prevent the safe and
effective use or maintenance of the facility, but will be addressed in a specified and agreed time. NCDs shall be listed on the
Commissioning Certificate (C-FORMS0300) and recorded in the relevant system (ASID / HEAT / SAIR). It is preferable for each
NCD to be recorded as a separate Issue.
Appendix 1

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
Requirement Reference:
(Procedure/instruction used to specified
required input)
Completed or
N/A
Evidence of Compliance
(If a requirement is N/A, a reason why it is N/A is required to be
entered)
1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY
1.1 Provide a link to the completed SCARD
SCARD Template (AA-TEMP-SAF-0042)
Note: For unregulated systems the SCARD shall be used to
assess the impact of the change and perform a preliminary
hazard analysis
Safety Change Management
Requirements
AA-NOS-SAF-0104
Completed
N/A
Link to SCARD
1.2 The outcome of the SCARD will be the requirement for one of
the following for commissioning:
Safety Statement – included in SCARD or standalone Safety
Statement which must provide Airservices Australia
management with sufficient information to demonstrate that
safety has been considered and the change presents minimal
or no safety issues.
Safety Plan & Safety Assessment Report, or
Safety Plan & Safety Case
Safety Plans, Safety Assessment Reports and Safety Cases
are required to be available in the Document Search Database
Requirements
AA-NOS-SAF-0104
Document Search Database
Completed
N/A
Link to Safety statement or
Link to Safety Plan & Safety Assessment Report or
Link to Safety Plan & Safety Case
1.3 Safety risk management process completed and includes
any new hazards / impact to existing hazards identified?
controls identified and in place? and
residual risk justified and accepted.
Safety Risk Management
Procedures
AA-PROC-SAF-0105
Completed
N/A
1.4 Impacts on the Operational Risk Assessments from residual
risks have been assessed and implemented using Operational
Risk Assessment Change Request and Acceptance Record –
AA-FORM-SAF-0032
Operational Risk Assessment
AA-NOS-SAF-0006
Procedures
AA-PROC-SAF-0105
Completed
N/A
Link to Operational Risk Assessment Change Request and Acceptance
Record:
1.5 Arrangements for monitoring and review of risks are in place
including arrangements for safety performance monitoring
following the transition.
Procedures
AA-PROC-SAF-0105
Completed
N/A
1.6 CASA have approved / accepted or been advised of the
change, as applicable
Requirements
AA-NOS-SAF-0104
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
2 WORKPLACE HEALTH & SAFETY
2.1 Initial WHS Hazard Identification must be completed as per the
template AA-TEMP-SAF-0020
Procedures
AA-PROC-SAF-0105
Initial WHS Hazard
Identification
AA-TEMP-SAF-0020
Workplace Health and Safety
Risk Management Summary
AA-TEMP-SAF-0016
Completed
N/A
Link to completed Workplace Health and Safety Management Summary
AA-TEMP-SAF-0016
2.2 Ensure employees and stakeholders are consulted when
significant changes to work arrangements are being
considered.
Working Together Workplace
Consultation
AA-PROC-SAF-0009
Completed
N/A
2.3 Tower Access / Classification assessed?
Working at Heights Safety Checklist & Daily Toolbox Meeting
(F098)
Fall arrest facility / equipment available
Working at Heights
PROC-157
Working at Heights Safety
Checklist & Daily Toolbox
Meeting F098
Completed
N/A
2.4 WHS hazard controls are in place
- Safe Work Method Statement completed
- Plant risks managed
- Radhaz survey completed, published on the Avnet and
general public & occupational exposure boundaries
identified
Safe Work Method Statement
AA-TEMP-SAF-0017
Managing WHS Risk for
Contractors and Projects
AA-PROC-SAF-0012
Plant Risk Management
PROC-134
RF Radiation, Surveys &
Health & Safety Mgmt
PROC-121
Completed
N/A
Link to completed Safe Work Method Statement AA-TEMP-SAF-0017
Link to completed F131 Plant Risk Management Checklist
2.5 At the completion of works ensure WHS Inspections are
completed and hazard controls are in place. Building condition;
clean, undamaged, all work completed.
Conducting Workplace Safety
Inspections
AA-PROC-SAF-0008
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
3 ENVIRONMENT
3.1 Environmental Impact must be assessed using the
Environmental Impact Screening & Assessment Criteria for
Changes to On-ground Activities
Assistance in assessing the Environmental Impact can be
obtained from Environment and Climate Change Unit in
Environment Group.
Environmental Screening &
Assessment Criteria for
Changes to On-ground
Activities
AA-REF-ENV-0010
Environmental Assessment of
Changes to On-ground
Activities.
AA-NOS-ENV-2.200
Completed
N/A
Link to completed Environmental Impact Screening and Assessment
Form
If a stage 2 assessment is required provide ARMS reference and links to
any Permits, Master Development Plans and relevant correspondence as
required.
3.2 Environmental Clearance obtained for ATM changes as per
AA-NOS-ENV-2.100
Assistance in assessing the Environmental Impact can be
obtained from Environment and Climate Change Unit in
Environment Group.
Environment Assessment
Process for ATM Changes
AA-NOS-ENV-2.100
Completed
N/A
Provide ARMS reference and NRFC reference if ATM change required
4 PEOPLE- SUPPORT
ATC TRAINING
4.1 ATC Training Needs Analysis completed and Training Plan
developed?
Completed
N/A
Link to Training Needs Analysis and Training Plan
4.2 Sufficient number of trained, rated and endorsed ATC staff
available.
Completed
N/A
Number Trained:
4.3 ATC staff individual training records in SAP database have
been updated
Completed
N/A
4.4 Plans are in place to complete any outstanding training, rating,
and endorsement of remaining ATC staff (Normally an
identified hazard)
Completed
N/A
HAZLOG Register No:

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
TECHNICAL TRAINING
4.5 Training Needs Analysis completed and Training Plan
developed for system support staff and field maintenance
staff?
Completed
N/A
Link to Training Needs Analysis and Training Plan
4.6 TechCert codes have been created, assessment criteria
developed or existing assessment criteria has been amended
TechCert codes
TechCert Guides and
Forms
Completed
N/A
Link to TechCert Guides and Forms
4.7 Sufficient system support staff and field maintenance staff
appropriately trained?
Completed
N/A
4.8 Are plans are in place to complete any outstanding training
and certification of system support staff and remaining field
maintenance staff?
Completed
N/A
4.9 Field maintenance staff hold the relevant TechCert to perform
duties.
Technical Certification
PROC-141
Completed
N/A
4.10 Statutory / special licensing obtained by field maintenance staff
including high risk work competencies and licensing
requirements?
Completed
N/A
4.11 ABS and FMS staff training details sent to Technical Training
Coordinator and training records updated as required?
Training
PROC-119
Completed
N/A
4.12 TechCert details sent to FMS System Support to update the
Qualifications (TechCert) Database
Technical Certification
PROC-141
Completed
N/A
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
4.13 CMRD have been consulted regarding special test equipment,
test beds, etc
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
4.14 CMRD / NDC have been consulted regarding spares holdings
and repair of LRUs from this equipment or in-house support of
Depot Level Support Contract / repair contract
Completed
N/A
4.15 TEMACC advised of any specialised test equipment
requirements.
Test Equipment Management
PROC-150
Completed
N/A
4.16 Maintenance support contracts in place (external and/or
internal)?
Appropriate vendor and/or internal support?
Appropriate Level 3 maintenance arrangements
Completed
N/A
4.17 Test equipment provided to maintenance base.
Note: Test equipment purchasing and calibration requirements
detailed in Engineering Execution Readiness form.
Completed
N/A
4.18 Specialised hardware or software system support and field
maintenance tools, test / patch leads, adaptors, isolators,
electronic discharge protection (mats, straps), etc supplied?
Completed
N/A
4.19 System Business Continuity/ Disaster Recovery provisions
supplied/updated?
Completed
N/A
4.20 Spares – Supplied, storage correct, transport cases supplied? Management of Goods &
Supplies
PROC-118
Completed
N/A
4.21 Spares – Software / firmware loaded, tested & configured? Completed
N/A
4.22 Service Restoration Times (SRT) established? Airways Service Data
PROC-207
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
4.23 Conduct Hardware physical configuration audit and ensure
SAP Plant Maintenance has updated information of all
installed and/or demolished equipment (including monitoring
circuits) and sent to System Operations
SAP PM DATA CHANGES.
Equipment
Installed/Demolished Advice
SAP Data Input Form
F104
Completed
N/A
Link to Email from SAP PM Support confirming update/s
5 PROCEDURES
ATC DOCUMENTATION
5.1 System Requirements documentation including Operating
Concept or Business Process Rules - produced/updated and
approved?
Completed
N/A
Link to documentation
5.2 Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) reviewed / updated.
Aeronautical information publications (AIP Book, AIP SUPP,
AIC, DAP, ERSA, Charts, etc) reviewed / updated.
Amendment times are determined by the AIS Distribution
Schedule
AA Publications
AIS Distribution Schedule
Completed
N/A
NRFC No.
5.3 National ATC Procedures Manual (NAPM) and any other
relevant ATC procedures reviewed / updated.
Completed
N/A
NRFC No.
5.4 ATC contingency / continuity plans reviewed / updated. ATS Contingency Plans
Business Continuity Plans
C-BCP
Completed
N/A
ATS-CP No:
C-BCP No:
5.5 NOTAM and/or AIP SUP issued / amended / cancelled Works Planning
PROC-213
Refer also
LOA3024
Completed
N/A
NOTAM No:
5.6 ATC Temporary Local Instruction (TLI) issued notifying
Operational staff of change?
Temporary Local
Instructions & Database
Completed
N/A
NRFC No.

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
USER DOCUMENTATION
5.7 User/operator manuals updated Completed
N/A
5.8 User/operator procedures provided/updated as applicable Completed
N/A
5.9 On-line user/operator documentation completed and published Completed
N/A
5.10 ARFF instructions updated Completed
N/A
5.11 Other Business Groups instructions updated? Completed
N/A
TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
5.12 Software design documents updated, adequate and supplied
to system support?
Completed
N/A
5.13 Software and/or dataset Version or Release Description
Documentation supplied and adequate?
Completed
N/A
Link to Version Description Document or Release Description Document
5.14 Software installation procedure and instructions
supplied/updated and adequate?
Completed
N/A
Link to Installation Procedure

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
5.15 SMP: System Management Plan created / updated and
adequate?
SMP Template Completed
N/A
SMP No:
5.16 SCP: System Contingency / continuity plans supplied/updated
and adequate?
SCP Template Completed
N/A
SCP No:
5.17 Technical drawings updated and listed in Data Viewer and list
supplied to system supporters and field maintenance staff.
Technical Drawing
Management
PROC-178
Completed
N/A
5.18 Technical handbooks/manuals supplied to ABS or FMS
Engineering/IT support and field maintenance staff (base and
site copy).
Document Management
PROC-103
Completed
N/A
5.19 On-line system support and field maintenance documentation
completed and published
Completed
N/A
5.20 Technical documentation registered and placed under
documentation control
Document Management
PROC-103
Completed
N/A
5.21 Appropriate engineering performance requirements specified
and issued for ongoing use?
System Specification documentation supplied/updated and
adequate?
System Performance
Requirements & Reporting
Specification
ASYS-106
Completed
N/A
5.22 Configuration & Modification AEI: Equipment and System
Modifications and Configuration (for hardware and software),
and Software Release Authorisations are documented in a
Part 2 AEI (or other approved documentation)
Development of Maintenance
Instructions for Equipment
PROC-151
Completed
N/A
AEI No/s:
Link to documentation detailing configuration and modification
5.23 Maintenance AEI: Maintenance requirements, including
Performance Inspection tolerances, have been defined and
documented in AEIs (or other approved documentation). (AEI
Part 3,4,7)
Development of Maintenance
PROC-151
Completed
N/A
AEI No/s:

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
5.24 AEI: New maintenance AEIs trialled by maintenance staff Development of Maintenance
PROC-151
Completed
N/A
5.25 TTD: Temporary Technical Dispensation raised and published
on the Document Search database.
Temporary Technical
Dispensations
PROC-153
Completed
N/A
TTD No:
5.26 Site Manifest updated Site Manifests
FMS-304
Completed
N/A
6 SYSTEM
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
6.1 System Requirements documentation including Operating
Concept or Business Process Rules - supplied/updated and
approved?
Design Control
PROC-146
Completed
N/A
Links to documentation
6.2 Standards – Installation and equipment comply with all
relevant Australian Standards?
Building Codes - Structures comply with the relevant Building
Codes?
The relevant Australian Standards and Building Codes are to
be determined by the Chief Engineer, Technical Authority or
Maintenance Authority
Australian Standards
Design Control
PROC-146
Completed
N/A
6.3 Other applicable Federal and/or State licensing requirements
met?
The relevant licensing requirements are to be determined by
the Chief Engineer, Technical Authority or Maintenance
Authority
Design Control
PROC-146
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
6.4 Electrical Mechanical, Structure and Building impacts have
been assessed as adequate or modifications organised and
completed through consultation with Engineering Branch,
P&E?
(Power supply capability / airconditioning capacity / mast
loadings)
Design Control
PROC-146
Completed
N/A
6.5 Earthing and Lightning Protection meets Airservices
requirements?
Earthing and Lightning
Protection Systems for
Operational Facilities
AEI 3.1504
Site Earthing and Lightning
Protection Systems for
Existing Installations
AEI 2.3011
Completed
N/A
6.6 Battery Procurement as per Airservices requirements? Lead Acid Batteries
(Stationary) Procurement and
Acceptance Testing
AEI-3.7050
Panel Contract Arrangement
C-PROC0140
Completed
N/A
6.7 Assessing the impact of information systems against corporate
objectives (7 Ticks process).
Information Technology
Application Certification –‘7
Ticks’
MI-0804 and PROC-190
Completed
N/A
Link to completed 7 Ticks Interim Certificate or Final Certificate
6.8 IT Security measures appropriate and in place(ie. to ensure
effective security and control practices to minimise the risks of
unauthorised access, inappropriate use, modification,
destruction or disclosure of electronically held data).
IT Security Roles and
Responsibilities Statement
MS-0013
Information Security MI-0808
ICT Resources – Conditions
of Use
MI-0829
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
6.9 Information Security Information Security
C-PROC0184
Completed
N/A
Link to completed security risk management plan
INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS
6.10 Has met the regulation and safety requirements for
Telecommunications Installations.
Cable Markers installed (external)?
Equipment complies with ACMA statutory requirement
Telecommunication Labelling (Customer Equipment and
Customer Cabling) Notice 2001 as amended (i.e. ‘A’ ticked on
the equipment compliance plate)
Implementing Regulation and
Safety Requirements for
Telecommunications
Installations
PROC-138
Installation of Optical Fibre
Cable - Underground
AEI 4.5001
Underground Cable Marking
AEI 4.3001
Completed
N/A
Link to Telecommunications Cabling Advice
6.11 MDF/IDF Records created / updated?
Labelling/Colour Coding – Rack, Cable, Chassis, etc.?
Colour Coding of RJ45 Patch
Leads for Voice and Data
Installations
AEI 7.3241
Completed
N/A
6.12 Transmitters licence label affixed Radio Communication
Transmitter Labelling
AEI 7.4238
Completed
N/A
6.13 Electrical Certificate of Testing and Safety or Testing and
Compliance on connection to a source of electricity (i.e.
installation conforms to AS3000) are required to be supplied
as soon as possible after connection or testing of any electrical
installation or change.
Labelling – Switch Boards, etc
Meets Airservices Electrical Cable Colour Coding
requirements?
Electrical Safety Regulation
2002 Sections 15 and 159
AS 3000 – Aust Standard
Electrical Cable Colour
Coding
AEI 3.1502
Completed
N/A
Links to Electrical Certificates

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
6.14 All modifications complete and scratch plate labels affixed to
equipments
Identification of Airways
Systems Equipment
Hardware Modifications
PROC-154
Completed
N/A
6.15 Integration with National Technical Monitoring has been
organised and completed through Engineering Branch, P&E?
Completed
N/A
6.16 Alarm monitoring installed and tested at TOC for local and
remote site?
Completed
N/A
6.17 Source media – supplied/backed up, stored, registered with
system support?
Software Media Archival and
Storage
PROC-147
Completed
N/A
6.18 Site installable media – supplied/backed up, appropriately
stored and registered by field maintainers?
Software Media Archival and
Storage
PROC-147
Completed
N/A
6.19 Software licences provided, registered and appropriately
stored?
(Including details of any third party licensing)
Completed
N/A
6.20 Update HEAT and/or ASID database to incorporate new
system/version number and assign issue management roles?
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
DESIGN CONFIRMATION
6.21 Airservices Physical Security requirements met.
The minimum security requirements are specified in C-
GUIDE0157. Physical Security advise can be obtained from
the relevant Security Advisor in Security and Crisis Planning,
Safety & Environment
Physical Access requirements are determined and established
Siting and accommodation impact has been assessed as
being satisfactory or modifications organised through National
Property?
Physical Security – Critical
Operational Facilities
C-GUIDE0157
Site Management
PROC-170
Completed
N/A
6.22 Network data load impact has been assessed as being
satisfactory or modifications organised and completed through
Engineering Branch, P&E?
Completed
N/A
6.23 Spectrum licences (either cancelled if no longer required or for
new licenses including if antenna moves by more than 10
metres)
Frequency Management:
Obtaining a Frequency
Assignment and Licence
AEI 7.4202
Completed
N/A
6.24 New system or system change acceptance tests (software
and/or hardware) satisfactorily completed against the
approved system requirements?
Test Plans provided?
FAT, SAT, UAT test results complete, passed to the
required level and provided?
Test identified defect listings and re-test information
provided?
System Management Manual
SMM
Design Control
PROC-146
Completed
N/A
6.25 Battery Acceptance Tests as per Airservices requirements? Lead Acid Batteries
(Stationary) Procurement and
Acceptance Testing
AEI-3.7050
Completed
N/A
Link to Battery Acceptance Test Results

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
6.26 Standard Operating Conditions (SOCs) / Site Configuration
Data (SCD) established / approved
Standard Operating
Conditions & Site
Configuration Data
Management
PROC-143
Completed
N/A
6.27 Flight Test results supplied and satisfactory Certification of Radio
Navigation Aid Facilities
AEI 7.4003
Completed
N/A
6.28 Equipment operation is as per AEI specifications and any
additionally specified requirements?
Relevant requirements and performance specifications to be
determined by the Chief Engineer, Technical Authority or
Maintenance Authority
Completed
N/A
7 TRANSITION
PLANNING
7.1 Does the system meet all critical user and technical
requirements?
Completed
N/A
7.2 If non-critical deficiencies are proposed to be accepted into
operation, are they managed and tracked via ASID, HEAT or
SAIR, including responsibilities and timings and attached to the
Commissioning Certificate?
Completed
N/A
7.3 Cutover Plan prepared and authorised by:
Appropriate level of engineering authority?
Appropriate level of User Authority?
Cutover Plan
C-TEMP0045
Completed
N/A
Link to Cutover Plan
7.4 Works plan created at least 7 days before deployment Works Planning
PROC-213
Completed
N/A
Works Plan No.

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
NOTIFICATION
7.5 Industry education / notification been completed? Completed
N/A
7.6 Relevant Business Managers advised of impending change? Completed
N/A
7.7 Change requester and/or sponsor notified? Completed
N/A
7.8 System Operations’ TOC and Service Desk notified and
accepted operating responsibility for the change.
Completed
N/A
7.9 ABS/FMS Manager has accepted maintenance responsibility Completed
N/A
7.10 Notify the following (as appropriate) that the system is at
“OPERATIONAL READINESS” and provide details of
commissioning and any system changes:
ATC
System Supervisor, Melbourne (ATC)
System Supervisor, Brisbane (ATC)
National ATC Systems Manager
Operating Authority (relevant)
Sys to Svc List
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0348
Item
No:
Requirement:
required input)
Completed or
N/A
entered)
7.11 Notify the following (as appropriate) that the system is at
“ENGINEERING READINESS” and provide details of
commissioning and any system changes:
P&E
Technical Authority (relevant)
Technical Operations Centre – Director
Service Desk -Airways
SAP PM Support
Sys to Svc List
Completed
N/A

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0300
COMMISSIONING CERTIFICATE
The requirement for this form is specified in the System Management Manual (Section 11.2 of V4), C-MAN0107
Project/Task Name SAP Project/Task ID: Sites or Locations affected:
Documentation prepared by: Date: Commissioning Date:
Affected System(s) System Criticality Change Consequence Level
Brief Description of Change:
Commissioning Approval
The approval of this document by the appropriate authorities as specified in the System Management Manual certifies that the new
system or system change is satisfactory to meet the specified service and performance requirements; that system operating and
support requirements are in place; that required user and technical training is adequately provisioned; as detailed in the
Commissioning Readiness Form and consequently the new system or system change is declared fit-for-purpose and can be
deployed and operated until formally decommissioned or otherwise revoked.
This approval is provided subject to the non-critical deficiencies
1
listed herein.
Chief Engineer, Technical or Maintenance Authority
Name Signature: Date
Designation:
Designation:
Chief Operating/User Authority or Operating/User Authority
Designation:
Records Management Instructions
Place the completed Commissioning Certificate, together with the completed Commissioning Readiness form on the Project file
Provide a copy of the completed Commissioning Certificate, and the completed Commissioning Readiness Form to P&E, Asset
Lifecycle Manager, Planning and Integration
Note 1: Non-critical deficiencies are those outstanding technical and operational issues that do not prevent the safe and
effective use of the facility by users or prevent effective technical maintenance, but will be addressed in a specified
and agreed time.

CHANGE CONTROL
C-FORMS0300
LIST OF NON-CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES WAIVED AT TIME OF COMMISSIONING
Either list non-critical deficiencies here or attach a list if space insufficient
Issue Issue Tracking
Reference
Number
Allocated to Proposed
Completion
Date
Comments

2 - 1
Appendix 2
Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis
of ADS-B Avionics Performance
1. Introduction
1.1 The APANPIRG has endorsed the following Conclusion during its 24th
Meeting to
encourage States/Administration to exchange their ADS-B performance monitoring
results and experience gained from the process :
Conclusion 24/45 - Exchange ADS-B Performance Monitoring Result
“That, States be encouraged to exchange findings/result of their ADS-B performance
monitoring including experience gained in conducting the required performance
monitoring.”
1.2 Since the ADS-B mandate for some airspace in the Region became effective in December
2013, monitoring and analysis on avionics performance of ADS-B equipped aircraft has
become an increasingly important task for concerned States. The APANPIRG has also
requested and the ICAO has agreed to support establishing a centralized database to be
hosted by the ICAO Regional Sub-office (RSO) for sharing the monitoring results in
order to enhance safety for the Region. The specification for the database and relevant
access procedures are being developed by the ADS-B Study and Implementation Task
Force, and will be shared with States in due course.
1.3 This document serves to provide guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of
avionics performance of ADS-B equipped aircraft, which is based on the experience
gained by States.
2. Problem Reporting and Feedback
2.1 For ADS-B avionics problems, it is critical that an appropriate reporting and feedback
mechanism be established. It is highly desirable that those discovering the problems
should report them to the appropriate parties to take action, such as study and analyse the
problems, identify the root causes, and rectify them. Those action parties include :-
(a) Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) – upon detection of any unacceptable
ADS-B reports from an aircraft, report the observed problem to the performance
monitoring agent(s), if any, and the Aircraft Operators for investigation. In addition,
ANSPs should take all actions to avoid using the ADS-B reports from the aircraft
until the problem is rectified (e.g. black listing the aircraft), if usage of such reports
could compromise safety.
(b) Regulators – to initiate any appropriate regulatory action or enforcement.

2 - 2
(c) Aircraft Operators – to allow avionics specialists to examine the causes and as
customers of the avionics manufacturers ensure that corrective action will take place.
(d) Avionics Manufacturers and Aircraft Manufacturers – to provide technical evidence
and knowledge about the problem and problem rectification
2.2 Incentives should be received by those parties acting on the problems including :-
(a) Regulations that require deficiencies to be rectified
(b) Regulatory enforcement
(c) Consequences if conduct of operations with problematic equipment (e.g. no access to
the airspace requiring healthy equipment)
2.3 When an ADS-B avionics problem is reported, it should come along with adequate
details about the problem nature to the action parties. In addition, the problem should be
properly categorised, so that appropriate parties could diagnose and rectify them
systematically.
3. Problem Categorisation
3.1 Regarding ADS-B avionics, their problems are quite diversified in the Region but can be
categorized to ensure they will be examined and tackled systematically.
3.2 Based on the experience gained from States, the common ADS-B avionics problems in
the Region are summarized under different categories in Attachment A. It is noted that
only a relatively minor portion of the aircraft population exhibits these problems. It must
be emphasized that aircraft transmitting incorrect positional data with NUC = 0 or NIC =
0 should not be considered a safety problem. The data transmitted have no integrity and
shall not be used by ATC. This situation exists for many aircraft when their GNSS
receivers are not connected to the transponders.
4. Managing the Problem
4.1 There are two major approaches to manage the problems :-
(a) Regulatory approach
Regulations which require non-approved avionics to disable ADS-B transmission (or
transmit “no integrity”), and the concerned operators to file flight plans to indicate no
ADS-B equipage. APANPIRG has endorsed this approach which is reflected in the
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).
(b) Blacklist approach
Filtering out (“black listing”) any airframes that do not comply with the regulations or
transmitting bad data, and advising the regulator of the non-compliance. This
approach is temporary which allows the ANSP to protect the system whilst regulatory
action is underway.

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5. Systematic Monitoring and Analysis of the Problem
5.1 For States who have radar coverage, a systematic and efficient means to monitor and
analyse the problem could be considered on top of relying on ATC to report the problem /
sample checking. This can be achieved by developing a system to automatically compare
radar and flight plan information with ADS-B reported position, and examine the ADS-B
quality indicators 1
and Flight Identification (FLTID) contained in the ADS-B reports.
5.2 The system will intake all recorded information on ADS-B, radar targets and ATS flight
plans in an offline manner. For each ADS-B flight, the system will compare it with its
corresponding radar and flight plan information, and analyse if the following pre-defined
criteria are met :-
(a) Deviation between ADS-B reported position and independent referenced radar
position is greater than 1NM for more than 5% of total number ADS-B updates; or
(b) NUC of each ADS-B reported position is smaller than 4 for more than 5% of total
number of ADS-B updates; or
(c) FLTID entered via cockpit interface and downlinked in ADS-B data (i.e. I021/170 in
Asterix CAT 21) does not match with aircraft callsign in the ATS Flight Plan for
more than 5% of total number of ADS-B updates.
5.3 For (a) above, deviation between ADS-B and radar tracks is set to 1NM in accordance
with ICAO Circular 326 defining position integrity (NUC) shall be at least 4 (0.5NM <
HPL < 1NM) for 3NM aircraft separation use, on assumption that radar targets are close
to actual aircraft position. A threshold of 5% is initially set to exclude aircraft only
exhibiting occasional problems during their flight journey. The above criteria should be
made configurable to allow fine-turning in future.
5.4 The system will generate a list of aircraft meeting the above pre-defined criteria showing
full details of each occurrence such as date/time of occurrence, Mode S address, screen
capture of radar and ADS-B history tracks, graphs of NUC value changes and deviation
between radar and ADS-B tracks along the flight journey. A sample screen shot of the
system is given at Attachment B for reference.
* * * * * * * *
1
Navigational Uncertainty Category (NUC) for Version 0 avionics (DO260) and
Navigational Integrity Category (NIC) and Source Integrity Level (SIL) for Version 1 and Version 2
avionics (DO260A and DO260B)

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Attachment A – List of known ADS-B avionics problems
Ref. Problem Cause Safety Implications to ATC
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
1. Track Jumping problem
with Rockwell Collins
TPR901
(See Figure1)
Software issue with TPR901
transponder initially only
affecting Boeing aircraft.
Does not occur in all aircraft
with this transponder.
Subsequent investigation by
Rockwell Collins has found
that the particular
transponder, common to all
of the aircraft where the
position jumps had been
observed, had an issue when
crossing ±180 degrees
longitude.
On some crossings (10%
probability), errors are
introduced into the position
longitude before encoding.
These errors are not self-
correcting and can only be
removed by a power reset of
the transponder. The
problem, once triggered can
last days, since many
transponders are not
routinely powered down.
Yes.
Will present as a few wild/large
positional jumps. Nearly all reports
are tagged as low quality (NUC=0)
and are discarded, however, some
occasional non zero reports get
through.
Problem is very “obvious”. Could
result in incorrect longitudinal
position of Flight Data Record
track. Can trigger RAM alerts.
Rockwell Collins has successfully
introduced a Service Bulletin that
solves the problem in Boeing aircraft.
The problem is known to exist on
Airbus aircraft. Rockwell has advised
that a solution will not be available in
the near future because of their
commitment to DO260B
development.
Rockwell Collins may not have a fix
for some time. Workaround solutions
are being examined by Airbus,
Operators and Airservices Australia.
The only workaround identified at
this time is to power down the
transponders before flight to states
using ADS-B – after crossing
longitude 180. It can be noted that in
Airbus aircraft it is not possible to
safely power down the transponder in
flight.
Airbus have prepared a procedure to
support power down before flight.
Airservices Australia have negotiated
with 2 airlines to enact this procedure
prior to flights to Australia.

2 - 5
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
An additional partial workaround is :
to ensure that procedures exist for
ATC to ask the pilot to changeover
transponders if the problem is
observed. Since there is a 10%
chance of the problem occurring on
each crossing of ±180 degrees
longitude, the chance that both
transponders being affected is 1%.
There is no complete workaround
available for flights that operate
across 180 degrees longitude directly
to destination without replacing the
transponder. Airbus advise that a new
TPR901 transponder compliant with
DO260B will be available in 2014.
This new transponder will not exhibit
the problem.
2. Rockwell Collins TDR94
Old version.
The pattern of erroneous
positional data is very
distinctive of the
problem.
(See Figure 2)
Old software typically before
version -108. The design was
completed before the ADS-B
standards were established
and the message definitions
are different to the current
DO260.
Rockwell has recommended
that ADS-B be disabled on
these models.
Yes.
Will present as a few wild
positional jumps. Nearly all reports
are tagged as low quality (NUC=0)
and are discarded, however, some
occasional non zero reports get
through. Also causes incorrect
altitude reports.
Problem is very “obvious”.
Problem well known. Particularly
affects Gulfstream aircraft which
unfortunately leave the factory with
ADS-B enabled from this
transponder model.
Rockwell has issued a service
bulletin recommending that ADS-B
be disabled for aircraft with this
transponder software. See Service
Information Letter 1-05 July 19,
2005. It is easy to disable the
transmission.

2 - 6
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
If a new case is discovered, an entry
needs to be made to the black list
until rectification has been effected.
3. Litton GPS with proper
RAIM processing
Litton GNSSU (GPS) Mark
1 design problem. (Does not
apply to Litton Mark II).
GPS does not output correct
messages to transponder.
No.
Perceived GPS integrity changes
seemingly randomly. With the GPS
satellite constellation working
properly, the position data is good.
However the reported integrity is
inconsistent and hence the data is
sometimes/often discarded by the
ATC system. The effected is
perceived extremely poor
“coverage”. The data is not
properly “protected” against
erroneous satellite ranging signals –
although this cannot be “seen” by
ATC unless there is a rare satellite
problem.
This GPS is installed in some older,
typically Airbus, fleets.
Data appears “Correct” but integrity
value can vary. Performance under
“bad” satellite conditions is a
problem.
Correction involves replacing the
GNSSU (GPS) which is expensive.
4. SIL programming error
for DO260A avionics
Installers of ADS-B avionics
using the newer DO260A
standard mis program “SIL”.
a) This problem appears for
DO260A transponders, with
SIL incorrectly set to 0 or 1
(instead of 2 or 3)
b) As the aircraft enters
No.
First report of detection appears
good (and is good), all subsequent
reports not displayed because the
data quality is perceived as “bad”
by the ATC system. Operational
effect is effectively no ADS-B data.
Hence no risk.
Would NOT be included in a “black
list”.
Aircraft with “Dynon avionics”
exhibit this behavior. They do not
have a certified GPS and hence
always set SIL = 0. This is actually
correct but hence they do not get
treated as ADS-B equipped.

2 - 7
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
coverage, the ADS-B ground
station correctly assumes
DO260 until it receives the
version number.
c) The transmitted NIC
(DO260A) is interpreted as a
good NUC (DO260) value,
because no SIL message has
yet been received. The data
is presented to ATC.
5. Garmin “N” Flight ID
problem
(See Figure 3)
Installers of Garmin
transponder incorrectly set
“Callsign”/Flight ID. This is
caused by poor human
factors and design that
assumes that GA aircraft are
US registered.
Yes.
Flight ID appears as “N”. Inhibits
proper coupling.
Can be corrected by installer
manipulation of front panel. Does not
warrant “black list” activity.
6. Flight ID corruption issue
1 – trailing “U”
Flight ID’s received :
GT615, T615U ,NEB033,
NEB033U, QF7550,
QF7550U, QF7583,
QF7583U, QF7585,
QF7585, QF7585U,
QF7594, QFA7521,
QFA7531, QFA7531,
QFA7531U, QFA7532,
QFA7532U, QFA7532W,
QFA7550, QFA7552,
TPR901 software problem
interfacing with Flight ID
source. Results in constantly
changing Flight ID with
some reports having an extra
“U” character.
Yes.
Flight ID changes during flight
inhibits proper coupling or causes
decoupling.
Affects mainly B747 aircraft. Boeing
SB is available for Rockwell
transponders and B744 aircraft.
Rockwell Collins have SB 503 which
upgrades faulty -003 transponder to -
005 standard.

2 - 8
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
QFA7581
7. Flight ID corruption issue
2
ACSS software problem
results in constantly
changing Flight ID.
Applies to ACSS XS950
transponder Pn 7517800-
110006 and Honeywell FMC
(pn 4052508 952). ACSS fix
was available in Sept 2007.
Yes.
Flight ID changes during flight
inhibits proper coupling or causes
decoupling.
Software upgrade available.
8. No Flight ID transmitted Various causes No.
Flight ID not available. Inhibits
proper coupling.
Aircraft could “fail to couple with
Flight Data Record”. Not strictly
misleading – but could cause
controller distraction.
9. ACSS Transponder
10005/6 without Mod A
reports NUC based on
HFOM.
Yes.
Appears good in all respects until
there is a satellite constellation
problem (not normally detectable
by ground systems).
Not approved and hence not
compliant with CASA regulations.
If known could be added to black list.
Configuration is not permitted by
regulation.
10. Occasional small position
jump backwards
(See Figure 4)
For some older Airbus
aircraft, an occasional report
may exhibit a small “jump
back” of less than 0.1 nm
Root cause not known
No.
Not detectable in ATC due to
extrapolation, use of latest data and
screen ranges used.
ATC ground system processing can
eliminate these.
11. Older ACSS transponders
report integrity too
Design error reports integrity
one value worse than reality
No. Can be treated in the same manner as
a loss of transponder capability.

2 - 9
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
conservatively In poor GPS geometry cases the
ATC system could discard the data
when the data is in fact useable.
Will be perceived as loss of ADS-B
data.
12. Intermittent wiring GPS
transponder
ADS-B transmissions switch
intermittently between INS
position and GPS position.
Yes.
Normally the integrity data goes to
zero when INS is broadcast, but
sometimes during transition
between INS and GPS, an INS
position or two can be broadcast
with “good” NUC value.
Disturbing small positional jump.
13. Wrong 24 bit code Installation error No.
No direct ATC impact unless a rare
duplicate is detected.
This is not a direct ADS-B problem,
but relates to a Mode S transponder
issue that can put TCAS at risk.
Cannot be fixed by black list entry.
Needs to be passed to regulator for
resolution.
14. Toggling between high
and low NUC
(See Figure 5)
Faulty GPS receiver/ADS-B
transponder
No.
ATC will see tracks appear and
disappear discretely. No safety
implications to ATC.
While it is normal for NUC value to
switch between a high and low figure
based on the geometry of GPS
satellites available, it is of the view
that more should be done to examine
this phenomenon. It is observed that
such switching between high and low
NUC occurs on certain airframe and

2 - 10
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
not on others. The issue was raised to
the airlines so as to get a better
understanding. On one occasion, the
airline replied that a module on their
GPS receiver was faulty. On another
occasion, the airline replied that one
of the ADS-B transponder was
faulty. Good NUC was transmitted
when the working transponder was in
use and poor NUC was transmitted
when the faulty ADS-B transponder
was in use.
15. Consistent Low NUC
(See Figure 6)
GNSS receivers are not
connected to the ADS-B
transponders.
No.
Data shall be filtered out by the
system and not detectable in ATC
Not considered a safety problem but
a common phenomenon in the
Region – the concerned aircraft will
be treated equivalent to “aircraft not
equipped with ADS-B”.
While it is normal for aircraft to
transmit low NUC, it is of the view
that “consistent low NUC’ could be
due to the avionics problem (e.g.
GNSS receiver is not connected to
the ADS-B transponder).
It is recognised that operators may
not be aware that their aircraft are
transmitting unexpected low NUC
/ NIC values, due to equipment
malfunction. Hence, it is desirable
for States to inform the operators
when unexpected low NUC

2 - 11
(Yes / No)
Recommendations
values are transmitted, where
practicable.
Concerned airline operators are
required to take early remedial
actions. Otherwise, their aircraft will
be treated as if non-ADS-B equipped
which will be requested to fly outside
the ADS-B airspace after the ADS-B
mandate becomes effective.
16. ADS-B position report
with good integrity (i.e.
NUC >= “4”) but ADS-B
position data are actually
bad as compared with
radar (met criteria 5.2(a))
Faulty ADS-B avionics Yes.
As the ground system could not
"automatically" discard ADS-B
data with good integrity (i.e. NUC
value >=4), there could be safety
implications to ATC.
The problem should be immediately
reported to the concerned
CAA/operators for problem
diagnosis including digging out the
root causes, avionics/GPS types etc.,
and ensure problem rectification
before the ADS-B data could be used
by ATC.
Consider to “blacklist” the aircraft
before the problem is rectified.
17. FLTID transmitted by
ADS-B aircraft does not
match with callsign in
flight plan
(see Figures 7a – 7d)
Human errors Yes.
Could lead to screen clutter - two
target labels with different IDs (one
for radar and another for ADS-B)
being displayed, causing potential
confusion and safety implications
to ATC.
Issue regulations/letters to concerned
operators urging them to set FLTID
exactly match with callsign in flight
plan.

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Figure 1 - Track Jumping problem with TPR901 Figure 3 - Garmin “N” Flight ID problem
Figure 2 - Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old version. The pattern of
erroneous positional data is very distinctive of the problem
Figure 4 - Occasional small position jump backwards

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Figure 5 - NUC value toggling Figure 6 – Consistent low NUC
NUC always 0

2 - 14
Figure 7a - Additional zero inserted Figure 7b - ICAO Airline Designator Code dropped
Figure 7c - Wrong numerical codes entered Figure 7d - IATA Airline Designator Code used
ADS-B
Radar
ADS-B
Radar
Radar
ADS-B
ADS-B
Radar
NUC always 0

2 - 15
Attachment B - Sample screen shot of a system to monitor and analyse performance of ADS-B avionics

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