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Agent handlingAgent handling
0BJECTIVE0BJECTIVE
TO IMPART TO THE STUDENTS THETO IMPART TO THE STUDENTS THE
MILITARY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT ISMILITARY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS
INTELLIGENCE HANDLINGINTELLIGENCE HANDLING
SCOPESCOPE
1 Intelligence1 Intelligence
2 Agent2 Agent
3 Case Officer3 Case Officer
4 Training4 Training
5 Agent in place5 Agent in place
6 Unwitting agent6 Unwitting agent
7 Fronts and cutouts7 Fronts and cutouts
8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations
9 Counter-intelligence9 Counter-intelligence
10 MICE10 MICE
Agent handlerAgent handler
Agent handlerAgent handler is a generic term common tois a generic term common to
many intelligence organizations which can bemany intelligence organizations which can be
applied to Case Officers, those who aspire toapplied to Case Officers, those who aspire to
be Case officers, "controllers", contacts,be Case officers, "controllers", contacts,
couriers and other assorted trainees.couriers and other assorted trainees.
IntelligenceIntelligence
The objectives of intelligence work are many.The objectives of intelligence work are many.
There is no single job for operatives: each hasThere is no single job for operatives: each has
a particular position within an organization. Ata particular position within an organization. At
the high end, it may be to penetrate andthe high end, it may be to penetrate and
infiltrate a target organization: either with one'sinfiltrate a target organization: either with one's
own personnel, or to gain an "agent in place". Ifown personnel, or to gain an "agent in place". If
the job is to handle an agent in place, a Casethe job is to handle an agent in place, a Case
Officer may be required to oversee the agent.Officer may be required to oversee the agent.
Intelligence. Cont.Intelligence. Cont.
Sometimes the oversight is done indirectly,Sometimes the oversight is done indirectly,
through lower level "handlers", "controllers",through lower level "handlers", "controllers",
and contacts. Theand contacts. The CIACIA customarily uses "customarily uses "
agents of influenceagents of influence": secondary sources": secondary sources
connected with a target, like the maid to anconnected with a target, like the maid to an
ambassador who digs through the trash. Thisambassador who digs through the trash. This
recognizes its weakness at the direct approachrecognizes its weakness at the direct approach
of recruitment. Such agents may be easier toof recruitment. Such agents may be easier to
find, but do not substitute for having the actualfind, but do not substitute for having the actual
target in your employ.target in your employ.
Other operative positions are support functions:Other operative positions are support functions:
maintenance and operation of "safe houses",maintenance and operation of "safe houses",
couriers, etc.couriers, etc.
Agent of influenceAgent of influence
 AnAn agent of influenceagent of influence is a well-placed, trustedis a well-placed, trusted
contact who actively and consciously serves a foreigncontact who actively and consciously serves a foreign
interest or foreign intelligence services on someinterest or foreign intelligence services on some
matters while retaining his integrity on others.matters while retaining his integrity on others. Agent ofAgent of
influenceinfluence might also refer to an unwitting contact thatmight also refer to an unwitting contact that
is manipulated to take actions that advanced interestsis manipulated to take actions that advanced interests
on specific issues of common concern.on specific issues of common concern.
 ForeignForeign intelligence servicesintelligence services take people who tend totake people who tend to
agree with the their positions on at least oneagree with the their positions on at least one
significant issue, such as opposition to some elementsignificant issue, such as opposition to some element
of a nation'sof a nation's foreign policyforeign policy, and then seeks ways to, and then seeks ways to
motivate and help that person become a successfulmotivate and help that person become a successful
advocate on that issue within their own circle ofadvocate on that issue within their own circle of
influence.influence.
AgentAgent
An "agent" by definition acts on behalf ofAn "agent" by definition acts on behalf of
another, the "another", in this case, being ananother, the "another", in this case, being an
organization or government. Agents can beorganization or government. Agents can be
either witting or unwitting, willing or unwilling.either witting or unwitting, willing or unwilling.
Agents are typically under the direction of anAgents are typically under the direction of an
agent handler or controller. In the case of theagent handler or controller. In the case of the
U.S.U.S. Central Intelligence AgencyCentral Intelligence Agency, this handler is, this handler is
known as aknown as a Case Officer.Case Officer.
Agent. . . cont.Agent. . . cont.
 A potential recruit is often identified by skimming ofA potential recruit is often identified by skimming of
trade journals and professional proceedings fortrade journals and professional proceedings for
subject experts names and affiliations, vulnerablesubject experts names and affiliations, vulnerable
political and technical delegation members, tradepolitical and technical delegation members, trade
conferences attendees, and foreign travellers whoseconferences attendees, and foreign travellers whose
activities make them potential subjects foractivities make them potential subjects for coercioncoercion oror
inducement. The assessment of a potential agentinducement. The assessment of a potential agent
includes verification of their credentials andincludes verification of their credentials and bona fidesbona fides
or true identities. An approach is either done 'cold,'or true identities. An approach is either done 'cold,'
where the recruiter has no prior contact with thewhere the recruiter has no prior contact with the
target, or 'warm,' in which the handler and the targettarget, or 'warm,' in which the handler and the target
are prior acquaintances. Recruitment of an agent canare prior acquaintances. Recruitment of an agent can
take many months or even years to accomplish, and istake many months or even years to accomplish, and is
risky.risky.
Agent. . . cont.Agent. . . cont.
 KGBKGB recruiting practices show a record of success.recruiting practices show a record of success.
The Soviet Union recovered from a defeat in theThe Soviet Union recovered from a defeat in the
Polish-Soviet WarPolish-Soviet War in 1920 to become one of thein 1920 to become one of the
worlds' only twoworlds' only two superpowerssuperpowers armed witharmed with
nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons within 30 years, in part based onwithin 30 years, in part based on
skilled espionage. The first step was obtainingskilled espionage. The first step was obtaining
permission from the Moscow (or 'the Center'). Nextpermission from the Moscow (or 'the Center'). Next
came a formal recruitment interview by ancame a formal recruitment interview by an
experienced operative or officer. Topic number one inexperienced operative or officer. Topic number one in
the interview was the person's motivation for spyingthe interview was the person's motivation for spying
for the USSR, with the attendant issue of whether thefor the USSR, with the attendant issue of whether the
person was a provocateur of another intelligenceperson was a provocateur of another intelligence
service. Often the language of "contracts" was used,service. Often the language of "contracts" was used,
with reference to "signing on". Following thewith reference to "signing on". Following the
recruitment meeting the recruiting officer submitted arecruitment meeting the recruiting officer submitted a
comprehensive report to the Center.comprehensive report to the Center.
Case OfficerCase Officer
 The relationship between Case Officer and agentThe relationship between Case Officer and agent
might be compared tomight be compared to psychiatristpsychiatrist and patient. Aand patient. A
person willing to become involved in espionage, andperson willing to become involved in espionage, and
the betrayal of his country, is often someone withthe betrayal of his country, is often someone with
emotional problems, or subject to the stress of theemotional problems, or subject to the stress of the
work. The Case Officer is mentor and must exhibitwork. The Case Officer is mentor and must exhibit
characteristics such as professionalism in thecharacteristics such as professionalism in the
operational field, a cool head, and control of theoperational field, a cool head, and control of the
emotions.emotions.
 After a source (agent) has been exploited, he is inAfter a source (agent) has been exploited, he is in
practice often no longer handled well (historicalpractice often no longer handled well (historical
examples fromexamples from BNDBND,, MI6MI6 and others). Promises areand others). Promises are
made but broken. Case officers may privately lackmade but broken. Case officers may privately lack
respect for an agent who is risking his life. Every agentrespect for an agent who is risking his life. Every agent
runs the risk of being exposed by penetration of hisruns the risk of being exposed by penetration of his
employers, for example by a defection from within hisemployers, for example by a defection from within his
handler's organization.handler's organization.
TrainingTraining
 After recruitment, agents are given the trainingAfter recruitment, agents are given the training
required to conduct espionage activities safely andrequired to conduct espionage activities safely and
effectively. CIA training often includes variouseffectively. CIA training often includes various
tradecraftstradecrafts such as clandestine communications,such as clandestine communications,
elicitation, surveillance and counter-surveillance,elicitation, surveillance and counter-surveillance,
photographic and audio recording,photographic and audio recording,
concealment deviceconcealment device construction, demolitions, use ofconstruction, demolitions, use of
small arms, all depending on the person’s fitness andsmall arms, all depending on the person’s fitness and
skills.skills.
 In some forms ofIn some forms of infiltrationinfiltration, the agent may be, the agent may be
provided with a false identity, which CIA calls a coverprovided with a false identity, which CIA calls a cover
or legend that might aid in their access and operabilityor legend that might aid in their access and operability
in regards to the target. This may depend on false orin regards to the target. This may depend on false or
reproduced documentation, disguises, and otherreproduced documentation, disguises, and other
identity support techniques.identity support techniques.
Agent in placeAgent in place
 An agent in placeAn agent in place refers to a subject known within arefers to a subject known within a
society, known to his friends, who may even have asociety, known to his friends, who may even have a
position inside a government, and is willing toposition inside a government, and is willing to
cooperate or assist. Case handling in these instancescooperate or assist. Case handling in these instances
requires much more caution, security, and training. Itrequires much more caution, security, and training. It
is extremely dangerous for both the Case officer andis extremely dangerous for both the Case officer and
agent to publicly meet and have face to face contact,agent to publicly meet and have face to face contact,
though initially this may be necessary to establishthough initially this may be necessary to establish
bona fides and some training regarding contacts.bona fides and some training regarding contacts.
Usually the agent in place is then handed off to anUsually the agent in place is then handed off to an
innocuous cutout, or series of cutouts, who act as go-innocuous cutout, or series of cutouts, who act as go-
betweens and courier, delivering instructions andbetweens and courier, delivering instructions and
retrieving material.retrieving material.
Unwitting agentUnwitting agent
Examples areExamples are Stephen S. AttwoodStephen S. Attwood andand
Walter LippmannWalter Lippmann. In Attwood's case someone. In Attwood's case someone
connected with the university he taught at wasconnected with the university he taught at was
working for Soviet intelligence; in Lippmann'sworking for Soviet intelligence; in Lippmann's
case his personal stenographer had knowledgecase his personal stenographer had knowledge
of all his Washington D.C. contacts and theirof all his Washington D.C. contacts and their
conversations.conversations.
Wen Ho Lee, it appears now, through sloppyWen Ho Lee, it appears now, through sloppy
work habits and carelessness on both his partwork habits and carelessness on both his part
andand Los Alamos National LaboratoryLos Alamos National Laboratory's,'s,
unwittingly passed vital information to theunwittingly passed vital information to the
Chinese Communist Government.
Fronts and cutoutsFronts and cutouts
AA front organizationfront organization in espionage functionsin espionage functions
within a system of "cutouts". The extensive usewithin a system of "cutouts". The extensive use
of cutouts, so long as they are trusted andof cutouts, so long as they are trusted and
reliable persons, can become a long chain ofreliable persons, can become a long chain of
individuals.individuals.
A "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists ofA "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists of
several collectors of information from differentseveral collectors of information from different
areas within the penetrated bureau. The mostareas within the penetrated bureau. The most
valuable source must be protected; so often thevaluable source must be protected; so often the
least "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the personleast "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the person
lowest on the totem pole within the penetratedlowest on the totem pole within the penetrated
target, functions as the head of the group andtarget, functions as the head of the group and
cutout.cutout.
Historical reconstruction and itsHistorical reconstruction and its
limitationslimitations
 IntelligenceIntelligence andand counter-intelligencecounter-intelligence are two differentare two different
fields.fields.
 What can be learned from a successful espionageWhat can be learned from a successful espionage
operation usually comes from counter-espionage files,operation usually comes from counter-espionage files,
which may give a distorted or opaque view. Forwhich may give a distorted or opaque view. For
example, what is known about theexample, what is known about the CPUSA'sCPUSA's
secret apparatussecret apparatus, which operated a very large and, which operated a very large and
successful organization in the United States fromsuccessful organization in the United States from
aboutabout 19211921 toto 19451945, comes largely from, comes largely from FBIFBI andand SISSIS
counter-intelligence files. These files, however, arecounter-intelligence files. These files, however, are
fragmentary. While counter-intelligence agentsfragmentary. While counter-intelligence agents
successfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA andsuccessfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA and
SovietSoviet operativesoperatives betweenbetween 19451945 andand 19501950, memoirs of, memoirs of
the operatives, testimony (if credible), or archivalthe operatives, testimony (if credible), or archival
documents, and these alone, can document the entiredocuments, and these alone, can document the entire
organization's mission and methods.organization's mission and methods.
Counter-intelligenceCounter-intelligence
The objective ofThe objective of counterintelligencecounterintelligence is tois to
identify hostile intelligence operatives. Onceidentify hostile intelligence operatives. Once
identification has been made, the operative isidentification has been made, the operative is
not necessarily arrested immediately. Anot necessarily arrested immediately. A
decision must be made, and hostile operativesdecision must be made, and hostile operatives
can be left alone for a period of time so as notcan be left alone for a period of time so as not
to reveal the existence of counter-intelligenceto reveal the existence of counter-intelligence
operations.operations.
Counter-intelligence cont.Counter-intelligence cont.
 Nonetheless, an identified operative must be cut offNonetheless, an identified operative must be cut off
from access to further secure information, withoutfrom access to further secure information, without
letting them know theirletting them know their covercover is blown. They mightis blown. They might
then be giventhen be given disinformationdisinformation, either directly or, either directly or
indirectly. An assessment must be made as to theindirectly. An assessment must be made as to the
extent of the damage caused by that operative.extent of the damage caused by that operative.
Eventually, the operative and his handlers will realizeEventually, the operative and his handlers will realize
their operation has been compromised if uselesstheir operation has been compromised if useless
disinformation is being passed, but this creates timedisinformation is being passed, but this creates time
for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards"for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards"
to determine what has been compromised within theto determine what has been compromised within the
target organization. That is the point at which an arresttarget organization. That is the point at which an arrest
is usually made. Sometimes the process of feedingis usually made. Sometimes the process of feeding
disinformation can be useful, and a hostile operativedisinformation can be useful, and a hostile operative
may be left in place for years.may be left in place for years.
Counter-intelligence cont.Counter-intelligence cont.
 Occasionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole;Occasionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole;
that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to histhat is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his
controllers that his cover has been blown. Turning acontrollers that his cover has been blown. Turning a
mole can make him an unwilling agent of eithermole can make him an unwilling agent of either
side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, orside, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or
being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betraybeing coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray
his compatriot organization. In the famous case ofhis compatriot organization. In the famous case of
Arkady ShevchenkoArkady Shevchenko, a Soviet, a Soviet diplomatdiplomat to theto the
United NationsUnited Nations who asked towho asked to defectdefect, rather than, rather than
accept his defection the CIA required he remain inaccept his defection the CIA required he remain in
place and engage in espionage. Shevchenko was aplace and engage in espionage. Shevchenko was a
professional diplomat, not a spy, and he found theprofessional diplomat, not a spy, and he found the
stressful work nerve-wracking.stressful work nerve-wracking.
MICEMICE
 The concept of "The concept of "MICEMICE" was originated by American" was originated by American
counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates acounterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a
person to be willing to betray their own country. It can beperson to be willing to betray their own country. It can be
regarded as one of America's contributions to the art andregarded as one of America's contributions to the art and
science of the business, now that both intelligence andscience of the business, now that both intelligence and
counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simplecounterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple
mnemonicmnemonic, to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents, to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents
in the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple: itin the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple: it
is eitheris either MoneyMoney,, IdeologyIdeology,, CoercionCoercion, or Excitement, that causes, or Excitement, that causes
a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbors, ora person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbors, or
their whole country, and go into the service of a foreigntheir whole country, and go into the service of a foreign
espionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted forespionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for
ideology, or "ideology, or "egoego" for excitement, but the end result is the" for excitement, but the end result is the
same. It is claimed that no one has produced a better summarysame. It is claimed that no one has produced a better summary
of traitors' motivations.of traitors' motivations.
MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont.
Individuals who are motivated to betray theirIndividuals who are motivated to betray their
country for money, out of greed, tend to becountry for money, out of greed, tend to be
persons who feel life has cheated them out ofpersons who feel life has cheated them out of
their just rewards, so they have no qualmstheir just rewards, so they have no qualms
about being fairly compensated, in their ownabout being fairly compensated, in their own
eyes, for their worth. At the same they can geteyes, for their worth. At the same they can get
back at the society which has misunderstoodback at the society which has misunderstood
and not appreciated their talents. Whenand not appreciated their talents. When
Aldrich AmesAldrich Ames bought an $80,000 Jaguar, therebought an $80,000 Jaguar, there
was not the slightest pretense of hiding the fruitwas not the slightest pretense of hiding the fruit
of his labors.of his labors.
MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont.
 Ideology however is the opposite end of the spectrum. PeopleIdeology however is the opposite end of the spectrum. People
with this motivation are deeply committed to a system of beliefswith this motivation are deeply committed to a system of beliefs
that they perceive sustains them, their families, communities,that they perceive sustains them, their families, communities,
and their friends. Such people will risk their lives for noand their friends. Such people will risk their lives for no
payment, service to the cause being their reward. Bothpayment, service to the cause being their reward. Both
Julius and Ethel RosenbergJulius and Ethel Rosenberg were "patsies", or fall guys, for awere "patsies", or fall guys, for a
much larger conspiracy, most of whom walked awaymuch larger conspiracy, most of whom walked away
unscathed. But the Rosenbergs wereunscathed. But the Rosenbergs were willing patsieswilling patsies, martyrs to, martyrs to
a cause for which Julius was willing to see his own wifea cause for which Julius was willing to see his own wife
executed rather than implicate others, and Ethel was willing toexecuted rather than implicate others, and Ethel was willing to
orphan her own children, in service to the cause. As to intrigue,orphan her own children, in service to the cause. As to intrigue,
Kim PhilbyKim Philby rose to the number two spot inrose to the number two spot in British intelligenceBritish intelligence
and was poised to become head, and assisted the Unitedand was poised to become head, and assisted the United
States to establish a peacetime espionage organization, but inStates to establish a peacetime espionage organization, but in
doing so compromised thedoing so compromised the CIACIA from its founding. He originallyfrom its founding. He originally
was recruited into Soviet intelligence to spy on his father,was recruited into Soviet intelligence to spy on his father,
St. John PhilbySt. John Philby..
MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont.
Coercion can be used against an unwillingCoercion can be used against an unwilling
participant,participant, homosexualityhomosexuality-related blackmail-related blackmail
andand briberybribery being two of the most commonbeing two of the most common
forms. The classic example of homosexuality isforms. The classic example of homosexuality is
Donald MacleanDonald Maclean who was compromised bywho was compromised by
Guy BurgessGuy Burgess. As to bribery, once a government. As to bribery, once a government
official takes a bribe, he is forever in theofficial takes a bribe, he is forever in the
possession of those who paid him. He mustpossession of those who paid him. He must
continue taking money, whether he wants to orcontinue taking money, whether he wants to or
not, for fear of exposure. Coercion can also benot, for fear of exposure. Coercion can also be
used against a loved one, in forms ranging fromused against a loved one, in forms ranging from
fear of exposure to violence and even murder.fear of exposure to violence and even murder.
MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont.
Elizabeth BentleyElizabeth Bentley is perhaps the classic studyis perhaps the classic study
of excitement being the motivating factor.of excitement being the motivating factor.
Bentley began her espionage career with aBentley began her espionage career with a
fascist organization, but quickly joined afascist organization, but quickly joined a
communist entity, so ideology does not seem tocommunist entity, so ideology does not seem to
apparent. Bentley then became the lover of aapparent. Bentley then became the lover of a
high-level CPUSA underground operative whohigh-level CPUSA underground operative who
had been ahad been a chekistchekist. When he died, Bentley. When he died, Bentley
took over his operations but her personal losstook over his operations but her personal loss
had a huge impact on her work. Excitement,had a huge impact on her work. Excitement,
romance, and sex were the original reasonsromance, and sex were the original reasons
she got involved, and when she lost thoseshe got involved, and when she lost those
things she defected back to her home country.things she defected back to her home country.
ResidualsResiduals
Valuable spies are sometimes not hanged butValuable spies are sometimes not hanged but
exchanged for spies from the opposite country.exchanged for spies from the opposite country.
Many agencies tell their spies that they will notMany agencies tell their spies that they will not
be forgotten in a foreign prison, but this is notbe forgotten in a foreign prison, but this is not
always the case. During thealways the case. During the Cold WarCold War manymany
exchanges with eastern-bloc agents wereexchanges with eastern-bloc agents were
made on themade on the Glienicke bridgeGlienicke bridge betweenbetween
East BerlinEast Berlin andand West BerlinWest Berlin..
SUMMARYSUMMARY
 1 Intelligence1 Intelligence
 2 Agent2 Agent
 3 Case Officer3 Case Officer
 4 Training4 Training
 5 Agent in place5 Agent in place
 6 Unwitting agent6 Unwitting agent
 7 Fronts and cutouts7 Fronts and cutouts
 8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations
 9 Counter-intelligence9 Counter-intelligence
 10 MICE10 MICE
 11 Residuals11 Residuals
QUESTIONS ??QUESTIONS ??
??
Agent handling

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Agent handling

  • 2. 0BJECTIVE0BJECTIVE TO IMPART TO THE STUDENTS THETO IMPART TO THE STUDENTS THE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT ISMILITARY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE HANDLINGINTELLIGENCE HANDLING
  • 3. SCOPESCOPE 1 Intelligence1 Intelligence 2 Agent2 Agent 3 Case Officer3 Case Officer 4 Training4 Training 5 Agent in place5 Agent in place 6 Unwitting agent6 Unwitting agent 7 Fronts and cutouts7 Fronts and cutouts 8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations 9 Counter-intelligence9 Counter-intelligence 10 MICE10 MICE
  • 4. Agent handlerAgent handler Agent handlerAgent handler is a generic term common tois a generic term common to many intelligence organizations which can bemany intelligence organizations which can be applied to Case Officers, those who aspire toapplied to Case Officers, those who aspire to be Case officers, "controllers", contacts,be Case officers, "controllers", contacts, couriers and other assorted trainees.couriers and other assorted trainees.
  • 5. IntelligenceIntelligence The objectives of intelligence work are many.The objectives of intelligence work are many. There is no single job for operatives: each hasThere is no single job for operatives: each has a particular position within an organization. Ata particular position within an organization. At the high end, it may be to penetrate andthe high end, it may be to penetrate and infiltrate a target organization: either with one'sinfiltrate a target organization: either with one's own personnel, or to gain an "agent in place". Ifown personnel, or to gain an "agent in place". If the job is to handle an agent in place, a Casethe job is to handle an agent in place, a Case Officer may be required to oversee the agent.Officer may be required to oversee the agent.
  • 6. Intelligence. Cont.Intelligence. Cont. Sometimes the oversight is done indirectly,Sometimes the oversight is done indirectly, through lower level "handlers", "controllers",through lower level "handlers", "controllers", and contacts. Theand contacts. The CIACIA customarily uses "customarily uses " agents of influenceagents of influence": secondary sources": secondary sources connected with a target, like the maid to anconnected with a target, like the maid to an ambassador who digs through the trash. Thisambassador who digs through the trash. This recognizes its weakness at the direct approachrecognizes its weakness at the direct approach of recruitment. Such agents may be easier toof recruitment. Such agents may be easier to find, but do not substitute for having the actualfind, but do not substitute for having the actual target in your employ.target in your employ. Other operative positions are support functions:Other operative positions are support functions: maintenance and operation of "safe houses",maintenance and operation of "safe houses", couriers, etc.couriers, etc.
  • 7. Agent of influenceAgent of influence  AnAn agent of influenceagent of influence is a well-placed, trustedis a well-placed, trusted contact who actively and consciously serves a foreigncontact who actively and consciously serves a foreign interest or foreign intelligence services on someinterest or foreign intelligence services on some matters while retaining his integrity on others.matters while retaining his integrity on others. Agent ofAgent of influenceinfluence might also refer to an unwitting contact thatmight also refer to an unwitting contact that is manipulated to take actions that advanced interestsis manipulated to take actions that advanced interests on specific issues of common concern.on specific issues of common concern.  ForeignForeign intelligence servicesintelligence services take people who tend totake people who tend to agree with the their positions on at least oneagree with the their positions on at least one significant issue, such as opposition to some elementsignificant issue, such as opposition to some element of a nation'sof a nation's foreign policyforeign policy, and then seeks ways to, and then seeks ways to motivate and help that person become a successfulmotivate and help that person become a successful advocate on that issue within their own circle ofadvocate on that issue within their own circle of influence.influence.
  • 8. AgentAgent An "agent" by definition acts on behalf ofAn "agent" by definition acts on behalf of another, the "another", in this case, being ananother, the "another", in this case, being an organization or government. Agents can beorganization or government. Agents can be either witting or unwitting, willing or unwilling.either witting or unwitting, willing or unwilling. Agents are typically under the direction of anAgents are typically under the direction of an agent handler or controller. In the case of theagent handler or controller. In the case of the U.S.U.S. Central Intelligence AgencyCentral Intelligence Agency, this handler is, this handler is known as aknown as a Case Officer.Case Officer.
  • 9. Agent. . . cont.Agent. . . cont.  A potential recruit is often identified by skimming ofA potential recruit is often identified by skimming of trade journals and professional proceedings fortrade journals and professional proceedings for subject experts names and affiliations, vulnerablesubject experts names and affiliations, vulnerable political and technical delegation members, tradepolitical and technical delegation members, trade conferences attendees, and foreign travellers whoseconferences attendees, and foreign travellers whose activities make them potential subjects foractivities make them potential subjects for coercioncoercion oror inducement. The assessment of a potential agentinducement. The assessment of a potential agent includes verification of their credentials andincludes verification of their credentials and bona fidesbona fides or true identities. An approach is either done 'cold,'or true identities. An approach is either done 'cold,' where the recruiter has no prior contact with thewhere the recruiter has no prior contact with the target, or 'warm,' in which the handler and the targettarget, or 'warm,' in which the handler and the target are prior acquaintances. Recruitment of an agent canare prior acquaintances. Recruitment of an agent can take many months or even years to accomplish, and istake many months or even years to accomplish, and is risky.risky.
  • 10. Agent. . . cont.Agent. . . cont.  KGBKGB recruiting practices show a record of success.recruiting practices show a record of success. The Soviet Union recovered from a defeat in theThe Soviet Union recovered from a defeat in the Polish-Soviet WarPolish-Soviet War in 1920 to become one of thein 1920 to become one of the worlds' only twoworlds' only two superpowerssuperpowers armed witharmed with nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons within 30 years, in part based onwithin 30 years, in part based on skilled espionage. The first step was obtainingskilled espionage. The first step was obtaining permission from the Moscow (or 'the Center'). Nextpermission from the Moscow (or 'the Center'). Next came a formal recruitment interview by ancame a formal recruitment interview by an experienced operative or officer. Topic number one inexperienced operative or officer. Topic number one in the interview was the person's motivation for spyingthe interview was the person's motivation for spying for the USSR, with the attendant issue of whether thefor the USSR, with the attendant issue of whether the person was a provocateur of another intelligenceperson was a provocateur of another intelligence service. Often the language of "contracts" was used,service. Often the language of "contracts" was used, with reference to "signing on". Following thewith reference to "signing on". Following the recruitment meeting the recruiting officer submitted arecruitment meeting the recruiting officer submitted a comprehensive report to the Center.comprehensive report to the Center.
  • 11. Case OfficerCase Officer  The relationship between Case Officer and agentThe relationship between Case Officer and agent might be compared tomight be compared to psychiatristpsychiatrist and patient. Aand patient. A person willing to become involved in espionage, andperson willing to become involved in espionage, and the betrayal of his country, is often someone withthe betrayal of his country, is often someone with emotional problems, or subject to the stress of theemotional problems, or subject to the stress of the work. The Case Officer is mentor and must exhibitwork. The Case Officer is mentor and must exhibit characteristics such as professionalism in thecharacteristics such as professionalism in the operational field, a cool head, and control of theoperational field, a cool head, and control of the emotions.emotions.  After a source (agent) has been exploited, he is inAfter a source (agent) has been exploited, he is in practice often no longer handled well (historicalpractice often no longer handled well (historical examples fromexamples from BNDBND,, MI6MI6 and others). Promises areand others). Promises are made but broken. Case officers may privately lackmade but broken. Case officers may privately lack respect for an agent who is risking his life. Every agentrespect for an agent who is risking his life. Every agent runs the risk of being exposed by penetration of hisruns the risk of being exposed by penetration of his employers, for example by a defection from within hisemployers, for example by a defection from within his handler's organization.handler's organization.
  • 12. TrainingTraining  After recruitment, agents are given the trainingAfter recruitment, agents are given the training required to conduct espionage activities safely andrequired to conduct espionage activities safely and effectively. CIA training often includes variouseffectively. CIA training often includes various tradecraftstradecrafts such as clandestine communications,such as clandestine communications, elicitation, surveillance and counter-surveillance,elicitation, surveillance and counter-surveillance, photographic and audio recording,photographic and audio recording, concealment deviceconcealment device construction, demolitions, use ofconstruction, demolitions, use of small arms, all depending on the person’s fitness andsmall arms, all depending on the person’s fitness and skills.skills.  In some forms ofIn some forms of infiltrationinfiltration, the agent may be, the agent may be provided with a false identity, which CIA calls a coverprovided with a false identity, which CIA calls a cover or legend that might aid in their access and operabilityor legend that might aid in their access and operability in regards to the target. This may depend on false orin regards to the target. This may depend on false or reproduced documentation, disguises, and otherreproduced documentation, disguises, and other identity support techniques.identity support techniques.
  • 13. Agent in placeAgent in place  An agent in placeAn agent in place refers to a subject known within arefers to a subject known within a society, known to his friends, who may even have asociety, known to his friends, who may even have a position inside a government, and is willing toposition inside a government, and is willing to cooperate or assist. Case handling in these instancescooperate or assist. Case handling in these instances requires much more caution, security, and training. Itrequires much more caution, security, and training. It is extremely dangerous for both the Case officer andis extremely dangerous for both the Case officer and agent to publicly meet and have face to face contact,agent to publicly meet and have face to face contact, though initially this may be necessary to establishthough initially this may be necessary to establish bona fides and some training regarding contacts.bona fides and some training regarding contacts. Usually the agent in place is then handed off to anUsually the agent in place is then handed off to an innocuous cutout, or series of cutouts, who act as go-innocuous cutout, or series of cutouts, who act as go- betweens and courier, delivering instructions andbetweens and courier, delivering instructions and retrieving material.retrieving material.
  • 14. Unwitting agentUnwitting agent Examples areExamples are Stephen S. AttwoodStephen S. Attwood andand Walter LippmannWalter Lippmann. In Attwood's case someone. In Attwood's case someone connected with the university he taught at wasconnected with the university he taught at was working for Soviet intelligence; in Lippmann'sworking for Soviet intelligence; in Lippmann's case his personal stenographer had knowledgecase his personal stenographer had knowledge of all his Washington D.C. contacts and theirof all his Washington D.C. contacts and their conversations.conversations. Wen Ho Lee, it appears now, through sloppyWen Ho Lee, it appears now, through sloppy work habits and carelessness on both his partwork habits and carelessness on both his part andand Los Alamos National LaboratoryLos Alamos National Laboratory's,'s, unwittingly passed vital information to theunwittingly passed vital information to the Chinese Communist Government.
  • 15. Fronts and cutoutsFronts and cutouts AA front organizationfront organization in espionage functionsin espionage functions within a system of "cutouts". The extensive usewithin a system of "cutouts". The extensive use of cutouts, so long as they are trusted andof cutouts, so long as they are trusted and reliable persons, can become a long chain ofreliable persons, can become a long chain of individuals.individuals. A "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists ofA "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists of several collectors of information from differentseveral collectors of information from different areas within the penetrated bureau. The mostareas within the penetrated bureau. The most valuable source must be protected; so often thevaluable source must be protected; so often the least "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the personleast "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the person lowest on the totem pole within the penetratedlowest on the totem pole within the penetrated target, functions as the head of the group andtarget, functions as the head of the group and cutout.cutout.
  • 16. Historical reconstruction and itsHistorical reconstruction and its limitationslimitations  IntelligenceIntelligence andand counter-intelligencecounter-intelligence are two differentare two different fields.fields.  What can be learned from a successful espionageWhat can be learned from a successful espionage operation usually comes from counter-espionage files,operation usually comes from counter-espionage files, which may give a distorted or opaque view. Forwhich may give a distorted or opaque view. For example, what is known about theexample, what is known about the CPUSA'sCPUSA's secret apparatussecret apparatus, which operated a very large and, which operated a very large and successful organization in the United States fromsuccessful organization in the United States from aboutabout 19211921 toto 19451945, comes largely from, comes largely from FBIFBI andand SISSIS counter-intelligence files. These files, however, arecounter-intelligence files. These files, however, are fragmentary. While counter-intelligence agentsfragmentary. While counter-intelligence agents successfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA andsuccessfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA and SovietSoviet operativesoperatives betweenbetween 19451945 andand 19501950, memoirs of, memoirs of the operatives, testimony (if credible), or archivalthe operatives, testimony (if credible), or archival documents, and these alone, can document the entiredocuments, and these alone, can document the entire organization's mission and methods.organization's mission and methods.
  • 17. Counter-intelligenceCounter-intelligence The objective ofThe objective of counterintelligencecounterintelligence is tois to identify hostile intelligence operatives. Onceidentify hostile intelligence operatives. Once identification has been made, the operative isidentification has been made, the operative is not necessarily arrested immediately. Anot necessarily arrested immediately. A decision must be made, and hostile operativesdecision must be made, and hostile operatives can be left alone for a period of time so as notcan be left alone for a period of time so as not to reveal the existence of counter-intelligenceto reveal the existence of counter-intelligence operations.operations.
  • 18. Counter-intelligence cont.Counter-intelligence cont.  Nonetheless, an identified operative must be cut offNonetheless, an identified operative must be cut off from access to further secure information, withoutfrom access to further secure information, without letting them know theirletting them know their covercover is blown. They mightis blown. They might then be giventhen be given disinformationdisinformation, either directly or, either directly or indirectly. An assessment must be made as to theindirectly. An assessment must be made as to the extent of the damage caused by that operative.extent of the damage caused by that operative. Eventually, the operative and his handlers will realizeEventually, the operative and his handlers will realize their operation has been compromised if uselesstheir operation has been compromised if useless disinformation is being passed, but this creates timedisinformation is being passed, but this creates time for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards"for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards" to determine what has been compromised within theto determine what has been compromised within the target organization. That is the point at which an arresttarget organization. That is the point at which an arrest is usually made. Sometimes the process of feedingis usually made. Sometimes the process of feeding disinformation can be useful, and a hostile operativedisinformation can be useful, and a hostile operative may be left in place for years.may be left in place for years.
  • 19. Counter-intelligence cont.Counter-intelligence cont.  Occasionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole;Occasionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole; that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to histhat is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his controllers that his cover has been blown. Turning acontrollers that his cover has been blown. Turning a mole can make him an unwilling agent of eithermole can make him an unwilling agent of either side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, orside, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betraybeing coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray his compatriot organization. In the famous case ofhis compatriot organization. In the famous case of Arkady ShevchenkoArkady Shevchenko, a Soviet, a Soviet diplomatdiplomat to theto the United NationsUnited Nations who asked towho asked to defectdefect, rather than, rather than accept his defection the CIA required he remain inaccept his defection the CIA required he remain in place and engage in espionage. Shevchenko was aplace and engage in espionage. Shevchenko was a professional diplomat, not a spy, and he found theprofessional diplomat, not a spy, and he found the stressful work nerve-wracking.stressful work nerve-wracking.
  • 20. MICEMICE  The concept of "The concept of "MICEMICE" was originated by American" was originated by American counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates acounterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a person to be willing to betray their own country. It can beperson to be willing to betray their own country. It can be regarded as one of America's contributions to the art andregarded as one of America's contributions to the art and science of the business, now that both intelligence andscience of the business, now that both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simplecounterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple mnemonicmnemonic, to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents, to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents in the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple: itin the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple: it is eitheris either MoneyMoney,, IdeologyIdeology,, CoercionCoercion, or Excitement, that causes, or Excitement, that causes a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbors, ora person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbors, or their whole country, and go into the service of a foreigntheir whole country, and go into the service of a foreign espionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted forespionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for ideology, or "ideology, or "egoego" for excitement, but the end result is the" for excitement, but the end result is the same. It is claimed that no one has produced a better summarysame. It is claimed that no one has produced a better summary of traitors' motivations.of traitors' motivations.
  • 21. MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont. Individuals who are motivated to betray theirIndividuals who are motivated to betray their country for money, out of greed, tend to becountry for money, out of greed, tend to be persons who feel life has cheated them out ofpersons who feel life has cheated them out of their just rewards, so they have no qualmstheir just rewards, so they have no qualms about being fairly compensated, in their ownabout being fairly compensated, in their own eyes, for their worth. At the same they can geteyes, for their worth. At the same they can get back at the society which has misunderstoodback at the society which has misunderstood and not appreciated their talents. Whenand not appreciated their talents. When Aldrich AmesAldrich Ames bought an $80,000 Jaguar, therebought an $80,000 Jaguar, there was not the slightest pretense of hiding the fruitwas not the slightest pretense of hiding the fruit of his labors.of his labors.
  • 22. MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont.  Ideology however is the opposite end of the spectrum. PeopleIdeology however is the opposite end of the spectrum. People with this motivation are deeply committed to a system of beliefswith this motivation are deeply committed to a system of beliefs that they perceive sustains them, their families, communities,that they perceive sustains them, their families, communities, and their friends. Such people will risk their lives for noand their friends. Such people will risk their lives for no payment, service to the cause being their reward. Bothpayment, service to the cause being their reward. Both Julius and Ethel RosenbergJulius and Ethel Rosenberg were "patsies", or fall guys, for awere "patsies", or fall guys, for a much larger conspiracy, most of whom walked awaymuch larger conspiracy, most of whom walked away unscathed. But the Rosenbergs wereunscathed. But the Rosenbergs were willing patsieswilling patsies, martyrs to, martyrs to a cause for which Julius was willing to see his own wifea cause for which Julius was willing to see his own wife executed rather than implicate others, and Ethel was willing toexecuted rather than implicate others, and Ethel was willing to orphan her own children, in service to the cause. As to intrigue,orphan her own children, in service to the cause. As to intrigue, Kim PhilbyKim Philby rose to the number two spot inrose to the number two spot in British intelligenceBritish intelligence and was poised to become head, and assisted the Unitedand was poised to become head, and assisted the United States to establish a peacetime espionage organization, but inStates to establish a peacetime espionage organization, but in doing so compromised thedoing so compromised the CIACIA from its founding. He originallyfrom its founding. He originally was recruited into Soviet intelligence to spy on his father,was recruited into Soviet intelligence to spy on his father, St. John PhilbySt. John Philby..
  • 23. MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont. Coercion can be used against an unwillingCoercion can be used against an unwilling participant,participant, homosexualityhomosexuality-related blackmail-related blackmail andand briberybribery being two of the most commonbeing two of the most common forms. The classic example of homosexuality isforms. The classic example of homosexuality is Donald MacleanDonald Maclean who was compromised bywho was compromised by Guy BurgessGuy Burgess. As to bribery, once a government. As to bribery, once a government official takes a bribe, he is forever in theofficial takes a bribe, he is forever in the possession of those who paid him. He mustpossession of those who paid him. He must continue taking money, whether he wants to orcontinue taking money, whether he wants to or not, for fear of exposure. Coercion can also benot, for fear of exposure. Coercion can also be used against a loved one, in forms ranging fromused against a loved one, in forms ranging from fear of exposure to violence and even murder.fear of exposure to violence and even murder.
  • 24. MICE . . cont.MICE . . cont. Elizabeth BentleyElizabeth Bentley is perhaps the classic studyis perhaps the classic study of excitement being the motivating factor.of excitement being the motivating factor. Bentley began her espionage career with aBentley began her espionage career with a fascist organization, but quickly joined afascist organization, but quickly joined a communist entity, so ideology does not seem tocommunist entity, so ideology does not seem to apparent. Bentley then became the lover of aapparent. Bentley then became the lover of a high-level CPUSA underground operative whohigh-level CPUSA underground operative who had been ahad been a chekistchekist. When he died, Bentley. When he died, Bentley took over his operations but her personal losstook over his operations but her personal loss had a huge impact on her work. Excitement,had a huge impact on her work. Excitement, romance, and sex were the original reasonsromance, and sex were the original reasons she got involved, and when she lost thoseshe got involved, and when she lost those things she defected back to her home country.things she defected back to her home country.
  • 25. ResidualsResiduals Valuable spies are sometimes not hanged butValuable spies are sometimes not hanged but exchanged for spies from the opposite country.exchanged for spies from the opposite country. Many agencies tell their spies that they will notMany agencies tell their spies that they will not be forgotten in a foreign prison, but this is notbe forgotten in a foreign prison, but this is not always the case. During thealways the case. During the Cold WarCold War manymany exchanges with eastern-bloc agents wereexchanges with eastern-bloc agents were made on themade on the Glienicke bridgeGlienicke bridge betweenbetween East BerlinEast Berlin andand West BerlinWest Berlin..
  • 26. SUMMARYSUMMARY  1 Intelligence1 Intelligence  2 Agent2 Agent  3 Case Officer3 Case Officer  4 Training4 Training  5 Agent in place5 Agent in place  6 Unwitting agent6 Unwitting agent  7 Fronts and cutouts7 Fronts and cutouts  8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations8 Historical reconstruction and its limitations  9 Counter-intelligence9 Counter-intelligence  10 MICE10 MICE  11 Residuals11 Residuals