An Effective Data Privacy Mechanism through Secure Session Key Exchange Model for MANET

International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE)
Vol. 8, No. 5, October 2018, pp. 3267~3277
ISSN: 2088-8708, DOI: 10.11591/ijece.v8i5.pp3267-3277  3267
Journal homepage: http://iaescore.com/journals/index.php/IJECE
An Effective Data Privacy Mechanism through Secure Session
Key Exchange Model for MANET
K. Ramesh Rao1
, S.N.Tirumala Rao2
, P. Chenna Reddy3
1
CSE, JNTUA, Anantapuramu (A.P), India
2
Department of CSE, NarasaraoPeta Engineering College Narasaraopet, India
3
Department of CSE, Director, Academic Audit, JNTUA, India
Article Info ABSTRACT
Article history:
Received Oct 12, 2017
Revised Apr 10, 2018
Accepted Sep 22, 2018
Data privacy in the mobile ad-hoc network is a problem due to wireless
medium, frequent node movement and lack of any centralized infrastructure
support. In such case, it is very important to build a reliable and secure
network and achieve high throughput in MANET. The reliability and security
of a network depend on whether the network remains linked to different
failures and malicious activities, which is the fundamental issue that needs to
be focused when designing a secure routing protocol in MANET. This paper
proposes an effective privacy mechanism to handle data security through a
novel secure session key exchange model, which provides the node data
privacy and network stability for a longer period of time and prevents
abnormal behavior changes due to malicious behavior and different type of
attacks in the network. The simulation results show improvement in
throughput with nominal overhead and end-to-end delay in different
malicious conditions against existing protocols.
Keyword:
Data security
MANET
Network Stability
Privacy
Session key exchange
Copyright © 2018 Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science.
All rights reserved.
Corresponding Author:
K.Ramesh Rao,
Department of CSE,
Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University,
Anantapuramu(A.P)-India.
Email: karanamramesh@yahoo.com
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks benefit greatly from wireless communications because of their
infrastructure independence and the multi-hop nature of communications. However, this advantage poses a
significant challenge to data security and privacy management, which affects secure data delivery in mobile
ad-hoc networks because of high numbers of attacks and dynamic topology changes on wireless channels. At
the same time, network stability is an integral part of reliable communication services. Since the operating
range is not limited to the topology, it is likely to be intrinsically damaged. This is because it is very difficult
to ensure temporary routing of this difficulty in order to preserve the "centralized policy" or "scheme" of the
existing network. Various ad-hoc routing protocols[1], [2], [3], [4], [6] deal with security requirements and
some of the proposals in the past have targeted high vulnerabilities in ad hoc networks. In addition to the
above difficulties, the resources of MANET cause major problems in security process deployment and major
constraints limitation. The protocols AODV and DSR routing are very efficient, but both are vulnerable to
various types of attacks.
In the past several routing protocols have been proposed [1], [6], [7], [10], [12] that are well suited
to the dynamic characteristic of ad-hoc networks. Nevertheless, these routing protocols assume security and
believe that all nodes in the environment are supportive and trustworthy. This assumption is not valid.
However, it is almost impossible to maintain prerequisites on a real network in view of potential node
malfunctions and random failures. For example, a rogue node cannot pass control or data packets to another

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Int J Elec & Comp Eng, Vol. 8, No. 5, October 2018 : 3267 - 3277
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node to store its resources and can initiate a denial of service (DoS) attack and interfere with normal
communication procedures. Many studies have been performed to characterize various node malfunctions
and to assess their impact on network performance. However, little research effort has been made to analyze
how much they affect node personal information during data communication.
In this paper, we propose an effective Data Privacy Mechanism (DPM) through Secure Session Key
Exchange (Sskey ) Model to establish node privacy during data communication. It contributes a distinct
Sskey for each data route from source and destination for the data privacy communication. It provides a
secure communication method that uses "symmetric encryption" and "authentication routing" to protect
messages. It protects the data with a unique, trusted encryption key that is generated using a trusted path.
This has the advantage of improving QoS by minimizing high "throughput" and "end-to-end delay" in low-
cost routing constraints. The objective of this paper is to secure an existing ad-hoc routing protocol, AODV
[11], by extending it in an approach that non-malicious nodes can distinguish and segregate malicious nodes
from the network so that it cannot interrupt the network. In this paper, to overcome these vulnerabilities
problem we evaluated the existing "AODV, S-AODV [15], EAACK [9] and FACE [8]" protocols. In the
Section 2, we describes related works that provide an overview of the secure routing protocol. The efficient
data privacy mechanism is proposed in Section 3, Section 4discusses the privacy analysis, Section 5, presents
the Results of Evaluation, and Section 6 discusses the conclusions.
2. RELATED WORKS
To ensure security and privacy of messages in routing is a primary concern in AODV routing [11].
An efficient authentication mechanism is needed to ensure a secure message exchange between the sender
and the receiver. AODV configures routes as needed because of its responsive routing protocol, which
provides short network overhead and utilizes a default sequence number to prevent routing loop avoidance
attacks. Mainly, three forms of messages are exchanged for communication "RREQ"," RREP", and "RRER"
[4]. Each node in the path broadcasts an RREQ and verifies the information accumulated in the routing table
and the sender serial number of the RREQ message. If it is new request it must be updated in the routing
table to prevent routing loop vulnerability attacks. In addition, many other vulnerability attacks, such as
"spoofing", "denial of service", and "message tampering", are serious problems with the AODV protocol.
There are many secure ad hoc routing protocols presented for mobile ad-hoc routing [7], [9], [10], [20], [21],
[23] because of its high-security vulnerabilities caused due to its openness and communication environment.
Since we extend the features of AODV [11] in this work we describe its mechanism to understand
its advantage in dynamic routing. It is a reactive routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that constitute a
route on demand [26]. It utilizes sequence numbers to provide minimum network overhead and avoid a
number of routing loop to perform maintenance and communication control it exchanges the standard
"RREQ"," RREP", and "RRER" messages. Each node maintains an individual routing table to route data
packets to the target node. But it does not secure its route data and messages which are a major cause of data
loss in AODV. It needs a secure authentication mechanism to protect sender and recipient messages. During
route request broadcast, every one node makes sure the sender "sequence number" of the "RREQ message" in
opposition to the stored information in the routing table. For the route responses, as a substitute of scrutiny
the sender "sequence number", it confirms the destination node "sequence number" and remains the routing
information restructuring. All vulnerability attacks result in a routing loop or packet loss. In addition "routing
messages fabrication", "spoofing" and numerous other attacks have a severe impact on the AODV protocol.
Zapat et al. [13] propose an authentication mechanism as Secure-AODV to secure intermediary
nodes from the malicious and illegal spoofing identity information activity. It even discusses the securing
process for "modify the number of hops count" and "route fabrication" error messages. The mechanism is an
addition to the AODV protocol supported by "public key cryptography" to give routing security. It mostly
ensures the integrity and reliability through digitally signed routing and controls messages. Each time a node
which generates a routing message sign with a "private key"; the node receiving this information verifies and
authenticates the signature using the "sender's public key". A mechanism supported by a "hash chain" is used
to protect it. The larger symmetric encryption used for digital signatures produces long messages. Each time
the intermediate node receives a message, it has to verify the "signature" for authentication. Using double
signing mechanisms for message verification it creates higher load over the network.
S K. Dhurandher et al. [8] proposed a "Friend based Ad hoc routing using Challenges to Establish
Security (FACES)" to offer secure communication in MANET routing. It defines a method for building a
secure network based on a list of friends who share a list of nodes in a friend network. Every node
periodically executes a process to retrieve a list of shared friends, creating a friend's node responsibility.
Based on this intervallic update, malicious nodes can be easily removed from the network. This approach
does not need to observe neighboring transmissions for node reliability assessment. The disadvantage of this

Int J Elec & Comp Eng ISSN: 2088-8708 
An Effective Data Privacy Mechanism through Secure Session Key Exchange… (K.Ramesh Rao)
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proposal is high "end-to-end delay" because of the computational overload and malicious behavior of the
friend node, which can affect the entire friend list, communication, and network stability.
M. S. Elhadi et al. [9] proposed an "intrusion detection system" known as "Enhanced Adaptive
Acknowledgment (EAACK)"for MANETs. This work mainly focuses on the "packet drop attack" which is a
security threat of MANET. It tried to prevent an attacker from attempting a fake acknowledgment attack
involving a digital signature. This paper proposes an effective data privacy mechanism protocol to overcome
the above observations in the routing privacy of AODV and other secure routing protocol and present an
evaluation comparison with "AODV", "S-AODV", "EAACK" and "FACES" secure routing protocol.
3. PROPOSED DATA PRIVACY MECHANISM
An ad-hoc routing protocol node exchanges information with neighboring regions and configures a
network for routing data packets to the required destination. An "external attacker" typically introduces
incorrect routing information into the route to repeating preceding routing messages or modifying applicable
routing information, which ultimately breaks the network. Internal attacks can cause serious damage because
the node does not meet the initial commitments. These nodes can easily alter the confined outlook of the
network by sending incorrect information. In general, it is very complicated to recognize an internal intruder,
as these nodes are included in the network due to their security credentials.
The proposed Data Privacy Mechanism (DPM) intend to target both internal and external type-
specific attacks to provide the highest level of privacy. The DPM approach can identify and enforce the
necessary precautionary measures by implementing a secure privacy mechanism for both route discovery and
data routing. It utilizes a trusted third-party (TTP) certificate that consists of all the initial required keys to
protect the private information from internal and external attackers.
3.1. Privacy Model
The privacy model consists of three secure process mechanisms to establish data privacy mechanism
as shown in Figure 1. Here the source node initially obtained the TTP certificate to participate in the
communication, later to do the data communication it builds secure route through route discovery process
utilizing DP mechanism. It utilizes the discovered data route for the data routing along with the privacy
maintenance.
Figure 1. Data privacy model
3.2. Data Privacy Mechanism
This section discusses the privacy mechanisms as shown in Figure 1. This categorizes the
mechanism as, 1). "Acquiring TTP Certificate", 2). "Secure Route Discovery Privacy" and, 3). "Secure Data
Routing Privacy" for the secure data routing and achieving the quality of service.
TTP Certificate
Route
Builder
DP
Mechanism
Destination
Node
Request for Secure
RREQ Msg.
Encrypted
RREQ Msg.
Broadcast
Encrypted RREQ
Request for
Secure
RREP Msg.
Encrypted
RREP Msg.
Unicast Encrypted
RREP
Node

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3.2.1. Acquiring TTP Certificate
Establishing a secure communication between network nodes is the hardest part in MANET. Due to
its constraints and characteristics reasons, it is challenging to utilize the predefined architectures for security.
In the most secure routing protocols, the operations are related to privacy and key distribution was not
properly handled. The previous secure routing protocols related to secure routing and key distribution are not
the best due to computation overhead and storage. The "group key exchange" mechanism is being described
in [21], which can be a simplified solution for the overhead of secure routing between the source and the
target node.
The mechanism of group key distribution is based on strong keys sharing, which is an effective
mechanism in the case of high mobility behavior where nodes participate and move very often. An
asymmetric encryption based security associations between nodes are being discussed [18] and [19], where it
issued secure certificates of each individual node in the network provided by a TTP. It is a secure and strong
process, as the distribution of certificate is done at a single point. However, if the malicious nodes are already
in the network, then vulnerability attack can intrude the certificate or gain a certificate loaded and can easily
acquire the identification of the new node causing insecurity to the node and network stability.
In this data privacy mechanism, we distribute certificates with initial secure connections between the
nodes. However, this certificate comes from a "trusted certification authority (CA)" and must be loaded on
every node before connecting to the network. It is an "offline process" in which every node must present its
own individuality to the "CA" to acquire the certificate. In this approach, if whichever node attempts to own
an "invalid certificate", it can be easily recognized and made in accessible legally. The certificate offered by
the "CA" for a node N will consist of "CA public key as CApub_key", "node address as Nadd", "public key
as Npub_key" and private key as "Npvt_key". It is can be represented as shown below,
(1)
We structure that all applicable nodes in the network to get this "CN Certificate" in prior to connecting to the
network.
3.2.2. Route Discovery Privacy
To perform the route discovery with privacy, we extend "AODV" [11] route discovery mechanism
and integrates the privacy mechanism. The discovery process is performed in 5 steps.
𝐶 𝑁 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝐶𝐴 𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑦
(𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑑 , 𝑁𝑝𝑢𝑏 _𝑘𝑒𝑦 , 𝑁𝑝𝑣𝑡 _𝑘𝑒𝑦 , 𝐶𝐴 𝑝𝑢𝑏 _𝑘𝑒𝑦 )
Algorithm 1: Secure Route Discovery Mechanism
Initialization of route request RREQ by Source Node, SN → Start_RREQ ( SNrreq )
Method-1: Start_RREQ ( SNrreq )
SN execute DH Algorithm to Generate a "Session Key" → SASKey
SN create msg signature through Eypt_SAH1(Msg) → SAsign
SN create broadcasting msg through Eypt (Br_Msg)CApub_key → Ebr_msg
SN create Eypt([SAsign, Ebr_msg , SASKey , DNadd, P, Tstamp ]) CApub_key → Brreq
SN broadcast generated Brreq for the intermediate nodes as, I in the network.
while each address of Ii ≠ DSadd then
Ii execute Dypt(Brreq)CApvt_key → [SAsign, Ebroad_msg , SASKey , DNadd, P, Tstamp ]
Ii execute Dypt(Ebr_msg)CApvt_key → Br_Msg
Ii execute Eypt_SAH1(Br_Msg) → IAsign
If Compare_authSign(IAsign, SAsign ) == 1 then
If Compare(Br_Msg , 'RREQ') = = 1 then
If Compare (Ii add, DNadd ) == 1 then
Update SN SASKey in destination route table → DR_Table
Start_RREP (DNadd );
Else
Ii update its address to P → Update(Brreq , Ii ) → NB
Ii Eypt(NB)CApub_key → Brreq
Ii broadcast generated Brreq in the network.
End if
End if
End If
End while

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In step-1, it prepares secure RREQ packets encrypted using CApub_key, in step-2 it broadcasts the
encrypted RREQ message in the network and waits for the reply from destination, in step-3, intermediate
node rebroadcasts the RREQ message, in step-4, destination node creates a session key, Sskey and creates the
route reply, RREP message, and finally in step-5 destination replies the secure RREP message to source.
Source on receiving the RREP from destination updates the path in its routing table along with session key
for that path.
Algorithm-1 provides a secure route discovery process used by DPM for route discovery. It
describes the above functionality in two methods. Method-1 describe the mechanism of the RREQ
broadcasting by source and functionality of intermediate nodes and method-2 describes the mechanism of
destination node on arrival of RREQ and RREP to the source.
3.2.3. Data Routing Privacy
Data routing is the next process after completing the secure route discovery process by the source
node. Each node in the route maintains its previous and next hop details for the data routing to the
destination. Mostly source node transmits the data through the most favorable and short route based on the
routing table and in the case of the AODV protocol it preserves only one path from the source to the
destination. In this mechanism, we retain the feature of AODV to lower routing overhead. It secures the data
packets before sending using the unique destination session key provided by the destination node. Using the
destination unique session key source initially generates a secret key as SCKey. Let's consider DSKeyis the
unique session key from the destination which is generated using a DH algorithm.
The data need to transmit to the destination is encrypted using the generated SCKey; as the
decryption key is already available with destination it decrypts the data received efficiently. This mechanism
is illustrated in Algorithm-2. Here, the functionality of the data routing is performed in two methods.
Method-1 describes the steps for a secret key, SCKey generation, data encryption and data transmission,
whereas Method-2 describes the steps for generating a unique secret key, SCKey using DSKey and data
decryption on receiving. It also creates the secure DELV_ACK message for the reply on the successful data
packet delivery.
Method - 2: Start_RREP (DNadd )
DN execute DH Algorithm to Generate a "Session Key" → DASKey
DN create msg signature through Eypt_SAH1(Msg) → DAsign
DN create reply msg through Eypt (Rep_Msg)CApub_key → Erep_msg
DN create Eypt([DAsign, Ebr_msg , DASKey , SNadd, P, Tstamp ]) CApub_key → Brrep
DN unicast Brrep through the path recorded in P to reach DN.
while each address of Ii ≠ SNadd then
Ii execute Dypt(Brreq)CApvt_key → [DAsign, Ebroad_msg , DASKey , SNadd, P, Tstamp ]
Ii execute Dypt(Ebr_msg)CApvt_key → Br_Msg
Ii execute Eypt_SAH1(Br_Msg) → IAsign
If Compare_authSign(IAsign, DAsign ) == 1 then
If Compare(Br_Msg , 'RREP') = = 1 then
If Compare (Ii add, SNadd ) == 1 then
Update DN DASKey in source route table → SR_Table
Else
Ii get route P from Br_Msg → R
Ii get next hop node from R → Nhop
Ii unicast Brrep to Nhop
End if
End if
End If
End while

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Mostly source node transmits the data through the most favorable and short route based on the
routing table and in the case of the AODV protocol it preserves only one path from the source to the
destination. In this mechanism, we retain the feature of AODV to lower routing overhead. It secures the data
packets before sending using the unique destination session key provided by the destination node. Using the
destination unique session key source initially generates a secret key as SCKey. Let's consider DSKeyis the
unique session key from the destination which is generated using a DH algorithm. The data need to transmit
to the destination is encrypted using the generated SCKey; as the decryption key is already available with
destination it decrypts the data received efficiently. This mechanism is illustrated in Algorithm-2.
Here, the functionality of the data routing is performed in two methods. Method-1 describes the
steps for a secret key, SCKey generation, data encryption and data transmission, whereas Method-2 describes
Algorithm 2: Secure Data Routing Mechanism
Initialization of data transmission by Source Node, SN → StartDataTx( DNadd , Seq_No)
Method-1: StartDataTx( DNadd , Seq_No)
SN read routing path from routing Table → R
SN read secure destination key → DASKey
Create distinct key for data encryption using DASKey → UAKey
For (t=0, t<number_of _pkt, t++) loop
Data packet to transmit → DPt
SN create secure data packet using UAKey → Eypt(DPt , UAKey) → ED
SN transmit the ED to its next hop in its R.
while ( ACK_Time ≠ 0) then
If (Received ED ) then
SN read secure destination key → SASKey
Create distinct key for data encryption using SASKey → UAKey
SN decrypt ED using UAKey → Dypt(ED , UAKey) → Dmsg
If (compare (Dmsg ,"DLV_ACK") == 1) then
End While;
Transmit next data packet → StartDataTx( DNadd , Seq_No);
Else if ( ACK_Time ≠ 0) then
Re-transmit next data packet → StartDataTx( DNadd , Seq_No);
End If
End If
End While
End For
Method2: RecieveData(EM, pkt_seq_no)
Destination node D on receiving the data packets,
D gets its own Session Key → DSKey
D generate unique Secret key using DSKey → SCKey
D decrypt the data packets using SCKey → Decrypt(EM , DSKey ) -> DM
D gets its Source Session Key → SSKey
D generate unique Secret key using SSKey → SCKey
D decrypt the DELV_ACK message using SCKey → Decrypt(DEL_ACK , DSKey ) → EM
D Sends secure acknowledge EM back to source.

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the steps for generating a unique secret key, SCKey using DSKey and data decryption on receiving. It also creates
the secure DELV_ACK message for the reply on the successful data packet delivery.
4. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The path discovery process must discover paths through intermediate node collaboration. The attack
on a route through "Route fabrication attack" can result in changes to path message modifications. To
provide a solution, to this attack DPM uses TTP public keys to encrypt messages. The "Route cache
poisoning attack" incorrectly routes a node to the wrong path.This attack is handled through implementing
different private keys at both the origin and destination. The malicious node does not affect the route cache,
which can transmit the incorrect route, each first route request message is very secure and protected by the
"private key" and the node's "public key" for the regular route message security. The "DoS" or "packet
dropping" is another issue in route discovery and does not interfere with the discovery mechanism until a
non-malicious node is presented in the network. To prevent this, DPM requires each contributing node to
have an "ID" and a valid "TTP certificate". We investigate possible attacks [23] on route discovery and
routing and countermeasures taken by DPM to protect routing in mobile ad-hoc networks [27], [28].
4.1. Attacks on Route Discovery Process
a. Message Fabrication: Route discovery procedure requires intermediate node collaboration to discover
routes to the destination. Attacks on intermediate nodes can lead to modification of route messages. To
prevent "message fabrication" DPM encrypts path messages symmetrically and asymmetrically and
encrypts them by means of the node "public key". This new contribution gives an additional guarding
against the attackers passing through the path to perform path message fabrication.
b. Cache Poisoning: This type of attack guides the node to route data to the wrong path. The DPM handles
this attack with trusted keys, available at both source and target nodes. If a malicious node broadcasts an
invalid route, it will not affect the "route cache". First, every route request message is protected by a
trusted key and a node public key, and later it is secured utilizing the"unique secret key" that is
completely independent of the normal route message.
c. DoS in Discovery Process: Denial-of-service (DoS) in path discovery or packet loss is an unreceptive
malicious characteristic that does not interfere with the discovery procedure. To prevent this category of
behavior, DPM makes certain that each included node need to have a valid and trusted "CA certificate".
4.2. Attacks on Data Routing Process
a. Data Packet Fabrication: During data communication, an intermediate node is able to inject a "false
route" by changing the data packet to reduce throughput. The DPM handles data packet fabrication by
encrypting data packets using a secret key that is unique during routing. Together the source node and the
destination node generate a "unique secret key" that transmits data packets and notifies the
acknowledgment messages.
b. Data Packet Dropping: Dropping data packets is a general behavior of malicious nodes that affect
network QoS. The proposed DPM prevent this attack through authentication of a trusted CA certificate
for each node which is a necessity for joining the network.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experimental evaluation supposes that both kind "internal" and "external" malicious nodes
occur in the network. Nevertheless, it is also believed that the majority notes in the network are trusted. We
utilize node "public key cryptography" to look after the network security using symmetric encryption for data
transmission and messaging attacks against external and internal attacks. The simulation is made using the
Glomosim Simulator which provides a scalable and configuration driven evaluation. The proposed DPM is
deployed in this simulator and evaluated against the configured parameter and also compares with the result
of "AODV [11], S-AODV[13], EAACK[9] and, FACES [8]".
5.1. Network Setup
This section discusses the set of parameters required for the simulation the protocol. The simulation
is executed in a "Random Way Point (RWP)” model with mobility changes from "10m/s to 100 m/s". The
simulation is carried out in two scenarios. Inthe first scenario communication is made without malicious node
in the network, whereas in the second scenario with a 40% malicious nodes. The required parameter for the
simulation is shown in Table 1.

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Table 1. Simulation Parameters
Configuration Values
Simulation Area 1200m X 1200m
CBR Rates 4 pkts/sec
Packet Size
Source-Destination Paris
512 bytes
20
Pause Time 25 sec
Mobility
Mobility Speed (m/s)
RWP
10,20,40,60,80,100
In the route discovery phase, every node is authenticated by means of CA certificate, and they all
behave like normal and secure nodes. To have an impact of malicious behavior40% malicious node are
configured for the data routing during simulation.
5.2. Experimental Results
5.2.1.Throughput
Throughput performance comparison is shown in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b). All protocols
illustrate related results in comparison. In the case of "without malicious nodes, "every protocol shows
similar kind of results and deteriorate with increasing mobility. But in the case of "40% malicious nodes,"
DPM performs better than others. This is due to effective data packet securing. The malicious node unable to
decrypt the message due to its secure protection of unique secret key and which prevents unwanted
fabrication and support in better throughput. The DPM show an average improvisation in the case of without
malicious due to its cryptography overhead, and in the case of with malicious it shows a 25% better
throughput compared to other protocols.
Figure 2(a). Throughput comparison without malicious nodes
Figure. 2(b). Throughput comparison with 40% malicious nodes

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5.2.2. End-to-End delay
End-to-end delay performance comparison is shown in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b). In the case of,
without malicious node, all protocols show a similar rate of delay up to 40m/s mobility, but with increased
mobility, they all attain high delay due to frequent link failure. However, in the case of with 40%, malicious
DPM and FACES show less delay in comparison to other protocols, as both implement the certificate
acquisition process which allows safe and secure identification of node which supports minimizing packet
loss and end-to-end delay.
Figure 3(a). End-2-end delay comparison without
malicious nodes
Figure 3(b). End-2-end delay comparison with 40%
malicious nodes
5.2.3. Control Overhead
Control overhead performance comparison is shown in Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(b). Here, in the
case of no malicious node, all protocols have similar distribution overhead as all suffer due to a link failure
under high mobility conditions. In case of with 40% malicious a parallel increment of overhead is observed
for all up to 60% mobility due to its security and authentication overhead, but DPM maintains the overhead
low, whereas other protocols result in higher overhead.
Figure 4(a). Control overhead comparison without
malicious nodes
Figure 4(b). Control overhead comparison with 40%
malicious nodes
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we propose an efficient data privacy mechanism (DPM) for mobile ad-hoc networks
that protects routing mechanisms from internal and external attacks. It authenticates the route discovery

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mechanism by securing the control messages using public key cryptography with symmetric encryption and
using unique session and secret keys to protect the data routing mechanism. Both mechanisms provide a
secure and quality of service establishing the data privacy mechanism through acquiring TTP Certificate and
implementing privacy for route discovery and data routing. The experimental evaluation is made with and
without malicious node scenario to compute the throughput, end-to-end delay, and control overhead. The
comparison result of DPM shows an average 25% satisfactory improvement in throughput, but it attains bear
minimum delay higher than AODV due to its security mechanism computation and it shows an average 20%
low control overhead in comparison.
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BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS
K. Ramesh Rao , Obtained his M.Tech degree from JNTUA University, Anantapuramu (AP)-
India in the field of Computer Science & Engineering. He is a Ph.D Research Scholor at Faculty
of Computer Science & Engineering. His main area of interests are Computer Networks,
Network Security and Communication Networks.
Dr. S.N. Tirumala Rao, M.Tech ., Ph.D . He is working as Professor and Head of the Department
of CSE, NarasaraoPeta Engineering College, Narasaraopet, Guntur(AP)-India. His Areas of
research are Data Mining, Multi-Core and Parallel Programming and Computer Networks. He
Published more than 20 National and International Journals and organized several National and
International Conferences.Books Published: Advanced Unix Programming HI-Tech Publisher
Prof. P.Chenna Reddy, B.Tech, MS., M.Tech, Ph.D . He is Professor of CSE Department and
Director Academic Audit, Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University Anantapur,
Anantapuramu(AP)-India. He Published more than 60 National and International Journals and
participated in more than 30 National and International Conferences. His Research areas are
Computer Networks, Bio-inspired Networking, Image Processing, Teaching Methodology. His
area of Interest is Computer Networks.

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