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#RSAC
SESSION ID:
Sean Doherty Deb Banerjee
Orchestrating Software Defined
Networks (SDN) to Disrupt the
APT Kill Chain
ANF-T08
Chief Architect, Data Center Security Products
Symantec
VP Technology Partnerships and Alliances
Symantec
@SeandDInfo
#RSAC
A Quick Level Set
#RSAC
The Phases of an APT Attack
3
1. Reconnaissance
Attacker leverages
information from a variety of
sources to understand their
target.
2. Incursion
Attackers break into network by using social
engineering to deliver targeted malware to
vulnerable systems or by attacking public
facing infrastructure.
3. Discovery
Once in, the attackers stay “low and slow”
to avoid detection.
They then map the organization’s defenses
from the inside and create a battle plan and
deploy multiple kill chains to ensure
success.
4. Capture
Attackers access unprotected systems and
capture information over an extended period.
They may also install malware to secretly
acquire data or disrupt operations.
5. Exfiltration
Captured information is sent
back to attack team’s home base
for analysis and further
exploitation.
#RSAC
Characteristics and Capabilities of Software
Defined Things
4
Abstraction Instrumentation Automation Orchestration
Agility Adaptability Accuracy Assurance
Characteristics
Capabilities
#RSAC
What is SDN – Definitions and Key Concepts
5
 This architecture decouples the network control and forwarding
functions enabling the network control to become directly
programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted
for applications and network
 Agile: Abstracting control from forwarding lets administrators
dynamically adjust network-wide traffic flow to meet changing
needs.
 Programmatically configured: SDN lets network managers
configure, manage, secure, and optimize network resources very
quickly via dynamic, automated SDN programs,
Source: https://www.opennetworking.org/sdn-resources/sdn-definition
#RSAC
Data Center Security Controls: Host-Based
6
Controls
• IDS/IPS
• Anti-Malware
• Detection/Response
Technologies
• Signature
• Behavioral
• Correlation
Challenges
• Operational Complexity
• Impact Analysis
• “Will updating a host-based
security policy cause an
outage?”
• False Positives
Shellshock Compensation:
(CVE-2014-6271)
#RSAC
Data Center Security Controls: Network-Based
7
Controls
• Firewalls/VLAN-based Segmentation: Zones, Applications, Tiers,
• Network IDS/IPS
• Packet Inspection for exploit payloads
• DLP : data egress detection
Challenges
• Operational Complexity
• Resource Consumption
• False Positives
• “Can’t scan all traffic for all exploits”
#RSAC
A ‘Typical’ Data Center
Network
#RSAC
9
Load
Balancer
WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 FEECOM004
Firewall
CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB
Application BApplication A
#RSAC
Attack Scenario
10
Source: Symantec ISTR : Volume 18
1
0
25%
have critical
vulnerabilities
unpatched
53%
of legitimate
websites have
unpatched
vulnerabilities
 APT that leverages public facing
infrastructure vulnerabilities
 Lots of these to chose from
 Our scenario a classic 3 tier
public web facing application in
traditional infrastructure
#RSAC
WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 FEECOM004
CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB
The Attack
11
Load
Balancer
Firewall
Application BApplication A
#RSAC
Micro-segmentation
A new model for data center security
12
STARTING ASSUMPTIONS
Assume everything is
a threat and act
accordingly.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
1
2
3
Isolation and segmentation
Unit-level trust / least privilege
Ubiquity and centralized control
#RSAC
13
Load
Balancer
Firewall
Application BApplication A
WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003
CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB
FEECOM004
#RSAC
14
Load
Balancer
Firewall
Application BApplication A
WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 FEECOM004
CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB
Firewall
#RSAC
If only everything was as easy as a diagram in PowerPoint
15
#RSAC
Logical View of SDN Architecture
16
NSX Manager,
APIC Manager
NSX Controller,
Nexus 9000
Firewalls,
Network IDS/IPS,
Network DLP
#RSAC
SDN
Creating the Dynamic and Secure Data Center
Orchestration
Policy
Service Chaining
Micro Segmentation
State
Dynamic and Secure
Data Center
#RSAC
Micro-Segmented
Architecture
18
Load
Balancer
ESXPRD01 ESXPRDA1 ESXPRDD6 ESXPRDB3
Firewall
PRDSVR01
Private Cloud with
Application A & B
ESXPRDFA ESXPRDFE
ESXPRDD
D
ESXPRDA2
#RSAC
Micro-segmentation with SDN
Each Workload is:
 Isolated
 Requires all routing to be pre
defined
Physical workloads
and VLANS
Control Plane
NSX Manager
Data Plane
Distributed switching,
rou ng, firewall
REST API
Management Plane
vCenter
Example Using VMware NSX
#RSAC
Service Chaining with SDN
Security controls including
• IPS
• Firewall
• DLP
can be dynamically added to any
traffic flow
Security Admin
Traffic
Steering
DashboardSecurity Policy
Example VMWare NSX and Symantec
DCS:Server
#RSAC
State
 Static State
 Applications
 Vulnerabilities/Exploits
 Dynamic State
 IoCs
 Network Traffic
 Data Flow and DLP Events
 Host and Network Intrusion Events
 Anomaly detection
State
Applicati
ons
Vulnerabilit
ies/Exploits
IoCs
Network
Traffic
Data
Flow and
DLP
Events
Host and
Network
Intrusion
Events
Anomaly
detection
#RSAC
Policy
Infrastructure
Provisioning
•vCenter
•NSX
•ACI
•AWS
Security Provisioning
Policies
•Firewall,
Segmentation
•IPS
•Anti-Malware
•DLP
•Host Integrity
Security Response
Policies
•Currently Ad-Hoc in
the future
standards required
#RSAC
Orchestration = SDN + State + Policy
1. Applica on
Admin Upgrades
Web Services
4. VA conducts scan
Vulnerability
Manager
Hypervisor
Change
App Event
2. Host-based Security detects
change App Event and reports.
Security
Orchestrator
3. Security Orchestrator: Based on
a ributes of applica on determines
Vulnerability Assessment is required.
CVSS High Exploitable
5. VA returns results to Security
Orchestrator: “CVSS High and
Exploitable.”
SDN
Manager
6. Security Orchestrator recommends
mi ga ons op ons
-Network Security policy (E.g. quaran ne)
-Host-based Security(System Hardening)
7. Sec Admin selects Network Security policy.
8. “Quaran ne Tag” to
Network Security device
Network
Security Device
9. PAN applies access control to
allow only admin access to VM.
10. VM is placed in SDN
“Quaran ne” Security Group
Quaran ne
#RSAC
SDN
Creating the Dynamic and Secure Data Center
Orchestration
Policy
Service Chaining
Micro Segmentation
State
Dynamic and Secure
Data Center
#RSAC
Orchestrating SDNs to disrupt APTs
 Automated Policy Based Provisioning
 Consistently apply appropriate controls
 Moves with the workload, and cleans up behind itself
 Remove ‘Legacy’ or Temporary Rules and Routes
 Restrict the ability for the attacker to traverse the network east-west
 Transparent Service Chaining of Compensating Controls
 Add, change or remove controls without detection
 Leverage real-time intelligence to automate this process
25
#RSAC
Orchestrating SDNs to disrupt APTs cont.
 Tap/Probe insertion during IR
 Systematic Workload Provisioning
 Give the attacker a moving target to hit without disrupting the application
 Honey-Pots and Honey-Nets
26
#RSAC
Summary
27
 SDN is a key capability for introducing micro-segmentation and
service chaining to facilitate dynamic response to APT attacks
 Security controls must offer API’s for feeds and for automated
response for incidents
 Apply the persistence of malware against the attack
 Security orchestration systems can automate policy updates to
network and host-based security controls for faster and targeted
APT responses
 SDN’s enable us to optimize infrastructure and operational resource
consumption for APT responses
#RSAC
 Short Term
 Evaluate how SDN can help you create fine-grained segmentation zones
with lower operational costs
 Medium Term
 Redefine your data center strategy for orchestration
 Threat Detection: malware, data loss, behavioral and IoC’s
 Vulnerability Management: assessment, prioritization and compensation
 Automation: Controls with APIs, application level policies and context
 Pilot Security Automation on SDN
 Long Term
 Change the asymmetry of the APT attack
28
Apply What You Have Learned Today

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Orchestrating Software Defined Networks To Disrupt The Apt Kill Chain

  • 1. #RSAC SESSION ID: Sean Doherty Deb Banerjee Orchestrating Software Defined Networks (SDN) to Disrupt the APT Kill Chain ANF-T08 Chief Architect, Data Center Security Products Symantec VP Technology Partnerships and Alliances Symantec @SeandDInfo
  • 3. #RSAC The Phases of an APT Attack 3 1. Reconnaissance Attacker leverages information from a variety of sources to understand their target. 2. Incursion Attackers break into network by using social engineering to deliver targeted malware to vulnerable systems or by attacking public facing infrastructure. 3. Discovery Once in, the attackers stay “low and slow” to avoid detection. They then map the organization’s defenses from the inside and create a battle plan and deploy multiple kill chains to ensure success. 4. Capture Attackers access unprotected systems and capture information over an extended period. They may also install malware to secretly acquire data or disrupt operations. 5. Exfiltration Captured information is sent back to attack team’s home base for analysis and further exploitation.
  • 4. #RSAC Characteristics and Capabilities of Software Defined Things 4 Abstraction Instrumentation Automation Orchestration Agility Adaptability Accuracy Assurance Characteristics Capabilities
  • 5. #RSAC What is SDN – Definitions and Key Concepts 5  This architecture decouples the network control and forwarding functions enabling the network control to become directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network  Agile: Abstracting control from forwarding lets administrators dynamically adjust network-wide traffic flow to meet changing needs.  Programmatically configured: SDN lets network managers configure, manage, secure, and optimize network resources very quickly via dynamic, automated SDN programs, Source: https://www.opennetworking.org/sdn-resources/sdn-definition
  • 6. #RSAC Data Center Security Controls: Host-Based 6 Controls • IDS/IPS • Anti-Malware • Detection/Response Technologies • Signature • Behavioral • Correlation Challenges • Operational Complexity • Impact Analysis • “Will updating a host-based security policy cause an outage?” • False Positives Shellshock Compensation: (CVE-2014-6271)
  • 7. #RSAC Data Center Security Controls: Network-Based 7 Controls • Firewalls/VLAN-based Segmentation: Zones, Applications, Tiers, • Network IDS/IPS • Packet Inspection for exploit payloads • DLP : data egress detection Challenges • Operational Complexity • Resource Consumption • False Positives • “Can’t scan all traffic for all exploits”
  • 8. #RSAC A ‘Typical’ Data Center Network
  • 9. #RSAC 9 Load Balancer WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 FEECOM004 Firewall CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB Application BApplication A
  • 10. #RSAC Attack Scenario 10 Source: Symantec ISTR : Volume 18 1 0 25% have critical vulnerabilities unpatched 53% of legitimate websites have unpatched vulnerabilities  APT that leverages public facing infrastructure vulnerabilities  Lots of these to chose from  Our scenario a classic 3 tier public web facing application in traditional infrastructure
  • 11. #RSAC WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 FEECOM004 CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB The Attack 11 Load Balancer Firewall Application BApplication A
  • 12. #RSAC Micro-segmentation A new model for data center security 12 STARTING ASSUMPTIONS Assume everything is a threat and act accordingly. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 1 2 3 Isolation and segmentation Unit-level trust / least privilege Ubiquity and centralized control
  • 13. #RSAC 13 Load Balancer Firewall Application BApplication A WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB FEECOM004
  • 14. #RSAC 14 Load Balancer Firewall Application BApplication A WEBA WEBB FEECOM001 FEECOM002 FEECOM003 FEECOM004 CRMAPP1 CRMAPP2 ECOMPRDA ECOMPRDB Firewall
  • 15. #RSAC If only everything was as easy as a diagram in PowerPoint 15
  • 16. #RSAC Logical View of SDN Architecture 16 NSX Manager, APIC Manager NSX Controller, Nexus 9000 Firewalls, Network IDS/IPS, Network DLP
  • 17. #RSAC SDN Creating the Dynamic and Secure Data Center Orchestration Policy Service Chaining Micro Segmentation State Dynamic and Secure Data Center
  • 18. #RSAC Micro-Segmented Architecture 18 Load Balancer ESXPRD01 ESXPRDA1 ESXPRDD6 ESXPRDB3 Firewall PRDSVR01 Private Cloud with Application A & B ESXPRDFA ESXPRDFE ESXPRDD D ESXPRDA2
  • 19. #RSAC Micro-segmentation with SDN Each Workload is:  Isolated  Requires all routing to be pre defined Physical workloads and VLANS Control Plane NSX Manager Data Plane Distributed switching, rou ng, firewall REST API Management Plane vCenter Example Using VMware NSX
  • 20. #RSAC Service Chaining with SDN Security controls including • IPS • Firewall • DLP can be dynamically added to any traffic flow Security Admin Traffic Steering DashboardSecurity Policy Example VMWare NSX and Symantec DCS:Server
  • 21. #RSAC State  Static State  Applications  Vulnerabilities/Exploits  Dynamic State  IoCs  Network Traffic  Data Flow and DLP Events  Host and Network Intrusion Events  Anomaly detection State Applicati ons Vulnerabilit ies/Exploits IoCs Network Traffic Data Flow and DLP Events Host and Network Intrusion Events Anomaly detection
  • 23. #RSAC Orchestration = SDN + State + Policy 1. Applica on Admin Upgrades Web Services 4. VA conducts scan Vulnerability Manager Hypervisor Change App Event 2. Host-based Security detects change App Event and reports. Security Orchestrator 3. Security Orchestrator: Based on a ributes of applica on determines Vulnerability Assessment is required. CVSS High Exploitable 5. VA returns results to Security Orchestrator: “CVSS High and Exploitable.” SDN Manager 6. Security Orchestrator recommends mi ga ons op ons -Network Security policy (E.g. quaran ne) -Host-based Security(System Hardening) 7. Sec Admin selects Network Security policy. 8. “Quaran ne Tag” to Network Security device Network Security Device 9. PAN applies access control to allow only admin access to VM. 10. VM is placed in SDN “Quaran ne” Security Group Quaran ne
  • 24. #RSAC SDN Creating the Dynamic and Secure Data Center Orchestration Policy Service Chaining Micro Segmentation State Dynamic and Secure Data Center
  • 25. #RSAC Orchestrating SDNs to disrupt APTs  Automated Policy Based Provisioning  Consistently apply appropriate controls  Moves with the workload, and cleans up behind itself  Remove ‘Legacy’ or Temporary Rules and Routes  Restrict the ability for the attacker to traverse the network east-west  Transparent Service Chaining of Compensating Controls  Add, change or remove controls without detection  Leverage real-time intelligence to automate this process 25
  • 26. #RSAC Orchestrating SDNs to disrupt APTs cont.  Tap/Probe insertion during IR  Systematic Workload Provisioning  Give the attacker a moving target to hit without disrupting the application  Honey-Pots and Honey-Nets 26
  • 27. #RSAC Summary 27  SDN is a key capability for introducing micro-segmentation and service chaining to facilitate dynamic response to APT attacks  Security controls must offer API’s for feeds and for automated response for incidents  Apply the persistence of malware against the attack  Security orchestration systems can automate policy updates to network and host-based security controls for faster and targeted APT responses  SDN’s enable us to optimize infrastructure and operational resource consumption for APT responses
  • 28. #RSAC  Short Term  Evaluate how SDN can help you create fine-grained segmentation zones with lower operational costs  Medium Term  Redefine your data center strategy for orchestration  Threat Detection: malware, data loss, behavioral and IoC’s  Vulnerability Management: assessment, prioritization and compensation  Automation: Controls with APIs, application level policies and context  Pilot Security Automation on SDN  Long Term  Change the asymmetry of the APT attack 28 Apply What You Have Learned Today