![methods of communication so that they form a coherent
presentation’ but they may also contradict one another.3
However, this delivery of ideas is not simply for the benefit of
a tutor or review audience. The modelling of an architectural
design has important advantages for a student during
the design process as he attempts to express his ideas
and translate them, allowing the designer to develop the
initial concept. However, it is important to emphasize the
performative nature of models at this point since they, as
with other media and types of representation, are highly
generative in terms of designing and are not simply used
to transpose ideas. This establishes a continuous dialogue
between design ideas and the method of representation,
which flows until the process reaches a point of consolidation.
This latter point is important and something we shall return
to again and again throughout the course of this book.
Fundamentally, the physical architectural model allows
us to perceive the three-dimensional experience rather than
having to try to imagine it. This not only enables a more
effective method of communication to the receiver – such
as the tutor, the client or the public – but also allows the
transmitter – such as a student or architect – to develop and
further revise the design. As Rolf Janke writes in the classic
Architectural Models, ‘the significance of a model lies not only
in enabling [the architect] to depict in plastic terms the end-
product of his deliberations, but in giving him the means –
during the design process – of actually seeing and therefore
controlling spatial problems’4
; while Criss Mills asserts that
‘models are capable of generating information in an amount
of time comparable to that needed for drawing, and they
offer one of the strongest exploration methods available’.5
At this stage it is worth expanding further upon
the use of a model by a student of architecture, since it
is a common assumption that an architect has sufficient
experience and skills to employ a variety of design processes
and methods of communication as required by the task
in hand. When developing design ideas as a response to
studio-project briefs, the employment of various methods
of communication is a prerequisite for the thinking process
necessary for a student to deal with the complexity of
architectural design. Unlike the final presentation type
frequently found in architectural practice and exhibited
to the public, in educational environments models and
drawings are not seen as end products in order to ‘sell’ the
solution, but as vehicles for thought or tools with which
ideas can be developed and expressed. More specifically, the
use of different communication methods encourages greater
exploration of a student’s ideas. This is because different
visualization methods and techniques provoke different
thought processes, and inspire greater insight during the
design process. Every model has a specific purpose and user,
as it is not possible to embody all potential design ideas
within a single one. In the first instance it may function
purely as a design tool, allowing the designer to explore a
particular idea or analyze successive developments. Secondly,
it may be used to present or demonstrate design ideas to
an audience – allowing others to share the designer’s vision.
Whilst it is tempting to rigidly classify different types of
1:20 model of a temporary pavilion by 6a architects
in the process of being made. The intricate pattern
directly replicates that of the final intervention and
uses the same process of manufacture, albeit on a
smaller scale.
A variety of explorative models by Grafton
Architects for their Università Luigi Bocconi
scheme in Milan. Note the range of materials
used and their resultant differing effects on the
spaces within the models.
8 Introduction](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/57766-250710204405-ed752078/85/Architectural-modelmaking-Second-Edition-Dunn-14-320.jpg)
![London. Built between 1673 and 1674 by a team of
craftsmen, the Great Model was accurately made at a scale of
1 inch to 18 inches, enabling the client and prospective
builders to walk inside the model’s 18-foot-high interior.
However, it is evident that Wren considered the model to be
for the benefit of the client and builders rather than for his
own design-development purposes as he wrote: ‘a good and
careful large model [should be constructed for] the
encouragement and satisfaction of the benefactors who
comprehend not designs and drafts on paper.’8
Prior to the eighteenth century, architectural models
were primarily produced as either descriptive or evaluative
devices, or occasionally as full-scale prefabrications used
to predict structural behaviour. However, during the mid-
eighteenth century, and coincident with the newly founded
technical colleges, the use of physical models for teaching
purposes became more widespread. Such models represented
the more complex structural and constructional conditions
that this period ushered in, and they were used in the
education of technical students and building tradesmen.
Parallel to this development, architectural and scientific
models quickly populated the displays of museums and
collections in different countries around the world. This
dissemination also began to have considerable impact on a
wider culture as Nick Hopwood and Soraya de Chadarevian
have explained, ‘models were demonstrated in popular
lectures and above all at the international age shows of the
capital and empire that followed the Great Exhibition of 1851.
Many of the exhibits representing manufactures, the sciences,
and the arts were models, which here came together most
prominently as a class.’9
A major resurgence in the use of the
model as a design tool in architecture can also be traced to
the start of the twentieth century – for example in the work of
Walter Gropius, who, in founding the Bauhaus in 1919, was
keen to resist the prevailing preoccupation with paper designs
in favour of physical models to explore and test ideas quickly,
an impetus reflected in the extensive use of models in the De
Stijl period and elsewhere.
From this point on, the scale model was re-established as
a vital design tool for architecture. The design-development
model was to have an important role in the conception
and refinement of countless built and unbuilt projects of
the Modernist era. For example, there was Gerrit Rietveld’s
attempt to give architectural form to the ideas about space
that he had previously explored in his furniture designs. From
the sequences of models for his design of the Schröder House,
it is clear that Rietveld’s starting point was a block form, whose
coloured surfaces combined with receding and projecting
parts to break up the massiveness of its volume. A similar
intent is discernible in Vladimir Tatlin’s search for a monument
to represent a new social order in Soviet Russia, described
in the great model of his leaning, twin helicoidal tower, the
Monument to the Third International. The actual building
of the model took just less than eight months and was
16 Introduction](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/57766-250710204405-ed752078/85/Architectural-modelmaking-Second-Edition-Dunn-22-320.jpg)
![538 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK manders, they went out of
their way to emphasize the probability of attack elsewhere. The
following passage in the war-warning message of November 27 from
the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel reflected the loose thinking
that prevailed widely in Washington : Japan is exi)ected to make an
aggressive move vpithin the next few days. An amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or
jwssibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of
Japanese troops and by the organization of tlieir naval forces. These
words not only displayed the apparent ignorance of Washington
authorities respecting Japanese designs on Pearl Harbor but also
gratuitously conveyed to Admiral Kimmel a false impression.
Although the message of the War Department to General Short on
the same day did not contain these misleading words, General Short,
in conferring with Admiral Kimmel on "the meaning and intent" of
their messages learned about this expectation that the Japanese
attack would occur in the Far East. Notwithstanding their apparent
ignorance of the full meaning of Japanese movements in the
Southeastern Pacific, Washington authorities knew or should have
known from their understandings of parallel action with the British
and Dutch, that a Japanese attack on the Philippines, Thai, or the
Kra Peninsula meant war with America. It also meant, in view of the
strategic principle that the flank of an advancing force must be
guarded, that Japan would not leave the strong fleet at Hawaii on its
left flank without doing something about it. This was the meaning to
Washington of the Japanese move in the Southeastern Pacific.^
Without having the benefit of these diplomatic understandings, it did
not have the same meaning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
Testimony and documents before the Committee lend support to —
in no way traverse — the Sixteenth Conclusion of the President's
Commission which found : "The opinion prevalent in diplomatic,
military, and naval circles, and in the public press," was "that any
immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East." [Italics
supplied.] IS. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly
and consistently in translating intercepts., evaluating information.,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/57766-250710204405-ed752078/85/Architectural-modelmaking-Second-Edition-Dunn-29-320.jpg)
![and sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders
was in considerable measure due to delays., mismanagement,
noncooperation, unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the
part of officers in Washington. The record before this Committee is
crowded with items of evidence which sustains this conclusion. As to
delays, take for example section B of Japanese Messages Concerning
Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc. [Exhibit 2]. Pages 16-29
give "messages translated after December 7, 1941." Here are
messages exchanged by the Japanese Government and its agents 1
Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in
regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which
are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the
most practicable way possible. * » * Indirectly influencing that
situation : American military and naval defensive forces in the
Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the
United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any
Japanese military movement into China from Indo-china, are ever
present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the
increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their
territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message,
approved by President Roosevelt and transmitted through
Ambassador Hu Shih to Chiang Kai-shek).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/57766-250710204405-ed752078/85/Architectural-modelmaking-Second-Edition-Dunn-30-320.jpg)
Architectural modelmaking Second Edition Dunn
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- 5. Architectural modelmaking Second Edition Dunn Digital Instant Download Author(s): Dunn, Nick ISBN(s): 9781780676463, 1780676468 Edition: Second edition File Details: PDF, 37.61 MB Year: 2014 Language: english
- 8. First published in 2010 by Laurence King Publishing Ltd 361–373 City Road London EC1V 1LR Tel +44 20 7841 6900 Fax +44 20 7841 6910 E enquiries@laurenceking.com www.laurenceking.com Second edition published in 2014 by Laurence King Publishing Ltd Design copyright © 2010 & 2013 Laurence King Publishing Limited Text © 2010 & 2013 Nick Dunn Nick Dunn has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs, and Patent Act 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. Technical consultants: Jim Backhouse and Scott Miller http://blogging.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/sedlab/ www.makecollective.co.uk All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. A catalogue record for this book from the British Library ISBN 978 178067 172 7 Series design by John Round Design This edition by Matt Cox at Newman+Eastwood Ltd. Printed in China
- 9. Laurence King Publishing NICK DUNN ARCHITECTURAL MODELMAKING SECOND EDITION
- 10. 6 INTRODUCTION 6 Why we make models 14 A brief history 20 Modelmaking now 21 About this book 22 Getting started 26 Machines Contents 28 MEDIA 30 Introduction 30 Abstraction 32 Size and scale 34 The selection and composition of media 36 Paper and cardboard 41 Step by step: Developing a design using paper models 48 Wood 55 Step by step: Woodworking 57 Styrofoam, acrylic and plastics 62 Case study: Using plastics and styrofoam 66 Step by step: Making an acrylic model 71 Resin, clay and cast materials 73 Step by step: Casting a plaster model from a silicone mould 78 Case study: Casting resin elements 79 Step by step: Using plasticine to develop form 80 Step by step: Casting a concrete model 81 Step by step: Casting concrete components from a silicone mould 82 Steel and other metalwork 83 Step by step: Modelling a geodesic dome 86 CAD/CAM 88 CNC 92 Step by step: Powder printing 93 Step by step: ABS Printing/Rapid prototyping 94 3D Printing: Amalgam Modelmaking 95 Step by step: CNC milling & routing
- 11. 168 APPLICATION 170 Introduction 171 Descriptive models 174 Case study: Descriptive model as communication tool 178 Case study: Descriptive model as practice 182 Predictive models 184 Case study: Detail models 186 Case study: Predictive modelling as hybrid process 188 Case Study: Predictive modelling as technical study 189 Evaluative models 193 Case study: Evaluating material properties 194 Step by step: Evaluating the effects of a façade 196 Explorative models 202 Case study: Explorative model of urban flows 203 Case study: Prototyping through explorative models 204 Step by step: Exploring materials through models 205 Case study: Exploring new materials through models 206 Case study: Explorative models of spatial narratives 207 Case study: Taichung Metropolitan Opera House 208 Modelling the future 210 Case study: Integrated making and thinking 212 Glossary 213 Further reading 214 Index 215 Picture credits 216 Acknowledgements 97 Finishing techniques 100 Photography and film 103 Step by step: Creating a realistic photomontage 105 Digital and camera technology 106 Case study: Model photography 107 Case study: Time lapse and lighting effects 108 TYPES 110 Introduction 111 Concept models 113 Case study: From concept to design proposal 114 Site/city models 119 Block/massing models 122 Design development models 126 Step by step: Making a wax model 128 Case study: Process models 129 Spatial models 133 Case study: Spatial models as design generator 134 Structural models 138 Case study: Structural models in the design process 140 Interior architecture models 144 Case study: Exploring light and shadow 146 Lighting models 148 Step by step: Light effects on an interior 152 Presentation/exhibition models 157 Step by step: Making a presentation model 158 Case study: Models for an exhibition 160 Full-sized prototypes 162 Case study: Prototype models 165 Case study: Material exploration through prototypes 166 Step by step: Making a cladding model Related study material is available on the Laurence King website at www.laurenceking.com
- 12. Introduction Why we make models The representation of creative ideas is of primary importance within any design-based discipline, and is particularly relevant in architecture where we often do not get to see the finished results, i.e. the building, until the very end of the design process. Initial concepts are developed through a process that enables the designer to investigate, revise and further refine ideas in increasing detail until such a point that the project’s design is sufficiently consolidated to be constructed. Models can be extraordinarily versatile objects within this process, enabling designers to express thoughts creatively. Architects make models as a means of exploring and presenting the conception and development of ideas in three dimensions. One of the significant advantages of physical models is their immediacy, as they can communicate ideas about material, shape, size and colour in a highly accessible manner. The size of a model is often partially determined by the scale required at various stages of the design process, since models can illustrate a design project in relation to a city context, a landscape, as a remodelling or addition to an existing building, or can even be constructed as full-size versions, typically referred to as ‘prototypes’. Throughout history, different types of models have been used extensively to explain deficiencies in knowledge. This is because models can be very provocative and evoke easy understanding as a method of communication. Our perception provides instant access to any part of a model, and to detailed as well as overall views. Familiar features can be quickly recognized, and this provides several ways for designers to draw attention to specific parts of a model. A significant advantage of using models is that they are a potentially rich source of information – providing three dimensions within which to present information, and the Members of the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), with a design development model for the Universal Headquarters, Los Angeles. 6 Introduction
- 13. opportunity to use a host of properties borrowed from the ‘real’ world, for example: size, shape, colour and texture. Therefore, since the ‘language’ of the model is so dense the ‘encoding’ of each piece of information can be more compact, with a resulting decrease in the decoding time in our understanding of it. In order to understand architecture, it is critical to engage in a direct experience of space. As Tom Porter explains in The Architect’s Eye, this is ‘because architecture is concerned with the physical articulation of space; the amount and shape of the void contained and generated by buildings being as material a part of its existence as the substance of its fabric’.1 The organization and representation of space is not the sole domain of architecture – other visually orientated disciplines such as painting and sculpture are equally engaged with these tasks, but on different terms. The principal difference between these disciplines lies in a concern with the function of the final ‘product’. In the case of painting or sculpture, such purposes are typically visual alone. By contrast, the creative process in architectural design often results in a building that has a responsibility to address additional concerns such as inhabitation, climatic considerations and maintenance. The considerable amounts of expense, resources and time invested in building architecture at its full-size scale demands that we need to be able to repeatedly describe, explore, predict and evaluate different properties of the design at various stages prior to construction. This raises an important issue concerning modelmaking since, as with other modes of representation in architecture, it is not a ‘neutral’ means for the conveyance of ideas but is in fact the medium and mechanism through which concepts and designs are developed. This point is reinforced by Stan Allen writing about architectural drawing, as he suggests it is ‘in some basic way impure, and unclassifiable. Its link to the reality it designates is complex and changeable. Like traditional painting and sculpture, it carries a mimetic trace, a representational shadow, which is transposed (spatially, across scale), into the built artefact. Drawings are, to some degree, scaled-down pictures of buildings. But to think of drawings as pictures cannot account either for the instrumentality of architectural representation nor for its capacity to render abstract ideas concrete.’2 Considered in this manner, the discrimination on behalf of the modelmaker to decide which information to include, and therefore which to deliberately omit, to best represent design ideas becomes crucial. As practitioners, architects are expected to have a highly evolved set of design skills, a core element of which is their ability to communicate their ideas using a variety of media. For the student learning architecture, the problem of communicating effectively so that the tutor may understand his or her design is central to the nature of design education; spatial ideas can become so elaborate that they have to be represented in some tangible form so that they can be described, explored and evaluated. This situation becomes complicated since ‘crosstalk occurs between different Left The team at the in-house modelmaking facility at Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners works on a 1:200 model of The Leadenhall Building, London. Right Antoine Predock working on a clay model for Ohio State University’s Recreation and Physical Activity Center, en route to a project presentation, 2001. On his website, Predock refers to the importance his clay models have within his design process: ‘compared to a drawing on paper, the models are very real; they are the building’. Why we make models 7
- 14. methods of communication so that they form a coherent presentation’ but they may also contradict one another.3 However, this delivery of ideas is not simply for the benefit of a tutor or review audience. The modelling of an architectural design has important advantages for a student during the design process as he attempts to express his ideas and translate them, allowing the designer to develop the initial concept. However, it is important to emphasize the performative nature of models at this point since they, as with other media and types of representation, are highly generative in terms of designing and are not simply used to transpose ideas. This establishes a continuous dialogue between design ideas and the method of representation, which flows until the process reaches a point of consolidation. This latter point is important and something we shall return to again and again throughout the course of this book. Fundamentally, the physical architectural model allows us to perceive the three-dimensional experience rather than having to try to imagine it. This not only enables a more effective method of communication to the receiver – such as the tutor, the client or the public – but also allows the transmitter – such as a student or architect – to develop and further revise the design. As Rolf Janke writes in the classic Architectural Models, ‘the significance of a model lies not only in enabling [the architect] to depict in plastic terms the end- product of his deliberations, but in giving him the means – during the design process – of actually seeing and therefore controlling spatial problems’4 ; while Criss Mills asserts that ‘models are capable of generating information in an amount of time comparable to that needed for drawing, and they offer one of the strongest exploration methods available’.5 At this stage it is worth expanding further upon the use of a model by a student of architecture, since it is a common assumption that an architect has sufficient experience and skills to employ a variety of design processes and methods of communication as required by the task in hand. When developing design ideas as a response to studio-project briefs, the employment of various methods of communication is a prerequisite for the thinking process necessary for a student to deal with the complexity of architectural design. Unlike the final presentation type frequently found in architectural practice and exhibited to the public, in educational environments models and drawings are not seen as end products in order to ‘sell’ the solution, but as vehicles for thought or tools with which ideas can be developed and expressed. More specifically, the use of different communication methods encourages greater exploration of a student’s ideas. This is because different visualization methods and techniques provoke different thought processes, and inspire greater insight during the design process. Every model has a specific purpose and user, as it is not possible to embody all potential design ideas within a single one. In the first instance it may function purely as a design tool, allowing the designer to explore a particular idea or analyze successive developments. Secondly, it may be used to present or demonstrate design ideas to an audience – allowing others to share the designer’s vision. Whilst it is tempting to rigidly classify different types of 1:20 model of a temporary pavilion by 6a architects in the process of being made. The intricate pattern directly replicates that of the final intervention and uses the same process of manufacture, albeit on a smaller scale. A variety of explorative models by Grafton Architects for their Università Luigi Bocconi scheme in Milan. Note the range of materials used and their resultant differing effects on the spaces within the models. 8 Introduction
- 15. model, and indeed this book will look at the full spectrum available, it is apparent that most models are dynamic in nature and have at least a dual function depending on who is using them and why and when they are employed throughout the design process. Marcial Echenique first described the difficulty of architectural model classification in his essay of 1970, ‘Models: a discussion’, wherein he defined a model as ‘a representation of reality, where representation is the expression of certain relevant characteristics of he observed reality, and where the reality consists of the objects or systems that exist, have existed, or may exist.’6 This short introduction seeks to demonstrate the significance of models not only as aids in the decision-making process, but also as a means of generating, searching and investigating creative impulses. Before moving onto the main part of the book there follows a brief overview of the role of the model in history, an explanation of the format of the book, and some basic information on the type of equipment necessary to begin making models. Below left and right Presentation model for UNStudio’s design for the Columbia Business School, New York, under construction (left) and the finished result (right). Bottom left A modelmaker at Alsop Architects in the process of assembling a presentation model for the CPlex project, West Bromwich (the completed building is known as The Public). Why we make models 9
- 16. Above A quickly produced design-development model made by UNStudio during their process of composing the geometry for the Mercedes-Benz Museum in Stuttgart. Models such as these provide architects with flexible tools, through which they can explore ideas in a fast and effective manner. Below The number of models made to investigate design ideas obviously varies from project to project, but a series of models that clearly communicate the process through which a concept has evolved are not uncommon, as shown here. 10 Introduction
- 17. Right Series of design- development models for Coop Himmelb(l) au’s SEG Apartment Tower, Vienna, illustrating the increasing articulation of the tower’s form in order to maximize its passive-energy performance. Why we make models 11 Left Explorative model for Daniel Libeskind’s design for the Jewish Museum, Berlin. This model was made to examine the relationships between the voids of the building and its powerful generative geometry. Below and right The effect of lighting upon a model and how it communicates its ideas is beautifully illustrated by this design for a new urban vision, FREE city, by the practice FR-EE (Fernando Romero), which uses different colours to indicate the various zones and networks. The master plan synthesizes three existing urban typologies: the radial city, the hexagonal connection and the urban grid. The scheme organizes the city in a radial manner, creating a hierarchical zoning strategy and allows for continuous growth in all directions. A rectangular grid is superimposed in each sector and hexagonal rings optimize the proximity between the various axes.
- 18. Above Sectional model for CPlex project by Alsop Architects, investigating internal characteristics of the design. Left Competition model for the Fourth Grace, Liverpool, by Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners, 1:500, illustrating the urban scale of the scheme. Right Coop Himmelb(l)au’s presentation model for Museum of Knowledge, Lyon, France, 2010 -14. Note the careful use of lighting within the model to enhance the effect of the project’s sculptural forms and their interplay with space. 12 Introduction
- 19. Above Series of design development models for the Burj Al Maydan Tower, Dubai by Morphosis which sought to integrate an iconic design with public space. The top two images show a card model used to refine the initial form. The bottom left image illustrates various iterations of the design as 3D powder prints, some with acrylic blocks for contrast. The final image demonstrates the evolved design placed into a massing model of the context. All these are tools for the design team to think about the building’s geometry and form. Right The presentation model of the Absolute Towers, Mississauga, Canada, designed by MAD Architects. Standing at 170m (558 ft) and 150m (492 ft) tall respectively, the towers consist of oval-shaped floors but with each storey incrementally rotated to give both buildings a curved and twisted outline and aims to provide each residential unit with 360 degree views. The design also features a continuous balcony that wraps around the whole building, eliminating the vertical barriers traditionally used in high- rise architecture. Far right: the completed building. Above The larger final model of the proposed scheme enables more detailed elements such as the translucent façade and intricate structural lattice of the curved wall to be appreciated. Why we make models 13
- 20. A brief history The first recorded use of architectural models dates back to the fifth century BC, when Herodotus, in Book V, Terpsichore, makes reference to a model of a temple. Whilst it may be inspiring to believe that scale models were used in the design of buildings from ancient civilizations, this appears highly unlikely. This is because the inaccuracies in translating scales at this time would have resulted in significant errors, but also because designs in antiquity were in fact developed with respect to cosmic measurements and proportions. Despite this, however, the production of repetitive architectural elements in large quantities was common, and the use of a full-size physical prototype as a three-dimensional template for the accurate replication of components such as column capitals was typical. Architectural design continued in a similar manner through to the Middle Ages. Medieval architects travelled frequently to study and record vital proportions of Classical examples that would then be adapted in relation to a client’s desires. Although models were not prevalent at this time, they would occasionally be constructed to scale from wood in order to enable detailed description to the client as well as to estimate materials and the cost of construction. This was largely because two-dimensional techniques of representation were comparatively under-developed. Therefore, despite the very early recording of an architectural model, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that such models were used again until this point: ‘only since the fourteenth century has this form of representation become relevant to the practice of building; we know that a model of the Cathedral of Florence was made towards the end of the fourteenth century.’7 There appears to be an explanation for this emergence of the scale model as a method of design and communication. Unlike his predecessor and Gothic counterparts, the Renaissance architect had no equivalent frame of reference as he derived his style from fragments of Graeco-Roman architecture. The only method of checking the feasibility of these new architectural concepts was to build exploratory models. These models were even, when necessary, made using the actual materials proposed for the building itself. 14 Introduction
- 21. Opposite, left Domenico Cresti di Passignano’s painting Michelangelo Shows Pope Paul IV the Model of the Dome of St Peter’s, 1620. Opposite, right Wooden model from around 1717 of the Church of Saint Mary-le- Strand, London, designed by James Gibbs. This type of model is typical of those made in the period between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Right Sir Christopher Wren, model for dome of Royal Naval Hospital, Greenwich, London. This model, from circa 1699, is one of the earliest examples of a sectional study in British architecture. Therefore, from the early Renaissance on, an increasing number of architectural scale models exist, illustrating not only buildings but also urban districts and fortifications. Well- documented architectural models included those of the church of St Maclou in Rouen from the fifteenth century, the church of ‘Schöne Maria’ in Regensburg of 1520 and the pilgrimage church of Vierzehnheiligen by Balthasar Neumann, circa 1744. Such scale models were large prefabrications constructed in wood, plaster and clay. In contrast to the primitive structural models of the Middle Ages, these new models were expensive and extravagant – frequently including pull-away sections and detachable roofs and floors, both to allow internal viewing and to aid the development of the design. During this period, the proliferation and status of the architectural scale model grew significantly. It not only complemented drawings, but also frequently became the primary method for the communication of design ideas in architecture. In particular, specialized models were made as part of the design process for major building commissions. Two such important examples were the domes of the Florence Cathedral by Filippo Brunelleschi and St Peter’s in Rome by Michelangelo. Brunelleschi primarily designed in three dimensions and used models extensively – whether as elaborate 1 ⁄12-scale wooden constructions for the benefit of the client, or quickly carved in wax or even turnips to explain structural ideas to the builders. Domenico Cresti di Passignano’s Michelangelo Shows Pope Paul IV the Model of the Dome of St Peter’s, 1620, perhaps best illustrates the importance of the model within this period. This painting depicts the architect using a large wooden model of St Peter’s Basilica to explain and sell his ideas to his papal client. The significance of the model as a method of communication is evident in the way the model is represented in the painting. The high quality of workmanship apparent shows how the proposed building could exist at full size. The model is the focal point of a conversation between the architect and the client, who will evaluate the design from it. This painting also signals a change in the function of the model during this period, from a vehicle for exploration to a descriptive tool used to explain a design. Inspired by Antonio da Sangallo’s huge wooden model of St Peter’s in Rome – started in 1539 and, at 1 ⁄24 of the full size, taking several years to construct – Sir Christopher Wren commissioned the Great Model for his design for St Paul’s in A brief history 15
- 22. London. Built between 1673 and 1674 by a team of craftsmen, the Great Model was accurately made at a scale of 1 inch to 18 inches, enabling the client and prospective builders to walk inside the model’s 18-foot-high interior. However, it is evident that Wren considered the model to be for the benefit of the client and builders rather than for his own design-development purposes as he wrote: ‘a good and careful large model [should be constructed for] the encouragement and satisfaction of the benefactors who comprehend not designs and drafts on paper.’8 Prior to the eighteenth century, architectural models were primarily produced as either descriptive or evaluative devices, or occasionally as full-scale prefabrications used to predict structural behaviour. However, during the mid- eighteenth century, and coincident with the newly founded technical colleges, the use of physical models for teaching purposes became more widespread. Such models represented the more complex structural and constructional conditions that this period ushered in, and they were used in the education of technical students and building tradesmen. Parallel to this development, architectural and scientific models quickly populated the displays of museums and collections in different countries around the world. This dissemination also began to have considerable impact on a wider culture as Nick Hopwood and Soraya de Chadarevian have explained, ‘models were demonstrated in popular lectures and above all at the international age shows of the capital and empire that followed the Great Exhibition of 1851. Many of the exhibits representing manufactures, the sciences, and the arts were models, which here came together most prominently as a class.’9 A major resurgence in the use of the model as a design tool in architecture can also be traced to the start of the twentieth century – for example in the work of Walter Gropius, who, in founding the Bauhaus in 1919, was keen to resist the prevailing preoccupation with paper designs in favour of physical models to explore and test ideas quickly, an impetus reflected in the extensive use of models in the De Stijl period and elsewhere. From this point on, the scale model was re-established as a vital design tool for architecture. The design-development model was to have an important role in the conception and refinement of countless built and unbuilt projects of the Modernist era. For example, there was Gerrit Rietveld’s attempt to give architectural form to the ideas about space that he had previously explored in his furniture designs. From the sequences of models for his design of the Schröder House, it is clear that Rietveld’s starting point was a block form, whose coloured surfaces combined with receding and projecting parts to break up the massiveness of its volume. A similar intent is discernible in Vladimir Tatlin’s search for a monument to represent a new social order in Soviet Russia, described in the great model of his leaning, twin helicoidal tower, the Monument to the Third International. The actual building of the model took just less than eight months and was 16 Introduction
- 23. Opposite left Delmaet and Durandelle’s plaster model from 1864 of the capital for the columns on the façade of the Opéra Garnier, Paris, designed by Charles Garnier. Opposite right Vladimir Tatlin’s assistants building the first model of his Monument to the Third International from wood connected by metal plates, 1920. This was one of several models made for this project that tested various iterations of the design. A simplified version was paraded through the streets of St Petersburg (then known as Leningrad) in 1926. undertaken without preliminary sketches, enabling Tatlin to explore design possibilities as the model was constructed. The progression of architecture throughout the twentieth century bore witness to the increasingly common use of models as explorative tools in an architect’s design process. Right Sir Edwin Lutyens’ proposed design for the Metropolitan Cathedral of Christ the King, Liverpool, 1929–58. The model was constructed from yellow pine and cork, and made by John B. Thorp in 1933. Below Model for the Concrete City of the Future, designed by F. R. S. Yorke and Marcel Breuer, 1936. A brief history 17
- 24. It was this direct handling of materials and space through the use of models that heralded the key early twentieth-century architects as creative designers who visualized and articulated their concepts in a provocative and unconventional manner. A study of their formative experience and design processes reveals an explorative nature, which, being founded upon an understanding of spatial possibilities, transcends a singular reliance upon drawing. In fact, as the twentieth century progressed, physical models sometimes became the fundamental means and resonating echo of radical ideas and projects. As Holtrop et al. have observed, ‘the revolutionary 1960s will always be associated with the models and images of Constant’s utopian New Babylon or Frederick Kiesler’s Endless House.’10 Whilst the architectural model continued to offer a dynamic tool for design conception, development and communication, during the 1970s it also began to be perceived as having value as an art object in its own right. Beyond this point in history, the physical model was established as a powerful method of communication in the description, exploration and evaluation of architecture. The model has been an important method of communication in the understanding of architecture for over five hundred years. Whilst the increase and developments of new technology have enabled Computer-Aided Design (CAD) to become a powerful design tool in architecture, the use of physical models remains a key aspect of education within the discipline and for many practices around the world. This position is further supported and explained by Juhani Pallasmaa in his book The Thinking Hand, ‘Even in the age of computer-aided design and virtual modelling, physical models are incomparable aids in the process of the architect and the designer. The three-dimensional material model speaks to the hand and the body as powerfully as to the eye, and the very process of constructing a model simulates the process of construction.’ 11 Therefore, let us turn our attention to modelmaking in the twenty-first century. Left Sir Denys Lasdun and Philip Wood looking at the model of the library extension for the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1972. Right Wooden concept model showing the geometrical solution for the pre-cast concrete shells, Sydney Opera House, Sydney. Designed by Jørn Utzon, this landmark project initiated an era of complex geometry in modern architecture. 18 Introduction
- 25. Top 1:20 model of the design for the new additions to the Reichstag, Berlin, by Foster + Partners. Made by Atelier 36, using MDF (medium- density fibreboard), acrylics, steel and brass, this model of the plenary chamber, dome and light cone was hoisted onto the roof of the Reichstag to test the lighting in 1996. Below left The widespread adoption of digital fabrication technologies in architecture schools and practices has contributed to a major resurgence in the production of models such as this 3D powder print of a sculptural staircase as part of UNStudio’s design for Le Toison d’Or, Brussels. Below right This beautiful concept model by Ken Grix, Feilden Clegg Bradley, skillfully combines concrete, acrylic and dichroic film to illustrate the proposed extension to the Festival Wing of the Southbank Centre, London. The model won the Grand Award for Architecture at the Royal Academy Summer Exhibition in 2013. A brief history 19
- 26. Another Random Scribd Document with Unrelated Content
- 27. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 537 or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge. No United States official then regarded this action as an overt act against Japan. Moreover, when in this 1940 case Washington authorities were worried about hostile Japanese action, they ordered the commanding general at Hawaii to an immediate "complete defense organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid" in language that was crystal clear. The fact is that the War Department and Navy Deioartment did not instruct General Short and Admiral Kimmel to put into effect an all-out war alert, and the War Department was informed by General Short that he had actually put into effect the alert against sabotage. Furthermore, the actions of the War Department in instructing General Short in November and December as the Army Pearl Harbor Board correctly stated, showed "a lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its actions" (APHB, p. 240). The War Department failed to reply to General Short's antisabotage report. It failed to give him further instructions for a stronger alert. These failures, it is reasonable to say, contributed heavily to the unpreparedness existing at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck. It could reasonably follow from this failure that the Army airplanes, instead of being scattered, were bunched together wing to wing ; ammunition, except that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, was in storehouses ; antiaircraft artillery and two combat divisions were in their permanent quarters and not in combat positions. As the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated : Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the antisabotage alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack, and the Japanese took full advantage of it (APHB, Report, pp. 193-94). This was known to the War Department by General Short's reply to the message of November 27, but the Department took no action. The President's lack of power under the Constitution to meet the Japanese menace
- 28. by an attack without a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. This they did not do. H. nigh authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to the, evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations which indicated that an attack on Pearl Earhor was highly probable and they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the Hawaiian commanders. Washington authorities had before them prior to December 7 conclusive evidence that the Japanese Government and its agents were giving minute attention to American military and naval installations, ship movements, and preparedness in the Hawaiian area, as well as in other areas. But despite their knowledge of this fact, those authorities failed to emphasize, in orders to the Hawaiian commanders, the perils of an attack on Pearl Harbor. They did worse than fail in this respect. With poor judgment as to the effect of their own words upon the com
- 29. 538 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK manders, they went out of their way to emphasize the probability of attack elsewhere. The following passage in the war-warning message of November 27 from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel reflected the loose thinking that prevailed widely in Washington : Japan is exi)ected to make an aggressive move vpithin the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or jwssibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and by the organization of tlieir naval forces. These words not only displayed the apparent ignorance of Washington authorities respecting Japanese designs on Pearl Harbor but also gratuitously conveyed to Admiral Kimmel a false impression. Although the message of the War Department to General Short on the same day did not contain these misleading words, General Short, in conferring with Admiral Kimmel on "the meaning and intent" of their messages learned about this expectation that the Japanese attack would occur in the Far East. Notwithstanding their apparent ignorance of the full meaning of Japanese movements in the Southeastern Pacific, Washington authorities knew or should have known from their understandings of parallel action with the British and Dutch, that a Japanese attack on the Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula meant war with America. It also meant, in view of the strategic principle that the flank of an advancing force must be guarded, that Japan would not leave the strong fleet at Hawaii on its left flank without doing something about it. This was the meaning to Washington of the Japanese move in the Southeastern Pacific.^ Without having the benefit of these diplomatic understandings, it did not have the same meaning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Testimony and documents before the Committee lend support to — in no way traverse — the Sixteenth Conclusion of the President's Commission which found : "The opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles, and in the public press," was "that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East." [Italics supplied.] IS. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and consistently in translating intercepts., evaluating information.,
- 30. and sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in considerable measure due to delays., mismanagement, noncooperation, unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in Washington. The record before this Committee is crowded with items of evidence which sustains this conclusion. As to delays, take for example section B of Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc. [Exhibit 2]. Pages 16-29 give "messages translated after December 7, 1941." Here are messages exchanged by the Japanese Government and its agents 1 Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable way possible. * » * Indirectly influencing that situation : American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-china, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to Chiang Kai-shek).
- 31. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 539 which were intercepted by American intelligence services before December 7, hut not translated until after December 7. Special attention should be drawn to the message from a Japanese agent in Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941, listing the ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor on that day and reporting to Tokyo : It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by tlie fleet air arm — a fact with which high authorities in Washington were not acquainted, if the testimony before this Committee is accepted as accurate and comprehensive. One of the great tragedies was that a message sent from Honolulu to Tokyo Deceinber 6, 1941, was not translated until December 8, 1941, after the attack. The following appeared in the message "at the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places" (Exhibit 2, p. 27). Another message intercepted and translated in the rough and available on the desk of a responsible officer in the Naval Intelligence on the afternoon of December 6, 1941, provided for land-sea signals at Hawaii. These signals were intended to disclose to Japanese the location of our ships in Pearl Harbor — apparently nothing was done about the message either in evaluating it in Washington or transmitting it to the commanders in Hawaii (Exhibit 2, p. 22). As to mismanagement, noncooperation, unpreparedness, and negligence, the evidence cited in the following pages is sufficient (Conclusions 8, 10, and 16). Since President Koosevelt was convinced as early as the middle of August that a clash with Japan was a matter of a few weeks, the responsible officers of his administration had ample time to strengthen, organize, and consolidate the agencies in Washington, especially the Army and Navy communication and intelligence services, in such a manner to assure the speedy translations of intercepts, prompt distribution to the appropriate officials, swift evaluation, and proper decisions based on such information and evaluation. Lack of time cannot be pleaded as an excuse for this failure, despite the difficulties involved in securing competent and reliable specialists. General Miles
- 32. admitted at the hearing on December 3, 1945, that there had been no meeting of the joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee between October 11 and December 8 or 9, 1941, and declared: I regret to say, Mr. Congressman, there were still discussions and difficulties going on between the War and Navy Departments as to just what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetra. There was lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy regarding the fourteen parts of the Japanese final message between 9 :30 p. m. on December 6 and the morning of December 7 about 10 :30. The existence of the first thirteen parts of this Japanese message, which President Roosevelt received between 9 and 10 o'clock on Saturday evening and interpreted as meaning war, was known more or less accidentally to certain high Army and Navy authorities about the same time. But Admiral Stark testified before this Committee at the hearing on January 1, 1946, that the first thirteen parts and the di
- 33. 540 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK rective for delivery to Secretary Hull at one o'clock Sunday, did not come to his attention until late on the morning of December 7. Admiral Stark thought that he went to his office between 10 :30 and 11 o'clock that morning and that as nearly as he could remember he did not see the directive message for one o'clock delivery until about 10 :40 that morning. It was the final part of the Japanese message, and the one o'clock directive that convinced General Marshall that war was immediately at hand and led him to send the warning dispatch which reached General Short after the Japanese attack. For this noncooperation and mismanagement, high authorities in Washington were fully responsible. The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark were all in Washington or environs. It is true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark — when they appeared before this Committee — could not remember where they were during the evening and night of December 6 but they were at least accessible to officers of the Army and Navy Departments, or should have been ; hence, there was no excuse for the failure of these high authorities to assemble on the evening of December 6, inquire into the defensive preparedness of outpost Commanders, and send peremptory directives to them. The setting up of so many councils and committees, and the intermeddling of so many men created such a state of confusion in Washington that the high principle of individual responsibility was apparently lost to sight. The result was that no one among the President's chief subordinates was enough concerned on the night of December 6 to do anything about the 13 parts which indicated a crucial stage in Japanese- American relations. (See Conclusion No. 10.) In the lower, operating echelons of the Army and Navy, on the other hand, men seemed to see or to sense the gathering crisis and even the immediate danger to Hawaii. They tried to take steps to meet it but were discouraged by their superiors. This was notably evident in the testimony of Captain Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence. Alarmed by conditions on December 4, 1941, he
- 34. prepared a dispatch to fully alert the fleets in the Pacific. He tried to get permission to send this dispatch at a meeting attended by Admiral Stark, Ingersol, Turner, and Wilkinson but was discouraged from doing so on the ground that the messages of November 24 and 27 to Admiral Kimmel was sufficient. He protested that it was not sufficient and that he would like to send his December 4 dispatch anyway. The dispatch he prepared and wanted to send was never sent, and the result was tragic. (See testimony of Captain McCollum, Tr., Vol. No. 49, p. 9132 ff.) Finally, there is no excuse for the failure of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to be on the alert early Sunday morning or for their failure, after they did meet near the middle of the morning, to reach the outpost Commanders with a definite war- warning message before the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor. This failure was all the more inexcusable for the reason that some time in July 1941, the practice of sending intercepts to General Short and Admiral Kimmel had been abandoned. 16. The President of the United States was responsible for the failure to enforce continuous^ efficient^ and appropriate cooperation among the Secretary of War^ the Secretary of the Navy^ the Chief of Staffs
- 35. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 541 and the Chief of Naval Operations^ in evaliiating information and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and luws of the United States vested in the President full .poioer, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chiefs to compel such cooperation and vested, this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people of the United States. As to the power, and therefore of necessity, the responsibility of the President in relation to the chain of events leading to the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt. The terms of the Constitution and the laws in this respect are clear beyond all cavil. The Constitution vests in the President the whole and indivisible Executive power subject to provisions for the approval of appointments and treaties by the Senate. The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints high officers, civil and military. He is Chief Magistrate in all civil affairs, including those related to the maintenance and operation of the Military and Naval Establishment's. Under the law he conducts all diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the United States, assigning to his appointee, the Secretary of State, such duties connected therewith as he sees fit, always subject to his own instructions and authorizations. Under the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, and with the approval of the Senate he appoints all high military and naval officers. He assigns them to their duties in his discretion except in the case of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations — these appointments must be approved by the Senate. And why did the framers of the Constitution vest these immense powers in one magistrate — not in a directory or a single official checked by a council, as was proposed in the Conveni:ion of 1787 ? The answer to this question is to be found in No. 70 of The Federalist. The purpose of establishing a single rather than a plural Executive was to assure "energy in the Executive," "a due dependence on the people," and "a due responsibility." A plural Executive, it is there argued, "tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for
- 36. the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first., the restraints of public opinion * * *; and, secondly^ the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of persons they trust * * *," The acts of Congress providing for the organization, operations, powers, and duties of the Military Establishments under the President particularized the powers and duties of the President in relation to them ; in brief, they empowered him to issue orders and instructions to the civil Secretaries and also directly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Such are the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the Chief Executive. From March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, Fi-anklin D. Roosevelt was President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States and in him was vested all Executive powers under the Constitution and the laws.
- 37. 542 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK He appointed Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in 1933 and retained him in that office during this period. He appointed all the Secretaries of War and of the Navy during this period. He selected, or approved the choice of, all Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of Naval Operations during this period. He selected, or approved the choice of, all the men who served as military and naval commanders in charge of the Hawaiian area and he assigned them to their posts of duty. In support of the doctrine that the President is entrusted with supreme Executive responsibility and cannot divest himself of it, we have more recent authority. Speaking at a press conference on December 20, 1940, on a subject of administrative actions. President Roosevelt said : "There were two or three cardinal principles ; and one of them is the fact that you cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is responsible. Now that man can delegate, surely, but in the delegation he does not delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate responsibility that rests on him" {Public Papers, 1940 volume, p. 623). * * * Although there were two departments for the administration of military and naval affairs during this period, they were both under the supreme direction of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in all matters relative to separate and joint planning for defense and war, to disposition of forces and materiel, to preparednesr. for operation in case of an attack. In respect of the President's power, the two departments were one agency for over-all planning and operational purposes. Tile President had power to issue directions and orders to the Secre,tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and also directly and indirectly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and on occasions used this power. Furthermore, under the Reorganization Act of 1939, President Roosevelt had enjoyed the power, by grant of Congress, to reorganize the Department of War and the Department of the Navy if he deemed it necessary in the interest of efficiency and more effective cooperation between the Departments. Since he did not reorganize the two Departments under that act, he must
- 38. have deemed them properly constructed as they were. By virtue of the powers vested in him the President had, during this period, the responsibility for determining the reciprocal relations of diplomatic decisions and war plans. In fine. Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, General Short, and Admiral Kimmel were all men of President Roosevelt's own choice — not hang-over appointees from another administration to which incompetence may be ascribed— and the President had ample power to direct them, coordinate their activities, and bring about a concentration of their talents and energies in the defense of the United States. Thus endowed with power and in full charge of diplomatic negotiations, the President decided long before December 7, at least as early as the Atlantic Conference in August, that war with Japan was a
- 39. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 543 matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so imminent as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation for that war. Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an overt act by Japan — an attack on territory of the United States. Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and dispositions necessary to that end were taken. During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meetings, discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that attack — or overt act. Yet when the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the attack effectively. In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding conclusions and more of the sam.e kind that could be cited, this failure cannot all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the President of the United States. This does demonstrate the weakness of depending on the political head of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the operating activities of the military branches, particularly in the areas of intelligence. The major lesson to be learned is that this coordination should be done in advance of a crisis. 17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian commanders the material which the latter often declared to he necessary to defence and often requested^ and no requirements of defense or war in the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities for their failures in this respect. The first part of this conclusion calls for no special citations of authority. In reports of the President's
- 40. Commission, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Navy Court of Inquiry, three points in this respect are accepted as plain facts : (1) The ultimate power to allocate arms, ammunition, implements of war, and other supplies was vested in the President and his aide, Harry Hopkins, subject to the advice of General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (2) General Short and Admiral Kimmel made repeated demands upon their respective Departments for additional material, which they represented as necessary to the effective defense of Pearl Harbor; and (3) Washington authorities, having full discretion in this regard, made decisions against General Short and Admiral Kimmel and allocated to the Atlantic theater, where the United States was at least nominally at peace, materiel, especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, which were known to be absolutely indispensable to efficient defense of Pearl Harbor. (See Exhibits 106 and 53, request for materials.) The decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made by the President in March 1940, over the protest of Admiral Richardson.
- 41. 544 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The second part of this conclusion may be arguable from the point of view of some high world strategy, but it is not arguable under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The President, it is true, had powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941. But his first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was to care for the defense and security of the United States against a Japanese attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the allocations of materiel, especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he made or authorized decisions which deprived the Hawaiian commanders of indispensable materiel they could otherwise have had and thus reduced their defensive forces to a degree known to be dangerous by high officials in Washington and Hawaii. When this decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made, certain definite facts in relation to such base must be presumed to have been fully known and appreciated by the responsible command at Washington. The base is a shallow-water base with limited base mobility, with no chance for concealment or camouflage and without enough air beaches to properly park the necessary defensive air equipment. Entrance to the base is by a narrow winding channel requiring sorties at reduced speed, and in single file, and presenting the possibility of a blockade of the base by an air or submarine attack on the entrance. The base is surrounded by high land immediately adjacent to the city of Honolulu, thereby affording full public familiarity with installations and movements within the base at all times. The base is located on an island where the population was heavily Japanese, and where, as was well known, Japanese espionage was rampant, and making it probable that any defensive insufficiency of any kind or nature would be open to Japanese information. All of the fuel for the base must be transported, by tanker, from the mainland more than 2,000 miles away, thus intensifying the necessity for complete defensive equipment and supplies for the base. The waters about Oahu are of a depth facilitating the concealed movement of submarines, and the near approach of submarines to the shore, thereby favoring such
- 42. methods of hostile attack. The approaches to Oahu cover a full circle of 360°, with open sea available on all sides. The situation thus confronting the Pacific Fleet upon reaching its Pearl Harbor base seems entirely clear. Before the base could be a safe base, it must be supplied with adequate defense facilities, which facilities must be in kind and amount in relation to the physical characteristics of the base above referred to. An absence of adequate defensive facilities directly increased the peril of the fleet. Since the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made at Washington, the responsibility for providing proper base defense for the fleet rested primarily upon Washington. (See Stark letter, November 22, 1940, Tr., Vol. 5, p. 706 ff.) It becomes important, therefore, to consider what defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl Harbor base, whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if not, the reasons for such failure. The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense of the Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions,
- 43. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 545 the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of longdistance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance covering a 360° perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such a reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol planes, with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in operation, and a suflGicient number of available crews to permit a continuous patrol. Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any attack which might be considered possible. This would require approximately 175 planes. The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable number of antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammunition and sufficient experienced crews for ready operation. The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and bafiles. It would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together with ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant recourse to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of the Pearl Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a more or less deferiseless situation except for the defense power of their own ship batteries. The British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, Italy, brought the question of torpedo bomber defense to the fore. Admiral Stark wrote on November 22, 1940 — expressing fear of a "sudden attack in Hawaiian waters" on the fleet, and asking about torpedo net protection. (Tr., Vol. 5, p. 707.) Admiral Richardson, then in command, expressed no enxiety about the security of the fleet, and thought torpedo nets unnecessary, but thought security to the fleet must be carried out, even at the expense of fleet training and extra discomfort. Approximately four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon the attack was the result of torpedoes fired by torpedo- bombing planes attacking the base at low altitudes. Against such an attack, antitorpedo baffles and nets would have been of extraordinary value. The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly discovered device known as radar, which before December 7 had been sufiiciently perfected to permit the
- 44. discovery of approaching planes more than 100 miles away. It seems to be agreed that it is not the duty of the fleet, ordinarily, to furnish its own base defense. That duty is supposed to be performed by the base defense itself, usually in the hands of the Army. The fleet, however, is always to be expected to furnish every available defensive effort it has, in event of an attack upon a base. The record discloses that with full knowledge of the defense necessities inherent in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the dangers and peril imposed upon the fleet while based at the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the equipment essential to a proper protection of the fleet at such base, it was decided by President Roosevelt to remove the fleet from the mainland bases and base it at Pearl Harbor. The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl Harbor until the attack on December 7, the high command at Hawaii, both in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military authorities at Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at the Pearl Harbor base (Exhibits 53 and 106). Nowhere in the record
- 45. 546 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of the requests for defense equipment made by the high command in Hawaii. On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was expressly recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to provide the equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages, the requested defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied. It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii than for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble with such an explanation is that Hawaii was the only nonmainland base charged with the defense of a major part of our Pacific Fleet, and the equipment supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient. The Philippines received much equipment which might well have gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii could have been defended, whereas no one expected the Philippines to be able to stand a direct Japanese onslaught. General IVIarshall reported to the President in March 1941 (Exhibit 59) that "Oahu was believed to be the strongest fortress in the world" and practically invulnerable to attack and that sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause great damage. The Government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and the Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no issue as to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point out that such decision resulted in the failure of the military authorities in Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the defense of the base and the Heet while in the base. As we have said, such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon the Pacific Fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that in view of the obligations assumed by the Government in other military theaters, and to which we have just referred, and the consequent inability of the Government to properly contribute to the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, that the only alternative left which might have relieved the fleet from the resultant peril would have been to have changed the original decision to base the fleet at Pearl
- 46. Harbor, and thereupon return the -fleet to its several mainland hases. It appears obvious that the safety of the fleet would have been helped by such removal. The perimeter of a defense at a mainland base would only be 180° instead of 360°, thus permitting distant patrol reconnaissance by one-half as many planes. The transportation and supply facilities to the mainland base would be immensely improved, as would all necessary communication facilities. The mobility of the fleet at a mainland base would have been improved and the concentration of the fleet in a single limited base would have been avoided. We therefore are of the opinion that the fleet should not have been based at Pearl Harbor unless proper base defenses were assu/red. Since no such change in policy was approved, and the fleet remained based at Pearl Harbor without the necessary defense equipment to which we have referred — plus the fact that the precise status of the defense weakness must be assumed to have been open to the unusual Japanese espionage operating in Hawaii, and therefore that the Tokyo war office must b(} assumed to have been cognizant of the status of affairs at Pearl Harbor, we are forced to conclude that the failure to remove the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the mainland must be viewed
- 47. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 547 as an important relevant factor necessarily involved in the success of the Japanese attack on December 7. The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, between February 1 and December 1, 1941, an abundance of longdistance patrol planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit 172 shows that the Army received between February 1 and December 1, 1941, approximately 600 long-distance bombers capable of flying, loaded, missions, of 1,250 miles or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii and 35 went to the Philippines. During the same period the Navy received approximately 560 similar long-distance bombers, of which approximately 175 were assigned to carriers in the Pacific. During the same period the Army received approximately 5,500 antiaircraft guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the Philippines. If it be true that it was found necessary to send this equipment elsewhere, as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii instead of having high priority, occupied a subordinate position. We have referred to the unavoidable vulnerabilities of the Pearl Harbor base, together with the identification of the essential defense equipment necessary for its proper defense. We likewise noted the demands made by the high command at Hawaii for such equipment, the agreement that such equipment was proper and necessary, and the continued and increased peril imposed upon the fleet by the failure to provide such equipment. It seems proper here to note the extent to which the Pearl Harbor base was deprived of needed and essential equipment. ( 1 ) We have pointed out that the perimeter of Oahu defense covered 360°. Full defense reconnaissance would likewise be required for the full 360°. The evidence discloses that it would take approximately 200 patrol planes to furnish such reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance would require flights of not less than 750 miles from Oahu. The evidence shows that the wear and tear upon patrol planes engaged in such distant operations would be heavy, that a certain proportion of available planes would have to be under repair and adjustment, and that only about one- third of the assigned planes would be available for a particular day's patrol. In a similar way, in connection with the overhaul and repair of
- 48. planes, a proper store of repair parts would be essential and of even greater importance, spare crews for the operation of the planes would be required, since the same crew could not fly such patrol missions daily. The record seems to establish that there were available at Pearl Harbor on December 7, approximately 85 patrol planes suitable for distant patrol, of which not to exceed 55 were in operable condition. The supply of spare parts was not ample, nor were there sufficient extra crews for a continuous operation. With reference to fighter planes, the situation was not so acute. An estimate appears in the record that 185 fighter planes would be necessary to defend the base, and there were, on December 7, 105 available fighter planes, which, if propertly alerted, would have been available for base defense. The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used as a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater.
- 49. 548 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK We agree that Admiral Kimmel was faced with a sharp dilemma. He was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Under WPL 46 he was given specific duties which required him to have his fleet ready for action promptly upon the breaking out of war. He had available 50 or 60 patrol planes, and he would need these j^lanes in aid of fleet movements if his fleet was to take the offensive against the enemy. If he used these patrol planes for base defense, such heavy duty would reduce their efficiency and ultimately put them up for repair in event the distance patrol duty should cover an extended period. In such an event his fleet could not sail against tlie enemy as required by WPL 46 because his patrol planes would be out of commission. He had therefore to make a choice between fleet training and preparation and base defense. He says his decision not to carry on distant reconnaissance was based upon his belief, in common with his staff, that Pearl Harbor was not in danger from a Japanese attack. W;e think in making such a decision Admiral Kimmel was unjustified in concluding, first, that there was no danger of attack at Pearl Harbor, and, second, that such a decision did not violate the fundamental proposition tliat no disposition should be taken which unnecessarily increased fleet peril. The absence of distant reconnaissance immediately imperiled fleet safety. We therefore think the abandonment of distance reconnaissance was unjustified. (2) The fuel reserves were insufficient, limiting full use of the fleet at sea, required constant augmentation from the mainland, and the location of such fuel supplies was such as to make them vulnerable to any raiding attack. The fleet was required to come into the base at frequent intervals to refuel. The facilities at the base made such refueling slow. The fleet was without a sufficient supply of fast tankers to permit refueling at sea, and there was ever present the inescapable fact that a destruction of the fuel supply would necessarily immobilize the entire fleet. (3) It is difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to the sufficiency of the antiaircraft batteries and supplies available at Pearl Harbor on December 7. General Short testified as to the number of guns available on December 7, 1941, as
- 50. compared with the number available in December 1942. It is apparent that the antiaircraft gun equipment had been much augmented during the year following the Pearl Harbor attack. The difficulty we have with respect to the antiaircraft batteries situation, as with the available force of fighter planes, is that practically none of these guns were alerted on December 7, and ammunition was not readily available, the crews serving them were not in attendance, and the only seeming excuse for such conditions was the common belief that there was no danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore no reason for any battery alert. Even if there had been twice as many batteries (or fighter planes) available, there is no reason to believe the condition of alert would have been different. The ships in the harbor were not provided with proper torpedo protection. The letter of June 13, 1941, with respect to the use of aerial torpedoes, seems to demonstrate the responsibility of the high command at Washington to provide a torpedo defense. Such a defense was well known and could have been provided and, if provided,
- 51. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 549 might have obviated the greatest source of damage suffered by the fleet during the raid, even though Admiral Richardson in 1940 thought such defense unnecessary. But it could not have been provided at Hawaii; it had to come from Washington. Washington's advices on the subject did more harm than good, because they intimated that an attack was possible even in shallow water, but at the same time, negatived the probability of attack.^ (See letter of June 13, 1941, Ex. No. 116, letter from Chief of Naval Operations (R. E. Ingersoll) to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, among others.) The installation of the radar in Hawaii was inexcusably delayed. It was a method of defense peculiarly essential in Hawaii. It was known that there were insufficient planes and insufficient guns to protect the base, and this made the availability of radar all the more necessary. It seems we could have priority for radar protection in New York and other mainland points, where no attack was probable, but none in Hawaii, where radar information was essential. The result was that fixed radio installations were not accomplished at all prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and such fixed installations would have furnished the most distant services. The mobile sets available had, b}^ reason of the delay, been operating only on a short experimental basis. There was a scarcity of trained operators. The operators were trying to learn and operate at the same time. The selected hours of operation, which proved of vast importance, were not wisely fixed. Service stopped at 7 a. m., the very time when the danger was acute. No suitable information center had been established, and it is conceded that such a center was essential to radar information. This was particularly true at Hawaii, because radar had not yet been developed to the point where the nationality of approaching planes could be ascer•tained. The information as to whether approaching planes were, therefore, friendly or enemy, depended upon the constant presence at an information center of representatives of the military services who could instantly advise as to location of friendly planes. No such information center was established, and no assignment of trained operators to such stations
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