Assignment 2 Discussion—Comparison of EditorialsIn this assignmen.docx

Assignment 2: Discussion—Comparison of Editorials
In this assignment, you will identify and explore your intuitive
critical-thinking strategies. It is the starting point to developing
the skills to analyze information critically.
Research methods of identifying strong and weak arguments
using your textbook and the Argosy University online library
resources. Be sure to cover the following:
Identify premises and conclusions
Discuss whether or not an inference is warranted
Determine whether arguments utilize inductive or deductive
reasoning
For this assignment, your facilitator will assign you one of the
following debates:
Debate 1: Should the “Ashley X” treatments have been
permitted?
Debate 2: Is Osama Bin Laden’s death a decisive blow to Al
Qaeda or an unmitigated victory against terrorism?
Each debate has two sets of articles for review. Your facilitator
will assign you one of these sets.
Each set has two articles with two varying, but important,
perspectives on the same subject. Be sure to read both articles
in the set.
Debate 2
These pairs of articles focus on the subject of Osama Bin
Laden’s death and the alleged implications his death are
expected to have on matters of future Al Qaeda activity and
international safety.
Set A
Clarke, R. A. (2011, May 3). Bin Laden’s dead. Al Qaeda’s not
[Op-Ed].
The New York Times,
p. A.23. (ProQuest Document ID 864311946).
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/8643119
46/abstract?source=fedsrch&accountid=34899

THE United States needed to eliminate Osama bin Laden to
fulfill our sense of justice and, to a lesser extent, to end the
myth of his invincibility. But dropping Bin Laden's corpse in
the sea does not end the terrorist threat, nor does it remove the
ideological motivation of Al Qaeda's supporters.
Often forgotten amid the ugly violence of Al Qaeda's attacks
was that the terrorists' declared goal was to replace existing
governments in the Muslim world with religiously pure Islamist
states and eventually restore an Islamic caliphate. High on Al
Qaeda's list of targets was Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak.
The protesters of Tahrir Square succeeded in removing him
without terrorism and without Al Qaeda.
Thus, even before Bin Laden's death, analysts had begun to
argue that Al Qaeda was rapidly becoming irrelevant. With Bin
Laden's death, it is even more tempting to think that the era of
Al Qaeda is over.
But such rejoicing would be premature. To many Islamist
ideologues, the Arab Spring simply represents the removal of
obstacles that stood in the way of establishing the caliphate.
Their goal has not changed, nor has their willingness to use
terrorism.
In the months ahead, Bin Laden's death may encourage Al
Qaeda to stage an attack to counter the impression that it is out
of business. The more significant threat, however, will come
from Al Qaeda's local affiliates. Bin Laden and his deputies
designed Al Qaeda as a network of affiliated groups that could
operate largely independently to attack America, Europe and
secular governments in the Middle East in order to establish
fundamentalist regimes. Once in place, the network no longer
needed Bin Laden and, in fact, has been proceeding with
minimal direction from him for several years.
The affiliates that Bin Laden helped to create, including Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Shabab in Somalia, are
still recruiting and financing terrorists and training them for
attacks. Neither the events of Tahrir Square nor the raid on Bin
Laden's hideout is likely to significantly diminish the appeal of

Islamist extremism to those who have been receptive to it.
In many Muslim societies, there remains a radical stratum born
of a sense of victimization by the West, fueled by inefficient
and corrupt governments, and carried forward by an enormous
youth population. Al Qaeda was and is simply a pressure valve,
an early form of connective social media that allowed young,
militant jihadists fed up with the West and their own
governments to organize and vent their anger.
Believing that their religion requires them to act violently
against nonbelievers in the West and impure, apostate Muslim
elites, the Islamist extremists will not be stopped by the
elimination of Al Qaeda's leader or even by the eradication of
Al Qaeda itself. They will continue their struggle, refusing to
renounce violence or accept more democratic, less corrupt
regimes as a substitute for the caliphate.
Just because we do not always know the identities of their
leaders or see a named and hierarchical organization does not
mean that Islamist extremists are not working hard to seize the
fruits of the Arab Spring. The challenge for the United States is
not merely to take advantage of the intelligence gained in the
Pakistan raid to further erode Al Qaeda, but to assist moderate
Muslims in creating a counterweight to violent extremism, with
both an appealingly articulated ideology and an effective
organizational structure.
The government that was overthrown in Egypt was corrupt and
feckless, as are the regimes now under siege in Libya, Syria and
Yemen, but the groups poised to take advantage of the upheaval
in those countries include many who share Bin Laden's vision
for repressive religious rule. Similar situations exist in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Moderate, tolerant and even some secular groups exist, but they
often do not have a comprehensive alternative vision, know how
to communicate it or have the organizational skills to promote
it. American and European experts can assist them in building
politically viable organizations, but to succeed these new
groups must be homegrown and tap into the Arab and Islamic

traditions that speak to many Muslim youth.
Moreover, without investment to create jobs, new governments
in these countries will fail under the weight of youth
unemployment. Unless corruption is replaced with efficiency,
investment will either not materialize or be wasted.
Without alternative movements with vision, appeal, and the
ability to deliver change, existing organized extremist groups
will fill the void. And despite his death, Bin Laden's goal may
yet be achieved.
AuthorAffiliation
RICHARD A. CLARKE Richard A. Clarke, the counterterrorism
coordinator at the National Security Council from 1993 to 2001,
is the author of "Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on
Terror."
Word count:
784
Soufan, A. H. (2011, May 3). The end of the Jihadist dream
[Op-Ed].
The New York Times,
p. A.23. (ProQuest Document ID 864311556). Retrieved from
http://www.thecampuscommon.com/library/ezproxy/ticketdemoc
s.asp?sch=auo&turl=http://search.proquest.com/docview/864311
556
TO the Qaeda members I interrogated at Guantanamo Bay and
elsewhere in the aftermath of 9/11, Osama bin Laden was never
just the founder and leader of the group, but also an idea. He
embodied the belief that their version of Islam was correct, that
terrorism was the right weapon, and that they would ultimately
be victorious. Bin Laden's death did not kill that idea, but did
deal it a mortal blow.
The immediate reaction of Al Qaeda members to Bin Laden's

death will be to celebrate his martyrdom. The group's ideology
champions death for the cause: Songs are composed, videos
made and training camps named in honor of dead fighters. Bin
Laden's deputies will try to energize people by turning him into
a Che Guevara-like figure for Al Qaeda -- a more effective
propaganda tool dead than alive.
But it won't take long for Al Qaeda to begin wishing that Bin
Laden wasn't dead. He not only was the embodiment of Al
Qaeda's ideology, but also was central to the group's fund-
raising and recruiting successes. Without him, Al Qaeda will
find itself short on cash -- and members.
Bin Laden's fund-raising (especially through his connections to
fellow wealthy Saudis) and his personal story (his decision to
give up a life of luxury and ease to fight in a holy war) had
brought him to prominence during the anti-Soviet jihad in
Afghanistan and later secured his position as Al Qaeda's leader.
He further cultivated that image by trying to model his ascetic
life on that of the Prophet Muhammad -- by dressing similarly
and encouraging his followers to ascribe divine powers to him.
Bin Laden regularly hinted at this when discussing Al Qaeda's
strikes against America and his ability to withstand
Washington's wrath.
Not only has Al Qaeda lost its best recruiter and fund-raiser, but
no one in the organization can come close to filling that void.
Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, who will probably try
to take over, is a divisive figure. His personality and leadership
style alienate many, he lacks Bin Laden's charisma and
connections and his Egyptian nationality is a major mark
against him.
Indeed, one of the earliest things I discovered from
interrogating Qaeda members in Afghanistan and Yemen as well
as Guantanamo was the group's internal divisions; the most
severe is the rivalry between the Egyptians and members hailing
from the Arabian Peninsula. (Even soccer games pit Egyptians
against Persian Gulf Arabs.) While Egyptians typically travel to
the Gulf to work for Arabs there, in Al Qaeda, Egyptians have

traditionally held most of the senior positions.
It was only the knowledge that they were ultimately following
Bin Laden -- a Saudi of Yemeni origin, and therefore one of
their own -- that kept non-Egyptian members in line. Now,
unless a non-Egyptian takes over, the group is likely to splinter
into subgroups. Someone like Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-
American who is a leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
is a likely rival to Mr. Zawahri.
Bin Laden was adept at convincing smaller, regional terrorist
groups that allying with Al Qaeda and focusing on America
were the best ways to topple corrupt regimes at home. But many
of his supporters grew increasingly distressed by Al Qaeda's
attacks in the last few years -- which have killed mostly
Muslims -- and came to realize that Bin Laden had no long-term
political program aside from nihilism and death.
The Arab Spring, during which ordinary people in countries like
Tunisia and Egypt overthrew their governments, proved that
contrary to Al Qaeda's narrative, hated rulers could be toppled
peacefully without attacking America. Indeed, protesters in
many cases saw Washington supporting their efforts, further
undermining Al Qaeda's claims.
But we cannot rest on our laurels. Most of Al Qaeda's
leadership council members are still at large, and they command
their own followers. They will try to carry out operations to
prove Al Qaeda's continuing relevance. And with Al Qaeda on
the decline, regional groups that had aligned themselves with
the network may return to operating independently, making
them harder to monitor and hence deadlier.
Investigations, intelligence and military successes are only half
the battle. The other half is in the arena of ideas, and countering
the rhetoric and methods that extremists use to recruit. We can
keep killing and arresting terrorists, but if new ones are
recruited, our war will never end.
Our greatest tool, we must remember, is America itself. We
have suffered a great deal at the hands of Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda, and we will never forget those killed in attacks like the

1998 bombings on United States Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, the 2000 attack on the Navy destroyer Cole, 9/11 and
the service members killed since then in the war against Al
Qaeda.
Many terrorists whom I interrogated told me they expected
America to ultimately fold. What they didn't understand is that
as powerful as the Bin Laden idea was to them, America's
values and liberties are even greater to us. Effectively
conveying this will bury the Bin Laden idea with him.
AuthorAffiliation
ALI H. SOUFAN Ali H. Soufan, an F.B.I. special agent from
1997 to 2005, interrogated Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo Bay
and elsewhere.
Illustration
Drawing (Drawing by James Victore)
Word count:
875
Copyright New York Times Company May 3, 2011
Set B
Clarke, R. A. (2011, May 3). Bin Laden’s dead. Al Qaeda’s not
[Op-Ed].
The New York Times,
THE United States needed to eliminate Osama bin Laden to
fulfill our sense of justice and, to a lesser extent, to end the
myth of his invincibility. But dropping Bin Laden's corpse in
the sea does not end the terrorist threat, nor does it remove the
ideological motivation of Al Qaeda's supporters.
Often forgotten amid the ugly violence of Al Qaeda's attacks
was that the terrorists' declared goal was to replace existing

governments in the Muslim world with religiously pure Islamist
states and eventually restore an Islamic caliphate. High on Al
Qaeda's list of targets was Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak.
The protesters of Tahrir Square succeeded in removing him
without terrorism and without Al Qaeda.
Thus, even before Bin Laden's death, analysts had begun to
argue that Al Qaeda was rapidly becoming irrelevant. With Bin
Laden's death, it is even more tempting to think that the era of
Al Qaeda is over.
But such rejoicing would be premature. To many Islamist
ideologues, the Arab Spring simply represents the removal of
obstacles that stood in the way of establishing the caliphate.
Their goal has not changed, nor has their willingness to use
terrorism.
In the months ahead, Bin Laden's death may encourage Al
Qaeda to stage an attack to counter the impression that it is out
of business. The more significant threat, however, will come
from Al Qaeda's local affiliates. Bin Laden and his deputies
designed Al Qaeda as a network of affiliated groups that could
operate largely independently to attack America, Europe and
secular governments in the Middle East in order to establish
fundamentalist regimes. Once in place, the network no longer
needed Bin Laden and, in fact, has been proceeding with
minimal direction from him for several years.
The affiliates that Bin Laden helped to create, including Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Shabab in Somalia, are
still recruiting and financing terrorists and training them for
attacks. Neither the events of Tahrir Square nor the raid on Bin
Laden's hideout is likely to significantly diminish the appeal of
Islamist extremism to those who have been receptive to it.
In many Muslim societies, there remains a radical stratum born
of a sense of victimization by the West, fueled by inefficient
and corrupt governments, and carried forward by an enormous
youth population. Al Qaeda was and is simply a pressure valve,
an early form of connective social media that allowed young,
militant jihadists fed up with the West and their own

governments to organize and vent their anger.
Believing that their religion requires them to act violently
against nonbelievers in the West and impure, apostate Muslim
elites, the Islamist extremists will not be stopped by the
elimination of Al Qaeda's leader or even by the eradication of
Al Qaeda itself. They will continue their struggle, refusing to
renounce violence or accept more democratic, less corrupt
regimes as a substitute for the caliphate.
Just because we do not always know the identities of their
leaders or see a named and hierarchical organization does not
mean that Islamist extremists are not working hard to seize the
fruits of the Arab Spring. The challenge for the United States is
not merely to take advantage of the intelligence gained in the
Pakistan raid to further erode Al Qaeda, but to assist moderate
Muslims in creating a counterweight to violent extremism, with
both an appealingly articulated ideology and an effective
organizational structure.
The government that was overthrown in Egypt was corrupt and
feckless, as are the regimes now under siege in Libya, Syria and
Yemen, but the groups poised to take advantage of the upheaval
in those countries include many who share Bin Laden's vision
for repressive religious rule. Similar situations exist in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Moderate, tolerant and even some secular groups exist, but they
often do not have a comprehensive alternative vision, know how
to communicate it or have the organizational skills to promote
it. American and European experts can assist them in building
politically viable organizations, but to succeed these new
groups must be homegrown and tap into the Arab and Islamic
traditions that speak to many Muslim youth.
Moreover, without investment to create jobs, new governments
in these countries will fail under the weight of youth
unemployment. Unless corruption is replaced with efficiency,
investment will either not materialize or be wasted.
Without alternative movements with vision, appeal, and the
ability to deliver change, existing organized extremist groups

will fill the void. And despite his death, Bin Laden's goal may
yet be achieved.
AuthorAffiliation
RICHARD A. CLARKE Richard A. Clarke, the counterterrorism
coordinator at the National Security Council from 1993 to 2001,
is the author of "Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on
Terror."
Word count:
784
Nocera, J. (2011, May 3). 4 questions he leaves behind [Op-
Ed].
The New York Times,
To give the devil his awful due, Osama bin Laden was the
greatest terrorist of the modern age. He took what had been
disparate, disorganized terrorist groups and reshaped them into
a disciplined and immensely ambitious organization, Al Qaeda,
with the singular goal of waging jihad on the West in general
and the United States in particular. Its terrorist prowess was
never more evident than on that horrible day of Sept. 11, 2001.
Now that Bin Laden is dead, the most pressing question we need
to ask is: Will his death make a difference? It is, of course,
symbolically important that the United States hunted down the
man responsible for the 9/11 attacks. And it will have political
ramifications for President Obama, which I leave to others to
debate.
But the thing that matters most right now is whether the world
today is safer than it was on Sunday, when Bin Laden was still
among the living. Though it is not an easy question to answer, it
seems to me that there are four areas where it ought to be asked:
THE ARAB SPRING The commentariat was quick to note the

delicious irony that Bin Laden's death coincided with the citizen
uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere. The Arab
Spring has shown that millions of Muslims have zero interest in
the hard-line theocracy favored by Al Qaeda. What they yearn
for instead is freedom and democracy. Bin Laden's death merely
put an exclamation point on the fact that his influence in the
region had diminished considerably in the decade since 9/11.
But Lawrence Wright, the author of "The Looming Tower," a
Pulitzer-Prize winning book about Al Qaeda, goes a step
further. He's convinced that Bin Laden's death could help
prevent the Arab Spring from sputtering out.
"As long as he was around, he created an alternative narrative,"
said Wright. "When the moment comes that the democratic
movement falters -- and there always is such a moment -- Al
Qaeda could say: We told you so. The fact that he is gone makes
it more likely for the Arab Spring to complete its reformation
cycle."
THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN Ever since he came into office,
President Obama has insisted that our presence in Afghanistan
was directly related to the ongoing threat from Al Qaeda. Ten
years in, though, the war has no end in sight and dwindling
public support. Liberal groups like the Brave New Foundation
are already saying that Bin Laden's death has "ended the
rationale" for the war.
It's not just liberals, either. James Lindsay, a senior vice
president of that establishment bulwark Council on Foreign
Relations, wrote that the president could use Bin Laden's death
to say that America's "goal has been achieved" -- and use it as
an excuse to wind down the war. Whether the president will
take such a step is unclear. But it's now at least feasible.
TERRORISM ITSELFMichael Nacht, a former Defense
Department official who now teaches at the
University of California, Berkeley
, believes that Bin Laden's death will diminish the terrorist
threat to the United States. Nacht compared terrorism in the Bin
Laden era to a "fatal disease." Now, he says, it's more like a

chronic illness: "It can still cause you trouble, but it's not a
mortal theat."
But this may turn out to be wishful thinking. The Wall Street
Journal reported on Monday that at the time of the 9/11 attacks,
Al Qaeda had maybe 200 members; today, it is vaster and "more
far-reaching than before the U.S. sought to take it down."
Independent offshoots have sprung up in Yemen, Somalia and
elsewhere. New terrorist leaders include Nasir al-Wahishi, who
leads Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Anwar al-Awlaki,
an American-born cleric who has been involved in several
terrorist plots, including the attempt to blow up a plane on
Christmas Day in 2009. Although America does a much better
job of rooting out planned attacks, the threat remains very real,
with or without Bin Laden.
RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD Let's face it: Much
of the Muslim world today is deeply distrustful of anything
America does. For this, certainly, a good portion of the blame
goes to the misguided invasion of Iraq and its aftermath --
which, in turn, was a response to 9/11 and Bin Laden. In that
sense, America played right into Bin Laden's hands.
The clock can't be turned back just because he's dead. The
distrust remains strong. A friend who recently returned from
Turkey -- a Muslim country that is ostensibly a close ally -- told
me that the Turkish media were united in their virulent
opposition to NATO's actions in Libya, even though those
actions were intended to prevent a cruel dictator from killing
his own people.
"The image of Westerners dropping bombs on Muslims is very
hard for Muslims to accept," he said.
One hopes that this is not Bin Laden's enduring legacy. But
that's something only we can fix.
Word count:
829

Respond to the following:
Identify and explain the strongest argument in each article.
Or
Identify and explain the weakest argument in each article.
Give reasons and examples from your research in support of
your response.
Your initial response should be about 300–400 words in length,
with at least one reference cited in APA format.

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