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BGP Bugs, Hiccups and weird stuff:
Issues seen by RT-BGP Toolkit
APNIC 46
Martin Winter, Hurricane Electric
About me…
2
‣ Martin Winter
• Researcher @ HE.NET, working on RT-BGP
• Otherwise working on FRRouting
3
“Real-Time BGP Toolkit”
A quick Introduction
?
Traditional Looking Glass
4
‣ Classic Looking Glass shows view of single entity
• View of routing table from various location within the
network of the same company
Traditional Looking Glass
5
‣ Classic Looking Glass mostly simple router output
• Showing current data from a single router at specific
location.
6
“Real-Time BGP Toolkit”
!
Breaking the single Entity view
7
Getting feeds from everywhere
Breaking the single Entity view
8
Getting feeds from everywhere
• Welcoming BGP feed from everyone with an AS
• Multiple regional feeds welcome too
• See https://rt-bgp.he.net to join
• No cost to join
• Who announced which route first?
• Where did some bad announcement start?
• Who leaks which routes?
• Bogus BGP announcements?
• à With real-time notification for your networks
Not just Real-Time. History too
9
Store it all. Every single update. From every peer.
Not just Real-Time. History too
10
Store it all. Every single update. From every peer.
• Who announced a specific route previously?
• From which AS?
• Did someone leak a route for 3 seconds?
• Did any metrics change?
Compare the BGP feeds
11
Compare BGP routes between ISPs
Compare the BGP feeds
12
Compare BGP routes between ISPs
• Ever wonder why you have a full table with
1000 routes less than others?
• How does AS-PATH compare for a route?
• Do I get different source AS for same route?
Compare the BGP feeds
13
Compare BGP routes between ISPs
Register routes with your AS
14
Get notifications on important events
Register routes with your AS
15
Get notifications on important events
Notifications for
• Routes seen announced with different
source AS (Hijack?)
• More specific blocks are seen (Hijack?)
• Various bad announcements
Current (initial) features
‣ Search for specific route (Current and past time)
• Show all current paths received for the route
• Search for peers which don’t have the prefix
• Highlight different source AS for route
‣ Search for specific AS number
• Show all routes received from the AS
‣ Unassigned AS number reports
• Show routes sourced by unassigned AS numbers
• Show routes with unassigned AS anywhere in AS path
16
Current (initial) features
‣ Timeline of updates for a given prefix
‣ Hijacking detection (routes are registered with
account)
• Detect more specific routes
‣ BGPplay
17
Prefix hijack report
18
+ additional email notifications
Peer comparison
19
Please be aware of slight update delays between peers
Unassigned AS Report
20
Current & past unassigned/private AS numbers announced
Unassigned AS Report – Prefix view
21
Current view of prefix
22
BGP Bugs, Hiccups and weird stuff
Interesting things found in BGP tables
BGP Attribute 21 ??
‣ Anyone remember draft-ietf-idr-as-pathlimit
‣ Hint: Expired 11 years ago
‣ From the draft:
This document describes the 'AS path limit' (AS_PATHLIMIT) path attribute
for BGP. This is an optional, transitive path attribute that is designed
to help limit the distribution of routing information in the Internet.
By default, prefixes advertised into the BGP graph are distributed
freely, and if not blocked by policy will propagate globally. This is
harmful to the scalability of the routing subsystem since information
that only has a local effect on routing will cause state creation
throughout the default-free zone. This attribute can be attached to a
particular path to limit its scope to a subset of the Internet.
23
AS_PATHLIMIT
BGP Attribute 21 ??
‣ Seen from from 3 originating AS
• 2 out of 3 answered inquiry
• Both use the same firewall vendor (Palo Alto Networks)
• Still supported in current code (as of 8.1)
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/documentation/81/pan-
os/web-interface-help/network/network-virtual-
routers/bgp/bgp-redist-rules-tab
24
AS_PATHLIMIT
Broken 4-byte AS implementation?
‣ RT-BGP uses 4-byte AS to force extended attributes
‣ One large vendor sends BGP OPEN without 4-byte
BGP option to us (but configuration shows 4-byte AS
for us correctly configured)
‣ Receiving BGP open from us (with correct 4-byte AS
in BGP option) is rejected as incorrect AS
‣ Seen on Foundry Brocade Extreme NetIron XMR
25
Is 4-byte AS support still a new thing?
Broken 4-byte AS implementation
‣ Configuration looks good…
26
Is 4-byte AS support still a new thing?
isp_router# sh run | incl 64.62.153.98
neighbor 64.62.153.98 remote-as 393338
neighbor 64.62.153.98 next-hop-self
neighbor 64.62.153.98 ebgp-multihop 250
neighbor 64.62.153.98 update-source loopback 1
neighbor 64.62.153.98 remove-private-as
neighbor 64.62.153.98 filter-list 2 in
neighbor 64.62.153.98 route-map out TRANSITout
Broken 4-byte AS implementation
‣ Configuration looks good…
• But missing AS4 enable!
27
Is 4-byte AS support still a new thing?
isp_router# sh run | incl 64.62.153.98
neighbor 64.62.153.98 remote-as 393338
neighbor 64.62.153.98 next-hop-self
neighbor 64.62.153.98 ebgp-multihop 250
neighbor 64.62.153.98 update-source loopback 1
neighbor 64.62.153.98 remove-private-as
neighbor 64.62.153.98 filter-list 2 in
neighbor 64.62.153.98 route-map out TRANSITout
isp_router(config-bgp)# capability as4 enable
Dear Brocade (now Extreme):
Please DON’T accept config with 4-byte AS if you have the
support not enabled and definitly don’t try to OPEN a session
to a 4-byte neighbor without having 4-byte support enabled
(and then rejecting the session because of AS mismatch)
High unassigned AS number
28
High unassigned AS number
29
High unassigned AS number
30
‣ High number created on EBGP peer between a
NetIron (Extreme) and some Juniper Router
• Peer is a 2-byte AS peer
• Happened on different routers, different software versions
• Clean up with a hard reset of the eBGP session
• Probably bug on NetIron XMR code
‣ Still a mystery – Anyone seen this before?
‣ Check your BGP tables if you have NetIron’s:
- show ip bgp regex [0-9]{7}
- Will get routing entries with 7 or more digit AS numbers
31
BGP Misconfigurations
Could we please agree to only use assigned AS numbers?
Unassigned AS-Numbers
‣ Comparing the world against the IANA list of
assigned AS numbers
• https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml
32
Ignoring the leaks of private AS space
Unassigned AS-Numbers
‣ Comparing the world against the IANA list of
assigned AS numbers
• https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml
33
Ignoring the leaks of private AS space
Unassigned AS-Numbers
‣ Comparing the world against the IANA list of
assigned AS numbers
• https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml
34
Ignoring the leaks of private AS space
Reserved AS-Numbers
35
In the APNIC region
AS-Paths Netnam Vietnam
… 9304 45903 24176 24176 24176 24173 65535
… 58879 2914 24176 24173 65535
… 9304 45903 24176 24173 65535
… 9304 45903 24176 24176 24176 24173 65535
AS24176, AS24173: Netnam Vietnam
à Please Fix!
AS45903: CMC Telecom Vietnam
AS9304: HGC Global Hong Kong
à Consider filtering!
RFC 7300 – Reservation of Last AS number
Reserved AS-Numbers
36
In the APNIC region
AS-Path Power Line Co, Hong Kong
… 131477 132839 65535
AS132839: Power Line Co
à Please Fix!
AS45903: Shanghai Huajuan Information
Technology Co., Ltd.
à Consider filtering!
RFC 7300 – Reservation of Last AS number
Reserved AS-Numbers
37
In the APNIC region
AS-Paths AOFEI Data Hong Kong
… 58879 2914 135391 64500
AS135391: AOFEI Data
à Please Fix!
AS2914: NTT America
AS58879: Shanghai Anchang Network
Security Technology
à Consider filtering!
RFC 5398 – AS for Documentation Use
38
Try It
https://rt-bgp.he.net
Peer with it
AS 393338
Set up peering at https://rt-bgp.he.net
(create an account & login, then look for the menu option to add peering)
Contact Us
RT-BGP Toolkit Martin Winter
rtbgp@he.net mwinter@he.net

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BGP Bugs, Hiccups and weird stuff: Issues seen by RT-BGP Toolkit

  • 1. 1 BGP Bugs, Hiccups and weird stuff: Issues seen by RT-BGP Toolkit APNIC 46 Martin Winter, Hurricane Electric
  • 2. About me… 2 ‣ Martin Winter • Researcher @ HE.NET, working on RT-BGP • Otherwise working on FRRouting
  • 3. 3 “Real-Time BGP Toolkit” A quick Introduction ?
  • 4. Traditional Looking Glass 4 ‣ Classic Looking Glass shows view of single entity • View of routing table from various location within the network of the same company
  • 5. Traditional Looking Glass 5 ‣ Classic Looking Glass mostly simple router output • Showing current data from a single router at specific location.
  • 7. Breaking the single Entity view 7 Getting feeds from everywhere
  • 8. Breaking the single Entity view 8 Getting feeds from everywhere • Welcoming BGP feed from everyone with an AS • Multiple regional feeds welcome too • See https://rt-bgp.he.net to join • No cost to join • Who announced which route first? • Where did some bad announcement start? • Who leaks which routes? • Bogus BGP announcements? • à With real-time notification for your networks
  • 9. Not just Real-Time. History too 9 Store it all. Every single update. From every peer.
  • 10. Not just Real-Time. History too 10 Store it all. Every single update. From every peer. • Who announced a specific route previously? • From which AS? • Did someone leak a route for 3 seconds? • Did any metrics change?
  • 11. Compare the BGP feeds 11 Compare BGP routes between ISPs
  • 12. Compare the BGP feeds 12 Compare BGP routes between ISPs • Ever wonder why you have a full table with 1000 routes less than others? • How does AS-PATH compare for a route? • Do I get different source AS for same route?
  • 13. Compare the BGP feeds 13 Compare BGP routes between ISPs
  • 14. Register routes with your AS 14 Get notifications on important events
  • 15. Register routes with your AS 15 Get notifications on important events Notifications for • Routes seen announced with different source AS (Hijack?) • More specific blocks are seen (Hijack?) • Various bad announcements
  • 16. Current (initial) features ‣ Search for specific route (Current and past time) • Show all current paths received for the route • Search for peers which don’t have the prefix • Highlight different source AS for route ‣ Search for specific AS number • Show all routes received from the AS ‣ Unassigned AS number reports • Show routes sourced by unassigned AS numbers • Show routes with unassigned AS anywhere in AS path 16
  • 17. Current (initial) features ‣ Timeline of updates for a given prefix ‣ Hijacking detection (routes are registered with account) • Detect more specific routes ‣ BGPplay 17
  • 18. Prefix hijack report 18 + additional email notifications
  • 19. Peer comparison 19 Please be aware of slight update delays between peers
  • 20. Unassigned AS Report 20 Current & past unassigned/private AS numbers announced
  • 21. Unassigned AS Report – Prefix view 21 Current view of prefix
  • 22. 22 BGP Bugs, Hiccups and weird stuff Interesting things found in BGP tables
  • 23. BGP Attribute 21 ?? ‣ Anyone remember draft-ietf-idr-as-pathlimit ‣ Hint: Expired 11 years ago ‣ From the draft: This document describes the 'AS path limit' (AS_PATHLIMIT) path attribute for BGP. This is an optional, transitive path attribute that is designed to help limit the distribution of routing information in the Internet. By default, prefixes advertised into the BGP graph are distributed freely, and if not blocked by policy will propagate globally. This is harmful to the scalability of the routing subsystem since information that only has a local effect on routing will cause state creation throughout the default-free zone. This attribute can be attached to a particular path to limit its scope to a subset of the Internet. 23 AS_PATHLIMIT
  • 24. BGP Attribute 21 ?? ‣ Seen from from 3 originating AS • 2 out of 3 answered inquiry • Both use the same firewall vendor (Palo Alto Networks) • Still supported in current code (as of 8.1) - https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/documentation/81/pan- os/web-interface-help/network/network-virtual- routers/bgp/bgp-redist-rules-tab 24 AS_PATHLIMIT
  • 25. Broken 4-byte AS implementation? ‣ RT-BGP uses 4-byte AS to force extended attributes ‣ One large vendor sends BGP OPEN without 4-byte BGP option to us (but configuration shows 4-byte AS for us correctly configured) ‣ Receiving BGP open from us (with correct 4-byte AS in BGP option) is rejected as incorrect AS ‣ Seen on Foundry Brocade Extreme NetIron XMR 25 Is 4-byte AS support still a new thing?
  • 26. Broken 4-byte AS implementation ‣ Configuration looks good… 26 Is 4-byte AS support still a new thing? isp_router# sh run | incl 64.62.153.98 neighbor 64.62.153.98 remote-as 393338 neighbor 64.62.153.98 next-hop-self neighbor 64.62.153.98 ebgp-multihop 250 neighbor 64.62.153.98 update-source loopback 1 neighbor 64.62.153.98 remove-private-as neighbor 64.62.153.98 filter-list 2 in neighbor 64.62.153.98 route-map out TRANSITout
  • 27. Broken 4-byte AS implementation ‣ Configuration looks good… • But missing AS4 enable! 27 Is 4-byte AS support still a new thing? isp_router# sh run | incl 64.62.153.98 neighbor 64.62.153.98 remote-as 393338 neighbor 64.62.153.98 next-hop-self neighbor 64.62.153.98 ebgp-multihop 250 neighbor 64.62.153.98 update-source loopback 1 neighbor 64.62.153.98 remove-private-as neighbor 64.62.153.98 filter-list 2 in neighbor 64.62.153.98 route-map out TRANSITout isp_router(config-bgp)# capability as4 enable Dear Brocade (now Extreme): Please DON’T accept config with 4-byte AS if you have the support not enabled and definitly don’t try to OPEN a session to a 4-byte neighbor without having 4-byte support enabled (and then rejecting the session because of AS mismatch)
  • 28. High unassigned AS number 28
  • 29. High unassigned AS number 29
  • 30. High unassigned AS number 30 ‣ High number created on EBGP peer between a NetIron (Extreme) and some Juniper Router • Peer is a 2-byte AS peer • Happened on different routers, different software versions • Clean up with a hard reset of the eBGP session • Probably bug on NetIron XMR code ‣ Still a mystery – Anyone seen this before? ‣ Check your BGP tables if you have NetIron’s: - show ip bgp regex [0-9]{7} - Will get routing entries with 7 or more digit AS numbers
  • 31. 31 BGP Misconfigurations Could we please agree to only use assigned AS numbers?
  • 32. Unassigned AS-Numbers ‣ Comparing the world against the IANA list of assigned AS numbers • https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml 32 Ignoring the leaks of private AS space
  • 33. Unassigned AS-Numbers ‣ Comparing the world against the IANA list of assigned AS numbers • https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml 33 Ignoring the leaks of private AS space
  • 34. Unassigned AS-Numbers ‣ Comparing the world against the IANA list of assigned AS numbers • https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml 34 Ignoring the leaks of private AS space
  • 35. Reserved AS-Numbers 35 In the APNIC region AS-Paths Netnam Vietnam … 9304 45903 24176 24176 24176 24173 65535 … 58879 2914 24176 24173 65535 … 9304 45903 24176 24173 65535 … 9304 45903 24176 24176 24176 24173 65535 AS24176, AS24173: Netnam Vietnam à Please Fix! AS45903: CMC Telecom Vietnam AS9304: HGC Global Hong Kong à Consider filtering! RFC 7300 – Reservation of Last AS number
  • 36. Reserved AS-Numbers 36 In the APNIC region AS-Path Power Line Co, Hong Kong … 131477 132839 65535 AS132839: Power Line Co à Please Fix! AS45903: Shanghai Huajuan Information Technology Co., Ltd. à Consider filtering! RFC 7300 – Reservation of Last AS number
  • 37. Reserved AS-Numbers 37 In the APNIC region AS-Paths AOFEI Data Hong Kong … 58879 2914 135391 64500 AS135391: AOFEI Data à Please Fix! AS2914: NTT America AS58879: Shanghai Anchang Network Security Technology à Consider filtering! RFC 5398 – AS for Documentation Use
  • 38. 38 Try It https://rt-bgp.he.net Peer with it AS 393338 Set up peering at https://rt-bgp.he.net (create an account & login, then look for the menu option to add peering) Contact Us RT-BGP Toolkit Martin Winter rtbgp@he.net mwinter@he.net