BriMor Labs Live Response Collection - OSDFCON

Brian Moran
Digital Strategy Consultant - BriMor Labs
Millersville, Maryland
28 OCTOBER 2015
BRIMOR LABS LIVE RESPONSE COLLECTION
or…
How to Leverage Incident Response
Experience for FREE!!

A Brief List of Topics
• Glance into the life of an incident responder
• “Can I do this better, faster, stronger?”
– (All right, not stronger. Just in an easier way.)
• Overview of Live Response Collection
• Questions/Comments
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The Introductory Introduction
• Hello, my name is Brian Moran
– Hi Brian!
• 13+ years Air Force Active Duty
– 10 years mobile exploitation/DFIR experience
• Co-winner: Unofficial Forensic 4Cast Awards 2012
-- Best Photoshop of Lee Whitfield
• Worked here….
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The Introductory Introduction
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The Life of an Incident Responder
• Digital Forensics/Incident Response (DFIR) is
how I decided to pay the bills.
• First rule of incident response is always expect
the EXACT opposite of what a client tells you
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• For example, clients typically see Incident
Responders like this

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• Or this

• So we are immediately held to high
expectations.
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The Client is always right*
• How the client makes their network
infrastructure sound.
*from a certain point of view

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• Actual undoctored photo of network
infrastructure

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• This leads to most DFIR professionals feeling
like this.

Don’t believe marketing hype
• “Oh, we spent $$$ on $Vendor product, so we
are safe”
• Any “tool”, regardless of the price, is still a
“tool”
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Simply Put: Doing this
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Does not equal this:
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Use one…don’t be one!
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Remember, attackers are clever too
AKA “Hiding in plain sight”
• Have you checked lately to make sure nothing
else is in that your expensive cyber security
tool folder?
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Remember, attackers are clever too
AKA “Hiding in plain sight”
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– Folder is probably whitelisted from security
application scans…which is perfect for malware
staging
– Could also be attackers with a sense of humor 

What do we want to collect?
• As much data as possible to help figure out
the issue
• What is “normal”? What is not “normal”
• Where do we start?
• What is your incident response process?
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What to collect?
• Logs are a great resource
– You do have logging enabled, right? 
• Active network connections
• Memory
• Common areas and techniques that
attackers/bad actors commonly use
– Autoruns
– %TEMP%
– Root directory
– At jobs (yup. Still effective!)
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Can We Build This? Yes We Can!
• Many times we have to collect data from multiple
systems, as quickly as we can
• Some tools exist to do this, but I wanted
something that was
– Repeatable
– Portable
– Customizable
– Easy to use
– And most importantly….FREE!!!
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Live Response Collection
• A single, downloadable .zip file that can be run from any
location
– Administrative privileges allows more collection of data, but not
necessary
• Major operating systems are currently covered
– Windows (XP, Vista, 7, 8, 10, Server 2003, 2008, 2012)
– OS X
– Unix/Linux
• Development on all platforms is always continuing
• https://www.brimorlabs.com/Tools/LiveResponse.zip
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*nix Live Response
• Collects various data from *nix systems, including:
– Logged in users on the system
– Running processes on the system
– Loaded kernel extensions
– Memory usage of running processes
– .bash_history (per user)
– current network connections
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*nix Live Response (cont.)
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• Example of output from
“lsof_network_connections.txt”

OSX Live Response
• Information about OSX Live Response, including:
– Loaded kernel extensions
– .bash_history (for each user)
– Wifi connections
– User/System Launch Agents
– User/System Launch Daemons
– Application LogIn Items
• *** More updates coming before the end the year!!
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OSX Live Response (cont.)
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• Example of output from “DNS_Configuration.txt”

Windows Live Response
• Collection of built-in system commands and
freely available tools
– Automated memory dump, gateway ARP
correlation, network connections, registry entries,
Sysinternals, etc.
• The executable presents an easy to
understand GUI, so ANYONE can use it!
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Windows Live Response
• Six options to choose from:
– Complete
• runs Complete_Windows_Live_Response.bat
– Memory Dump
• runs Memory_Dump_Windows_Live_Response.bat
– Triage
• runs Triage_Windows_Live_Response.bat
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Windows Live Response (cont.)
• Six options to choose from:
– Secure Complete
• runs Secure-Complete_Windows_Live_Response.bat
– Secure Memory Dump
• runs Secure-Memory_Dump_Windows_Live_Response.bat
– Secure Triage
• runs Secure-Triage_Windows_Live_Response.bat
• GUI is just an HTML application, so you can customize
the batch scripts (not the names) and the GUI will still
work!
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Windows Live Response (cont.)
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Complete option
• Complete performs the following items:
– Memory Dump (using Belkasoft RAM Capture)
– Volatile data (using variety of tools)
– Disk imaging (using FTK command line)
• Disk imaging images all mounted drives, with the exception
of network shares
– Images will only be created if tool is run from an external (non-
OS) drive (ie Can’t run it from C: )
– Also performs destination free space check prior to each
imaging iteration
Processing time depends on number and size of drives
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Memory Dump option
• Memory dump performs the following items:
– Memory Dump (using Belkasoft RAM Capture)
• Memory dump can be created using other
tools too, but I prefer Belkasoft RAM Capture
Processing time depends on size of memory
(15-30 minutes usually)
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Triage option
• Triage performs the following items:
• Uses a combination of built-in Windows
commands and third party tools to gather
data
Processing time depends on amount of data to
be collected (5 - 15 minutes usually)
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“Secure” options
• Secure option is used when you want to protect
collected data (Complete, Memory Dump, Triage)
– Randomly generated 16 character password
– Uses 7zip to compress and encrypt the data
– Sdelete used to securely delete data – makes data
recovery very difficult (*I will never say impossible)
Remember to copy the password. Without the
password, brute forcing the data is the only way
in!
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Windows LRC folder structure
• The folder structure has changed to give users
minimal presentation
– This also makes finding the collected data easier
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Windows LRC folder structure
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Windows_Live_Response/Scripts
• This folder contains all six versions of the
scripts that are run by the Live Response
Collection
– You can edit the contents of the scripts and run
certain tools (or add tools) as long as you follow
the structure and do not change the name of the
script!
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Windows_Live_Response/Scripts
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Windows_Live_Response/Scripts/
Windows Modules
• This folder contains all of the “modules” utilized
by the batch scripts
– Since they share so much code, only having to
maintain one item instead of six is much easier
– Makes customization of LRC for your own
environment even EASIER!!
– Blog post on writing your own module:
http://www.brimorlabsblog.com/2015/09/introducing
-windows-live-response.html
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Windows_Live_Response/Tools
• This is where all of the third party tools are
saved.
– The file “Windows_Complete_Tool_List.xslx” lists
all of tools, downloadable URL, and date the tool
was updated
– You can add your own tools, but if you do,
remember to update the script(s) accordingly!
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Live Response Collection Windows
output
• Attempted to give user guidance as much as
possible
– If something may take awhile, the script prints a
nice message to the screen
– Tries to be as “polite” as possible!
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Live Response Collection Windows
output

Script output
• Script saves data to a folder with the computer
name and date/time stamp under the folder from
where the script was run
• Two folders and two text files
– “ForensicImages”
– “LiveResponseData”
– COMPUTERNAME_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS_File_Hashe
s.txt
– COMPUTERNAME_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS_Process_D
etails.txt
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Script output
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COMPUTERNAME_YYYYMMDD_
HHMMSS_File_Hashes.txt
• Text file containing the MD5 and SHA256 of
every collected/generated file and the full
path to that file
– Excludes “DiskImage” folder
– But does include memory dump, if created
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HHMMSS_File_Hashes.txt
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HHMMSS_Processing_Details.txt
• “Logging” text file containing each command
that was run by the script and (if present) any
error messages from running that command
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“ForensicImages” folder
• Location where forensic images are stored
– “DiskImage” – location of disk images created by
the script (or manually)
– “Memory” – location of memory dumps created
by the script (or manually)
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“ForensicImages” folder
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“ForensicImages/DiskImage”
folder
• The “Complete” option will store created
image(s) in this folder
– Uses AccessData’s FTK Imager command line to create
an E01 image, with a compression level of “4” and
fragment size of 4096M (4GB)
– Built-in checks to prohibit automated imaging of the
OS drive to itself
– Images ALL mounted drives (except network shares)
• Will not image the destination drive
– Built-in checks to ensure destination drive has enough
free space for image
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“ForensicImages/DiskImage”
folder
• This system had a “C” and “E” drive that was
imaged
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“ForensicImages/Memory” folder
• The “Complete” and “MemoryDump” option will
store created memory dump in this folder
– Uses Belkasoft’s RamCapture to create a memory dump
– Filename:
“COMPUTERNAME_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS_mem.dmp”
• You can customize and use other tools if you like,
but I’ve had the best experience with Belkasoft
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“LiveResponseData” folder
• Contains a total of five subfolders
– “BasicInfo” – Various types of system Information
– “CopiedFiles” – Files copied from the system
– “NetworkInfo” – Network information about the
system
– “PersistenceMechanisms” – Ways that items can
persist on the system (cough cough malware)
– “UserInfo” – User information
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“LiveResponseData” folder
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“LiveResponseDataBasicInfo”
folder
• Contains primarily system information,
including:
– Alternate Data streams
– Hashes of files in %Temp% (User and System) and
System32 folder
– Last Activity View
– PsLoglist
– Running Processes
– Possible Unicode files/directories

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“LiveResponseDataBasicInfo”
folder

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“LiveResponseDataCopiedFiles”
folder
• Contains files copied from the system, including:
– Web browser (Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome)
– Event Logs
– Logfile
– MFT
– Prefetch
– Registry Hives
– USNJrnl
NOTE: Files copied into folder associated with the
type of file that was copied

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“LiveResponseDataCopiedFiles”
folder

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“LiveResponseDataNetworkInfo”
folder
• Contains primarily network related
information including:
– ARP
– Cports
– Internet Settings
– Netstat
– Routing table

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“LiveResponseDataNetworkInfo”
folder

“LiveResponseDataPersistence
Mechanisms” folder
• Contains information related to persistence
mechanisms on the system including:
– Autoruns
– Loaded drivers
– Scheduled tasks
NOTE: More often than not, if you have an
infected system, you will find the evidence in here
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“LiveResponseDataPersistence
Mechanisms” folder
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“LiveResponseDataUserInfo”
folder
• Contains information related to users of the
system, including:
– Logons
– Listing of users
– Current User
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What you see is what you get
• Script output is plain-text or html. No unique
obfuscation attempts or proprietary file
formats
– Memory dump, disk image(s), and copied files are
obvious exceptions
• Can write/create your own parsing mechanism
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Examples of gathered data
• ZeroAccess and POS RAM scraper present in
CurrentVersionRun output from autoruns
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• Poweliks malware present in autoruns output
– Malware is stored entirely in registry key, it does
not “write itself to disk” in a typical fashion
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Short Case Study
• A user complains their system is running slow
• IT admin runs “Complete” version of the Live
Response Collection…just in case
• Events (sort of) occur in real time
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Short Case Study
• First stop is “autorunsc.txt” file. Strange entry
noted under the “CurrentVersionRun” path.
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Short Case Study
• “msofficeservice” kind of seems legitimate
• Hmm..maybe not, since the company is
“Google Labs”
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Short Case Study
• Since we have the hashes, lets do a quick
Google search
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Short Case Study
• File detected as malicious by virustotal
– 23/45 back in 2012

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Short Case Study

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Short Case Study
• Since we have the disk image, let’s check out
the folder where the executable resides

Short Case Study
• We can mount the image using FTK Imager
Lite (included in the Live Response Collection)
• Browse to
“Windows_Live_ResponseToolsFTK_Imager_
Lite_3.1.1” and run “FTK Imager.exe”
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Short Case Study
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Short Case Study
• Select “File”
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Short Case Study
• Select “Add Evidence Item”
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Short Case Study
• Select Source box pops up
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Short Case Study
• Select “Image File”

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Short Case Study
• Click “Next >”

Short Case Study
• Select File box pops up
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Short Case Study
• Click “Browse” and browse to source path
– Be sure to select E01 file, not E01.txt file
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Short Case Study
• Click “Finish”

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Short Case Study
• Navigate to path of interest
• “C:UsersWin7-
BMLAppDataLocalmsoffice”

Short Case Study
• Two files
– msofficeservice.exe
– winrnfsl32.dll
• Maybe the dll is needed by the exe. We can
look at it in the hex editor pane in FTK Imager
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Short Case Study
• Uh oh!! That looks a lot like a log file window
titles and key strokes!!
– HINT: It is exactly that
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Short Case Study
• Nicely formatted keylogger file
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Short Case Study
– Bonus points for you if you can tell what I was
doing on the last entry!
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Short Case Study Summary
• We identified a strange file thanks to the
output of autoruns
• Searching for the hash determined the file was
malicious
• A quick check of the folder reveals not only is
the file malicious, it is actually a key logger

BONUS: Can use buatapa to
accomplish VirusTotal lookups
• buatapa is a small Python script (based heavily on
Brian Baskin’s noriben) to parse autorun.csv files
generated by autoruns
– Point script at autoruns csv file and let it run
– Attempts to find VirusTotal hits, strange Unicode
characters in paths, and entries similar to powileks
• http://www.brimorlabsblog.com/2015/08/publicly-
announcing-buatapa.html
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buatapa console output example
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buatapa text output example
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Checklists for each OS!
• A checklist is included for each operating
system
– Creates starting place for “what” to collect
• You can put your company logo at the top…
• …And you now have an incident response
collection plan for each operating system!

Why free?!?!
• Because it saves your business time, money, and resources!
• How?
– Initial data gathering can help you reveal problems without the
need for external consulting
– If you want external help, providing already gathered data can
expedite incident response lifecycle
– Scripts collect data from “common” areas incident
responders/digital forensic analysts look at first
– If scripts can help DFIR consultant remotely diagnose issue
remotely, no need to pay travel, lodging, incidentals, etc. costs
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Questions?
Contact Us!
Email: brian@brimorlabs.com
Phone: 443.834.8280
Website: www.brimorlabs.com
Blog: www.brimorlabsblog.com
Twitter: @BriMorLabs
@brianjmoran
BriMor Labs - 2015

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