Cambridge Quantum Computing - The Need for Certifiable Quantum Encryption and How to Solve It
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The document discusses the need for certifiable quantum encryption to secure against future quantum computers. It outlines that current encryption could be broken in 5-10 years by quantum algorithms like Shor's algorithm. It then discusses several approaches to quantum encryption including post-quantum algorithms, quantum key distribution (QKD), and certifiable random number generation which is needed for secure key generation. The document argues for transitioning to quantum encryption now before current encryption can be hacked by emerging quantum technologies.
Cambridge Quantum Computing - The Need for Certifiable Quantum Encryption and How to Solve It
- 1. CAMBRIDGE QUANTUM COMPUTING The Need for Certifiable Quantum Encryption and How to Solve it Mark Jackson, Ph.D. January 2020
- 3. 1) Post-quantum Encryption Algorithms 2) Quantum Communication 3) Certifiably Secure Key Generation Outline
- 6. Bit becomes Quantum Bit Bit Qubit Until we measure a qubit, it is in a “superposition” of being both a 1 and 0
- 7. In 1994 Peter Shor discovered a very important quantum program: decomposing integers into its prime factors Shor’s Algorithm 433 x 937 = 405,721 easy (multiplying) hard (factoring)
- 8. 99% of online encryption} Post-Quantum Encryption } 26 Candidates Announced by NIST in January 2019
- 9. Quantum Annealing: The New Threat to Cybersecurity
- 10. April 2019: Chinese Claim to Use Annealing for Decryption
- 11. Annealing: Hacking Within ~5 years? Credit: Fujitsu
- 12. Urgency: Mosca’s Inequality TIME TO TRANSITION TO QUANTUM ENCRYPTION TIME WISHED FOR DATA TO BE SECURE TIME FOR PROCESSORS TO BREACH CLASSICAL ENCRYPTION Time DANGER Don’t wait - upgrade your encryption now!
- 14. QKD Credit: Center for Quantum Technologies, Singapore Absolute Security through Quantum Entanglement
- 15. Creating a Quantum Network Works up to about ~100 km Similar networks being built in China, Switzerland, UK, and NYC
- 16. A Few Months Ago in the Washington Post Credit: (l) Jeanne Whalen and Daniel Hertzberg for The Washington Post; (r) Defense Systems August 2016: Micius Satellite
- 17. Last Month in the Washington Post
- 18. Start with a Secure Base Certifiable Random Numbers Post-Quantum Encryption Algorithms Cybersecurity Infrastructure
- 19. (Pseudo)Random Keys Can Be Hacked June 2017
- 20. Example: Heartbleed • In 2014 a vulnerability was discovered in the OpenSSL cryptographic library, making secret keys accessible • This allowed attackers to eavesdrop on communications, steal data, and impersonate from services and users
- 21. What is a Certifiable Random Number? • Cannot be predicted • Cannot be known by anyone else
- 22. RNG needed for QKD
- 23. Agility Shim Policy Server IronBridge (Remote) Crypto Libraries REST, PKCS#11, ICFS… Post Quantum Crypto. CQC Cryptographic / Engineering Team Client Infrastructure Customer Environment API Enforce Policies for Cryptographic Standards On-Premise Deployment Cloud Deployment IronBridgeTM Deployment US Patent Pending
- 24. Conclusion and Forecast Now 5 years 10 years Quantum Computers Exist Advantage from Financial Algorithms Quantum Encryption Exists Hacking possible from Quantum Computers Quantum Computers Fully Integrated Hacking likely from Quantum Computers
- 25. Q&A