CASE Network Studies and Analyses 365 - CIS Countries' Interests vis-à-vis the European Union and Its Eastern Policy

Materials published here have a working paper character. They can be subject to further publi-cation.
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those of CASE Network.
This work has been prepared within the framework of the ENEPO project (EU Eastern
Neighbourhood: Economic Potential and Future Development), financed within the Sixth Frame-work
Programme of the European Commission.
Keywords: ENP, CIS countries, EU
Jel codes: P36, P45, P48, P51, P52
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CIS COUNTRIES’ INTERESTS VIS-À-VIS THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS EASTERN POLICY
Contents
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 6
Part I: The CIS States’ Interests in Relation to the European Union ................................................ 7
I.1. The CIS countries’ position in relation to the EU.................................................................. 7
I.2. The political interests of the CIS states in relation to the EU............................................. 11
I.3. Economic interests............................................................................................................. 20
I.4. Security objectives ............................................................................................................. 25
Part II: The European Union’s Offer to Its Eastern Neighbours ...................................................... 28
II.1. The general framework ..................................................................................................... 28
II.2. The regional framework .................................................................................................... 29
II.3. Individual policies.............................................................................................................. 31
II.4. Sectoral policy................................................................................................................... 34
Part III: Summary – the EU and Its Eastern Partners in Search of a Cooperation Formula ........... 36
III.1. The eastern partners’ interests vs. EU policy................................................................... 36
III.2. The common interests ..................................................................................................... 36
III.3. Challenges and major problems in mutual relations ........................................................ 37
III.4. Conclusions for the EU’s policy ....................................................................................... 39
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 365 3

Marek Menkiszak, Wojciech Konończuk, Marcin Kaczmarski
The Authors
Marek Menkiszak, the team leader, is Head of the Russian Department at the Centre for
Eastern Studies (CES). He specialises in particular in Russia’s foreign and security policy, includ-ing
Russian-EU relations. Mr Menkiszak was responsible for coordination of the work on this study
as well as for preparing the third part, with conclusions and recommendations for the EU policy.
Wojciech Konończuk is an expert in the CES Russian Department. He specialises in the is-sues
of Russia’s policy towards the Western CIS states and the Baltic States, Russia’s energy pol-icy
towards the CIS area, as well as the multilateral structures in the CIS area. Mr Konończuk was
responsible for preparing the first part of the study concerning the analysis of the CIS countries’
interests towards the EU.
Marcin Kaczmarski is an expert in the CES Russian Department. He specialises in Russia’s
foreign policy in the ‘far abroad” (beyond the CIS area), including Russian – EU relations. Mr
Kaczmarski was responsible for preparing the second part of the study concerning issues related
to the EU’s proposals towards its Eastern Partners (the countries within the CIS area).
4 CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 365

Abstract
The CIS countries’ EU-related interests are very heterogeneous. The countries themselves dif-fer
not only in terms of their geopolitical and geo-economic situations, and how those affect their
relations with the EU, but also in their levels of ambition in relation to the Union, as well as their
specific sectoral interests. Some Eastern Partners have set full EU membership as their strategic
goal; others want to enjoy the benefits of the common free market, and the ambitions of others are
limited to developing cooperation in selected areas. Similarly, the EU’s policy towards its Eastern
neighbourhood is multi-level and very diverse, considering as it must the different characters of
mutual relations. The EU and most of its Eastern partners have a sufficient number of common or
converging interests to expect reasonable cooperation between the two sides to develop and
deepen. However, serious challenges and problems exist that may prevent this positive scenario
from being realised.

Introduction
The turbulent processes that took place in the early 1990s in the post-Soviet area have had a
significant impact on the situation in the European Union’s immediate eastern neighbourhood. The
EU’s enlargement to the East, which has changed the geopolitical landscape of the European con-tinent,
has encouraged the Union to intensify its policy towards countries that are either its new
immediate neighbours or which affect its vital interests. A successful continuation of this policy re-quires
a systematic and in-depth analysis of the situation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in-cluding
the interests of those countries linked to the EU.
The main objective of this paper is to present a comparative analysis of the diversified inter-ests
of CIS countries towards the EU. An overview of CIS countries’ policies and interests towards
the EU forms the core of the first section of this paper. It is supplemented in the second section
with an outline of the EU’s various proposals towards its Eastern neighbours, which in part consti-tutes
its response to its partners’ interests and needs. A comparison thereof has been used as the
basis upon which to draw some general conclusions, characterising the major common interests,
as well as the challenges and impediments in mutual relations in part three of this study. This last
section also provides some recommendations for EU policy towards the CIS area stemming from
analysis of CIS interests and expectations. The work on this paper was finished prior to the Rus-sian-
Georgian conflict of August 2008 and hence does not take into account its repercussions.
This paper clearly cannot claim to fully exhaust this very extensive topic. Nevertheless, it pro-vides
a basis for discussion on both the Eastern partners’ policies and the EU’s Eastern policy.
A companion study (Dura, 2008a) provides an account of the heterogeneity of interests and
policies from the other side, namely among the EU member states in their relations with the CIS
area and groups of CIS countries.
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the following persons who have contributed
to the development of this paper: Wojciech Bartuzi, Anna Górska, Kamil Kłysiński, Witold Rod-kiewicz,
Krzysztof Strachota and Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga. The authors are also to grateful to
Marek Dąbrowski and Wojciech Paczyński for insightful comments on an earlier version of this
paper.

Part I: The CIS States’ Interests in Relation to the European Union
I.1. The CIS countries’ position in relation to the EU
I.1.1. The current state of affairs
Due to their diverse geopolitical, political, economic and social conditions, the members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), have very different interests with regard to the Euro-pean
Union, and they therefore pursue different policies in relation to it. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bela-rus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan differ significantly from each other in terms of their political systems, levels of economic
development and social structures. Among them there are states that meet democratic criteria
(Ukraine, Moldova, and to some extent Georgia), states considered authoritarian (Azerbaijan, Bela-rus,
Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) as well as totalitarian states (Turkmenistan). The eco-nomic
models within the CIS are equally diverse: starting with the market economies of Ukraine,
Russia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan, to economies with centrally-planned elements (such as Bela-rus,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Complex historical traditions have also influenced current posi-tions.
Some CIS countries have been within the orbit of European civilisation for centuries (Bela-rus,
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). Other states have been tied to it more loosely, although still
consider themselves to be remote parts of Europe (Christian Armenia and Georgia, and to some
extent Muslim Azerbaijan). In the case of the Central Asian states, their ties with Europe have al-ways
been very weak, and they have remained within the orbit of Islamic civilisation, with also
some influences stemming from Russian colonisation. The geographical factor is another key as-pect
when analysing the policies of the CIS states, given that the region stretches over a vast terri-tory
in Europe and Asia, five times as large as the EU’s total territory. At the same time, the com-bined
population of the CIS member states is less than half that of the EU population. Moreover,
the level of diversity among the CIS member states as regards their political and economic devel-opment
is much greater than is the case among the EU countries.
The CIS, an integrative organisation established mainly on Russia’s initiative in December
1991, was supposed to bring together the states that had emerged following the collapse of the
Soviet Union (except for the Baltic States). However, since at least the mid-1990s it has remained
a ‘virtual’ creation that has been largely unable to accomplish the objectives it set out for itself.
Even though the CIS still exists, it remains something of an illusion of a united post-Soviet state
association and merely in effect a symbol of Russia’s ambitions in the region. At the moment, there
is much more that divides the twelve member states than unites them, since most of the political
and economic ties created within the Soviet Union have ceased to exist, or have become consid-erably
weaker. It is therefore much more reasonable to use the notion of a ‘CIS area’ in this context
(Sushko, 2004; pp. 119-120, Konończuk, 2007; pp. 26-27).
I.1.2. Individual CIS states’ policy ambitions towards the European Union
The CIS countries can be divided into five groups in terms of their levels of ambition in relation
to the EU, as well as their perceptions of the EU’s significance. The first group includes those
states that aspire to integrate with European institutions (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). The second
group includes states that have not to date announced any aspirations with regards EU integration,
although have also not ruled it out in the future. At the moment, their cooperation with the EU is
restricted to the European Neighbourhood Policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan). The third group consists
solely of Belarus, which could be a potential active participant of the ENP because it is the EU’s
direct neighbour; it does not aspire to EU membership now, but might consider integration with the
EU in the future. The fourth group is another single-state entity, Russia, which by emphasising its
own potential, role and ambitions on the international arena, has worked out a special type of rela-tionship
with the EU. Russia’s policy is aimed at limited economic integration with the EU and rec-ognition
of the two parties’ parity but not at full EU membership. The fifth group includes the Cen-tral
Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) for whom
the EU is not a key international partner and who do not associate their future with the European
project. At the same time, they attach significant importance to their relations with the EU, wherein
they pursue their objectives (mainly economic ones).

The simplified division of the CIS area presented above does not mean, however, that all the
states assigned to one group have exactly the same interests in relation to the EU or that they ar-ticulate
their policies in a similar fashion. Despite similarities, there are clear differences between
them. In fact, each of the twelve CIS states has adopted its own specific policy in relation to the EU
and each has its own interests, resulting from domestic and external circumstances. At the same
time, it should be stressed that not all CIS states are carrying out an active policy in relation to the
EU, as will be shown later. Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian states and to some extent Bela-rus,
merely respond to EU initiatives, and lack a defined policy in relation to the EU of their own.
They attach much greater importance to bilateral relations with the EU’s largest countries.
I.1.2.1. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
EU membership is a key foreign policy objective for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. There is a
general consensus among all the major parties and political options concerning the aspiration to
join the EU. A crucial argument in favour of European integration is widespread social support for
the idea; ranging from around 51% of the population in Ukraine1, 75% in Moldova2, up to around
81% in Georgia3. Unlike integration with NATO, European integration is relatively uncontroversial
in the eyes of Georgians, Moldovans and Ukrainians, and is considered a project that would bring
many more advantages than harm4. Another key aspect is the conviction, widespread in the three
states, that they have an undeniable right to be EU members because they have always been an
inseparable part of Europe in terms of culture and history (Gromadzki et al., 2004, pp. 21-22;
Furman, 2007; Silitski, 2006).
Despite Ukraine’s, Moldova’s and Georgia’s declared priority of European integration, the vari-ous
political camps within these countries are not equally ardent in their pursuit of EU membership.
In addition, difficulties in coordinating the political centres’ activity is noticeable. In Ukraine, the
most passionate advocates of European integration are President Viktor Yushchenko, the Our
Ukraine bloc associated with him, and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s party (BYuT). EU mem-bership
is a strategic civilisational option for them, seen as a key determining factor for Ukraine’s
future. At the same time, these two political camps often compete for the leading position regarding
propaganda successes in Ukraine’s EU integration (Volchuk, 2008, pp. 92-95). The opposition
Party of Regions supports Ukraine’s integration with the EU, although pragmatic benefits from
membership are of much greater importance for the party than recognising any European value
system. This attitude suggests that the party tends to articulate the interests of big business, which
is interested in gaining access to the EU’s markets.
The variety of interests in the different political centres in Moldova is even more evident. The
Communist Party, which has been ruling the country since 2001, has pledged its support for EU
integration on an official level, while it has in fact treated European integration rather instrumen-tally.
The Communists cannot afford to abandon the idea of EU membership, since the majority of
the population strongly supports this project. At the same time, they are reluctant to implement
European standards (Dura and Popescu, 2007, p. 472), since the development of genuinely de-mocratic
institutions could eventually deprive them of power. As a result, the Communist Party has
pledged its support for European integration, enigmatically presented as ‘joining the united Europe
of nations and states’5. This in effect empties its European policy of any real essence. Enthusiasm
for real integration with the EU is displayed by the Moldovan opposition, who perceive it as a
chance to accelerate the country’s development, and also as a guarantee of protection against the
Communists’ authoritarian tendencies.
1 A poll conducted by the Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Research, quoted in
Natsyonalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no 1, p. 43.
2 Barometrul de Opinie Publica – Noiembrie 2007 (IPP, Chisinau, 2007), p. 111.
3 Quoted from Ghia Nodia, Reviving Georgia’s Western Dream, Project-Syndicate, 5 January 2008,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nodia1.
4 This is particularly evident in Ukraine, where possible NATO membership raises a great controversy.
For example, see Larrabee (2007) pp. 32-33 and ‘The arguments over NATO expansion’, The Economist, 15
June 2008.
5 See the project adopted at the 12th plenum of the Communist Party of Moldova in November 2007,
published in the Kommunist magazine, issue 46, 19 October 2007. Available at:
http://www.comunist.md/index.php?idPaper=30&class=Articles&action=getDetail&id=56.

In Georgia the idea of integration with the EU is supported both by the authorities and most of
the opposition. However, once again a marked difference can be observed between the expansive
declarations that Georgia must join the EU as soon as possible and the real implementation of
European standards that would serve this objective6. The Georgian opposition has accused Presi-dent
Mikheil Saakashvili of using the idea of European integration purely for propaganda purposes
and not taking any real action to fulfil the terms of accession, including adherence to democratic
principles. An acute problem in the case of Georgia (as well as Moldova) is the lack of cooperation
between the authorities and the opposition on their strategies for European integration.
The greatest problem for all of the three states mentioned here is that their fulfilment of EU
membership criteria is a very slow process, often restricted to declarations and propaganda. In
Ukraine this was particularly evident under the rule of President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004),
when the European idea did not go beyond rhetorical declarations (Volchuk, 2008, pp. 90-91). It
was only after the ‘Orange Revolution’ that some integration-oriented actions were taken, albeit far
from adequate. In Moldova, the policy of President Vladimir Voronin boils down to postponing any
practical steps towards integration, especially as regards political reforms. At the same time,
Moldova excels at consuming EU funds. The Moldovan Communist Party keeps exploiting the
European idea to remain credible vis-à-vis a Euro-enthusiastic society (especially since Romania’s
accession to the EU). In Georgia, the first integration-oriented actions were only undertaken after
the ‘Rose Revolution’ in late 2003. However, when it comes to implementing reforms, the post-
Shevardnadze authorities often confine themselves to declarations.
Despite the permanent presence of the integration idea in the sphere of rhetoric and symbols,
none of the states mentioned here has in fact been able to consistently implement a European
integration policy. Even though Ukraine adopted a document entitled ‘The European integration
strategy’ in 1998, Kyiv has never really implemented it, and the document remains mainly in the
propaganda sphere. Moldova’s activity has boiled down to renaming its Ministry of Foreign Affairs
the ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration’, while Chisinau has failed to intensify its
integration-oriented activity. Since the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, the authorities have decorated
their state institutions and borders with EU flags and established a Ministry for Euro-Atlantic Inte-gration.
However, the actual execution of the integration projects remains insufficient, while in the
sphere of adherence to fundamental European principles, Georgia has actually regressed (it was
the only CIS country that was downgraded on two dimensions – political rights and civil liberties –
in the last edition of the Freedom House (2008) index).
I.1.2.2. Armenia and Azerbaijan
Even though Armenia and Azerbaijan do not aspire to European integration, the EU plays a
very significant role in their internal politics, and is one of their key international partners (Linotte,
2007). Armenia’s priority is political and economic cooperation with Russia, whereas the EU’s sig-nificance
is manifested in Armenia’s bilateral relations with individual EU member states, especially
France. Azerbaijan’s main political partners are the United States, Russia, some EU states (mainly
the UK and Italy) and Iran. Nevertheless, the EU is the most important economic partner for both
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU also plays a significant role in the context of the Nagorno-
Karabakh region, though it must be said that Armenia and Azerbaijan have contradictory expecta-tions,
with each expecting Brussels to support their position in this conflict7.
Although neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan aspire to EU membership, their positions might
change if one day Georgia and/or Turkey joins the EU. In the case of Armenia, one factor that
could foster a change in this sphere could be a change of ruling elite; in other words, the replace-ment
of the currently ruling ‘Karabakh clan’ (headed by the former President Robert Kocharyian
and his successor Serzh Sargkisyian) by the European-oriented opposition. Another factor in fa-vour
of EU integration is the position of Armenian society, with the majority of citizens supporting
the idea, even though they consider it rather unrealistic8.
6 Cornell et al. (2007); ‘Georgia: EU Official Calls On Tbilisi To Address Election Shortcomings’,
RFE/RL, 8 February 2008.
7 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Caucasus: EU, Azerbaijan Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh’, RFE/RL, 19 May 2004.
8 Armenia in a Transforming World, ACNIS, Yerevan 2006.

I.1.2.3. Belarus
Belarus has never shown any official aspirations for EU membership, although its government
has displayed its readiness to expand its relations with the EU in selected spheres (Rontoyanni,
2005, pp. 48-57). Minsk’s key international partner is Russia. Belarus’ relations with the EU are not
considered a priority, although the authorities attach great importance to bilateral relations with
some EU states. EU-Belarus relations have been frozen for years, due to the undemocratic politi-cal
system that has developed in Belarus since Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s assumption of power in
1994. Currently, Belarus is appealing for ‘a shift towards pragmatism’ and ‘depoliticisation’ of its
cooperation with the EU, referring to the idea of a ‘neighbourhood in the common European home’.
Belarus’s priority is to activate economic exchange (the EU is its main export partner) and coopera-tion
in non-political spheres (economy, energy, transit, ecology). Belarus has not refused to partici-pate
in EU aid programmes, although Minsk treats them ‘pragmatically’ – in other words, merely as
a source of financial support. Moreover, in the last few years Belarusian policy in relation to the EU
has been heavily influenced by the state of Russian-Belarusian relations (Dura, 2008b, pp. 4-5). At
some points Minsk has tried to activate its dialogue with Brussels in order to strengthen its position
vis-à-vis Moscow (especially in early 2007, following Belarus’s conflict with Russia over energy
issues).
The Belarusian opposition, marginalised and discriminated by the authorities, takes a com-pletely
different stance towards the EU. Most of the opposition parties are in favour of Belarus’s
integration with the EU. They consider their country to be an integral part of European civilisation,
which should be entitled to become a member of united Europe (Vesely, 2007; Heinrich and Lo-bova,
2006). It should be stressed, however, that the level of social support for the idea of integra-tion
in Belarus is decreasing. In 2002, 60% of Belarusians supported the idea of joining the EU,
and a mere 10% were against, while in 2007 only 30% were in favour of this idea and 46% were
against9. This decrease may have resulted from the Belarusian people’s perception of the conse-quences
of the new visa regime for Belarusians introduced by Belarus’s neighbours (Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland). These three states are often visited by Belarusians, and so the subsequent
tightening of visa procedures and substantial rise in visa costs (especially after the Schengen area
enlargement in December 2007) have posed a problem to travellers. Another factor strengthening
the scepticism in relation to the EU has been Belarusian state propaganda.
I.1.2.4. Russia
Due to its size and potential, Russia obviously stands out against all the other CIS states. This
implies a specific approach to and the specific interests of Moscow in relation to the EU. Moscow
has repeatedly stressed that it does not intend to become an EU member, although it is interested
in partial economic integration with the EU (within the framework of the Common European Eco-nomic
Space)10. Still, the EU is Russia’s most important economic and a key political partner. In its
relations with the EU, Russia ostentatiously stresses the necessity to respect both parties’ parity; it
demands to be treated in a privileged manner, and not just as one of the EU’s neighbours (this was
the reason behind Moscow’s decision not to accept participation in the ENP). Russia wants the
new EU-Russia basic agreement to guarantee special relations between the parties in the form of
a ‘strategic partnership’11. In Moscow’s perception, cooperation with the EU should emphasise
Russia’s privileged status on the international arena as an independent centre of influence. Mos-cow
also perceives the EU as a player that could partially balance the global domination of the
United States (based on the fact that the EU and Russia have a similar approach to a number of
international issues). Still, it must be stressed that the EU only appeared on the ‘map’ of Russian
interests around 2000, when the final decision concerning the EU’s eastward enlargement was
taken. Regardless of its relations with the EU as a whole, Russia’s relations with selected EU
9 Polls conducted by the Belarusian Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies
(IISEPS), http://www.iiseps.org/e9-07-07.html. See Rakova (2008).
10 V. Chizhov, ‘Rossiya nuzhdayetsya v silnom Yevrosoyuzye’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 October 2007.
11 In a speech by the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the European
Communities, Vladimir Chizhov, entitled ‘Objectives and perspectives of the relations and cooperation
between Russia and the European Union after 2007’, delivered at the 6th International Public ‘St Petersburg
Dialogue’ Forum in Dresden, 9-10 October 2006.

member states remain a priority. This reflects Moscow’s conviction that it can achieve its main ob-jectives
in the EU by successfully negotiating with the EU’s largest member states (principally
Germany and France) and omitting the EU’s institutions12.
I.1.2.5. The Central Asian states
From the perspectives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
the EU is a distant international partner, not regarded as a priority. The existing geographical, geo-political
and civilisation barriers are so significant that the post-Soviet Central Asian states do not
envisage the EU becoming an important partner in either their foreign policies or in a regional di-mension13.
Regardless of some differences, the Central Asian states’ interests in relation to and
perceptions of the EU overlap, which makes it possible to treat them as a single region. Turkmeni-stan
stood out until late 2006, isolated and distant as it was from any international initiatives. The
death of President Saparmurat Niyazov and the assumption of power by Gurbanguly Berdymuk-hammedov
finally induced Turkmenistan to start opening up to the world, albeit with great cau-tion14.
Russia still remains the main political and economic point of reference for all the Central Asian
states. The EU is not considered a strong enough player to influence the region, and is also sur-passed
in its influence by China, the United States, India and Iran. Certain EU member states (like
Germany, France, the UK and Italy), and even some European energy companies, matter more to
the Central Asian states than the EU itself. As a result, Central Asian countries have not developed
a concrete policy in relation to the EU. What can be noticed is an important symbolic dimension to
EU-Central Asian relations. Political contacts with EU institutions give the Central Asian states the
feeling of importance in international relations, and are perceived as a factor that boosts their posi-tion.
Kazakhstan has been using the EU’s symbolic weight in its regional policy in order to support
its aspirations of becoming the region’s leader (Olcott, 2005, pp. 38-43). The ability to carry out a
dialogue with Brussels is one of the factors underpinning Kazakhstan’s position in Central Asia,
also vis-à-vis its traditional rival Uzbekistan, which has been marginalised since Brussels imposed
economic sanctions following the Andijan massacre in 200515. Another indication of Kazakhstan’s
position in the region is its repeated requests to be included in the European Neighbourhood Pol-icy.
Even though the possibility is not big, the appeals Kazakhstan has made on this front are seen
as raising the national profile16.
I.2. The political interests of the CIS states in relation to the EU
I.2.1. Expectations regarding the level of EU involvement in the CIS area
The relations of all the CIS states with the EU are influenced by their relations with Russia.
The ‘Russian aspect’ is always present, although its importance varies from country to country.
Russia exerts the most powerful influence on the foreign policies of Armenia, Belarus, Moldova
and the Central Asian states. To a lesser (though considerable) extent, Russia's influence can be
noticed in the policies of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The CIS countries can be divided into
four groups as regards their expectations of the EU’s activity on CIS territory: 1) those who expect
the EU to increase its political support; 2) those interested in limited activity by the EU (maintaining
12 Compare ‘Obzor Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, 27 March 2007, pp. 47-57, www.mid.ru.
13 ‘Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?’, International Crisis Group, Asia Report no 113, 10
April 2006, pp. 1-3,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/central_asia/113_central_asia_what_role_for_the_eu.pdf.
14 ‘Turkmenistan: Leader Proclaims ‘Open Door’ Investment Policy’, Eurasianet.org, 27 March 2008.
15 ‘Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter’, International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 54, 6 November
2006, pp. 2-4,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/central_asia/b54_uzbekistan___europes_sanctions_matte.
pdf.
16 For the EU’s part, the MEP Charles Tannock has submitted such a proposal, as has the rapporteur
for the ENP’s Eastern dimension. For more, see Charles Tannock, ‘Back to the Great Game in Kazakhstan’,
29 February 2008, Project-Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tannock13.

the status quo); 3) those who expect the EU to limit its activity, and 4) those who do not perceive
the EU as an actor that could influence the situation in the region.
I.2.1.1. Desire to increase the EU’s geopolitical role
Recent years have seen the emergence of a group of CIS states interested in increasing the
EU’s (and generally, the West’s) activity in the post-Soviet territory. In their perception this would at
least partially balance Russia’s influence in the region. A symbolic manifestation of this attitude is
the GUAM organisation, founded in 1997, and composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Moldova (GUAM is an acronym for the names of the states). These states are the strongest sup-porters
of the EU’s increased involvement in the CIS area, and perceive its activity as a possible
counterbalance to Russia’s actions, and a reinforcement of the pro-European direction of their for-eign
policies. Azerbaijan is probably an exception here, given that the country does not consider
the EU as a key partner. In the case of Ukraine, the emphasis on ‘Europeanisation’ is also meant
to strengthen the national identity and accentuate the differences between Ukraine and Russia
(Samokhvalov, 2007, pp. 27-31).
The policy of Moldova shows a certain ambivalence. On one hand, the state has announced
its EU aspirations, while on the other the ruling Communist government has also declared that
Moldova should participate in the CIS economic integration project – and the two projects are de
facto mutually exclusive17. The two attitudes, pro-Russian and pro-Western, are evidently compet-ing
in Moldova’s foreign policy. In late 2003, Chisinau took a swing towards the EU, rejecting the
Russian project for resolving the Transnistria conflict. The second half of 2006 saw a certain rap-prochement
with Russia, which in turn decreased Chisinau’s activity in relation to the EU18. This
ambivalence in Moldova’s foreign policy is a result of its subordination to the ruling Communist
Party’s interests. The Communists are forced to ask Russia for support, especially in the context of
resolving the Transnistrian conflict (Rodkiewicz, 2008).
In the Southern Caucasus, Georgia has a strong interest in stronger EU involvement in the re-gion
(Coppieters, 2007, pp. 5-6). Tbilisi has placed its hopes on the EU to be able to help in resolu-tion
of the separatist problems in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia also hopes for political
support vis-à-vis Russia's policy, which Tbilisi regards as aggressive and ‘imperialist’.
Azerbaijan, for its part, does not have such high expectations in respect to the EU. Baku would
like the EU to strengthen its economic activity in the region, especially as regards projects for oil &
gas transportation via Azerbaijan19.
I.2.1.2. Desire to limit increases in the EU’s role
Belarus and Armenia are interested in only a limited increase in the EU’s role in the region.
Belarus’s objective is to sustain a certain amount of contact with Brussels in order to strengthen its
position vis-à-vis Moscow20. The Belarusian authorities treat dialogue with EU purely instrumen-tally,
and use it mainly for propaganda purposes vis-à-vis Russia. In fact Belarus does not intend to
meet the majority of the EU’s requirements, which were laid out in late 2006 in a twelve-point
document entitled ‘What the European Union could bring to Belarus.’21 This document made the
development of bilateral relations dependent on democratisation of the Belarusian system. All
17 The project of the Common Economic Space in the CIS area (covering Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan
and Belarus but with prospects for enlargement to include other post-Soviet states) envisaged establishing a
supranational regulatory body. Iulian Chifu, ‘Moldova between East and West’, 7 August 2007,
http://www.viitorul.org/public/864/en/IC%20-%20Relations_with_the_EU_and_CIS__eng%20rivesed_.doc.
18 Oazu Nantoi, ‘New Initiatives are the Key to Success’, 7 August 2007,
http://www.viitorul.org/public/869/en/ON%20-%20New%20initiatives%20(eng)%20MD.doc.
19 See Yunosov (2007, pp. 85-115). Such a position was also confirmed in an interview with an official
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan interviewed by an expert from the Centre for Eastern
Studies, Baku, July 2006.
20 Dzianis Melyantsou, Vitali Silitski, ‘In the Shadow of Kremlin Stars: Belarus-EU Relations Lack Sub-stance’,
BISS Blitz #1/2008en, 13 February 2007, 13 February 2008,
http://www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/blitz20080213breuen.pdf.
21 European Commission non-paper, ‘What the European Union could bring to Belarus’, 5 December
2006. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.

Minsk’s gestures and signals of improving relations are in fact a part of the game aimed at
strengthening its negotiation position vis-à-vis Moscow. Since 2006 it has been particularly evident
that Minsk’s policy in relation to the EU is closely linked to Russian-Belarusian relations.
In the case of Armenia, its main ‘European objective’ is restricted to the expectation that the
EU will support Yerevan in two key issues: pressing Turkey to unblock the Armenian-Turkish bor-der
and officially recognising the 1915 Armenian massacres as genocide. Yerevan is also aware of
the EU’s growing potential in the region, and has been trying to use it to further its own interests
(such as the Karabakh conflict and economic cooperation)22. To this end, it has taken advantage of
the presence of the Armenian diaspora in some EU states, among other measures.
I.2.1.3. Desire to restrict EU activity
While Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would like to see greater EU involvement in the CIS
area, Russia is interested in restricting this activity (Vahl, 2006, pp. 11-16). Moscow wants the EU
to respect its special interests on the post-Soviet territory, and to refrain from any actions perceived
as undermining Russian influence over the CIS. For the same reason, Moscow has taken a nega-tive
stand towards the European Neighbourhood Policy, the so-called ‘Black Sea Synergy’ and the
EU’s strategy in relation to Central Asia23. Moscow fears that these initiatives may eventually
weaken its influence in the CIS area. In the last few years, Russia has developed the notion of the
EU’s ‘near abroad’, overlapping with the Russian ‘near abroad’ (Averre, 2005, pp. 175-179). Mos-cow’s
most desirable scenario would be the EU consulting Russia on all actions taken in the CIS
area, or even restricting its activity there. Russia does admit that the EU has important interests in
the region concerning energy and security. Furthermore, the Russian authorities have shown their
dissatisfaction with the EU’s criticism of Russian policy in relation to the CIS area, and are trying to
play it down. They also demand that the EU recognise the Russian Federation’s special interests in
this territory (Menkiszak, 2006, p. 59).
I.2.1.4. Lack of interest (the EU as a non-important player)
The Central Asian states find themselves at the opposite pole as regards the level of EU in-volvement.
These countries, for geographical and geopolitical reasons, do not perceive the EU as
an important player that might be able to undermine Russia's position in the region. The Central
Asian states are interested in maintaining their special relations with Moscow, in order to balance
the growing influence of China24, among other goals. It is Brussels that is the more active partner in
the mutual relations (Burkhanov, 2007; Norling, 2007), given its conceptual actions (i.e. its strategy
towards Central Asia), the appointment of a special EU representative for Central Asia, highlighting
the Central Asian countries in its policy of diversifying energy supplies, and the frequency of visits
by EU representatives to the region. To compare, in the last few years only the presidents of Ka-zakhstan
and Turkmenistan have paid visits to Brussels (in 2006 and 2007, respectively). More-over,
their visits to EU headquarters were one of many in their foreign travel schedules, and were
not given any special priority25.
22 For example, Armenia was able to block EU support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway that was
supposed to circumvent its territory. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey applied to the EU and the US for
financial support for this project. However, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European
Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has ruled out the possibility of the EU co-financing the
Azerbaijani-Georgian-Turkish project, deeming it inconsistent with the ‘spirit of European integration’ as it
would circumvent Armenia. The US has decided likewise.
23 A speech by the permanent representative of the Russian Federation…, op. cit. In the case of the
‘Black Sea Synergy’, Russia fears that the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) will
be weakened.
24 Nicklas Norling & Niklas Swanström, ‘Sino-Russian Relations in Central Asia and the SCO’, CACI
Analyst, 10 March 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4705; and Rolberg (2007, pp. 29-34).
25 Chemen Durdiyeva, ‘Berdimuhammedov Enters a New Phase of EU-Turkmenistan Relations’, CACI
Analyst, 11,14.2007. http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4740.

I.2.2. The aspirants to EU membership (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia)
As pointed out in the first part of this study, the main objective of the foreign policies of
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia is full membership of the EU. Thus, European integration is their
crucial political interest in relation to the EU. Ukraine and Moldova are particularly active in seeking
full membership (Buscaneanu, 2006). Georgia realises that as far as it is concerned the process of
joining the EU may take much longer. The elites of all three states, regardless of political orienta-tion,
are convinced that they are entitled to EU membership as they are European countries. Re-luctance
on the part of EU institutions and some of the member states to meet the strategic objec-tives
of Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi has tended to make them feel frustrated and rejected. In the case
of Moldova, these feelings are additionally reinforced by the conviction of being discriminated
against, compared to the western Balkan states, which have been offered the chance to join the
EU in the future. Another source of Moldova’s frustration was Romania’s accession to the EU and
the consequences stemming from it, namely impediments to Moldovans’ contacts with Romanians,
a nation the former consider themselves to be culturally very close to (Furman, 2007; King, 2000).
Some Moldovan politicians share a deep conviction that this refusal is the result of the EU’s ‘silent
recognition’ that Moldova belongs to the Russian sphere of influence (Hedenskog and Larsson,
2007).
Recently, some Ukrainian and Moldovan politicians have admitted that their countries do not
have a chance of being granted a perspective of membership in the near future. In September
2007, Ukraine’s then minister of foreign affairs, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, acknowledged that his country
was not yet ready to apply for membership26. Moldova’s President Vladimir Voronin is not trying to
push the accession issue either, as he seems to understand that achieving this goal is impossible
in the immediate future, and would be problematic for the EU itself. Some experts suspect that this
policy of the Moldovan Communists is based on a silent consensus between the two parties: Chis-inau
will not actively raise the issue of membership, while Brussels will restrain its criticism of Vo-ronin
and his party for ‘limiting reforms’ and failing to meet democratic standards27. Georgia also
realises that Tbilisi is not ready for EU accession (which would take more than ten years, at best),
nor is the EU itself ready for another round of enlargement, especially in the case of such distant
states as Georgia. Regardless of politicians’ and experts’ awareness that Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia are rather far from fulfilling membership criteria, it is widely believed that the prospect of
EU membership would accelerate the necessary reforms (Górska, 2005, pp. 38-40).
I.2.3. New legal framework for relations with the EU
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Russia form a group of CIS states seeking to create a new le-gal
framework for relations with the EU, first of all to replace the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements (PCA) adopted in the 1990s by a new, much more advanced agreements. Their ex-pectations
as regards the parameters and contents of the new basic agreement depend on how
ambitious their European policy is. The remaining countries of the CIS area (Belarus, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, the Central Asian countries) do not seek to change the current legal regulations as
defined in the PCAs (in the cases of Belarus, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the PCAs have not
come into effect at all).
I.2.3.1. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia
While waiting for being granted prospects of EU membership, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
face the most serious challenge of negotiating new basic agreements to replace the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) concluded with Kyiv and Chisinau in 1994 and with Tbilisi in
1996. All three states believe that the new agreement will become an important step bringing them
closer to full EU membership.
From Ukraine’s point of view, the New Enhanced Agreement, apart from setting the deep free-trade
area (elimination of customs duties and non-tariff barriers, liberalising services and approxi-mating
Ukrainian law to EU standards), should set up an association and award Ukraine with the
26 Interfax Ukraina, 14 September 2007.
27 Moldovan Vedomosti, 30 January 2008.

prospect of EU membership (the latter issue is considered a priority) (Jakubiak and Kolesnichenko,
2006; CEPS, 2006). However, the EU refuses to offer an association agreement similar to that
concluded with the Central European candidate countries in the early 1990s, just as it refuses to
award Ukraine even the prospect of accession.
Moldova’s objective is quite similar to Ukraine’s, although it has been articulated in a different
manner. Chisinau is counting on the EU replacing the PCA with a new document concerning
deepened partnership, while at the same time choosing not to insist on mentioning the prospects
for accession to the EU (Gutu, 2006, pp. 16-20). The Moldovan authorities believe that the ‘deep-ened’
PCA-2, apart from the prestige it would bring, would also increase their ability to use EU
funds and bring Moldova closer to future entry into the area of the ‘four freedoms’.
Georgia is watching Ukraine’s negotiations on the New Enhanced Agreement closely; Tbilisi
wants to base the new EU-Georgia agreement on the ultimate outline of the Ukraine-EU one. Tbi-lisi
would like this document to create a new framework for partnership with EU institutions, to in-clude
regulations on the free trade area, and to mention the possibility of future membership28.
I.2.3.2. Russia
Russia has no membership aspirations, but at the same time insists that the special and privi-leged
character of EU-Russian relations should be guaranteed. Even though none of the CIS coun-tries
has as broad institutional arrangements with the EU as Moscow does (EU-Russia summits
twice a year, fourteen sector dialogues, the Permanent Partnership Council, regular consultations
concerning foreign policy and security), Russia has been pushing for a revision to the current
model of EU-Russia cooperation (Emerson, 2008). The pretext Moscow has been using is the ex-piry
of the 10-year term of the PCA (if neither of the parties revokes the treaty within 6 months, it is
automatically prolonged for another year). Moscow insists on adopting a new legal framework in
bilateral relations, wherein Russia would be recognised as an equal and strategic partner of the
EU29. In late 2006, Poland vetoed the European Commission’s mandate to launch negotiations
with Moscow on the so-called PCA-2. Russia declared that this was an EU internal problem and
that Moscow was ready to launch the talks at any moment. After a year and a half, Poland with-drew
its veto and in June 2008, at the Russia-EU summit at Khanty-Mansiysk, both sides decided
to start the talks.
From the Russian point of view, the precondition for signing the new basic agreement is the
EU’s readiness to stop treating Russia as if it were Europe’s ‘pupil’. The new deal would mainly
have prestige value, and would strengthen Russia’s newly-acquired position in the international
arena30.
Another serious problem is the discussions on the content of the PCA-2. Moscow would prefer
those countries considered as its traditional allies (mainly Germany and France) to define Euro-pean
policy in relation to Russia. This would marginalise the position of those countries (especially
some of the new EU members) that have opted for a firmer EU policy towards Russia. To put it in a
wider context, Russia would like to have a kind of ‘pro-Russian lobby’ (Germany, Hungary, Slova-kia,
and Greece, among other states) taking care of Russian interests in the EU31.
I.2.4. Reactions to the EU’s attitude towards the CIS countries’ internal affairs
I.2.4.1. Desire to limit the EU’s criticism
Russia and Belarus are interested in restricting EU criticism of their political systems and hu-man
rights violations. Both states regard the EU’s criticism as interference in their internal affairs
and a violation of their sovereignty. Moscow denies the EU and individual member states the right
to criticism, including election monitoring, and insists on recognition of a ‘Russian model of democ-
28 A high-ranking Georgian official, interviewed by an expert from the Centre for Eastern Studies. Tbilisi,
January 2008.
29 A speech by the permanent representative of the Russian Federation…, op. cit.
30 Obzor vneshney politiki…, op. cit., pp. 47-57.
31 See the division of the EU states according to their attitude towards Russia, presented by Leonard
and Popescu (2007, pp. 27-50).

racy’32. Even though there are other CIS countries that have problems with meeting European
standards, Russia and Belarus are hypersensitive to the EU’s criticism.
I.2.4.2. Moderate stance on the EU’s criticism
Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states are not overly worried about the EU’s nega-tive
assessment of their authoritarian regimes33. They consider Brussels as having no practical
tools to influence their internal situations. Moreover, the countries – rich in fossil fuels (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) – are also convinced that the EU needs them more than the other
way round34. On the other hand, experience shows that the EU does restrict its criticism to those
authoritarian states that are high on the list of the EU’s alternative suppliers of oil and gas. Only
Uzbekistan is really displeased with the EU’s criticism (Brussels imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan
following the massacre in Andijan, when 700 demonstrators were slaughtered in May 2005) 35.
The anti-democratic activities of the Central Asian regimes is the key reason why these states
have drifted away from the EU (and the West in general) and approached Russia and China. The
EU emphasises the promotion of democracy and human rights, thus arousing these regimes’ mis-trust,
reducing its attraction as a political partner. Moreover, the results of the so-called ‘Tulip
Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (President Askar Akayev was overthrown after he had falsified
parliamentary elections (Marat, 2006) were a signal to the political elites in the region that Western
standards pose a threat to their authority and may lead to long-term destabilisation. It is quite tell-ing
that even Kazakhstan, the state considered most pragmatic and open to cooperation with the
EU, has declined the West’s recommendations, saying they are incompatible with the reality of the
region.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have taken a slightly different stand on the EU’s recommendations to
democratise their political systems. Yerevan and Baku have repeatedly declared their readiness to
implement the recommendations36, while their legislation based on EU standards in fact remains
merely a dead letter.
I.2.4.3. Acceptance of the EU’s criticism
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the most advanced of all the CIS countries in building democ-ratic
institutions, accept the EU’s criticism much more calmly (although they are still quite distant
from Western standards), and do not perceive it as a serious political problem or as an interference
in their internal affairs.
I.2.5. Visa regime issue
Citizens of all CIS countries need a visa when travelling to the EU. Therefore, the issue of lift-ing
or liberalising the visa regime is a key objective in the policies of some CIS countries towards
the EU. This is clearly linked to the problem of migration. For citizens of several CIS states (par-ticularly
Moldova and Ukraine, and to some extent Belarus, Georgia and Armenia) the possibility of
temporary or long-term economic migration to the EU is a key aspect in their perception of the EU
(Jaroszewicz and Szerepka, 2007).
I.2.5.1. Lifting the visa regime
Russia and Ukraine are the most advanced in the process of future liberalisation of the EU’s
visa regime37. However, the agreements signed are merely one of the stages in the process of
32 ‘Obzor vneshney politiki…’, op. cit.
33 Country Summaries, Nations in Transit 2007, Freedom House, Budapest 2007 http://www.freedom-house.
hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007/nit%2007%20country%20summaries%20final11.pdf.
34 MacFarlane (2003, pp. 141-164); Fariz Ismailzade, ‘Azerbaijan and Europe: Toward Closer
Integration?’, CACI Analyst, 24 January 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4416/print.
35 ‘Uzbekistan: Europe’s... op. cit., pp. 2-4.
36 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Azerbaijan: EU Doubtful Of Baku's Commitment To Democracy’, RFE/RL, 27 October
2005; Daniel Linotte, ‘Challenges and Dilemmas of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the South
Caucasus’, CACI Analyst, 19 September 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4694/print.
37 The EU has signed agreements on facilitating the visa regime with Russia (2006) and Ukraine (2007).

lifting the visa regime, and the concessions won do not, in fact, substantially ease the EU’s compli-cated
procedures for applying for a visa. For Russia, lifting the visa regime is also an issue of pres-tige.
Moreover, it is connected to the issue of transit via the Kaliningrad oblast, the Russian en-clave
surrounded by EU territory. Moscow is interested in easing the Kaliningrad inhabitants’ feel-ing
of isolation from Russia proper.
In the case of Ukraine, the visa issue became an acute problem following the entrance of
some of the new member states into the Schengen travel area in 200838. As a result of the Schen-gen
enlargement, long queues appeared in front of the consulates of some new Schengen mem-bers,
and the numbers of people crossing the border dropped significantly. A partial solution to the
problem is recently signed agreements on small-scale cross-border traffic between the new
Schengen members and the CIS states (such as Poland & Ukraine, Slovakia & Ukraine); it allows
citizens living within a 50-km border zone to cross the border without visas, with a special permit.
However, only a small part of citizens of border countries are eligible for this kind of privilege. An-other
problem is the cost of the Schengen visa (€35).
I.2.5.2. Liberalisation of the visa regime
Belarus, Moldova, the Southern Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and Ka-zakhstan
are also working to see a liberalisation of the EU visa regime. For citizens of Belarus and
Moldova, the visa issue is a particularly acute problem; their geographical proximity to the EU
makes them the most frequent travellers there (along with Ukrainians and Russians). The Schen-gen
area enlargement has raised the cost of travel to the EU (at the moment a Schengen visa
costs €35 for Moldovans, and €60 for citizens of Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Bela-rus
remains the only Western CIS state which has neither signed an agreement on visa facilitation
nor concluded an agreement on small-scale cross-border traffic with the EU (the reason being
Minsk’s failure to fulfil the twelve-point list of requirements set out in the European Commission's
non-paper). The Belarusian authorities accuse the EU of creating ‘new artificial barriers’, while it is
ordinary Belarusians who suffer most from the restrictive visa regime39.
Moldova is also striving for the EU’s visa issuing procedures to be eased. According to esti-mates,
up to 600,000 Moldovan citizens are working in EU member states on a permanent basis40.
For an ordinary Moldovan, the possibility of free access to the European Union labour market is a
central EU-related issue.
In the Southern Caucasus, Georgia stands out as the state that has advanced most in negotia-tions
with the EU concerning visa easing. In 2006, Georgia lifted visa requirements for EU citizens.
In Central Asia, it is possible that Kazakhstan will sign an agreement with the EU on visa facilitation
(like those signed by Russia and Ukraine), liberalising its visa regime, although it must be said that
the states of this region, which is remote from Europe, do not regard the visa issue to be as crucial
as the Western CIS countries do, as the latter’s citizens travel to the EU much more frequently.
I.2.6. Absorption of EU funds
Apart from Russia, the CIS states’ key interest in the EU is the opportunity to take advantage
of its programmes and assistance. Even those countries whose relations with the EU are far from
ideal, and who are not interested in closer cooperation (Belarus being a prime example), readily
participate in these programmes. EU funds allow the CIS governments to implement important
tasks unrelated to politics, such as developing transport and border infrastructure (this applies to
states neighbouring the EU), ecology programmes and raising the efficiency of energy consump-tion.
However, some CIS countries (especially Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) consider the EU’s
financial support to be far too meagre and would like Brussels to become involved in the region’s
transformation to a much greater extent. They have a strong interest in seeing an increase of EU
funds from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), among other
38 See among others Anton Chekhlov, ‘Polish arguments concerning Ukrainians’ visa and border
problems’, Day, 4 March 2008.
39 Statement by Valery Voronetsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, at the
Conference ‘Working Together – Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, 3
September 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/press/official-releases/fa1aad88b52f8cdf.html.
40 Data provided in 2005 by the Moldovan National Bureau for Migration.

sources. The states bordering the EU (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia) can also use the
Euroregion funds, which were created for cooperation with EU member states and allotted to eco-nomic
cooperation, ecology programmes and the development of tourism. Belarus’s cooperation
on the Euroregion level is hampered by the fact that its local authorities have hardly any autonomy,
and are therefore afraid of getting involved in international cooperation (Rakova, 2007). Moldova
and Georgia have a specific interest in the EU’s financial support, as they hope that in the future
the EU will be willing to grant them substantial funds for the reintegration into their territories of
Transnistria and Abkhazia & South Ossetia, respectively (for more see section I.4.1).
I.2.7. The assessment of EU policy
The CIS countries’ assessment of EU policy tends to depend on the priorities and expectations
of the individual CIS member states in relation to the EU. Most of them do not consider the EU to
be a key partner in their foreign policies and so they mainly respond to Brussels’ initiatives, while
rarely putting forward their own ones. They still attach much greater significance to bilateral rela-tions
with selected EU member states. Nevertheless, their general assessment of EU policy is
positive, mainly because the CIS countries have rather moderate expectations of the EU, except in
a few particular spheres. This view is shared above all by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and the
Central Asian states. For the same reasons, Belarus has a positive assessment of EU policy, pro-vided
that the EU does not criticise the Belarusian political regime41. Russia’s assessment of EU
policy is rather ambivalent and depends on particular spheres of EU-Russian cooperation, which is
less significant than bilateral relations with some individual EU member states. Ukraine and Geor-gia
have also taken a specific stand on this issue; they believe that the EU should adopt a much
more active policy in relation to them and that the aim of this policy should be to prepare the two
states for EU membership.
I.2.7.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan
Armenia and Azerbaijan assess current (although somewhat inert) EU policies quite positively,
mainly because of their moderate expectations of the EU42. The two states would like Brussels to
disregard issues of democratisation and civil liberties. Baku’s position is additionally strengthened
by the conviction that it is the EU that needs Azerbaijan more than vice versa, because of the lat-ter’s
oil and gas deposits. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have a positive assessment of the ENP,
mainly as a source of financial and technical support. They also consider the appointment of an EU
special representative for the Southern Caucasus as a positive step, which they see as a confirma-tion
of their importance in EU policy.
I.2.7.2. Moldova
The Moldovan authorities are satisfied with the current state of EU policy. They are afraid that
its strengthening would lead the EU to raise the issue of the state of democracy in Moldova more
frequently. As a result, the Moldovan authorities are satisfied with the ENP and are not pushing for
full and quick integration with the EU. Chisinau’s greatest expectation in relation to the EU con-cerns
Brussels’ participation in the settlement of the Transnistria conflict and this province’s reinte-gration
into Moldova proper (the EU is mainly expected to provide financial support).
I.2.7.3. Central Asia
The Central Asian states do not expect the EU to intensify its activity towards them. The EU
strategy in relation to this region and the appointment of an EU special representative for Central
Asia have received positive appraisal in the region. However, these EU actions have mainly been
41 Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Kamil Kłysiński, ‘Belarus – a new wave of repression,’ Eastweek
Analytical Newsletter of the Centre for Eastern Studies, issue 12 (121), 12 April 2008,
http://osw.waw.pl/en/epub/EW/2008/080402/01.htm.
42 Haroutiun Khachatrian, ‘New Partnership with European Union Prompts Hopes in Armenia’,
Eurasianet.org, 30 November 2006.

interpreted as an appreciation of the Central Asian states’ significance and position, and less so as
Brussels’ intention to increase its activity in the region.
I.2.7.4. Belarus
Minsk takes the view that the development of EU-Belarusian relations should be independent
of the assessment of Belarus’s political situation43. For this reason, Minsk has negatively assessed
the document entitled ‘What the European Union could bring to Belarus’, which is the basis of the
EU’s policy in relation to Belarus44. The Belarusian authorities have appealed for ‘pragmatic’ and
‘depoliticised’ cooperation, mainly in the economic sphere, and treat the EU’s criticism as interfer-ence
in their internal affairs. Belarus also accuses the EU of having adopted double standards:
Brussels has welcomed the President of Turkmenistan, a country rich in fossil fuels, while it boy-cotts
the ‘more democratic’ Belarusian authorities. Despite these objections, Minsk is aware of the
limited potential of the EU’s foreign policy, especially when it comes to influencing the internal
situation in Belarus. Minsk has also given a positive appraisal of the ENP, as it opens up the pos-sibility
of Belarus obtaining financial support and cooperating in ‘non-political’ spheres45.
I.2.7.5. Georgia
Officially, Georgia has a positive assessment of EU policy, although Tbilisi considers it to be
too cautious and inert. The Georgian authorities would like Brussels to become more involved in
Georgia’s economic transformation and in resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia46.
The authorities in Tbilisi claim that these conflicts are also the EU’s problem, and therefore that
Brussels should become more involved in their resolution. In this context, Georgia expects the EU
to take a firm stand towards Russia. Tbilisi also wants the EU to pay less attention to the flaws in
Georgian democracy and to understand the country’s complicated domestic and international
situation. Georgia also expects the EU to increase its financial and technical support. At the same
time, Tbilisi has welcomed the decision to extend the ENP to encompass Georgia and considers
this as a sign of recognition for Georgia’s aspirations. In the longer term, the Georgian authorities
expect the EU to offer them the prospect of EU membership.
I.2.7.6. Ukraine
Among the CIS states, Ukraine has the most serious reservations about EU policy. Kyiv’s main
concern is Brussels’ reluctance to offer Ukraine membership prospects; for these reasons Ukraine
is critical of the ENP idea, considering it to be ‘politically incorrect’. Ukraine claims to be a Euro-pean
country, and therefore not subject to the European Neighbourhood Policy47. Despite this,
Ukraine has accepted the current EU offer, as Kyiv is doing its best to maintain good relations with
the EU and show its determination to cooperate. For these reasons, Ukraine is participating in the
ENP and has signed the ENP Action Plan, even though it believes the document does not corre-spond
to Ukrainian aspirations and does not bring it any closer to EU membership. On the other
hand, the EU’s proposals to sign the New Enhanced Agreement (to replace the PCA), and on the
deep free-trade area, are treated as acknowledgment of Ukraine’s special status. In Ukraine’s per-ception,
these will be the real instruments that will draw the country closer to the EU. Having said
that, Kyiv’s overall assessment of the EU’s policy remains largely negative. Ukraine is critical of the
EU’s insufficient involvement in Ukraine’s transformation and of the refusal to offer Ukraine EU
43 Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Kamil Kłysiński, ‘Belarus – a new wave…’, op. cit.
44 Yury Chavusau, ‘One Year After the European Message: Reaction of Official Minsk to the EU’s Twelve
Demands’, BISS Blitz #13/2007, 5 December 2007,
http://www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/blitz20071205eumessageen.pdf.
45 Belarusian deputy minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Martynau, inteview for ‘Belaruskaya dumka’
journal, no. 3/2008, http://www.mfa.gov.by/ru/publications/mass-media/ece9347523743ff5.html
46 ‘EU Mulls New Opportunities for Breakaway Regions,’ Civil Georgia, 22 January 2007.
47 See for example Volchuk (2008, p. 89) and the comment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine on the communiqué from the European Commission on the Implementation of the European
Neighbourhood Policy in 2007 to the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, 3 April 2008,
http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/17692.htm.

membership prospects, which the country considers its key objective in relation to the EU (Górska,
2005).
I.2.7.7. Russia
Russia’s assessment of EU policy is relatively positive, although Moscow has a number of
reservations about it48. Moscow’s perception of the EU is based on a conviction that the EU’s role
on the international stage is weaker than Russia’s, as Brussels is not able to establish a common
foreign policy. Therefore, Moscow considers bilateral relations with the EU’s largest member states
to be much more important than relations with the EU as a whole49, and this is not likely to change
soon. Until recently, the opinion in Russia was widespread that the EU has found itself in a deep
crisis, resulting from the Constitutional Treaty fiasco and its double enlargement. In Moscow’s opin-ion,
these two issues have further weakened the EU’s ability to adopt a joint policy in relation to
Russia. Moscow sees the EU’s foreign policy as still being at an initial stage of development. The
advantages resulting from this state of affairs, from the Russian point of view, are an evolution to-wards
a multi-polar world and the weakening of the United States’ position in Europe, while the
main draw back is the EU’s rising activity in the CIS area, which Russia perceives as its own
sphere of influence. Moscow expects the EU to consult on its actions concerning all important in-ternational
affairs, above all those concerning the post-Soviet area50. At the same time, Moscow is
critical of the influence of several new EU member states (mainly the Baltic States and Poland) on
the EU’s policy towards Russia. Moscow accuses these states of Russophobia and of trying to
achieve their own goals at the expense of the EU (to support their point, Russia highlighted the
Polish veto of EU-Russia talks concerning a new basic agreement51). Russia also accuses the EU
of double standards, pointing to the fact that Brussels ignores the infringement of the Russian-speaking
minority rights in Latvia and Estonia while criticising Russia for human rights violations.
Another issue is Moscow’s critical assessment of EU policies in non-political spheres, espe-cially
the energy sphere. Russia realises that the EU has a certain potential in this area. In Mos-cow’s
opinion, deepening European integration may prove to be harmful to Russian interests
(Kaczmarski and Smolar, 2007, pp. 27-29). The projects it considers posing the greatest threat are
those that may hamper the expansion of Russian capital (energy companies, among other firms)
on the EU market.
I.3. Economic interests
For most of the CIS, economic exchange is the key area to their cooperation with the EU. The
EU is either the most important (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan) or a significant (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) economic partner
for the CIS states. For most of them, trade exchange is the priority field of cooperation with the EU,
especially for Belarus and Russia, whose economies are heavily dependent on exports to EU mar-kets.
For Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia exports to EU markets are also substantial. The situation
is more diversified among Central Asian countries. A substantial proportion of Kazakhstan’s and
Tajikistan’s exports are directed to the EU (in Kazakhstan’s case mainly oil, and aluminium in Taji-kistan’s),
but for Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, key economic partners include Russia,
China, Turkey and Iran rather than the EU. The EU’s economic cooperation with Central Asian
countries is impeded by their remote location and low development level (excluding Kazakhstan)
when compared to other CIS countries. In the institutional sphere, the Central Asian priority is co-operation
with the member states of the Eurasian Economic Community (all countries in the region,
except for Turkmenistan, are members of the Community).
The CIS countries have two priorities in their economic cooperation with the EU: getting ac-cess
to the EU’s markets and attracting EU investments in their economies. These interests are
shared by all the CIS countries, although to different degrees depending on the nature of their
48 Obzor vneshney politiki…, op. cit.
49 Charles Grant, ‘What to do about Russia’, The Guardian, 22 October 2006.
50 Compare Nadezhda Arbatova, ‘Russia-EU beyond 2007. Russian Domestic Debates’,
Russia.Nei.Visions, no. 20, IFRI, June 2007, pp. 5-8.
51 For example, see the statement by Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Reuters, 30 January 2007.

economies. For some of the CIS countries, energy cooperation is another priority; the model for
this cooperation depends on whether any given state is a net exporter or importer of energy re-sources.
Considering the three spheres mentioned above, we may learn how the CIS states have
articulated their economic interests in relation to the EU.
Table 1. Russia’s and EU’s share in foreign trade of CIS countries, 2006
(percentage of total exports and imports)
Exports to the EU Imports from the EU Imports from Russia Exports to Russia
Armenia 46 25 13 11
Azerbaijan 55 29 22 5
Belarus* 43 21 59 37
Georgia 18 25 15 7
Kazakhstan 43 23 36 11
Kyrgyzstan 4 12 38 19
Moldova 51 45 20 22
Russia 56 37 – –
Tajikistan 45 14 24 4
Turkmenistan –** –** 9 –**
Ukraine* 30 37 27 25
Uzbekistan –** –** 27 23
Notes. * – 2007 data; ** – no data available. Different data sources used to compile the table limit the com-parability
of presented figures.
Source: Statistical agencies of CIS countries.
I.3.1. Access to the EU market
For many companies in the CIS area, the EU’s is the most important export market, hence
their attempts to reduce the existing trade barriers. This is an important issue in the policies of
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, for whom economic integration with the EU is supposed to tempo-rarily
replace political integration. The authorities of these three states assume that the process of
establishing a free trade area will become a stimulus to modernise their economies and transform
their economic policies, and will thus draw them closer to meeting the criteria of EU membership.
Russia, Belarus (Liakhovich, 2008, p. 3) and Armenia (Minasian, 2005, p. 28) are also interested in
a greater opening-up of the EU market to their products. Armenia would also like to establish a free
trade area with the EU. These issues are less relevant to the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan,
as their economies are less developed, and more fossil-fuel or agriculture-oriented. Only Kazakh-stan,
which has significant economic potential, is interested in increasing its non-resource exports
to the EU, as well as in obtaining Brussels’ support for its access to the WTO (Ipek, 2007). Uzbeki-stan’s
priority is the lifting of economic sanctions imposed by the EU, as they significantly limit
Uzbek exports to the EU52.
The establishment of a deep free-trade area is treated as a priority, especially by Ukraine (Ja-kubak
and Kolesnichenko, 2006, pp. 13-14; CEPS, 2006, pp. 21-22). The negotiations on this is-sue
started in February 2008, after the decision to admit Ukraine into the WTO. The agreement will
surpass the standard free-trade agreement and, apart from lifting customs duties, will also include
provisions concerning liberalisation of services and regulatory convergence with the EU. The es-tablishment
of a free trade area is thus intended to help Ukraine meet EU membership criteria.
Gradual adaptation to EU standards is supposed to improve the quality of Ukrainian products, con-tribute
to the modernisation of Ukrainian industry and enhance its competitiveness on the EU mar-ket.
There is no unanimous support for the establishment of an enhanced deep free-trade area in
Ukraine; the idea is supported by big business, which is interested in getting greater access to EU
markets and has significant leverage on political parties (mainly the Party of Regions)53. This ap-plies
particularly to the metallurgy sector, which has a powerful political lobby. On the other hand,
both exporters and importers are interested in reduction of the non-tariff barriers in their trade with
52 ‘Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions…’, op. cit.
53 For more information on the interests of Ukrainian economic lobbies in relation to the establishment of
a free trade area with the EU see Shumylo, (2006, pp. 20-22).

the EU. The opponents of the free trade area include some producers of industrial products, espe-cially
those who export their goods to CIS markets (Puglisi, 2008, pp. 70-73).
Moldova, Georgia and Armenia also expect an agreement on a free trade area with the EU to
be signed soon, and this objective is widely supported within all three countries. Both Moldova and
Georgia, whose economies are agriculture-oriented, attach great importance to the lifting of barri-ers
to agricultural exports to the EU, even though they realise that it may be hard to achieve. Lifting
these barriers may be helpful in the context of the Russian embargo on Georgian and Moldovan
agricultural products and wine (the latter being the main export product of both states)54. Even
though the year-long Russian embargo on Moldovan products has already been lifted, it signifi-cantly
weakened Moldovan producers’ position on the Russian market, which hitherto had been
their main market. Moreover, companies from Moldova’s separatist province of Transnistria are
also interested in keeping and expanding their access to the EU market. Currently, Transnistrian
exports amount to $250 million, i.e. more than half the total exports to the EU from the Republic of
Moldova (including Transnistria)55.
In EU-Russia relations also foreseen is the creation of the so-called Common European Eco-nomic
Space, aimed at establishing an “open and integrated market” between Russia and the
EU56. This concept assumes that the economies of Russia and the EU will become at least partially
integrated. However, the details have not been worked out and the target model of mutual eco-nomic
relations remains somewhat unclear (Menkiszak, 2006, p. 49). Moscow declares that it is
interested in getting better access to the EU market. Talks on the establishment of a free trade
area could start after Russia joins the WTO57.
Belarus is interested in expanding its economic exchange with the EU, although not in the es-tablishment
of a free trade area (Liakhovich, 2008, pp. 3-4). The Belarusian economy is heavily
dependent on exports, largely directed towards the EU markets. In particular, exports of oil prod-ucts
(which accounted for around 60% of Belarusian exports to the EU in 2006) have been buoyant
for the last few years. An important problem in Belarus’s economic relations with the EU has been
Minsk’s exclusion from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The Council of the Euro-pean
Union took this decision in December 2006, following a motion by the International Labour
Organisation, which had accused Belarus of labour rights violations. As of June 2007, Belarus has
remained outside the GSP (which has affected its exports of timber, textiles and artificial fibres).
Even though the effects on the trade balance have been very limited (around $36 million a year58),
the exclusion itself has symbolic importance and has shown Minsk that the EU is capable of exert-ing
negative leverage on the Belarusian economy. It is in Minsk’s best interests to return to the
GSP, although it will not be able to do so without changing the legal status of Belarusian trade un-ions
and employees. Having said that, the authorities in Minsk are unlikely to change their legisla-tion
to satisfy the International Labour Organisation’s requirements.
Apart from the ongoing process of opening up the EU markets to firms and products from the
CIS area, some companies from the region (especially Russia and Ukraine, but also Kazakhstan,
Moldova and Georgia) have been seeking to enter the EU member states’ stock exchanges. As of
late 2007, Belarusian state-companies have also shown interest in entering EU stock markets.
I.3.2. Cooperation in the energy sphere
The CIS states can be divided into three groups, according to their interests in the energy
sphere in relation to the EU: the first group is made up of Russia alone, the second of other states
54 Hedenskog and Larsson (2007, pp. 61-65). Access of Georgian and Moldovan agricultural products to
the EU market will also lead to a rise in quality standards.
55 Dmitrij Sierov, ‘Pod flagom Moldovy Pridnestrovskiye predpriyatiya narashchivayut export v ES’, Puls,
25 January 2008.
56 Road Map for the Common Economic Space,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/road_map_ces.pdf.
57 Road Map for the Common Economic Space,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/road_map_ces.pdf.
58 Torbjoern Becker, Jesper Roine, SITE Country report: Belarus, Stockholm 2007. http://www.hhs.se-
/NR/rdonlyres/BC22DC52-08B1-4EE4-A16A-FF5D362C1C65/0/BelarusCountryReport4b.pdf. Kirill Hajduk
and Vitali Silitski, ‘After the GSP withdrawal: the case for the revision of the EU policy towards Belarus’,
BISS, 7 August 2007, http://www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/gspaug7en.pdf.

that export their energy resources to the EU and the third of transit states and importers of energy
resources.
I.3.2.1. Russia
Russia is the main producer of oil and gas in the post-Soviet area and a significant exporter of
these resources to the EU. Currently, Russian gas makes up 38% of the EU’s gas imports, while
oil makes up 33%59). Russia therefore has specific interests in the energy sphere related to the EU
and to this end has initiated projects to construct new pipelines: the Nord Stream (running under
the Baltic Sea) and the South Stream (running under the Black Sea). The creation of the new
routes is aimed at strengthening Russia's position as the main supplier of gas to the EU market
and reduce its dependence on transit countries (mainly Ukraine and Belarus). Moreover, Moscow
is interested in raising its share of energy resources supplied to the EU market.60 Russia also
wants Brussels to give up its plans to construct infrastructure for new resource routes that would
circumvent Russia61. Russia's main objective is to maintain its monopoly as a transit country for
Central Asian oil and gas. At the same time, Russia wants EU energy companies to invest their
capital and technologies in the Russian oil and gas sector, provided that these companies do not
have controlling stakes in such projects62.
Another of Russia's objectives is to avoid EU regulations that could limit the operations of Rus-sian
energy companies on the EU market. Russia’s main source of concern is the actions taken by
European Commission as part of the so-called ‘third energy package’, which provides for unbun-dling
of energy production from distribution and transmission. Gazprom, the Russian gas monop-oly,
also aspires to substantially increase its share in the EU’s retail gas market. However, Gaz-prom
has faced stiff resistance from EU institutions as well as from some member states anxious
about Gazprom’s expansion and its possible consequences. Therefore, Moscow has been lobby-ing
against the adoption of energy legislation that would adversely affect its interests and has
found support from several influential EU member states (Germany and France), whose positions
have been strongly influenced by several domestic issues. The European Commission’s plans are
in turn supported by some of the CIS states who would like the EU to adopt an active common
energy policy. Should the individual EU member states adopt the most radical version of the draft
project for liberalising the gas market (ownership unbundling), both Gazprom’s current position and
its plans for further expansion in the EU might be undermined63.
Russia has also refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), nor has it reached a con-sensus
with the EU on a document that would provide for practical implementation of Energy Char-ter
provisions on energy transit (the so-called discussion on the Transit Protocol), claiming that in
its current form the ECT might impair the interests of Russian energy companies and favour EU
companies64. Moscow believes that the ECT (and some version of a Transit Protocol) should either
be completed by new provisions that would meet Russia’s demands, or be revised.
59 See Eurostat, Data in focus, no. 16/2008 and 17/2008.
60 EU gas imports are expected to grow substantially in the coming years. According to recent forecasts,
by 2030 the EU may import around 84% of the gas it consumes (DG TREN, 2008, p. 13) A significant part of
the increased gas demand may be covered by imports from Russia, although there is substantial uncertainty
as to its exact export potential (CASE, 2008).
61 Cf. Transcript of remarks and replies to media questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ser-gey
Lavrov at a joint press conference of G8 foreign ministers following their meeting, Moscow, June 29,
2006. www.mid.ru. Russia aims to block European energy projects (such as Nabucco) by promoting alterna-tive
routes (the South Stream).
62 Proof of this includes the increase in government control over so-called strategic resources.
63 From Gazprom’s point of view, the greatest threat is posed by the European Commission’s proposal
to force the separation of energy production, transmission and distribution (so-called ‘unbundling’). See Judy
Dempsey, ‘Gazprom challenges EU proposal. Russian giant opposes breakup of energy operations in bloc’,
The New York Times, 22 May 2008 and Locatelli (2008).
64 See Larsson (2006, p. 180) and Sergey Yastrzhembsky, ‘Ya vizhu zainteresovannost Yevrosoyuza’,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 November 2006.

I.3.2.2. Energy commodity exporters (apart from Russia)
In the case of the other oil- and gas-exporting CIS countries, their economic interests in the
EU are largely limited to the energy sector. Other sectors are significantly less important, as is evi-dent
from the EU’s import structure. This applies to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (in
the case of Kazakhstan, however, exports of other mineral resources are also important). How-ever,
EU-based energy companies (especially ENI, BP and Shell), and not the EU itself, are per-ceived
in these states as cooperation partners in projects for diversifying energy resource supplies
(such as the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian gas pipelines) (Starchenkov, 2006). Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan have used their negotiations with Brussels on energy issues mainly to strengthen
their bargaining positions in their relations with Moscow (Kazakhstan wants to persuade Russia to
develop the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which transports Kazakh oil to European markets via
Russia; both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan want to act as strong players against Moscow) and
China, which is becoming an increasingly important economic partner and investor in the Central
Asian states (as shown by the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, construction of a gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan to China, the increasing involvement of Chinese companies in the development
of Kazakh and Turkmen gas fields, etc.).
In the longer term, Turkmenistan may want to reduce its dependence on the transit of its gas
via Russia and may join the project to construct a gas pipeline to the EU that would circumvent
Russia. In Central Asia, only Kazakhstan, due to its considerable economic potential, has its own
economic interests in relation to the EU outside the energy sector65. These are mainly linked to
exports of Kazakh mineral resources and metal products to the EU (uranium, titanium and steel).
Among all the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan’s economy has the closest ties with the EU.
Like Russian energy companies, companies from Kazakhstan (KazMunaiGaz) and Azerbaijan
(SOCAR) are seeking to expand into EU markets, including the takeover of assets in EU member
states (this process has already begun in Romania66).
I.3.2.3. Transit states and energy resource importers
A group of CIS states has been attempting to drum up EU support for projects aimed at diver-sifying
the supplies of energy resources. Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan want the EU to join a
project aimed at constructing an oil pipeline running along the Odessa-Brody-Plock route, which is
intended to transport oil from the Caspian Sea67. Azerbaijan and Georgia also expect the EU to
provide greater support for the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project (this pipeline is intended to
transport gas from the Caspian Sea region to the EU). This project is particularly significant for
Azerbaijan, which is seeking to create permanent ties between the EU market and the energy re-sources
from the Caspian Sea region, transported to the EU via Azerbaijan (Piotrowski, 2008, pp.
99-101). Baku’s objective is to become a significant transit country for Kazakh and Turkmen re-sources
in case its own resources become depleted.
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, which are the transit countries for transporting Russian energy
resources to the EU, are seeking to maintain this position (Dura, 2008b, p. 7). On one hand, this is
seen generating considerable financial revenues, and on the other, guaranteeing their energy se-curity.
With these objectives in mind, they are trying to persuade Brussels that they are and will
remain safe and reliable transit states, no matter what Russian propaganda says. These three
countries and Georgia are trying to win Brussels’ support in their negotiations with Russia, with
whom they have been disputing prices and terms of energy resource supplies over the last few
years. Minsk, Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi expect the EU to adopt an efficient energy policy and to
exert pressure on Moscow to stop using its oil and gas as tools in its foreign policy in relation to
other CIS states.
65 ‘Central Asia’s Energy Risks’, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 133, 24 May 2007, pp. 3-4,
21-22, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/central_asia/133_central_asia_s_energy_risks.pdf.
66 ‘EU Anxious to Shake Off Energy Dependence on Russia’, Kommersant, 9 March 2007; Vladimir
Socor, ‘Bridgehead in Europe: Kazakhstan Acquires Romania’s Rompetrol’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, volume 4,
issue 165, 7 September 2007.
67 Roman Kupchinsky, Ukraine: ‘Odessa-Brody Pipeline Potential Still Unused’, RFE/RL, 12 January
2007.

The CIS energy importers want to obtain financial and technical support from the EU so they
can implement more efficient and energy-saving technologies and develop alternative sources of
energy (such as hydroelectric power in Georgia). Ukraine is also trying to obtain EU support to
modernise its coal mines68, as well as for cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy safety (which
applies to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, among other sites), and to reform its gas network
management system.
Belarus stands out from among the other CIS states as regards its energy sector. Although
Belarus has no domestic oil fields, it exports large amounts of oil products to EU markets (mainly
diesel oil), which account for close to 60% of total Belarusian exports to the EU. Belarus owes this
to Russia, whose oil it processes in the Novopolatsk and Mazyr refineries and then re-exports it,
mainly to the Netherlands and the UK. Belarus wishes to maintain this model of cooperation, which
generates huge revenues for the Belarusian budget. However, this scheme could be threatened if
Russia remains determined to change the current preferential terms of exporting Russian oil to
Belarus69. At the same time, Belarus would like to drum up EU support for implementing energy-saving
technologies.
I.3.3. EU investments
All the CIS states want to attract investments from EU member states, and are generally open
to foreign investments, including from the EU. EU investors are believed to support modernisation
and development of the CIS economies, spreading a new corporate culture and strengthening their
stock markets. The CIS countries differ significantly as regards the overall investment climate and
other characteristics of their domestic markets that determine their attractiveness in the eyes of EU
investors. For example, the energy-rich economies of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turk-menistan
can expect continued interest from EU energy-sector investors, despite legislative
frameworks and implementation practices that do not appear to be very favourable. Also, more
developed countries with large internal markets (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) are much more
attractive to EU investors than smaller, less-developed countries. In some countries (especially
Georgia and Ukraine) investments from the EU are welcomed as they are regarded as being much
less ‘politicised’ than Russian ones. This attitude may also be noted in Belarus, which has recently
been trying to attract investors from the EU to protect itself against the expansion of Russian capi-tal.
I.3.4. Investments in the EU
Russia, and also to some extent Ukraine and Kazakhstan, have seen more significant FDI out-flows,
also directed to EU markets70. In this regard, Russia has been seeking to remove barriers to
its investments in the EU, which it considers politically-motivated71. Russia also expects Brussels
not to put up barriers to investments from Russian state funds into selected sectors of the EU
economy.
I.4. Security objectives
The CIS countries do not perceive the EU as a potentially influential player in the security
sphere. In this respect they regard NATO and the United States to be much more serious actors. In
the post-Soviet area, the EU is still perceived as a civilian power, albeit with some capabilities to
act in the sphere of security and defence (for instance, the European Security and Defence Policy
68 The EU-Ukraine Action Plan contained provisions concerning coal mines and energy efficiency; see
points 55 and 56, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.
69 This was partly done in January 2007, when Russia introduced customs duties on oil exports to Bela-rus
(however, the duties were only one-third of the ordinary value). For more, see among others Yafimava
and Stern (2007), Konończuk (2007b).
70 They have invested especially in the telecommunications sector, metallurgy, construction, the air
industry and the banking sector.
71 Russia perceives the European Commission’s attempts to block the expansion of Gazprom and Ru-sAl’s
failure to take over Europe’s largest aluminium producer as actions aimed at creating barriers to Rus-sian
capital.

[ESDP]). However, some CIS states envisage the EU significantly increasing its potential in the
security sphere in the next few years, and see this as an opportunity to enhance their own position.
This view is shared by Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and the Southern Caucasus states. The Central
Asian states, due to their remoteness, do not have any concrete security concerns in relation to the
EU.
I.4.1. Conflict resolution (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh)
The priority of several CIS states is to make the EU actively involved in the resolution of con-flicts
that have arisen on their territories. Such an attitude is well presented by Moldova (regarding
the Transnistria problem), Georgia (the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Azerbaijan
(the Karabakh conflict). At the same time, these states are anxious about the consequences of
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which they regard as a precedent with possible dangerous
consequences for the CIS area. They are trying to convince the EU that the conflicts on their terri-tories
are also EU problems, and Brussels should become more involved in their resolution.
Moldova expects that apart from becoming an active participant in the 5+2 peace negotiations
(OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the United States, the EU and Moldova and Transnistria), the EU will also
pressure Russia to withdraw its troops from Transnistria (Todua, 2007). Chisinau points to the EU
Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) as a successful example of the EU’s
involvement (EUBAM monitors the situation on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border in Transnistria).
The mission has also been positively appraised and supported by Ukraine (its headquarters are
located in Odessa). However, at the moment Moldova seems to be disappointed by the lack of
active EU involvement in the conflict’s resolution in recent years and sees a greater chance to
solve the problem in cooperation with Russia. The Moldovan opposition does not share this view; it
is convinced that the EU’s whole-hearted involvement is the only way to solve the problem and
prevent Russia from reducing Moldova politically and economically to a kind of de facto vassalage.
Georgia wishes to make the EU an important actor in resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Tbilisi is convinced that Brussels has important instruments for solving the problem,
but that it is reluctant to use them. Georgia wants EU peacekeeping forces to be deployed in the
two separatist provinces so that they can replace the Russian corps currently operating there un-der
the banner of the CIS mission (Lynch, 2006, pp. 45-51). Another Georgian objective in the con-text
of the Abkhaz and Ossetian separatisms is to persuade the EU to take a more critical stand
towards Russia, whose position Tbilisi perceives as destructive. In fact, Georgia would like to see
the EU act as a counterbalance to Russia’s influence (both in the security sphere and elsewhere),
or even as a political player that could adopt a policy of restraining Russia.
Azerbaijan and Armenia take a slightly different stand on the EU’s possible involvement in re-solving
the Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan does not overestimate the EU’s potential in this field, al-though
it is aware of Brussels’ positive contribution72. At the same time, the authorities in Baku are
worried that some EU member states considered to be Armenia’s allies (mainly France) will take
actions at the EU forum to undermine Azerbaijan’s interests. Armenia perceives the EU and indi-vidual
member states in the context of their possible ability to prevent Azerbaijan from attempts to
resolve the Karabakh conflict by force. At the same time, Armenia does not seek the greater in-volvement
of EU diplomacy in the conflict. The Armenian authorities’ objective is to maintain the
status quo in Karabakh, or at best to help the province to become independent73.
I.4.2. The specific interests of individual CIS states
I.4.2.1. Russia
Among the CIS states, Russia stands out as the country with ambitions and international posi-tion
greatly in excess of those of any other state in the CIS area. Russia thus has its own well-
72 ‘Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?’, International Crisis Group, Europe Report no. 156, 13 May
2004, p. 31. http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/156_azerbaijan_turning_over_a_-
new_leaf.pdf.
73 Emil Danielyan, ‘Armenia/Azerbaijan: Has A New Chance Emerged For Karabakh Peace?’, RFE/RL,
15 February 2007; Shaun Walker, Daria Vaisman, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh's referendum’, OpenDemocracy.org,
14 December 2006.

articulated security interests related to the EU. Moscow and Brussels share in their declarations a
similar vision of the international order (multipolarity/effective multilateralism), and a similar ap-proach
to several key international problems, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and the necessity of solving the Middle Eastern conflicts74. Russia wishes to increase
the EU’s independence in the sphere of security, as it assumes that this might cause greater ten-sion
in trans-Atlantic relations and weaken the position of the United States in Europe75. Russian
diplomacy also seeks to win EU support for Moscow’s objections over plans to locate American
missile defence sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. In this context, Russia's objective is to
weaken the ties between the US and Europe in the security sphere. Russia has tried to persuade
the EU (and European members of NATO) member states that the US missile defence system
would threaten the stability of the European continent and also to intimidate the EU with a vision of
Russia’s possible response to American plans. Moreover Russia has been trying to acquire influ-ence
on European Security and Defence Policy (for example by participating in the EU’s stabilisa-tion
missions, provided Moscow is allowed to take part in the decision-making processes). Russia
perceives the ESDP as a factor that may weaken NATO’s position in the European security archi-tecture,
which is in Moscow’s best interests.
I.4.2.2. Ukraine and Georgia
Ukraine and Georgia perceive the EU as an important positive factor in their attempts to ac-complish
their security objectives, first of all to join NATO and to drum up international support in
their tense relations with Russia. At the same time, both Kyiv and Tbilisi are aware of the EU’s lim-ited
potential in the spheres of foreign policy and international security. Despite this, Ukraine has
actively supported the ESDP, participated in the EU’s policing activities in Bosnia & Herzegovina
and Macedonia, and often appended its name to the EU’s joint statements (on Belarus, among
other issues) (Samokhvalov, 2007, pp. 19-26). Some political parties in Ukraine (mainly the Party
of Regions) perceive their country’s participation in the EU’s security policy as a solution that could
substitute for Ukraine’s membership in NATO (the latter issue has raised serious controversy in
Ukraine).
I.4.2.3. Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan attaches great importance to cooperation with the EU on the ‘Iran problem’, espe-cially
with regard to its objections to military solutions. Baku perceives this scenario as a potential
threat that could destabilise the whole region and damage its economic interests.
I.4.2.4. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan expect the West (including the EU and its member
states) to participate, on a long-term basis, in the process of stabilisation in Afghanistan (the latter
being perceived as a potential source of instability for the whole region), including the provision of
the EU development assistance.
74 Compare Obzor vneshney politiki…, op. cit.
75 Russia has already used a policy of dividing Europe and the US in relation to such problems as the
Kosovo issue and plans for NATO enlargement.

Part II: The European Union’s Offer to Its Eastern Neighbours
As illustrated in the previous part of this paper, the CIS countries have very diversified inter-ests
towards the EU. This heterogeneity has not passed unnoticed in Brussels, hence the various
stances the EU has adopted towards its Eastern neighbours. This part provides a brief account of
the diversified EU policies towards CIS countries76.
In terms of the EU’s policy towards the CIS area, the following countries or groups of countries
can be distinguished: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the South Caucasus states (Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia) and the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-menistan
and Uzbekistan). The development of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004
marked a breakthrough in this policy. The ENP does not cover Russia or the Central Asian states;
Belarus participates in it to a very limited extent.
II.1. The general framework
II.1.1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
Cooperation with most CIS countries is based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-ments
(PCAs), signed in the 1990s. These were concluded and ratified with Armenia (respectively,
in 1996 and 1999), Azerbaijan (1996 and 1999), Georgia (1996 and 1999), Kazakhstan (1995 and
1999), Kyrgyzstan (1995 and 1999), Moldova (1994 and 1998), the Russian Federation (1994 and
1997), Ukraine (1994 and 1998) and Uzbekistan (1996 and 1999).
The agreement with Tajikistan was signed in 2004, and at the time of writing this report was in
the process of being ratified by the EU member countries. An Interim Agreement regulating trade
issues came into force in May 2005.
Political reasons have prevented the ratification and coming into effect of agreements with
Belarus (signed in 1995) and with Turkmenistan (signed in 1998).
II.1.2. The European Neighbourhood Policy
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was adopted by the EU in 2004 on a basis of the
Wider Europe concept, which in turn was formulated in 2002. The ENP provides a framework for
bilateral cooperation between the EU and its southern and eastern neighbours. It covers countries
whose potential EU membership has not so far been taken into consideration, namely Algeria, Ar-menia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco,
the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Its main objectives include the stabilisation of
the EU’s neighbourhood, preventing the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe, promoting
European legal standards and values in neighbouring countries and establishing closer economic
ties. The ENP’s intention is to create an attractive offer and a new formula for contacts between the
EU and those countries that are not expected to be offered membership prospects in the medium
term.
Following two years of practical operations (2005-2006), the ENP underwent some changes.
Proposals to strengthen it were announced by the European Commission in December 2006. The
EC presented a document entitled Strengthening European Neighbourhood Policy77 as well as a
number of proposals (in so-called non-paper form). During the term of its EU presidency in 2007,
Germany also presented an ENP Plus concept, which was not officially published78.
The European Commission delivered a communication entitled A Strong European
Neighbourhood Policy79, on 5 December 2007. This stated that attention should principally be fo-
76 For a detailed account of EU member countries heterogeneous policies towards the CIS region see a
companion paper, Dura (2008a).
77 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Strengthening
European Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006) 726 final,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf.
78 The concept was widely covered in the press. See e.g. Emerson et al. (2007).
79 Communication from the Commission, ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, 5
December 2007, COM(2007) 774 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf.

cused on implementing the existing commitments. It emphasised the principle of differentiation,
which means that relations with individual states will depend on their political situation, their level of
ambition with regard to the EU, their reform agendas and their level of socio-economic develop-ment.
It indicated the need for joint ownership and the sense that it would be possible to co-create
a neighbourhood policy among the ENP partners. The key instrument in economic cooperation will
be the so-called deep free-trade area agreements covering trade in goods and services, as well as
harmonisation of the respective domestic legislation with EU acquis (in the long term, the EC pro-vided
for the possibility of establishing a Neighbourhood Economic Community between the EU
and the countries covered by the ENP, which could be complemented with an institutional compo-nent).
The Commission also suggested introducing some facilitation for the flow of people, includ-ing
labour movements (so-called mobility partnerships). This would have to be combined with in-creased
co-operation in the areas of internal security and combating organised crime and illegal
migration. The Commission has also pointed out the need for the EU to become more strongly
involved in conflict resolution in its neighbourhood.
On 18 February 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted its conclusions on the
ENP80. It emphasised above all the lack of a link between the ENP and membership. It determined
a “deep and comprehensive free-trade area”, which would be open to all countries that had already
joined the WTO. Strong emphasis was placed on the issue of people-to-people contacts and the
need to ease visa regimes for ENP partners. The necessity to enter into agreements on small-scale
cross-border traffic (within a 50-km zone on each side of a given border) with countries bor-dering
the Schengen zone was raised. Developing regional co-operation as part of the ENP was
supported.
Under the TACIS programme, the main EU aid instrument to CIS countries, €7.3 billion was
transferred between 1991 and 2006. As of 1 January 2007, financial instruments were standard-ised
and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), covering ENP partners
and Russia, was introduced. Additionally, further financial instruments, such as the Governance
Facility aimed at supporting key reforms in the most advanced countries and the Neighbourhood
Investment Fund adding to the loans granted by international financial institutions, were launched.
II.2. The regional framework
II.2.1. Policy towards the Southern Caucasus
The Southern Caucasus states were admitted to the ENP in June 2004. A common and at the
same time distinguishing feature of the EU’s offer to the Southern Caucasus states is the inclusion
of the development aid component into the programmes addressed to this region. Country Strategy
Papers (CSP, a standard EU instrument that sets out the framework for using EU aid) were
adopted for the period from 2007 to 2013 in cooperation with each individual state81. These were
completed by National Indicative Programmes (NIP, instruments that provided details for the aid
programmes for a given country), adopted for the period from 2007 to 2010. All the South Cauca-sus
countries also participate in the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), aimed at supporting democratisation projects, the rule of law and human rights.
The PCAs concluded with the Southern Caucasus states outline the following mechanisms of
cooperation: the Cooperation Council (annual meetings); the Cooperation Committee; the Sub-committee
for Trade, Economic and Legal Affairs; and the Committee of Parliamentary Coopera-tion.
On 14 November 2006, the EU concluded 5-year Action Plans (instruments that specify the
goals of cooperation of a given state with the EU) with all three countries.
In 2003, the EU increased its involvement in the region by appointing a Special Representative
for the Southern Caucasus, whose mandate includes support for resolution of the conflicts in Kara-bakh,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
80 Council Conclusions on European Neighbourhood Policy, 2851st External Relations Council Meeting,
Brussels, 18 February 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/-
98790.pdf.
81 Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programmes and Action Plans for the South Caucasus
states can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.

In relation to Armenia, the EU’s priority is to support democratisation, human rights, socio-economic
reforms, poverty alleviation and conflict resolution. According to the NIP, Armenia is to
receive aid totalling €98 million in the period 2007-2010. The priorities of this programme include
support for democratic institutions and good governance, assistance in implementing regulatory
reforms, supporting the efficiency of administration and poverty alleviation.
The EU’s priorities in Azerbaijan include support for democratisation, human rights, socio-economic
reforms, poverty alleviation and conflict resolution. According to the NIP, Azerbaijan is to
receive aid totalling €92 million during 2007-2010. The priorities of this programme include support
for democratisation, the rule of law and basic freedoms; socio-economic reforms and the harmoni-sation
of the Azeri legal system with EU standards; energy and transport. On 7 November 2007,
the EU and Azerbaijan signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which was intended to set up
partnership in the energy sphere. At the same time, the EU has emphasised the importance of
‘proper’ organisation of the 2008 presidential election, which is perceived as a test for Azerbaijan’s
democracy. Special attention will be given to freedom of the media.
As for Georgia, the EU’s priorities provided in the Action Plan encompass support for democ-racy,
the rule of law and human rights, socio-economic reforms, improvement of the investment
climate, poverty alleviation, conflict resolution, internal security issues and regional cooperation.
According to the NIP, Georgia is to receive aid totalling €120 million during 2007-2010. The priori-ties
of this programme include support for democratisation and economic development, implemen-tation
of the Action Plan, support for social reforms and poverty alleviation and assistance in the
peaceful resolution of internal conflicts. The EU’s support addressed to the resolution of conflicts is
mostly meant to improve the living conditions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. The European Commission is also an observer in the Joint Control Commis-sion
for South Ossetia, which is made up of representatives of Russia (including the province of
North Ossetia), Georgia and South Ossetia.
Feasibility studies regarding deep free-trade area agreements with Georgia and Armenia were
completed in 2008, whereupon the Council of the European Union may decide on initiating nego-tiations.
II.2.2. Strategy towards Central Asia
In relation to Central Asia, the EU is convinced that many of the specific problems can only be
solved at the regional level and not by means of bilateral relations. This approach was imple-mented
in June 2007 by adopting The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership82. The
main objective outlined in the strategy was strengthening EU cooperation with the region. The
strategy included the following points: setting up a regular dialogue at foreign ministerial level;
starting up the ‘European Education Initiative’ aimed at supporting education systems in the region;
creating the ‘EU Initiative for the Rule of Law’; initiating a dialogue on human rights with each of the
Central Asian countries; and carrying out a regular dialogue on energy issues.
The EU’s involvement in the Central Asian region is based on recognition of several factors:
the threats that may spread from the region (organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism); the
search for diversification of energy resource supplies and transit routes; the promotion of the Mil-lennium
Development Goals; the EU’s geographical ‘movement’ towards Central Asia by including
the Southern Caucasus in the ENP. In 2005, the EU appointed a Special Representative for Cen-tral
Asia to boost cooperation with the region in the area of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
A significant aspect of the EU’s involvement is its support for development and poverty alleviation
(considerable funds have been earmarked for these purposes).
Apart from the initiatives mentioned, the European Commission has prepared the EC Regional
Strategy Paper for Central Asia 2007-2013 and a detailed Central Asia Indicative Programme for
the period from 2007 to 201083. The funds, earmarked for accomplishing these objectives, amount
to €719 million (for a six-year period) and will be transferred from the so-called Development Co-operation
Instrument (a financial instrument, part of the EU’s development aid, which was created
82 The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, Council of the European Union, Document
10113/07, Brussels, 31 May 2007, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.
pdf.
83 Both documents can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/c_asia/.

in 2006). The priorities of the programmes mentioned include regional cooperation and friendly
relations (30-35% of the budget), poverty alleviation and improving living standards (40-45%), and
the promotion of good governance and economic reforms (20-25%). 70% of these funds will be
earmarked for bilateral programmes.
In November 2006, the EU and Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on en-ergy
issues. The EU’s support will be directed to priority spheres such as support for political, eco-nomic,
legal and social reforms; infrastructure development and cooperation in the energy sector.
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the EU’s support will be concentrated on the development of rural
areas and poverty alleviation, support for social, political and market reforms and legal regulations
in the energy sector.
In Tajikistan, the EU’s support will be concentrated on the development of rural areas and
poverty alleviation, reforms in the agricultural sector, promotion of good governance and economic
reforms.
In 2004, the EU resumed dialogue with Turkmenistan by setting up a Joint Committee. The
priorities connected to the EU future support include economic, market and regulatory reforms (es-pecially
in the energy sector), promotion of civil society and the development of agriculture and
rural areas.
The dialogue with Uzbekistan was halted in November 2005 (including the partial suspension
of the PCA), following the Andijan massacre. In November 2007, having revised its previous policy,
the EU decided to resume dialogue, as defined in the PCA. The priorities of the EU’s future support
include the promotion of human rights and democratisation, support for civil society, the rule of law,
legal reforms and support for local development, including rural areas.
II.2.3. The Black Sea Synergy
The Black Sea Synergy, initiated in 2007 by the EU, is treated as a versatile way of supple-menting
other forms of bilateral cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours84. The
Synergy was established following Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, due to the EU’s
increased interest in the region. Another multilateral forum for cooperation for the EU with the re-gion
is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The Black Sea Synergy groups Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and the EU
Troika. The Synergy surpasses the legal framework of the ENP, and the EU itself as such. To a
certain extent, it could resemble the Northern Dimension project.
The first meeting of foreign ministers from the EU and the Black Sea states took place in Kyiv
in February 2008. The participants adopted a joint statement, wherein they emphasised that the
objective of the Synergy was to boost cooperation both within the region and between the region
and the EU85. Among the priorities of EU involvement they named the development of transport,
energy and transit infrastructures.
II.3. Individual policies
II.3.1. Special partnership with Russia
Even though Russia formally remains outside the ENP framework, in the 2004 strategy it was
identified as a key EU partner in its immediate neighbourhood. Cooperation with Russia was sup-posed
to be based on the four ‘common spaces’ set up during the EU-Russia summit in St Peters-burg
in 2003: the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Jus-tice,
the Common Space of Co-operation in the Field of External Security and the Common Space
on Research, Education and Culture. The EU declared that it was ready to include some elements
of the ENP in the strategic partnership with Russia, namely trans-border, regional and energy co-operation.
Moreover, as of 1 January 2007, Russia has been included in the European Neighbour-
84 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Black Sea
Synergy – a new regional cooperation initiative’, Brussels, COM(2007) 160 final, 11 April 2007,
85 “A Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the European Union and of
the wider Black Sea area”, Kyiv, 14 February 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/doc/-
joint_statement_blacksea_en.pdf.

hood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is the main instrument the EU uses for financing its
neighbourhood policy.
The main instrument for regulating the EU-Russian strategic partnership remains the Partner-ship
and Cooperation Agreement. On 1 December 2007, the 10-year period of PCA’s operation
expired, but was automatically prolonged for another year (the treaty is being prolonged provided
that neither of the parties revokes it within six months). The framework set up by the PCA is sup-plemented
by common spaces; the sector agreements that regulate different spheres of coopera-tion;
the Energy Dialogue, initiated in 2000; and institutionalised political dialogue. The regional
dimension of EU-Russia cooperation is based on the so-called Northern Dimension. Political dia-logue
has been institutionalised using the following instruments: summits twice a year; the Perma-nent
Partnership Council at the ministerial level; consultations on human rights issues (as of 2004);
meetings between the EU ‘troika’ with the Russian minister of foreign affairs; dialogue on external
security (meetings with the Political and Security Committee ‘troika’); meetings at the level of offi-cials
and experts.
The main field of cooperation relates to the four common spaces. In May 2005, during the EU-Russia
summit, the parties adopted so-called Road Maps, aimed at putting the common spaces
into practice86. The package was composed of four documents, which included bilateral political
commitments, albeit without being legally binding. These Maps identified the spheres of EU-Russian
cooperation, generally defined its objectives and principles and indicated the directions of
future activity (the documents included specification of the spheres of common activity, but did not
set any time limits on their implementation). Even though the nature of the Road Maps formally
suggests that the parties will mutually agree (itself meant to emphasise the partners’ equality) on
common regulations, the EU actually expects Russia to adapt itself to European standards. How-ever,
this adaptation only concerns selected fields and has not brought with it any detailed com-mitments
yet. These documents do not ‘condition’ the EU’s approach to Russia (in other words,
making support or closer cooperation dependent on Russia’s progress in the implementation of the
regulations adopted). The Road Maps are less ambitious than the analogous Action Plans con-cluded
with other states within the ENP framework; they seem less likely to be implemented
quickly and do not make the path of further cooperation framework clearer. A positive aspect of the
Road Maps is the ongoing process of the de facto acceptance of certain European standards by
Russian legislation, especially in the sphere of customs and industrial production, while a political
discussion on Russia's acceptance of the acquis is in progress.
The main achievements of the common spaces have included signing agreements on read-mission
and visa facilitation; initial agreements on fees on Siberia flights, on cooperation of the
European Border Security Service (Frontex) with the Russian border guard authorities; on the ex-tension
of the PCA to include Romania and Bulgaria; on the opening of the European Institute in
Moscow; on setting up Europol’s contact points, and on enhancing communication in the sphere of
crisis management.
In the European Commission’s documents intended to back up the ENP Russia has lost its
distinguished position, as compared to 2004. It is mentioned only twice – as a country that should
be involved in closer cooperation in the prevention of conflicts and supporting stability in Eastern
Europe and the Southern Caucasus, and in the context of cooperation and stabilisation processes
in the Black Sea region.
During the Helsinki summit in November 2006, the parties agreed to extend already existing
initiative of regional cooperation, the Northern Dimension, which encompasses the EU, Russia,
Norway and Iceland. The Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document and a Political Decla-ration
were signed87. The Northern Dimension is designed to boost cooperation between European
countries and Russia’s northwest regions (including the Kaliningrad oblast) in those areas that do
not raise political controversy.
The EU is still trying to work out a new legal framework for its relations with Russia (the so-called
PCA-2). The EU wants to sign a comprehensive agreement that would be legally binding for
both parties and would precisely define the commitments of both parties and how to accomplish
them. This agreement is intended to include the following fields: trade issues, terms of cooperation
in the energy sphere and human rights (although the latter issue was not made a priority).
86 The documents can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/.
87 The texts of both documents can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm.

There is some readiness on the side of the EU to develop new forms of cooperation, such as
the adoption of a free trade area (although this will require Russia’s membership in the WTO), and
in the longer term, a visa-free regime as well.
II.3.2. Ukraine
The EU has declared that in relation to Ukraine it is ready to proceed from cooperation to
gradual economic integration and deepened political cooperation. The EU is using the idea of
‘privileged relations’ to describe the formula for its relations with Ukraine.
The main forms of cooperation stated in the PCA include EU-Ukraine summits, with the par-ticipation
of the President of Ukraine (twice a year); the Cooperation Committee, with the participa-tion
of the Prime Minister; the Cooperation Council at ministerial level; the Parliamentary Coopera-tion
Committee; and regular consultations between Ukraine and the EU Troika. According to the
Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, eighty official meetings and consultations in different formats
take place every year. Within the Committee are sector subcommittees for trade and investments,
for finance, economy and statistics, for transport, energy, environment, training and technologies,
for customs, trans-border cooperation, fighting illegal immigration, money laundering and drug traf-ficking.
The PCA set out the priorities in EU-Ukraine cooperation: energy cooperation, trade and in-vestments,
legal and domestic affairs, harmonising Ukrainian legislation with EU standards, envi-ronment
protection, transport, trans-border cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and
space research.
The EU-Ukraine Action Plan was signed on 21 February 200588. On 18 June 2007, Brussels
approved the revised EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice.
On 5 March 2007, the EU and Ukraine started negotiations on a new post-PCA treaty, de-scribed
as a ‘new enhanced agreement’, and a year later on the deep free-trade area, since
Ukraine was in the latter stages of its accession to the WTO. In 2007, the EU initiated negotiations
with Ukraine on a Protocol defining Kyiv’s participation in the EU’s programmes and agendas. The
first allocation of funds under the Governance Facility was transferred to Ukraine in 2007. The EU-Ukraine
Action Plan of 2005 expired in early 2008. The EU suggested prolonging the agreement
for another year without changing its contents, which was considered the most pragmatic option.
As far as Ukraine is concerned, the character of the New Enhanced Agreement currently being
negotiated with the EU is the crucial question. The treaty is intended to include agreement on a
deep free-trade area, which would provide for the liberalisation of both trade and services. In the
sphere of transport, the new agreement on air transportation is under preparation. The New En-hanced
Agreement may possibly to some extent resemble the association agreements concluded
with the Central European countries during the 1990s, however it may leave aside the issue of
clear EU membership prospects.
The EU is ready to expand its cooperation with Ukraine in the external security sphere as well,
which would oblige Ukraine to adopt the Common Foreign and Security Policy declaration and
send its troops on EU missions.
The EU is trying to stimulate harmonising Ukrainian legislation with European standards, fur-ther
economic cooperation and making Ukraine more stable internally. In the political dimension,
the EU is not ready to offer Ukraine more than ‘privileged relations’. The EU-Ukraine agreement
will likely be experimental; it might include issues concerning all the three EU pillars (covering also
co-operation in the CFSP area and the JHA), and also have an institutional component.
II.3.3. Moldova
The EU-Moldova Action Plan was signed on 22 February 200589. It expired in early 2008, but
the EU has suggested prolonging it for another year, as in the case of Ukraine. The priorities de-fined
in the Action Plan include the strengthening of Moldova’s administrative and judicial capacity;
88 See the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_-
final_en.pdf.
89 See the EU-Moldova Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_-
final_en.pdf.

guaranteeing the freedom of speech and of the media; a permanent resolution to the Transnistrian
conflict; and combating trans-national crime. The main forum of cooperation is the annual Coop-eration
Council.
In its December 2007 communiqué, the European Commission suggested the introduction of
autonomous trade preferences for Moldova, which would lead to lifting of the customs tariffs on
industrial products and some tariffs on agricultural products.
The EU has maintained its involvement in resolving the Transnistrian conflict. In 2003, the EU
appointed a Special Representative for Moldova and imposed a visa ban on leaders of the separa-tist
Transnistria province. In 2005, the EU established a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and
Ukraine in order to reduce the illegal traffic of persons and goods. Two years later, the mission was
further prolonged. The EU also remains an observer in the 5+2 process.
II.3.4. Belarus
At the moment, Belarus remains in a state of semi-isolation in relation to the EU. In response
to violations of political rights during the presidential election in April 2006, the EU imposed sanc-tions,
including a visa ban on Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his inner circle, and freezing their eco-nomic
assets in Europe. By supporting the independent Belarusian media, the EU is also trying to
provide unbiased information to Belarusian society. The EU also provides financial support to re-duce
the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe and to combat trans-border crime. Other
spheres financially supported by the EU include the Belarusian NGO sector and scholarships (es-pecially
for students expelled from high schools for political reasons). Even though Belarus re-ceives
this support, it in fact remains outside the ENP framework.
On 21 November 2006, the EU offered to change its policy towards Belarus. Minsk was of-fered
inclusion in the ENP, on condition that Belarus initiated fundamental political and economic
reforms90. Minsk should in this respect start by ratifying the PCA signed in 1995. For its part, the
EU offered a visa facilitation agreement; extension of trans-border cooperation; support for the
development of entrepreneurship, especially in the sphere of SME; support for the development of
infrastructure and environmental protection; extension of the scholarship programme; resuming
dialogue with the Belarusian authorities; opening the EU market to Belarusian companies, espe-cially
from the textile sector; increasing financial support. The main condition Belarus has to fulfil is
to join the twelve-step democratisation programme, which includes democratic elections, respect-ing
freedom of speech and other freedoms and civil rights, releasing political prisoners, etc.
A representative of the Belarusian government was invited to the conference on the ENP in
2007. Another sign of a ‘new quality’ in relations between the EU and Belarus was the latter’s con-sent
to open a European Commission office in Minsk (the relevant agreement was signed on 7
March 2008).
II.4. Sectoral policy
In EU-CIS relations, energy policy is becoming increasingly important. The EU has signed
Memoranda of Understanding with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine concerning energy coop-eration.
In 2008, the EU is organising a meeting at ministerial level as part of the Baku Process.
This process, initiated in 2004, groups the states of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Black
Sea basin. The meeting is intended to boost cooperation in the field of energy security and integra-tion
of the EU’s eastern neighbours’ energy markets. Within the Baku Process, four working groups
have been established.
Another aspect of the EU’s offer in the energy field is issuing an invitation to Ukraine and
Moldova to join the European Energy Community (which was established in 2005 in order to unite
the European gas and electricity markets with those of the Western Balkans; the Community also
includes Turkey and Norway).
Another crucial sectoral policy concerns transport. The EU perceives the CIS states, especially
the South Caucasus and Central Asian states, as an important transport corridor uniting Europe
with East and South Asia. The two important projects, set up in the 1990s and targeted at the CIS
90 See the non-paper ‘What the European Union Could Bring to Belarus’, 21 November 2006,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.

states, are the INOGATE initiative (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) and TRACECA
(Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia). INOGATE’s objective is to boost the regional integra-tion
of the pipeline system and facilitate transportation of oil and gas into European markets. The
aim of TRACECA is to create transport corridors, boost the integration of local markets and de-velop
infrastructure. However, despite formal support for the aforementioned projects, their imple-mentation
remains at the initial stage and the funds allotted for the project remain rather scarce.

Part III: Summary – the EU and Its Eastern Partners in Search of a
Cooperation Formula
The key characteristics of the CIS countries’ (eastern partners) interests, as presented above,
on the one hand, and the offer addressed to them by the EU, on the other, raise questions about
the extent to which EU policy meets the partners’ needs and also about the prospects for mutual
relations and possible ways of overcoming impediments to their development.
III.1. The eastern partners’ interests vs. EU policy
Successive enlargements of the European Union eastwards in 2004 and 2007 caused a real
geopolitical revolution in the eastern part of the European continent. On one hand, they brought
many CIS countries geographically closer to the EU area, giving rise to the emergence of the EU’s
present eastern neighbourhood in the geopolitical sense. The former stimulated the EU to embark
upon a neighbourhood policy in 2003, which evolved into the ENP in 2004, and develop a special
partnership with Russia, while the latter led it to initiate the Black Sea Synergy (in 2007) as part of
the ENP’s regional dimension. On the other hand, EU enlargements encouraged some of the east-ern
partners (especially Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) to intensify their efforts to strengthen ties
with the EU in the hope of future membership. This also had some negative consequences for the
countries in the CIS area, the most palpable of which was the introduction (in 2003) and the sub-sequent
tightening (in 2007) of the visa regime by the new EU member states.
The analysis carried out in this study has shown that the EU-related interests of the CIS coun-tries
are very heterogeneous. The countries differ not only in terms of the geopolitical and geo-economic
situations affecting their relations with the EU, but also in their levels of ambition in rela-tion
to the EU and their specific sectoral interests. It is extremely difficult to indicate a common de-nominator
for such interests. It would have to be very general, such as the will to develop political
dialogue and economic cooperation, and to use EU funds for the implementation of concrete pro-jects.
Some eastern partners have set full EU membership as their strategic goal; others want to
enjoy the benefits of the common free market, while the ambitions of others are still limited to de-veloping
cooperation in selected areas. This is a consequence of both objective factors (such as
differences in economic and political potential, levels of development, distance from the EU border,
geographical location, initial conditions after the collapse of the USSR, etc.) and subjective ones
(different external relations including with Russia and other countries in the CIS area, approaches
to the Soviet legacy and the reform processes in the political, social and economic fields, and per-sonal
relations between individual leaders of the countries in the area).
Similarly, EU policy towards its eastern neighbourhood is multi-level and very diverse, given
that it must take into consideration the different characters of mutual relations. Nevertheless, the
European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s special relations with Russia and the policy it has
adopted towards Central Asia do have some common objectives. These are, first of all, encourag-ing
and supporting reforms aimed at bringing the countries closer to the EU political and economic
model, as well as supporting political, economic and security cooperation in order to expand the
area of stability and relative welfare in the EU’s neighbourhood. To those European CIS countries
whose reform processes and cooperation with the EU are the most advanced, the EU offers an
opportunity to participate in the common EU market and political cooperation within the European
space, although this is a somewhat vague perspective as yet.
In its offer, the EU is aiming to meet the diversified expectations of its Eastern partners half-way.
Sometimes the interests of the parties diverge. However, a general answer to the question of
whether EU policy and the needs of the Eastern partners coincide is impossible. The question can
only be answered by analysing individual cases. Nevertheless, it is still worth paying attention to
the clear similarities of interests between the CIS countries and the EU on the one hand, and to the
challenges and problems in mutual relations on the other.
III.2. The common interests
The more general the level of analysis, the more noticeable the similarities of the interests be-tween
the Eastern partners and the EU are. Therefore, a wide range of areas where both sides are
interested in intensifying dialogue and cooperation can be highlighted.

Both individual CIS countries and the EU want a continuation of political dialogue and the de-velopment
of its instruments, whatever their various motivations are. This has been shown espe-cially
by the efforts of most of the countries (see part I) to conclude the new framework agreements
with the EU, as well as the activity of EU institutions and selected member states in formulating
offers addressed to the Eastern partners.
Belarus is a special case, however. This European country, located in the immediate
neighbourhood of the EU, has not been able to establish full-scale political relations with the EU in
the ENP framework. This is a consequence of the EU’s decision to limit co-operation with Minsk,
because the Belarusian regime’s internal policy continues to violate key European standards and
values and has not responded to the EU’s repeated incentives to change this situation.
Practically all countries in the CIS area are interested in using EU funds, and some in using
technical assistance in the implementation of various projects (especially in the socio-economic
area), and sometimes in other fields too (such as construction and improving efficiency of state
institutions or security). Moreover, the EU is increasingly conscious of the need to respond posi-tively
to the Eastern partners’ appeals to liberalise the movement of people.
Both sides aim to lift barriers to economic cooperation, especially in trade. Some countries in
the CIS area have already met the criteria to enable talks to start with the EU on creating a free
trade area, and some can reasonably hope for limited economic integration with the EU through
the application of the new formula for a comprehensive and deep free trade area. The two sides’
intentions also include trade in services, and in the future may also include labour mobility. Practi-cally
all the countries in the CIS area are interested in attracting investments from EU member
states. This has been facilitated through gradual improvements in the investment climate in some
countries. Some Eastern partners have already generated sufficient potential that will soon enable
them to substantially increase export of capital to the EU market.
The energy (oil and gas) sector is a special area of cooperation. The policies adopted by indi-vidual
CIS countries depend on their energy resource endowments, the role they play in the inter-national
oil and gas markets and access to transit infrastructure. Practically all the Eastern partners
are interested in receiving support in investments in the energy infrastructure as well as acquiring
technical knowledge (such as that concerning energy saving, for example) from the EU and indi-vidual
EU member states. Some CIS countries have the ambition to become, or remain, either ma-jor
suppliers of oil and gas to the European market, or significant transit countries. This partly con-verges
with the interest of the EU and its member states, which want to invest in the energy sec-tors
of those countries with the intention of generating profits, improving the security of supplies
and diversifying their supply sources.
Both the Eastern partners and the EU are generally willing to enhance cooperation on selected
security issues. This includes such tasks as combating terrorism, organised crime and drug and
people trafficking, as well as supporting actions and investments to improve the security of their
borders and to control immigration from third countries (mainly from Asia). Practically all the East-ern
partners are interested in a dialogue on security issues, and some are ready to support the
EU’s efforts in military and police operations, not only politically but also operationally. On the other
hand, a significant group of CIS countries supports the EU (albeit cautiously) in its desire to in-crease
its role in conflict resolution in their territories. Another area of practical cooperation that has
not been fully explored is civil emergency services (some CIS countries have capacities and ex-perience
in this field).
This brief overview supports the conclusion that the EU and most of its Eastern partners have
a sufficiently number of common or converging interests to expect reasonable cooperation be-tween
the two sides to develop and deepen. However, there are serious challenges and problems,
which may prevent this positive scenario from being materialised.
III.3. Challenges and major problems in mutual relations
III.3.1. The EU’s main dilemmas
The obvious challenge is to match the Eastern partners’ interests and expectations with the in-terests
and possibilities of the EU itself. Considering the diversity among the Eastern partners, this
can be divided into several detailed policy problems.

In the case of countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s main chal-lenge
is to formulate a sufficiently attractive offer to the partners to encourage them to undertake
and sustain efforts to implement political and economic reforms that would bring these countries as
close as possible to European standards, in a situation where the EU does not have the political
will to offer them clear and concrete prospects for future membership.
In the case of Russia, the main challenge is to create a model of relations that would enable
Russia, if it wishes, to constructively join the common European space (which in practice would
require revising Moscow’s present European policy, a ‘re-Europeanisation’), but also to prevent a
situation where there is an asymmetry of benefits in its relations with the EU and its member states
(as in energy cooperation).
In the case of the Central Asian countries, the main challenge is to reconcile the EU’s desire to
develop cooperation in the field of energy, which is beneficial for the EU, with protecting and pro-moting
basic European principles and values, including those related to democracy and human
rights.
Moreover, the nature of relations between the EU and some Eastern partners is adversely af-fected
by specific problems, some of which are caused by the partners and some by the EU. Such
problems are outlined below.
III.3.2. Problems caused by the Eastern partners
Unrealistic or undefined expectations. Some countries in the CIS area (see part I) insist on the
EU formulating a clear, or more preferably a precisely scheduled plan, for their future EU member-ship
(in the not-too-distant future), disregarding both the situation inside the EU and their own pro-gress
(usually limited) in carrying out the necessary reforms. Some want the EU to accept asym-metric
relations in the energy sector and some expect financial support from the EU without any
political commitments. Some CIS countries have not presented a clear vision of their relations with
the EU, which makes it difficult to see exactly what aims they are pursuing.
Using relations with the EU for political advantage. Many governments and political groups in
the CIS area play on developing their relations with the EU, using them either domestically (to in-crease
their legitimacy or for purposes of internal political competition, including election cam-paigns)
or in foreign relations (to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their neighbours or important
partners and to gain advantage over their rivals in the region), without considering relations with
the EU as an autonomous policy goal.
Reluctance to pursue deeper reforms. Another problem is that many CIS countries have either
limited their policy of adjusting to European standards to mere declarations (which means poor
practical implementation and problems with carrying out the previously agreed legal and institu-tional
changes), or at times – in the political sphere – have even rejected the very idea of adjust-ment
and have instead pursued their own, ‘country specific’ values. The latter practice is often
used in some countries to justify the existence of undemocratic regimes and policies which violate
human rights.
The passive approach. The majority of the Eastern partners have adopted a reactive policy
towards the EU: they merely respond (or not) to the EU’s initiatives and do not initiate any of their
own. They neither present their own ideas nor propose any possible solutions to existing problems.
This is accompanied by their approach as passive recipients of EU aid, which gives rise to asym-metry
in mutual relations.
Malfunctioning administrations. Even if the political will for reform and cooperation with the EU
exists, efficient implementation and activity is hampered in many CIS countries due to malfunction-ing
state administrations, including poor organisational cultures, post-Soviet institutional relics and
widespread corruption and nepotism.
III.3.3. Problems caused by the EU
Lack of consensus. The fundamental problem linked to implementing some of the initiatives
emerging from the EU is the lack of consensus between member states. Some countries have a
limited interest in developing relations between the EU and the Eastern partners and some even

believe that initiatives in this field compete with their own interests and political ideas91. One prob-lem
is the partly real and partly artificially generated rivalry between the Southern and Eastern di-mensions
of the ENP.
Low ambition and feeble imagination. The aforementioned lack of consensus in practice does
not help to the formulation of visionary, far-reaching ideas for relations with the Eastern partners.
The EU does not have a clear, focused vision of a target model of relations with them. Sometimes
initiatives are limited, hampered or torpedoed, even if such behaviour harms the EU’s obvious
long-term interests92. As a result, the EU has the habit of making vague and overly cautious pro-posals,
which are insufficient to fully meet the existing needs and challenges.
Enlargement fatigue. A factor fundamentally affecting policy towards the Eastern partners, es-pecially
the ENP’s most active participants, is the sense of ‘enlargement fatigue’ present in the EU.
The governments of some EU member states, often under pressure from their societies (most of
whom are not always fully aware of the positive consequences of the EU enlargement process),
are very reluctant to offer membership prospects to more countries93. Sometimes this is merely a
pretext resulting from a general vision of EU integration supported by individual governments.
Reluctance towards further institutionalisation and shortages of funds. Some EU member
states, especially those which are geographically most distant from the EU’s Eastern borders, as
well as those which are the biggest net contributors to the EU budget, are very unwilling to estab-lish
new institutions dealing with the Eastern partners or enhance such relations, even if the real
needs of co-operation require it. This is closely linked to a reluctance to increase spending on the
ENP and other policies addressed to the Eastern partners. Both the level of funding and the distri-bution
of funds already allocated have caused controversy94.
The virtual and declarative approach. Several EU objectives and policies have a purely de-clarative
character. There is the tendency to be satisfied with documents or institutional solutions,
without taking due care to implement them effectively. The desire to achieve political and propa-ganda
successes in relations with some Eastern partners, or to take the credit for interesting initia-tives,
has sometimes caused a ‘virtualisation’ of cooperation, where real progress substantially
differs from what had been formally declared. In some cases, dialogue is the goal per se, even if it
fails to yield any concrete results.
III.4. Conclusions for the EU’s policy
Given the facts mentioned above, questions can be raised about the adequacy of the EU’s
policy, which are based on matching the interests of the Eastern partners and the EU itself and
which, at least in part, would meet the partners’ expectations on the one hand, and address the
challenges and problems linked to mutual relations on the other. This section proposes some rec-ommendations
that could help to achieve this objective.
III.4.1. The general principles
It is vital to emphasise some of the principles that should guide EU policy towards the Eastern
partners in order to achieve maximum efficiency. These are listed below.
91 One of the examples was the stance taken by France, which insisted that the German proposal in
2006 to strengthen the Eastern dimension of the ENP should be extended to cover all the ENP countries.
However, in 2007 France came up with the proposal for establishing a Mediterranean Union and in 2008 it
supported a Polish-Swedish proposal for an Eastern Partnership.
92 For example, in 2007 France torpedoed the initiative to lower visa prices for the ENP Eastern partners
in connection with the expansion of the Schengen zone.
93 Such sentiments appear to be strongest in Luxembourg, Germany and Austria. According to
Eurobarometer polls in Spring 2006, opposition to future membership of the individual Balkan states and
Turkey in the EU (even if they comply with all conditions) varied between 47% and 69% in Luxemburg,
between 52% and 69% in Germany, and 59% and 81% in Austria. ‘Special Eurobarometer 255 / Wave 65.2.
Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement’, Brussels July 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/-
archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf.
94 Some criticised the fact that more than two-thirds of the funds allocated for the ENP have been
offered to partners in the Southern Mediterranean region; others pointed out that the number of Southern
ENP partners is bigger than the Eastern partners and that Southern countries are more populous and
represent a lower level of development, on average.

Differentiation. As clearly illustrated in this analysis, there are major differences between the
individual countries in the CIS area. Therefore, regardless of the existence of various collective
frameworks and instruments, which are necessary and reasonable, the EU’s policy should be
based on an evaluation of the approach, situation, needs and progress in the reform processes
and co-operation of each partner state with the EU. Individualised partnerships should be at the
core of relations between these countries and the EU95. Therefore, EU policy should avoid artificial
linkages between relations with different partners (i.e. making the developing of relations with one
of them dependent on relations with the other partners). Obviously, this does not mean that the EU
should give up supporting horizontal (including regional) cooperation between partners. At subse-quent
levels, the differentiation of groups of partners should be based not only on their geographi-cal
location but also their level of ambition and the advancement of their relations with the EU. This
kind of approach should especially be adopted towards the Eastern partners.
The open door. The EU should reaffirm its commitment to being open to accepting new mem-bers,
democratic European countries that are ready to accept and implement the EU acquis; this
was particularly emphasised in article 49 of the EU Treaty. This does not mean the automatic ac-cession
of the new countries, even if they meet the Copenhagen criteria. However, neither can this
mean that Article 49 will remain in practise frozen. If this becomes the case, new permanent divid-ing
lines will appear in Europe and the essential goals of EU policy will be undermined, which
would in turn contribute to destabilisation and weakening of European standards in the Eastern
neighbourhood, generating various threats to the EU. Therefore, it is vital to maintain and
strengthen the open-ended character of the ENP addressed towards Eastern neighbours. The
ENP is not formally a path towards EU membership. However, it should be an instrument that
could be used efficiently to prepare the most advanced partners in such a way as to enable them
to apply for EU membership in the future.
Joint ownership. The EU should allow the Eastern partners to participate, to a maximum ex-tent,
in co-determination of their relations with the EU. This could be facilitated by participation of
the most advanced partners in the key EU agencies and programmes 96 and, to some extent, in
shaping EU decisions on issues which directly pertain to them. The EU should be more open to
proposals from the advanced Eastern partners (i.e. those countries that are ready and able to take
joint constructive actions with EU member states). However, the partners will have to improve the
efficiency of their public administrations to be able to make use of such possibilities.
Complementarity. EU policy is not conducted in a vacuum. Its success depends on its ade-quate
harmonisation with the policies of other European and regional structures, especially NATO,
the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the Council of the Baltic Sea States, to be able to implement
common or similar goals, with the purpose of achieving synergy. Therefore, it is worth making pol-icy
towards the Eastern partners a subject of regular dialogue between the EU and other organisa-tions
and major players (such as NATO and the US).
Focus on implementation. In addition to devising concepts, preparing documents and conclud-ing
agreements with the Eastern partners, processes which have been especially intensive over
recent years, the EU should place stronger emphasis on constant monitoring and enforcing of mu-tual
commitments. Implementation should become the key criterion in the evaluation and decision-making
processes of the EU’s policy towards the Eastern partners.
Limited conditionality. The EU should continue differentiation of requirements addressed to in-dividual
partners, adhering to the principle of ‘the greater the ambitions, the higher the require-ments.’
Additionally, it is natural to have different approaches to European countries (which have
made certain legal and political commitments) and to non-European countries (where the scope of
such commitments is narrower and cultural specifics need to be taken into account). At the same
95 The principle of differentiation was strongly emphasised by the European Commission in its
communications as of 5 December 2007. Cf. Communication from the Commission: ‘A Strong European
Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, 5 December 2007, COM (2007) 774 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/-
pdf/com07_774_en.pdf.
96 Such proposals were presented by the European Commission in its communication of 4 December
2006. Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the
general approach to enable ENP partner countries to participate in Community agencies and Community
programmes. Brussels, 4 December 2006. COM (2006) 724 final,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_724_en.pdf. Negotiations with Ukraine on a protocol concerning
this issue started in the second half of 2007.

time, the EU should diversify its offer addressed to the Eastern partners in respect to the level of
political dialogue and institutional development, depending on their compliance with democratic
principles and standards (including human rights). However, such conditionality may be limited – or
sometimes even abandoned – as part of selective pragmatic cooperation with individual partners
(for example, Central Asian countries) in such areas as energy or security issues.
III.4.2. Selected recommendations
Considering the above analysis, we would like to recommend the following EU policy approach
in respect to its Eastern partners.
Systematising the Partnerships. The previous structure of EU arrangements with the Eastern
partners could be somewhat amended, mainly by developing a separate identity for the Eastern
dimension of the ENP and distinguishing a special status for Ukraine. Consequently, the structure
of the Partnership would be as follows:
An Enhanced European Neighbourhood Policy (EENP)97 would continue to be the main EU
policy framework in its relations with the EU’s immediate geographical neighbours, offering institu-tional
(Action Plans, etc.) and financial (ENPI, etc.) frameworks. The EENP would be divided (not
formally but de facto) into two natural dimensions, the Southern Partnership (Southern Mediterra-nean
Partners) and the Eastern Partnership (ENP Eastern partners). The latter would not yet be
institutionalised (no permanent institutions). Its existence would consist mainly in emphasising the
different situations and prospects of the participating countries, prioritising tasks and managing the
flow of funds.
The Eastern Partnership would include a special, associated status for Ukraine (a new agree-ment
on association with some form of a membership perspective, DFTA with regulatory conver-gence,
etc.); deepened individual dialogues with Moldova and Georgia (the European Neighbour-hood
Agreement, DFTA, etc.); possible future individual dialogue with Belarus and individual dia-logues
with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Eastern partnership would function in parallel (partly
linked through institutions like the ENPI) with the special dialogue with Russia, based on the previ-ous
(Road Maps and other institutions) and future (PCA 2, sectoral agreements, FTA, etc.) institu-tional
arrangements, as well as institutional dialogues with the five Central Asian countries (and
possible special dialogue with Kazakhstan in the future) as part of a Central Asia Partnership98 (a
limited institutionalisation of which would be worth considering; a FTA offer may be considered for
the WTO member states in the region). The Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy, with
the participation of selected non-EU and non-ENP countries, would remain supplementary regional
dimensions of the Eastern partnership. However, bilateral relations of individual countries with the
EU would be the most important.
Multistage integration. It will be necessary to make the division between member and non-member
states less distinct by introducing certain multistage integrations. This would make it pos-sible
to positively respond to the realistic aspirations of the most advanced Eastern partners, while
still being able to withhold a political decision on any further enlargement of the EU. One method
could be to create a multi-level system of partnerships and individual dialogues (see above) that
would offer various levels of access to participation in the EU’s policies and selected institutions.
This participation would be made conditional on an adequate level of the regulatory adjust-ment/
convergence between individual partners and the EU (i.e. adopting and implementing a suffi-cient
part of the acquis by selected partners).
Addressing a meaningful offer to the advanced. In order to put the aforementioned mechanism
into operation, create strong incentives to reforms and harmonisation with the EU acquis, it is nec-essary
to supplement the initiatives of the EU with more specific content, which would meet the
partners’ expectations.
97 Referring to the changes made in the ENP pursuant to the proposals of the European Commission
stated in the Communication of 4 December 2006. Cf. Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council on Strengthening the ENP. Com (2006) 726 final,
98 The EU made its first step in this direction on 31 May 2007, by adopting the strategy of relations
between the EU and Central Asia at the initiative of the German presidency. Cf. ‘The EU and Central Asia:
Strategy for a New Partnership’, Council of the European Union, Document 10113/07, Brussels, 31 May
2007, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf.

In particular, it seems desirable to concretise the European Commission’s offer of a future
European Neighbourhood Community (ENC)99, the name of which should be reconsidered (the
name ‘Common European Area’ might be better). It seems that, pursuant to the original idea of a
Wider Europe, it should enable its participants to enjoy the four freedoms of the common market
(the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour), with possible temporary exclusions,
provide for common institutions and enable the partners to participate in some EU decisions.
Another important element of the EU’s offer that has to be presented in more detail is the
comprehensive deep free trade area, which was originally intended to be a phase on the way to-wards
a future ENC.100 It should have the widest possible range (including regulatory convergence
linked with the access to the EU internal market).
Facilitation of the movement of people, including visa facilitation is an important element of the
EU policy from the partners’ point of view101. The EU should take more determined steps to offer
visa easing to the largest possible group of Eastern partners (including, most definitively, lower
visa prices and simplified procedures for granting visas), and subsequently introduce visa-free re-gimes
with those countries that are most advanced in co-operation (especially in terms of migration
control). This is vital for increasing the positive impact of the EU in the internal situations of individ-ual
countries in the CIS area and for supporting European standards.
This is linked to another element of the EU’s offer that is essential for many Eastern partners,
i.e. mobility partnerships102. On the one hand, this could provide a response to growing demand for
labour in selected economic sectors in many EU member states, and on the other it could contrib-ute
to civilising, legalising and controlling the migration of people (including labour) from the CIS
area. However, the EU offer in this field will have to be enhanced. It seems reasonable to support
the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements to regulate access to labour markets be-tween
individual EU member states and CIS countries as a phase on the path towards a real free
movement of labour, to be achieved at a later stage.
Finally, the offer for selected countries from the CIS area to participate in the Energy Commu-nity103
has to be made more precise. This should entail not only partners’ acceptance of EU law and
principles in the energy field, but also engagement by the EU and individual member states in sup-porting
development of partners’ energy infrastructure and, potentially, their production capacity.
Adopt more flexible funding mechanisms. The limited funds allocated for Eastern partnerships,
along with the unwillingness of many EU member states to increase it in the future would call for
the adoption of more flexible funding mechanisms. This includes, above all, a broader usage of
funds not coming from the EU budget but from European financial institutions (such as the EBRD
and EIB), and encourage member and partner states to finance/co-finance the implementation of
99 The offer was presented in non-paper form by the European Commission on 4 December 2006. Cf.
Non- paper. ‘Expanding the proposals contained in the Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council on Strengthening the ENP’. Com (2006) 726 final of 4 December 2006. ‘ENP – a path towards
further economic integration’, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_economic-integration_en.pdf.
100 Pursuant to the concept presented by the European Commission in non-paper form on 4 December
2006. Cf. Non-paper. ‘Expanding the proposals contained in the Communication to the European Parliament
and the Council on Strengthening the ENP.’ Com (2006) 726 final of 4 December 2006. ‘ENP – a path
towards further economic integration’, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_economic-integration_-
en.pdf. DFTA negotiations with Ukraine were set in motion in February 2008. The talks are at a very early
stage.
101 The European Commission presented cautious proposals in this field in its communication on 5
December 2007. Cf. Communication from the Commission: ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’,
Brussels, 5 December 2007, COM (2007) 774 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf. It
was supplemented in January 2008 by the Commission’s non-paper on visa facilitation. Cf. Non-paper.
‘Expanding on the proposals contained in the communication to the European Parliament and the Council on
Strengthening the ENP’ – COM (2006) 726 final of 4 December 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/-
non_paper_visa_facilitation_en.pdf.
102 The offer was formulated more extensively in a document from the European Commission of 16 May
2007. Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: ‘On circular migration and mobility
partnerships between the European Union and third countries’, COM (2007) 248 final, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0248:FIN:EN:PDF.
103 Preparations for including Ukraine and Moldova in the Energy Community have been launched.
These countries, as well as Georgia, have observer status (together with Norway and Turkey).

specific projects, if they are willing to do so. Using the experience of NATO, it is worth applying the
Trust Fund104 mechanism for this purpose, where a leading state – in response to the concrete
need for a partner – organises a group of member and partner states that provide funding for a
given project, to be carried out by a selected specialist agency or firm.
It is impossible to predict the development of relations between the Eastern partners and the
EU. These will depend on many factors, the most significant of which seem to be the partners’ in-ternal
stability and their governments’ political will to embark on necessary reforms, the Russian
policy towards other CIS countries and the character of their mutual relations, on the one hand,
and public sentiment in EU member states, the EU’s ability to embark on internal reform, continue
enlargement, carry out coherent external policy and present an attractive offer to its neighbours, on
the other. Their future will also depend on policies conducted by other actors influencing the situa-tion
in the Eastern neighbourhood, above all the US and China. However, it seems worth empha-sising
that – as illustrated in this study – individual CIS countries have different interests as well as
different prospects for future relations with the EU.
104 The first positive sign was the discussion on establishing a Trust Fund as part of the Neighbourhood
Investment Fund (NIF). Cf. Communication from the Commission: A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,
Brussels, 5 December 2007, COM (2007) 774 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf.

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