Chris hunter
This document discusses strategies for countering improvised explosive device (IED) networks. It outlines the typical structure of a terrorist network, including leadership that provides direction, operators who plan and execute operations, and active supporters who assist without direct involvement in violence. Approaches to defeating the network at strategic and operational levels include targeting training camps, disrupting procurement chains, social network analysis, and correctly trained debriefing. The challenges of addressing future threats like chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are also noted. Throughout, the focus is on maintaining momentum against terrorist forces through speedy render-safe techniques and staying alert to abnormal activities.
Chris hunter
- 1. Secure Cities II InitiativeCountering Improvised Explosive Device NetworksChris Hunter QGMFIExpE GCGI MCMIKratosEnterprises LtdCounter-IED Consultants
- 3. Assault IEDDAssault IEDD is the process in which an operator uses speedy render-safe techniques to maintain the momentum of an assaulting force in a potentially hostile environment.
- 4. Nov 26th Mumbai Attacks
- 5. C-IED Operations Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and Colombia
- 6. ScopeThe Structure of a Terrorist NetworkMethods of attacking the networkChallengesFinal Considerations
- 7. LeadershipProvides direction and policyApproves Goals and ObjectivesOverarching guidance for OperationsGenerally rise from within ranks or establish their own splinter groups
- 8. OperatorsPlan and execute operationsManage and acquire intelligence, finance, logistics and commsIncludes bomb making and surveillance expertiseBomb emplacers generally not bomb makers
- 9. Operators: Cellular FoundationTactical level3 – 4 peopleSecurityDifficult to infiltrateUnaware of other cells and their membershipProvide emotional and social supportLeader is often only contact with outside world
- 10. Active SupportersActive in:Political/Ideological IndoctrinationFund RaisingInformation gatheringProvision of safe houses, transportation and medical assistanceDo not normally commit violent acts
- 11. Defeating the Terror Network at the Strategic and Operational Level
- 12. Profiling those at high risk of becoming radicalised
- 13. Targeting the Training CampsAssassinationArsonBombingHijackingHostage TakingKidnappingMaimingRaidsSeizureSabotageHoaxesUse of CBRN weapons
- 14. Global not Regional Trend Analysis
- 15. RamziYousef
- 16. Project Bojinka - 1995
- 18. Money Laundering
- 19. Global Logistics and Procurement Chains (Land, Sea and Air)
- 20. Covert Operations – Letting an operation run
- 21. Disruption of Component Chain
- 22. Technical & Forensic Exploitation
- 24. Correctly Trained Debriefing Personnel
- 26. Analysis and Testing of Likely Targets
- 27. Intelligence must be multi-source:
- 29. Prepare for the Future: CBRN
- 30. Prepare for Future Threats: London & Glasgow Bombings 2007
- 31. Investing in protection: The Cost of Terror vs Defence SpendingSept 11Twin towers New York: Cost to terrorist $500,000; Cost to America $600bnMadrid Bombings: Cost to terrorist 10,000 euros; Cost to Spain 212 million euros 2002: Yemen French oil tanker Limburg: Cost to terrorist <$50,000. Cost to Yemen $3.8m per month
- 32. The war on terror has only two outcomes: Win, or lose…and we can only win, if we stay alert…and look for absence of the normal, and presence of the abnormal
- 33. Questions?Chris Hunter QGMFIExpE GCGI MCMIDirector Kratos Enterprises LtdCounter-IED Consultantswww.kratosenterprises.com