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CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
edited by
MICHAEL BOTHE AND ECKARD REHBINDER

Published, sold and distributed by Eleven International Publishing
P.O. Box 358
3500 AJ Utrecht, the Netherlands
Tel.: +31 30 231 0545
Fax: +31 30 225 8045
info@elevenpub.com
www.elevenpub.com
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN 90-77596-04-6
# 2005 Eleven International Publishing
‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Background’ # 2005 Ju
« rgen Lefevere
‘The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme’ # 2005 Ju
« rgen Lefevere
This publication is protected by international copyright law.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy-
ing, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Printed in The Netherlands
05-4

Table of Contents
List of Contributors vii
Introduction
Climate Change as a Problem of Law and Policy: The International
Climate Change Regime and its European Implementation
Michael Bothe and Eckard Rehbinder 1
PART I: International Negotiations and Implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol
Chapter 1
The Dynamics of the Climate Negotiations: A Focus on the
Developments and Outcomes from The Hague to Milan
Barbara Buchner 19
Chapter 2
Equity Principles to Enhance the E¡ectiveness of Climate Policy:
An Economic and Legal Perspective
Barbara Buchner and Janna Lehmann 45
Chapter 3
A Comparative Analysis of the Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, Ozone Layer Protection and Climate Change Regimes
Janna Lehmann 73
Chapter 4
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Background
Ju
« rgen Lefevere 103

Chapter 5
The Clean Development Mechanism and Ancillary Bene¢ts
Barbara Buchner, Alejandro Caparro
¤ s Gass and Tarik Tazda|« t 131
Chapter 6
Biodiversity and Carbon Sequestration in Forests: Economic
and Legal Issues
Alejandro Caparro
¤ s Gass and Fre
¤ de
¤ ric Jacquemont 149
Chapter 7
Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea: On the Legal
Admissibility of Strategies to Mitigate Climate Change by
Ocean Sequestration
Susan Nicole Krohn 183
PART II: EU and Climate Change Policies
Chapter 8
State Aid Issues Raised by the Implementation of Climate Change
Policy Instruments
Mercedes Ferna
¤ ndez Armenteros 219
Chapter 9
The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme
Ju
« rgen Lefevere 259
Chapter 10
Inhomogeneous Allocation and Distortions of Competition in
the Case of Emissions Trading in the EU
Dietrich Brockhagen 309
Chapter 11
The Kyoto Compliance Regime, the European Bubble: Some Legal
Consequences
Fre
¤ de
¤ ric Jacquemont 351
Chapter 12
Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation: Interactions
in the Enlarged EU
Mercedes Ferna
¤ ndez Armenteros and Leonardo Massai 407
vi Climate Change Policy

List of Contributors
Buchner, Barbara
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, FEEM, Venice, Italy
Brockhagen, Dietrich
Germanwatch, Berlin, Germany
Caparro
¤ s Gass, Alejandro
CIRED, Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le
De
¤ veloppement, Paris, France
Ferna
¤ ndez Armenteros, Mercedes
O
« ko-Institut e.V., Darmstadt, Germany
Jacquemont, Fre
¤ de
¤ ric
FSUR, Forschungsstelle Umweltrecht, University of Frankfurt, Germany
Krohn, Susan Nicole
Bundesumweltministerium, Berlin, Germany
Lefevere, Ju
« rgen
FIELD, Foundation for International Environmental Law and
Development, London, UK
Lehmann, Janna
CERDEAU, Centre d’Etude et de Recherche en Droit de l’Environnement,
de l’Ame
¤ nagement et de l’Urbanisme, Paris, France
Massai, Leonardo
FSUR, Forschungsstelle Umweltrecht, University of Frankfurt, Germany
Tazda|« t, Tarik
CIRED, Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le
De
¤ veloppement, Paris, France

MICHAEL BOTHE AND ECKARD REHBINDER (EDS.), Climate Change Policy, 1–16.
© 2005 ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING. Printed in The Netherlands.
Introduction
MICHAEL BOTHE AND ECKARD REHBINDER
Climate Change as a Problem of
Law and Policy
The International Climate Change Regime and its European Implementation
During the years 1999 to 2003, researchers in six institutions dealing with
legal, political and economic aspects of climate change, namely the
Forschungsstelle Umweltrecht/Environmental Law Research Centre (ELRC,
Frankfurt/M.), the Öko-Institut (Darmstadt), the Centre d’Étude et de
Recherche en Droit de l’Environnement, de l’Aménagement et de
l’Urbanisme (CERDEAU, Paris), the Centre International de Recherche sur
l’Environnement et le Développement (CIRED, Paris), the Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei (FEEM, Milan/Venice) and the Foundation for International
Environmental Law and Development (FIELD, London) joined forces to
shed some light on the emerging international regime of climate change and
its problems of implementation.
1. The issues of climate change
This international climate change regime is one of the most ambitious
undertakings of international governance, highly complex in many respects.
The present volume tries to elucidate some key features. The starting point
and raison d’être of this regime is a natural phenomenon, namely the
greenhouse effect. So-called greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere
account for the effect that the heat derived from solar energy is retained in
the earth’s atmosphere. It is an effect to which life on earth owes its
existence. The regulatory problem addressed by the climate change regime is
due to the forecast that a further accumulation of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere will increase the greenhouse effect in a way which is prejudicial.
Business as usual forecasts predict a rise in the average global temperature
of two degrees by 2025 and four degrees by 2100. This, it is predicted,
would negatively affect the biological balance of the earth.

2 MICHAEL BOTHE AND ECKARD REHBINDER
While the greenhouse gas effect as such is an uncontroversial fact of
nature, the scope of overall global warming remains uncertain, the
distribution of this effect over the earth is still more so, and still more so are
the consequences of that effect. The melting of the polar icecaps and the
ensuing rise in the sea level are only the most commonly cited effects of
climate change. Disastrous weather effects are another perspective. When
the first warnings from the scientific community were uttered in the 1970s,
the scope of the problem was very controversial. Since then, a tremendous
amount of research has been done, providing a clearer picture, but
uncertainties remain.
The political reaction to scientific warnings started in the 1980s. In 1985,
the United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) organized a common conference in
Villach. In 1988, the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere was
organized by the Canadian Government. In that year, UNEP and WMO
created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a
scientific, yet official body. The General Assembly of the United Nations
addressed the question in Resolutions 43/53, 44/207 and 45/212, the latter
Resolution establishing an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC).
In 1990, IPCC rendered its first assessment report. As a result of the efforts
of the negotiating committee, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCC) could be opened for signature at the Rio
Conference in 1992. It must be stressed that this action was based on the
precautionary principle, recognized at the same time by the Rio Declaration.
The convention is indeed a precautionary measure, based on the rule (which
constitutes the core of the precautionary principle) that scientific uncertainty
should not bar remedial action.
This definition of the principle is a negative one. Turned positive as a
basis for measures to be taken, the precautionary principle is not a hard and
fast rule. It is not possible to automatically derive from the principle an
indication of specific measures. Thus, the application of the precautionary
principle requires political determinations. It is, thus, influenced by political
interests. In order to understand the compromise finally reached in the
UNFCC of 1992 and later in the Kyoto Protocol (KP), it is necessary to
understand the interest at stake, be they real or “only” perceived by relevant
actors.
There are, first, the environmental interests pursued by the UNFCCC
regime, i.e. the interest to limit the man-made increase of the greenhouse
effect and its ensuing negative consequences. The problem of the greenhouse
effect is a long-term one. Those really affected are not yet, or only just, born.
It is a concern for future generations. But by whom and how strongly could
those interests be represented? Much of the pressure to take into account
those environmental interests came from civil society. UNCED 1992 was the

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A PROBLEM OF LAW AND POLICY 3
first big international conference which opened itself systematically to the
input from organizations of civil society. As to governments, “green power”
was stronger in Europe than elsewhere in the world. Thus, one can
acknowledge green preferences of European politicians, expressed by the
European Economic Community (as it then still was) and its Member States.
Other developed countries (the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand) took a different view. They preferred to leave the solution of
the problem to market forces.
Probably the strongest emphasis on environmental interests was put
forward by those states which are most probably affected by a sea level rise,
the so-called Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The obvious
environmental interests of these developing states limited the unity of the G-
77 and China Group which otherwise is an important fact in international
negotiations.
There were countervailing economic interests: the cost of investment to
be made in order to cope with the greenhouse effect, which means high costs
threatening certain industries, in particular old, low-efficiency industries in
the industrialized countries. It appears that this cost has been of particular
concern for the United States. The industrial development interests of
developing countries, however, pointed in a similar direction. The fear of the
developing countries was that these costs might force them to renounce, or at
least restrict, industrialization, a fear which has characterized the stance of
developing countries towards environmental policy in general from the early
1970s. The economic interests of fossil fuel producers (OPEC), at least as
they currently perceive them, are also adverse to any attempt to limit fuel
consumption through climate protection measures.
Combined with the countervailing economic interests, there is also a
countervailing social interest: the interest in maintaining a lifestyle based on
high energy consumption. This is a politically powerful interest in a great
number of industrialized countries. Finally, there is a countervailing political
interest, often formulated as a sovereignty interest. It is the perceived threat
to state freedom of action which might be the result of the climate change
regime. In this perspective, this more general sovereignty aspect joins
unilateralist tendencies in the United States’ foreign policy.
The UNFCCC is able to accommodate these conflicting interests in a
specific way. It is a compromise solution in many respects.
The first aspect of this compromise is the time element: the convention
adopts a stepwise approach, which by 1992 had become a standard element
in the creation of international environmental regimes. It is a framework
convention, which contains only general commitments, thus leaving
obligations which really hurt to a later phase. On the other hand, the
convention recognizes indeed the existence of the problem, a fact that cannot

be underestimated in the face of remaining uncertainties. The first phrase of
the preamble reads:
Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a
common concern of humankind ...
The approach is based on the precautionary principle (Article 3 no. 3) in
accordance with the principle of intergenerational equity of Article 3 no. 1.
Nevertheless, the convention recognizes, on the other hand, the necessity of
development, which should, however, be sustainable (Article 3 para. 4). All
this corresponds to the principles adopted at the same time in the Rio
Declaration.
As to the specific problem to be solved, the convention adopts what can
be called the double track approach: mitigation through stabilization of
emissions on the one hand (primary goal) and adaptation to the change, on
the other (secondary goal). The former is formulated in Article 2, the latter is
reflected in a number of different provisions, e.g. assistance to adaptation by
most vulnerable countries (Article 3 para. 2, Article 4 para. 1(e)).
The essential compromise between developed and developing countries
lies in a system of differentiated obligations of developed countries on the
one hand, and developing countries on the other. On the level of principles,
this is formulated in the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. To quote the preamble:
Noting that the large share of historical and current global emissions of
greenhouse gases has originated in the developed countries, that per capita
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of
global emissions originating in the developing countries grow to meet their
social and development needs,
…
acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and
appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and
economic conditions.
The most important practical difference between developing and developed
countries relates to their stabilization duties (for all countries Article 4 para.
1 (d), for developed countries Article 4 para. 2 (a)). Also for developed
countries, these stabilization duties are rather soft. In this respect, the
convention really adopts a wait-and-see-approach. What is important is the
provision for review.
As to implementation and enforcement, the convention calls for the
establishment of inventories and reporting; both obligations also being
differentiated between developing and developed countries.
A last element of the compromise achieved between developing and
developed countries relates to finance. For all practical purposes, the

developed countries should bear the actual compliance costs of the
developing countries (Article 4 para. 3, 11). It is probably this soft approach
which accounts for the smooth ratification process. Within less than two
years after the adoption of its text, the UNFCCC entered into force on 21
March 1994 after the deposit of the 50th ratification instrument.
The ensuing development of the regime is characterised by the attempt to
achieve stricter stabilization obligations. In 1995, the second IPCC-
Assessment Report brought more certainty as to the man-made components
of the greenhouse effect and furnished worse predictions for the business-as-
usual approach. But it could not remove all uncertainties, in particular those
relating to the negative social and economic impact of climate change on
specific areas, nor those relating to the actual cost of remedies.
The first Conference of the Parties (COP) took place in Berlin in
March/April 1995. In conformity with Article 2 (4) (d), already mentioned, it
undertook a review of the existing obligations and held them to be
inadequate. A new negotiating group was created with the mandate to
elaborate an additional protocol containing concrete stabilization obligations,
the so-called Berlin Mandate. That mandate was fulfilled at the Kyoto
Conference in 1997 (COP 3). It is the regime created by this Kyoto Protocol
which is the object of the research documented in the present publication.
The Kyoto Protocol, too, constitutes a compromise, but this time more
between various groups of developed countries than between developing and
developed countries. The developing countries defended their position as it
emerged from the Rio Conference: no strict stabilization obligations for
developing countries, not even for threshold countries whose contribution to
the greenhouse effect is not negligible. That tough stance of the developing
countries furnished an additional reason, even an appearance of justification,
for the United States’ rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. The United States
considers the absence of important developing countries, such as India and
Brazil, and in particular of China as unjust and therefore a major flaw of the
Kyoto Protocol regime.
The general regulatory approach of the Protocol constitutes a
compromise in many respects. The basic obligation of the developed
countries is a quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment
(QELRC) formulated as an aggregate target, i.e. a stabilization or reduction
of the overall greenhouse gas emissions of a particular state, taken as a
whole. This method of fixing an absolute target was not uncontroversial
from the point of view of the countervailing economic interests. Some would
have preferred, and still prefer, a relative target, such as one linked to
economic growth factors. On the other hand, the formulation of an aggregate
obligation leaves a complete freedom, at least as a matter of principle, as to
how the state reaches this overall target. Thus, there is a type of obligation

which is not very intrusive, which does not infringe upon claims of state
sovereignty. It thus accommodates sovereignty interests.
Like UNFCCC itself, the Kyoto Protocol constitutes a compromise in
relation to time. It does not attempt to achieve at once the entire reduction
required to solve the problem of the excess greenhouse effect. It only
provides for a more modest reduction to be achieved during a first
“commitment period”, 2008–2012. The full solution of the problem is left to
future commitment periods.
It is in a number of important details that further problems involved in
this approach appear and where compromises between the developed
countries had to be made. As a matter of fact, the concrete shape of the
obligations was a matter of horse-trading. The first problem is the
determination of the QELRC for each particular country. Concessions had to
be made in various respects, leading to a result where certain countries
which were reluctant, but necessary to achieve a meaningful participation
with the Protocol, were given concessionary QELRCs. This is particularly
the case for Russia and Australia. The second serious problem involved in
the calculation of the targets is carbon sinks. Recognizing sequestration of
greenhouse gases by sinks favours countries having a large potential of
afforestation, as growing forests are the most important sink on land.
The next compromise element is flexibilization. Mainly the United
States, but not only, insisted on the insertion of a flexibilization mechanism.
The basic rational behind the flexibilization mechanism is a process of
compensation between a non-reduction in one place and an increased
reduction in another. The four flexibilization mechanisms provided by the
Protocol are a specific bubble approach, Joint Implementation, Clean
Development Mechanism and Emissions Trading. The major argument for
flexibilization is economic efficiency. Flexibilization mechanisms allow
reductions to be made where it is economically speaking most efficient.
Thus, the basic idea is to achieve the overall reduction target at lower cost.
That purpose is no doubt laudable, even necessary, given the considerable
cost involved in the implementation of the regime. On the other hand, this
approach also raises certain doubts. In particular, the Clean Development
Mechanism opens up the possibility that developed countries fulfil their
reduction obligations by paying for reductions achieved in other countries
which do not have quantified reduction obligations of their own without, so
to say, making a significant effort at home. For many, this approach seems to
be unreasonable, and there have therefore been attempts to put a cap on
flexibilization, meaning that the use of flexibilization mechanisms can only
be supplementary to a serious stabilization effort made by each developed
country.
Similar considerations apply to sinks, in particular in combination with
Joint Implementation. This allows a country having relatively high emissions

to reduce its burden by financing afforestation in another country. The
calculation of individual stabilization targets for states as a result of
aggregate emissions and the use of sinks and in combination flexibilization
mechanisms posed difficult questions of calculation, monitoring compliance
and last but not least sanctions.
When the basic elements of the compromise were adopted in Kyoto, it
was not possible to deal with all these technical details. Thus, in a way,
Kyoto was still characterized by a wait-and-see approach. The real meaning
of Kyoto could only become clear when these relevant details were settled.
Thus, there developed a widespread reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol
until these details became clear. COP 6, which took place at The Hague in
2000, brought a final show-down on these matters. It was not possible to
solve the outstanding issues during that conference. COP 6 had to be
adjourned and resumed in Bonn in 2001. It was at this conference that the
difficulties were settled as a matter of principle, while the finalization took
place at COP 7 in Marrakech in 2001. The result are the so-called Marrakech
Accords, a huge volume of instruments most of which will have to be
formally adopted by the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCC
serving as a meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP).
The Clinton administration had taken steps in the direction of a
ratification of the Protocol by the United States, but was not successful
against an hostile Senate. In 2000, the Bush administration announced its
intention not to ratify. The other countries decided to go ahead nevertheless,
although the United States is by far the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases.
But the US decision fundamentally changed the negotiating environment.
The negotiations now practically took place between the rest of the
industrialized countries. Vis-à-vis the EU which pushed for a strong
Protocol, the relative bargaining power of some hesitant countries grew. The
position of Russia became particularly strong as the entry into force of the
Protocol then depended on the ratification by Russia. Entry into force
requires ratification by a number of countries which, taken together, account
for at least 55% of the world’s emissions. Russia accounts for 17%. After the
non-ratification by the United States, it was not possible to reach the
necessary 55% without Russia. The Russian decision to ratify finally came
late in 2004.1
The Protocol enters into force on 16 February 2005.
As the consequence of the process of progressive concretization of the
UNFCC and Kyoto Protocol regime, a most ambitious and complex system
emerges. Four categories of problems can be distinguished:
1. The calculation of QELRCs: the stabilization obligation is calculated in a
unit which makes the different greenhouse gas emissions comparable. To
arrive at a national emission figure, sequestration of greenhouse gases in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 The contributions contained in this volume were concluded before this event.

sinks has to be deducted. The method of calculating this sequestration is
the next problem as there is no practical means to actually measure it.
2. Flexibilization: flexibilization means that reductions achieved in one
place may be credited to a QELRC of another, or, vice versa, that an
emission taking place in one place is debited to the account of another
state. This means, first of all, that the transactions in question have to be
documented, registered and monitored. The calculation problems already
mentioned are complicated by that fact.
3. Implementation: as the QELRC is expressed in an aggregate quantity of
emissions originating in one state, the state has a complete freedom as to
the choice of the means how to achieve the required stabilization of those
aggregate emissions. These measures are different in relation to different
greenhouse gases. In relation to CO2, the basic principle is reducing the
combustion of fossil fuels, which can be achieved in a number of ways,
such as more energy-efficient combustion engines, energy saving through
measures such as modification of the construction and situation of
buildings, and the reduction of combustion processes by change in
consumption habits, such as reducing the speed of cars or the use of air-
conditioning systems. To achieve these results, very different regulatory
approaches are possible, such as command and control approaches in
relation to certain points of a chain of causation leading to the use of
combustion processes, economic incentives or disincentives such as an
energy tax or social incentives such as premiums on good environmental
behaviour. The appropriate choice of a mix of implementation measures
is the major challenge of a national (or, as the case may be, EU/EC)
policy to achieve compliance with the QELRC. In the light of the costs
involved, a cost-efficient choice of instruments is vital. The problem is
further complicated by the fact that these national measures of
implementation may also be subject to other international legal regimes.
An example is, for instance, land-use measures to develop sinks which
may be in contradiction to an international legal regime such as the
Biodiversity Convention which may require that nature is left in the
existing state and not be modified through measures of afforestation.
4. Compliance control: information concerning national compliance, i.e.
relating to the aggregate figure of emissions as calculated in conformity
with the rules just described, has to be collected by a body established
under the Convention and/or the Protocol. As in many other
environmental regimes, the Protocol relies on national reporting. For this
purpose, the Kyoto Protocol develops the relevant provisions of the
Convention. There are a number of procedural obligations of the
developed country parties to ensure compliance with the Protocol. They
include the development of inventories of all greenhouse gas emissions in

the base year 1990 and the following years (Article 3 (4), 10 (a) KP), the
establishment by 2007 of a national system for estimating greenhouse gas
emissions from sources and their removal by sinks (Article 5 KP) and
reporting on compliance with quantitative emission reduction obligations
(Article 7 KP). These obligations have to be concretized by COP/MOP
decisions. They are reinforced by the verification procedure set forth in
Articles 3, 4, and 7 KP – a task to be undertaken by the technical body
established by the Convention, namely the review teams of the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). All that
is a very complex challenge. The reporting is complex and ambitious, and
so is the scrutiny of those reports.
Following the modern trend towards non-conflictual compliance
regimes, the compliance provisions of the Protocol have been
supplemented, through a text adopted at COP 7 in Marrakech, by a
compliance mechanism which contains important procedural safeguards,
including an appeals procedure, as required by Article 18 KP.
5. Sanctions: reactions of the system in cases of non-compliance are
essential. As in other environmental regimes, the system of carrots and
sticks is applied. The sticks, so far, are rather weak. In case of non-
compliance, a Party may no longer be eligible to participate in the
flexible mechanisms. Emissions exceeding the assigned amount,
multiplied by a factor of 1.3, will be debited to the next reduction period.
Article 3 I KP allows each Annex I State to achieve its reduction obligation
(assigned amounts) not only individually but also collectively. Article 4
specifies this empowerment by setting forth the methods of compliance and
responsibility for non-compliance. States joining in this mechanism can add
up their respective reduction and stabilization commitments and redistribute
them internally in a different way. These provisions are not limited to supra-
national organizations; they could also be used by any two or more Annex I
Parties, for instance as a substitute for emissions trading between these
Parties. However, they are primarily designed to afford regional economic
integration organizations such as the EU flexibility in reallocating their
reduction burdens internally according to criteria other than the flat rate
reduction obligations provided by the KP. Consequently, Article 4 VI
specifically addresses the situation that Annex I Parties acting jointly and
together with an organization of regional economic integration are both
Parties to the KP. In case of non-compliance with the collective (aggregated)
reduction obligation each Member State is individually and jointly with this
organization responsible for meeting its reduction obligation as agreed upon
within the organization.
In the course of the negotiations on the KP, the EU Council concluded a
burden-sharing agreement under the EU bubble taking into account aspects

of cost-effectiveness, national starting points (base year emissions),
economic structure and growth expectations, energy efficiency and
capabilities to reduce emissions. Consequently, Germany, Austria and the
United Kingdom are to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in the first
commitment period by 21, 13 and 12.5% respectively, Belgium, Italy and the
Netherlands by 7.5, 6.5 and 6% respectively. France and Finland have only
to stabilize their emissions. By contrast, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal
are entitled to increase their emissions by 13, 15, 25 and 27% respectively.
This agreement was adopted in a binding form of a Council decision on the
occasion of EU ratification of the KP.
The development since the conclusion of the burden-sharing agreement
has shown that a number of Member States miscalculated their reduction
capabilities. While Sweden, Finland, France and the United Kingdom have
overcomplied or at least complied with their obligations and Germany is
close to complying, other countries such as Spain, Denmark, Austria and
Belgium are far behind meeting their obligations; as a matter of fact in view
of the actual development of emissions in these countries, only drastic
reduction measures or extensive acquisition of emission allowances within
the emissions trading system to be instituted by the EU or from joint
implementation or clean development mechanism projects could ensure
compliance in the future.
Implementation of, and compliance with the KP requires a number of
steps to be taken by the EU and/or at national level. The EU has already
undertaken some efforts to comply with the procedural obligations under the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Directives 93/389/EC and 99/296/EC, as
amended by Decision 280/2004/EC, already oblige Member States to
establish inventories and to set up a reporting and monitoring mechanism for
GHG. As regards the program obligation under Article 10 KP, the
Commission adopted in July 2000 a first EU climate change program
(ECCP) which identified potential sources of emission reduction. In 2002,
the second phase of the ECCP started, aiming at the implementation of the
proposals of the first phase. Finally, two core instruments of EU legislation
concerning climate change were adopted after lengthy debates between the
Council and the Commission as well as between the Council and the
European Parliament: Council Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the
Community framework for the taxation of energy product and electricity and
the European Allowance Trading Directive 2003/87/EC (EATD).
The EATD introduces a EU-wide trading system which as a first step is
limited to CO2 and designated categories of facilities in electricity generating
and industry. The system is operated by the Member States under
supervision of the Commission. Essential decisions such as the
determination of the respective burdens of the emissions trading and other
sectors of the economy, the allocation of emission allowances and the

granting of greenhouse gas permits are taken by the Member States
according to criteria and requirements set by the directive. With respect to
the allocation of burdens between the emissions trading and other sectors of
the national economy, the directive requires consideration of the respective
share in emissions without, however, making strict proportionality
mandatory. Allocation of allowances must be based on a national allocation
plan for which certain criteria, including the applicability of EC rules on
state aids, are set forth and which have to be approved by the Commission.
Early reduction action and new entrants must be considered in a way
essentially to be determined by the Member States. Even the base year on
which allocation must be based is – in contrast to pertinent EP proposals –
not set forth in the directive. At least 95% of the initial allocation will be free
of charge, based on existing emissions (grand-fathering), while in the second
commitment period this is reduced to 90%. This means that no Member
State is required to auction off allowances, but can do so to a limited extent.
There are provisions for temporary exclusion of individual facilities (Article
27) and pools of facilities (Article 28) from the system and for unilateral
inclusion of further greenhouse gases and categories of sources in the second
period (Article 24). Links with joint implementation and the clean
development mechanism as well as the relation to emissions trading between
signatory states provided under Article 17 KP were left to be decided at a
later stage. The “linking” directive 2004/101/EC was finally adopted after
lengthy negotiations on 24 October 2004.2
Credits obtained from JI and
CDM may be used for emissions trading, with the exception of credits from
nuclear projects and sinks.
As regards compliance, a comprehensive, two-tier compliance regime
will be established. The directive sets forth monitoring, reporting and
verification obligations for enterprises (Articles 14, 15) on which required
reporting by Member States must be based (Article 21). The new decision
280/2004/EC on the EU’s reporting and monitoring mechanism also applies
to emissions trading. Moreover, Member States are required to lay down
rules on sanctions applicable to infringements and ensure that they are
implemented. These sanctions must be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive; there is a minimum penalty set forth by the directive. When a
Member State does not comply with its obligations under the burden sharing
decision as well as under the emissions trading directive the general
infringement procedure under Article 234 EC Treaty is available. This
undoubtedly is a cumbersome procedure, yet its advantage is that court
decisions on infringement are binding on Member States and in case of non-
compliance with the judgement penalties can be imposed.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2 The contributions contained in this volume were concluded before this event. They, thus,
refer only to the draft linking directive.

2. The contributions of this publication
The papers presented in this volume highlight a number of fundamental
issues of the climate change regime as it has evolved and try to provide for
their better understanding. In relation to the international regime, they
address three layers of problems: the political forces at stake, the principles
and the regulatory approaches.
A key to understanding the current shape of the regime, and its potential
for further development, is the clash and the alliances between the various
interests at stake in the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, then to the
Kyoto Protocol and finally to the complex system of norms resulting from
the post-Kyoto negotiations. The introductory paper by Barbara Buchner
concentrates on the latter phase, which is also a key to a possible
development of the regime during the negotiation of the second reduction
period. The paper gives a detailed description of political and economic
problems, the political forces involved and the course of the negotiations up
to COP 9 in Milan.
The following contributions address a selection of key problems of the
Kyoto Protocol.
A key principle of the UNFCCC regime is equity, analysed in the paper
by Barbara Buchner and Janna Lehmann. Equity has different connotations.
In the UNFCCC, it is reflected in the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, intergenerational equity and sustainable development, and
the polluter-pays principle, but also in the differentiation of obligations
between the developed countries. The paper shows that equity constitutes a
major principle of interpretation although it is not a directly applicable norm.
The paper also shows that equity is an element influencing the efficiency of
international agreements, though the equity approaches adopted in the
climate change regime do not necessarily promote the most efficient
solutions. The paper concludes that a simultaneous consideration of equity
and efficiency in climate policy improves the overall performance of the
regime.
The regulatory approaches of the climate change regime, as is shown in
the paper by Janna Lehmann, constitute the result of a history of regulatory
experiments made in the earlier treaty regimes concerning air pollution, i.e.
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Air Pollution in Europe and the 1985
Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances, supplemented by the
Montreal Protocol of 1987.
The following papers address a number of specific regulatory instruments
of the UNFCCC/KP regime.
A distinctive feature of the Kyoto Protocol is the flexibilization of
obligations through the use of economic instruments. Among them, probably
the most controversial and in many ways puzzling one is emissions trading.

In his paper, Jürgen Lefevere discusses the background of the concept of
emissions trading, and how it was introduced into the Kyoto Protocol. He
provides an overview of the concepts, including its ethical dimensions.
The following paper by Barbara Buchner, Alejandro Caparrós and Tarik
Tazdaït on green technology transfers is concerned with another of the
flexibilization mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, namely the Clean
Development Mechanism. Based on the analytical framework of game
theory, it concludes that the welfare benefit for developing countries ensuing
from technology transfers made under this mechanism is more than doubtful.
The picture changes, however, if certain ancillary benefits are taken into
account.
A general issue raised in the calculation of QELRCs and in the
flexibilization mechanism is carbon sequestration in sinks. This raises
general questions of forest conservation and/or management which are also
relevant under other international regimes, in particular the Biodiversity
Convention. The paper by Alejandro Caparrós and Frédéric Jacquemont
shows that the economic incentives for carbon sequestration provided by the
Marrakech Accords may have negative impacts on biodiversity in the case of
afforestation and reforestation programmes. Thus, policies duly taking into
account both regimes are needed.
The major natural sink, namely ocean sequestration, has been neglected
by the express provisions of the UNFCCC and the KP. The paper by Susan
Krohn first shows the technical possibilities of ocean sequestration and then
evaluates these measures in the light of various applicable international
regimes (the Biodiversity Convention, UNCLOS, the London Dumping
Convention, regional seas treaties) and general principles of international
environmental law (common heritage of mankind, intergenerational equity).
The last two papers, thus, point to a general problem of the current
international legal order, namely its fragmentation and the ensuing issue of
harmonization between overlapping regulatory regimes. In a problem area
which cuts across as many natural phenomena and divers human activities as
does the problem of climate change, this is of particular importance.
The second part of the book deals with specific regulatory problems
which climate change raises for the EU.
Both the Member States and the EU itself try to promote activities and
behaviour which can lead to a stabilization or reduction of GHG emissions.
But this raises the problem of undesirable effects which positive financial
incentives may have on competition and, thus, on the proper functioning of
the internal market. The paper by Mercedes Fernández shows how the
Community norms concerning state aid address this problem, trying to strike
an appropriate balance between the concern for undistorted competition and
the environmental interest to promote climate-friendly patterns of energy
production and consumption.

The paper by Jürgen Lefevere addresses another economic instrument,
namely emissions trading. It discusses the background of the Emission
Allowance Trading Directive, some of its key design issues and also the
possible link to other economic instruments (Joint Implementation, Clean
Development Mechanism).
Emissions trading raises in particular the problem of the initial allocation
of allowance, which is highly controversial in economic theory and in the
political arena. The paper by Dietrich Brockhagen provides an economic
analysis of this issue.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol create a highly complex multi-
level system of governance. As to the EU, this is further complicated by the
fact that both the EU and the Member States are Parties to these treaties and
that, in addition, they have availed themselves of the possibility admitted by
the Protocol to jointly fulfil their obligations in a differentiated way. This is
the so-called EU bubble. It poses difficult problems for compliance control,
as the paper by Frédéric Jacquemont shows.
The so-called EU bubble is limited to the “old” Member States of the EU.
But the “new” Members, too, are Parties to Protocol. Their interactions are
determined both by the Kyoto Protocol and EU law – a complicated
relationship analysed in the paper by Mercedes Fernández and Leonardo
Massai.
3. Perspectives
At a time when the Kyoto Protocol is about to enter into force (December
2004) a debate of its perspectives is appropriate. The challenge is diverse. It
concerns both the application of the existing law, i.e. the implementation of
the climate preservation regime established by the Protocol and its rule of
application, and the further development of the law, i.e. negotiations for the
second commitment period which should start in 2013.
As to the application of existing law, this is, so to say, the hour of truth:
now, it has to be tested whether the grand design is going to work.
The Protocol sets up a very ambitious system of international
governance. It is designed to implement fundamental principles of the
international order down to the practical detail. It tries to find a balance
between the respect of the sovereignty of States and the effective solution of
a problem which by its very nature is universal. It tries to achieve intra-
generational equity by applying the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. It intends to attain intergenerational equity by a set of rules
which are based on the principle of sustainable development and the
precautionary principle.

The Protocol, unlike many international declarations and also some
treaties, does not just recognize these principles; it breaks them down to the
nitty-gritty technical detail. It does so, inter alia, through novel regulatory
instruments, flexible mechanisms, so-called economic instruments of
environmental policy which go in many respects beyond the legal tools for
the protection of the environment so far tested at the national level. These
instruments are analysed in the present volume.
They have to face a double challenge: efficiency and uniform application.
Efficiency: the use of economic instruments, i.e. of market mechanisms,
is not per se a guarantee of an optimal solution of problems. The market
mechanisms are created by law, the law has been developed through a
process of political negotiations, where the word “horse trading” was
sometimes a fitting description. The market signals may, thus, be distorted
by that law. As a consequence, the optimal allocation which the market is
expected to achieve does not necessarily take place. This artificial market
has rather high transaction costs which may also lead to sub-optimal results.
Despite the high degree of theoretical analysis, in particular in economic
theory, which has accompanied the formation of this law and which is in part
reflected in the present volume, the ambitious regulatory approach is an
experiment. The results have to be carefully observed.
Uniform application: the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol depend on
national implementation which is subject to international scrutiny. The
regulatory problem has to be addressed by a multi-level approach, which has
been described in a number of contributions in this volume. There has to be a
division of responsibilities between the international and the national level,
the latter being divided, for the European region, between the EU and its
Member States. Whether this division is able to bring about cost-effective
and uniform application of the rules remains to be seen. The latter is both a
matter of efficiency and a requirement of justice: free-riding has to be
avoided, and equality before the law must be secured.
As to the development of the law: it is not in doubt that the relative
stabilization of the greenhouse gas content of the atmosphere which might be
achieved during the first commitment period 2008–2012 will not be enough
to save the world from the deleterious consequences of global warming. The
debate on the next commitment period has started at COP 10 in Buenos
Aires. Two problems must inspire the negotiation process. There is, first, the
need to take into account the results of the “test phase” which is only
starting. The negotiations have to be a “lessons learned” exercise. This is
somewhat problematic as the negotiations will have to take place while the
test is still going on.
The second problem, however related to the first, is the lack of
participation with the Kyoto regime. This concerns, first of all, the world’s
biggest producer of greenhouse gas emissions, the United States, and a few

other industrial States like Australia. It is obvious that the problem of global
warming cannot adequately be addressed without the participation of the
United States. This is both a matter of efficiency and of distributive justice.
What is needed for the purpose of bringing the United States back into the
boat is both a process of political persuasion among the industrial countries
and a further serious debate on the economics of the climate problem. Some
of the analyses provided in this volume may also serve as a point of
departure for this debate.
The other participation problem is the exemption of the major new
industrialized countries from quantitative emission reduction or limitation
obligations. This concerns, in particular, China, India and Brazil. It has to be
asked whether the equitable raison d’être of the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities is not overstressed if these major contributors
to current emissions are free from these obligations, even if it is true that
their contribution to the creation of the problem has not been significant.

PART I
International Negotiations and Implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol

Chapter 1
Barbara Buchner
The Dynamics of the Climate Negotiations:
A Focus on the Developments and Outcomes
from The Hague to Delhi
1 Introduction: A Brief Glance Into the Past
As early as the 19th century, French scientist Jean-Baptiste Fourier described the
existence of an atmospheric e¡ect which ^ similar to a greenhouse ^ enables the
earth to maintain an average temperature of approximately 158C instead of
^198C, which otherwise would be the case. Indeed, scientists had anticipated that
adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere could change the climate of the earth,
but initially they expected that oceans would harmlessly absorb the CO2 caused
by the industrialisation. From the 1890s to 1940, scienti¢c e¡orts regarding
greenhouse e¡ects increased due to growth in the global average surface air
temperature by 0.258C, but diminished in the next three decades when a world-
wide cooling of 0.28C took place. In its beginnings, research on the greenhouse
e¡ects was directly linked to changes in temperature. Around 1970, global
temperatures started to rise again and accordingly interest in climate change re-
surfaced. In the 1970s, the US Department of Energy intensi¢ed its research and
published a number of studies, which augmented the concerns about future
global warming. As a consequence of this growing awareness on environmental
concerns ingeneral, in 1972 environmental issues were for the¢rsttime placed on
the international political agenda: the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (UNCHE) tookplace inStockholmandisgenerally regarded as the
landmark event marking the emergence of environmentalism and the starting
point of current international environmental negotiations.
However, the¢rst instance when climate changewas discussed internationally
can be traced back to the year 1979: the First World Climate Conference was
organised by theWorld Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in Geneva. At this
Michael Bothe and Eckard Rehbinder (eds.), Climate Change Policy, 19^43.
# 2005 Eleven International Publishing. Printed in The Netherlands.

conference, climate change was for the ¢rst time recognised as a serious problem
and increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide resulting from the
burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes in land use were identi¢ed as
the principal cause of global warming. In addition the declaration of this ¢rst
major international meeting in the context of climate change urged governments
from all over the world ‘to foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in
climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.’
This event initiated a series of international conferences on climate change. In
1985, the ¢rst major scienti¢c international conference on the greenhouse e¡ect
was held at Villach, Austria, jointly organised by WMO, UNEP (United Nations
Environmental Programme) and ICSU (International Council of Scienti¢c
Unions). This conference ¢nally established greenhouse warming as an interna-
tional concern, warning that greenhouse gases will ‘in the ¢rst half of the next
century, cause a rise of global mean temperature which is greater than any in
man’s history’. At this event, researchers predicted possible implications such as
sea level rises by up to a metre and reported that gases other than CO2, such as
methane, ozone, CFCs and nitrous oxide, also contribute to warming.
In 1988, global warming attracted world-wide attention when scientists at
Congressional hearings in Washington DC blamed a major US drought on the
changing climate. In the same year, the Toronto Conference on the Changing
Atmosphere took place where scientists, politicians and o⁄cials from 48
countries as well as the UN called for a 20 per cent reduction of global CO2
emissionsby 2005 as comparedto 1988 levels.The approach taken inToronto, i.e.
setting a near term target relating to the reduction of the emissions volume,
proved to be very in£uential in the international negotiations on the development
of a multilateral framework to address climate change that followed.
Through pressure from the scienti¢c community which emphasised the need
for more scienti¢c research into the causes and e¡ects of climate change, the
WMO and UNEP subsequently set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), a global networkofover 2000 scientists, to analyse and reporton
scienti¢c ¢ndings. In particular, the IPCC was given the mandate to make an
inventory of current scienti¢c knowledge of our climate system, to identify the
e¡ects of climate change and to suggest the possible response strategies.
Increasing scienti¢c evidence of the likelihood of global climate change in the
1980s led to an increasing awareness that human activities induce a growth in the
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The year 1990 can be con-
sidered as a crucial year towards a binding Convention on Climate Change. On
the one hand, representatives of 137 countries and the European Community
attended the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva, calling in particular
for the drafting of an international Convention on Climate Change by June 1992.
Atthesametime, the¢rst assessmentreportoftheIPCC drew furtherattentionto
climate change, ¢nding that the planet warmed by 0.58C in the past century. The
IPCC warned that only strong measures to halt rising greenhouse gas emissions
20 Barbara Buchner

would prevent serious global warming. While the Second World Climate
Conference provided the political pressure, the ¢rst IPCC report contained the
scienti¢c basis for initiating the process of the UN negotiations on a climate
convention. Indeed, the supreme decision-making body of the UN, the General
Assembly, decided in December to enter into negotiations aimed at such a
framework convention. In particular, a resolution was adopted establishing the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on
Climate Change (INC/FCCC). Its mandate consisted of preparing an e¡ective
Framework Convention on Climate Change, supported by UNEP and WMO.
In June 1992, the ‘Earth Summit’, the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. At this conference,
after two years of intense work, the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) was adopted and opened for signature.The Convention was
signed by 155 countries, agreeing thereby to prevent ‘dangerous’ warming from
greenhouse gases, and setting an initial target of reducing emissions from
industrialised countries to 1990 levels by the year 20001
. At the Rio Earth
Summit, the need for industrialised countries to somehow control their emissions
of greenhouse gases ^ although in a non-binding fashion ^ was thus recognised.
In 1994, the Convention entered into force with the ultimate objective to
induce
(...) stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system (...) (UNFCCC, Art. 2),
and emphasising that
(...) the Parties should protect the climate system (...) on the basis of equity
and in accordance with their common but di¡erentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities. (UNFCCC, Art. 3).
The UNFCCC builds on the principle of precaution (Art. 3) and places the main
responsibility for taking action on the industrialised countries, dividing the world
along the classic UN line of developed and developing countries2
. The treaty is
ambitious in requiring, for the ¢rst time in history, targets for GHG emissions in
the atmosphere. However, it only sets a vague stabilisation target. It does not
impose speci¢c levels of concentrations to be achieved in order to avoid
1
More states have signed it since then. As of 24 May 2004, 166 countries signed the
Convention and 189 rati¢ed it. For a detailed and up-dated list of signatories see http://
unfccc.int/resource/conv/ratlist.pdf.
2
The developed countries are further separated into the Annex I, consisting of indus-
trialised countries including those countries with economies in transition and the Annex II,
comprising only those countries that were OECD members when the UNFCCC was
established in 1992.
The Dynamics of the Climate Negotiations 21

dangerous climate change, nor does it specify policies, imply commitments or
mandate which remedies governments have to pursue in order to achieve a
stabilisation of GHGs3
. Instead, the UNFCCC was primarily meant to form
the basis for an international agreement that can ensure emissions reductions in
the future by providing the framework for future negotiations, expecting that
both thebasic science and a political consensus onglobal warming would develop
over the following years4
. Most importantly, the UNFCCC established the
institutions for the future work, in particular the Conference of the Parties
(COP). The COP represents the highest body of the UNFCCC, comprising all
Parties, and is supported by two ‘subsidiary bodies’, SBI (Subsidiary Body on
Implementation) and SBSTA (Subsidiary Body on Scienti¢c and Technological
Advice). By ratifying the UNFCCC, countries do not only acknowledge that
climate change is a real problem, but they also accept to start working on this
problem through the UNFCCC institutions.
The application of the Convention represented a crucial step towards future
negotiations. Indeed, the year after in 1995, the COP met for the ¢rst time (in
Berlin) in order to assess progress towards the promises made at the Earth
Summit5
. At this ¢rst Conference of Parties to the Climate Convention (COP-1),
the countries noted that progress since Rio was very modest. Parties adopted the
Berlin Mandate in which they agreed that the commitments embedded in the
Convention were inadequate in order to reach the Convention’s objectives. The
need for negotiations about real emissions cuts was emphasised and conse-
quently, a negotiation process aiming at the adoption of a protocol or another
legal instrument to strengthen GHG emission reductions in Annex I countries
after 2000 was launched. In particular, the process required Annex I Parties to
elaborate policies and measures (PAMs) to limit their GHG emissions and to set
quanti¢ed limitations and reduction objectives with speci¢ed time-frames, such
as 2005, 2010 and 20206
. The Berlin Mandate thus exempted developing
countries from mandatory emission reductions. Nonetheless, the developing
countries certainly participated in the negotiations. COP-1 also established an
3
The only commitments that the Parties have are to ensure that the workof implementing
measures is initiated.
4
For more details on the UNFCCC see for example Anderson (2000), Grubb etal. (1999)
and Torvanger et al. (2001).
5
As indicated above, the COP represents the assembly of all the countries that have
rati¢ed the UNFCCC and currently convenes once a year to report on the progress of the
Convention.
6
Policies are procedures developed and implemented by one or several governments with
the objective of mitigating climate change through the use of technologies and measures,
whereas measures are actions that can be taken by one or several governments, also together
with the private sector, to accelerate the use of technologies or other practices that reduce
GHG emissions.
22 Barbara Buchner

open-ended Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) in which all Parties
were invited to negotiate a protocol on the future commitments, which was to be
¢nalised in 1997 at COP-3.
In July 1996, the Second Conference of the Parties (COP-2) met in Geneva
and sent out some important political statements. Shortly before the meeting, the
IPCC issued its SecondAssessment Report (SAR).TheSAR’s strong conclusions
were endorsed by the Ministerial Geneva Declaration, which consequently called
for legally binding commitments and signi¢cant GHG reductions. A number of
ministers showed concern about the discernible human in£uence on the global
climate, as concluded by the SAR, and agreed that its scienti¢c elements need to
be considered in decision-making. However, due to sharp di¡erences between
delegations, the declaration was only ‘noted’ by the COP-2. The conclusions
drawn by the IPCC motivated also the US to signi¢cantly change its position,
supporting for the ¢rst time an instrument containing legally binding reduction
commitments to ful¢l the Berlin Mandate. Yet, the US decision to support the
binding emission reduction commitments was linked to a strong preference for a
tradable permit system, which raised new complexities for the negotiations.
Therefore, notwithstanding the important positive elements of the COP-2, the
number of disagreements during the conference indicated that the future
negotiations would have to cope with many obstacles.
2 The Background:The Kyoto Protocol and its Key Issues
After a number of meetings in the AGBM, the Third Conference of the Parties
(COP-3) adopted in December 1997 the Kyoto Protocol, establishing for the ¢rst
time in history legally binding emission reductions targets for the industrialised
world. The agreement represents without any doubt a milestone in international
climate policy. This section will now brie£y analyse its evolution and its main
components.
2.1 The Negotiating Process: Key Players and their Strategies
The negotiationswere mainly in£uenced by fourcountries orgroups ofcountries:
the European Union (EU); the so-called Umbrella group, comprising the United
States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Russia and
Ukraine; and the G-77/China group consisting of developing countries including
China7
. Obviously, negotiations between these groups implied a lot of di¡erent
7
Main negotiating group of developing countries within the UN system. Despite its
name, it represents more than 130 countries.

viewpoints and priorities, not only among the groups but also within them. A
further crucial negotiating group within the UNFCCC process is the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS), which is a group of 42 countries that are among
those most threatened by rising sea levels and other impacts of climate change.
The European Union took the role of a ‘green consciousness’ in the
negotiation process, emphasising from the beginning the necessity of substantial,
legally binding emission reduction targets to enable real emission reductions and
strongly criticising attempts to build ‘loopholes’ into the architecture of the
protocol. Consisting of many environmentally sensitive member states that have
called for action on climate change ever since the issue emerged politically, the
EU had a strong sense ofglobal and environmental responsibility. Notwithstand-
ing di¡erences in the development between the North and the South, the EU thus
has been at the forefront of stronger climate change control. The ambitious
negotiating position of the EU represented indeed the main motivation behind
the numerical targets of the Kyoto Protocol. However, AOSIS was decisive in
proving the ¢rst step into this direction. Indeed, AOSIS countries worked
intensively to achieve the wording of the objective of the Climate Convention,
namely to stabilise concentrations ofgreenhouse gases inthe atmosphere at levels
that would not present a danger to the global climate system. Toward this end,
AOSIS submitted a draft Protocol to the ¢rst Conference of the Parties to the
Climate Convention held in Berlin in April of 1995. This draft Protocol
established a goal of a 20 per cent reduction of greenhouse gasses by the year
2005. The ‘AOSIS Protocol’, became a centrepiece for continued international
negotiations on climate policy known, as noted above, as ‘the Berlin Mandate’
and thus remained the basis and the framework for the negotiations.
On the other hand, the US provided a major in£uence on the institutional
approach to implementation, in particular with respect to the shaping of
emissions trading. In contrast to Europe, the US has been more hesitant about
actions on climate change, emphasising instead the economic consequences of
mitigation activities. Apparently contrary to its strong position in the scienti¢c
analysis of the issue, demonstrated for example by the US leadership on the way
to the establishment of the IPCC, the US initially only asked for emission limits
and its acceptance of binding commitments was achieved only by admitting a
higher degree of £exibility in the Protocol. In general, the US ^ supported by
other members of the Umbrella group, in particular Australia and Canada who
also have economies characterised by high energy-intensity and population
growth ^ advocated a maximum of £exibility in achieving emission reductions
in order to weaken the domestic impact of the reduction targets, favouring,
therefore, a £exibility mechanism and carbon sequestration in the form of carbon
24 Barbara Buchner

sinks8
.The inclusion of ‘negative emissions’, allowing for sinks from the land-use
and forestry sector was insisted upon by the US.
Japan had an ambiguous role in the negotiation process, strongly dependent
on the fact that they hosted the conference at which the ¢nal aspects of the
Protocol were negotiated. Being strongly related to the US in an institutional
sense, Japan tried to ¢nd a mediating position by following the European lead in
adopting strong emission reduction targets. Motivated by hopes to strengthen
and revive energy conservation through emission constraints, Japan supported
the EU notwithstanding the concerns of its industrial sector and scant worries
about climate change impacts.
The G-77/China group represents a numberof countries with a large range of
very di¡erent characteristics. Apart from AOSIS, a group of mostly very poor
countries, G-77 comprises the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) and a numberofother developing countries, including big countries
such as India and Brazil, supported by China. According to their di¡ering
interests, this group followed two main objectives during the negotiations. On
the one hand, it supported the EU strategy by pushing for high emissions targets,
while it also forcefully vetoed, onthe other hand, thebroad inclusion ofvoluntary
commitments for developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, the
key players of this group demonstrated decisive opposition to the article of
voluntary commitments and they succeeded in dropping this component by
inducing a debate on the pace at which emissions trading is supposed to come
into e¡ect. However, diverging interests within this group led to a number of
strange situations in the negotiating process, most impressively illustrated by the
process leading to the creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Notwithstanding the strong resistance of China and India, Brazil pushed ^ with
support by the US ^ for this type of hybrid institution, bringing together certi¢ed
joint implementation and emissions trading with voluntary developing country
participation. Several developing countries declaredtheir voluntary participation
in this mechanism, and after the US recognised it as the ‘politically correct
avenue’for involving some ofthekeydeveloping countries, theCDMbecame one
of the cornerstones of the Kyoto Protocol.
Intense negotiations among these key players led to the ¢nalisation of the
Protocol’s text after delegates worked throughout the last nights of the COP-3 in
the ¢nal session. In particular, the EU lowered its resistance against the inclusion
of six gases, sinks, and emissions trading and agreed to a broader di¡erentiation
of targets after other delegations conceded to include policies and measures
according to ‘national circumstances’. At about 1:00 p.m. on 11 December 1997,
the ¢nal COP Plenary convened and adopted the Kyoto Protocol.
8
Sinks are ecosystems such as forests, soil and oceans which absorb carbon dioxide,
reducing thus a country’s net CO2 emissions in proportion to the existence of large
ecosystems.

2.2 The Contents: Main Components of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol sets binding emissions reduction targets for industrialised
countries and requires that by the year 2005 ‘demonstrable progress’ must be
made in achieving those targets9
. By 2012 the overall GHG emissions of
industrialised countries should decline to an average 5.2 per cent below their
1990 levels. For the ¢rst time in history, industrialised countries accepted legally
binding targets for emissions of a range of greenhouse gases. In addition, by
signing the Protocol, industrialised countries appear to admit to bear the main
responsibility for the prevailing concentration of greenhouse gases. Under the
Protocol, economies in transition, including Russia and several states from the
former Soviet Union, are allowed to catch up with their economic development
after experiencing serious economic recessions in the early 1990s before they
must comply with strict targets. The choice of the base year of 1990 allows these
countries to dispose of notably large amounts of emission credits due to their
currently lower emission levels compared to 1990. Developing countries, includ-
ing the large economies of India and China, were exempted from binding
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
The Protocol establishes also a series of £exibility measures, which enable
countries to meet their targets by cooperating on emission reductions across
country borders and by vaguely establishing carbon sinks such as certain forestry
and land-use activities to soak up emissions. In particular, the following three
£exibility mechanisms are introduced: international emissions trading (IET, also
referred to simply as ‘emissions trading’), joint implementation (JI) of GHG
mitigation or sequestration projects between developed countries, and the CDM
to set incentives for joint projects in abating GHG emissions between Annex I
(developed country) and Non-Annex I (mostly developing country) Parties to the
Convention. These mechanisms are meant to assist countries in meeting their
emission targets in a £exible, cost-e¡ective way.
In addition, an entry-into-force provision was established: a precondition for
the Protocol to enter into force is that at least 55 Parties to the Convention,
representing at the same time at least 55 per cent of 1990 carbon dioxide
emissions of Annex I Parties, must have rati¢ed the treaty.
The main components of the Kyoto Protocol are as follows:
9
According to the principle of common but di¡erentiated responsibilities which has been
set in the UNFCCC, the developing countries, including the large economies of India and
China, were exempted from binding reduction targets in the ¢rst commitment period.
Indeed, the per capita emissions of these countries are much lower than the industrialised
countries’ emissions and at the moment their priorities are rather centred on the main-
tenance of development than on environmental issues.
26 Barbara Buchner

* Emission limitation/reduction requirements for industrialised countries: the
industrialised countries agreeto reduce theiraggregate GHG emissionsby 5.2
per cent in the so-called ¢rst commitment period between 2008 and 2012 in
comparison to the base year of 1990.The speci¢c targets are de¢ned in Annex
B to the Kyoto Protocol, which represents an up-dated version of the
industrialised countries de¢ned in Annex I to the Convention, including, in
addition to the original OECD countries, economies in transition to a market
economy.The emission reduction targets are di¡erentiated between countries
and vary from +10 per cent for Iceland, +/^0 for Russia, ^8 per cent for the
EU, ^7 per cent for the US and ^6 per cent for Japan.
* Emission limitations can be jointly managed through a ‘bubble’ or group of
countries, which has to achieve the overall target of all its participating
countries, with the possibility to distribute the burden within the bubble. The
EU has formed such a bubble.
* Emission targets can be achieved through the implementation of three
£exibility mechanisms (emissions trading, Joint Implementation and the
CDM), which are intended to increase the cost-e¡ectiveness of climate
policies by reducing the countries’abatement costs.
* Sequestration of CO2 in forests and sinks is included in the Kyoto Protocol as
one of the options to comply with the reduction targets, although the extent of
the use of this option was left vague.
* No emission reduction commitments for developing countries in the ¢rst
commitment period.
* Coverage of six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro£uorocarbons (HFC), per£uorocarbons (PFC),
and sulphur hexa£uoride (SF6).
* An entry into force provision requiring rati¢cation by at least 55 Parties to the
Convention, representing at the same time at least 55 per cent of 1990 carbon
dioxide emissions of Annex I Parties.
In the Kyoto Protocol, the targets, methods and timetables for global action
against climate change were set. However, the precise rules were missing and left
for further negotiations. The Kyoto Protocol thus left a lot of questions
unresolved, with the common understanding that these challenging issues would
require further negotiations. In particular, the rules for the £exible mechanisms
still needed to be negotiated, the accounting for sinks and sources of GHGs from
land-use changes and forestry had to be speci¢ed and questions regarding
compliance issues, the funding mechanisms and capacity building in developing
countries needed to be resolved.

3 From Kyoto to Delhi
3.1 Setting the Scene: The Developments up to the COP-6
a) The Political Controversies after Kyoto
In November 1998, the Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-4) convened in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Characterised by a lack of ambition and fatigue after
Kyoto, COP-4 failed to resolve the disputes over the rules for the Kyoto Protocol.
Nevertheless, the conference represented a further step on the way towards
e¡ective climate change control: the Parties adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of
Action (BAPA), aimed at ¢nalising the negotiations on the remaining points by
COP-6 in The Hague, the Netherlands, in November 2000. By this decision, the
Parties demonstrated their determination to show substantial progress on the
outstanding issues in order to prepare for the future entry into force of the Kyoto
Protocol, strengthening at the same time the implementation of the Convention.
In addition, after a lack of attention paid to developing countries in the COP-3,
this conference achieved a number of positive developments for the G-77/China
group, related above all to technology and ¢nance issues. The strategy of making
concessions to the developing world illustrated the long-term objective of
diminishing the dis-equilibrium between the viewpoints of developed countries
and developing countries with regard to developing countries’ voluntary commit-
ments. COP-4 demonstrated also the con£icting interests within developing
countries, when Argentina announced its intentions of a voluntary commitment
at COP-5, strongly opposed by the other group members. Nonetheless, it was
BAPA, which triggered a further important event during the COP-4, namely the
US signature of the Kyoto Protocol.
In 1999, COP-5 was held in Bonn, Germany, aimed at continuing the work
towards the ful¢lment of the BAPA. The conference revitalised the process after
the more hesitant approach in Buenos Aires, demonstrated by the ‘unexpected
mood of optimism’ that was created after the delegates completed their work
ahead of schedule. COP-5, therefore, sent a clear and powerful sign to the world,
demonstrating that work on climate change control was being taken seriously.
After the COP-5, a number of formal and informal consultations were held in
order to enable thebest preparations for the subsequent climate talks, which were
expected to demonstrate the progress of international climate policy since its
beginnings. In particular, these numerous meetings were supposed to help lay the
foundations for an agreement at COP-6.
b) The Open Issues in November 2000
After the ¢rst euphoria over the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol had passed, the
situation changed dramatically as soon as the various countries recognised the
28 Barbara Buchner

scope of the Protocol and the level of detail that needed to be elaborated upon.
Almost all the de¢nitions and exact formulations ofthe details were postponed to
later meetings. Only afterwards were the dimensions of the delayed work
recognised. In particular, the complexity of the mechanisms and the dimensions
of the potential ‘loopholes’ as well as the extent of the concession regarding ‘hot
air’ (i.e. the concern that countries with economies in transition will sell large
amounts of emission credits due to emission reductions acquired because of the
economic recession inthe early 1990s) had been under-estimated.Therefore, after
three years of negotiations and preparations for the COP-6, a large number of
controversial key issues required more speci¢c discussions. The main questions
were related to the key issues on the BAPA and regarded the following issues:
* Mechanisms: as discussed above, the Kyoto Protocol established three
mechanisms meant to assist countries in meeting their emission targets in a
£exible, cost-e¡ective way: an emission trading system, joint implementation
(JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). At the COP 6,
operational details governing the use of the mechanisms had to be elaborated
and a compromise between the countries’ di¡ering views should have been
found. Key issues in this context included: the determination of the roles and
responsibilities ofvarious institutions; the‘hot air’debate; decisions regarding
carbon‘sink’projects; andthe‘supplementarity’issue(i.e. whetheror notthere
should be a limit in the form of a ceiling on the quantity of emissions
reductions that can be met through the use of the mechanisms). Further
questions to be addressed included decisions concerning the baselines for
measuring the emissions-reduction contribution of speci¢c projects, account-
ing rules for allocating credits and a de¢nition of criteria for the eligibility of
projects.
* Carbon sinks: forestry and other forms of land use have the potential of
sequestering atmospheric carbon. Forthisreason, the Kyoto Protocolvaguely
promised to provide emission reduction credits for some land use, land-use
change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities. The question that should have
been answered at the COP-6 was twofold: 1) which types of LULUCF
activities can be accounted for; and 2) how much credit countries could get
for their forestry and land-use activities and consequently in which dimension
these activities could lessen the adverse e¡ects of emission reduction
measures. The problem is that plants and soils can act as carbon sinks, but
there is no scienti¢c certainty about how much carbon is being removed from
the atmosphere, or whether the removal from the atmosphere is permanent.
Therefore, the use of carbon sinks in meeting emission targets was not only
controversial but also complex and questions concerning an accurate de¢ni-
tion of ‘sinks’, their consequences and possibilities to measure them needed to
be clari¢ed.

* Compliance: the Kyoto Protocol identi¢ed a compliance system as a key
element of the agreement. This system should be able to determine whether
countries have met their commitments under the Protocol at the end of the
commitment period and the eventual consequences of non-compliance. The
aim should be a compliance system that sets incentives for the positive
performance of the participants. Decisions should have been made at COP-6
regarding the enforcement, organisational details, monitoring and veri¢ca-
tion and non-compliance.
* Developing country issues: developing countries, including the large econo-
mies of India and China, were exempted frombinding reduction targets in the
¢rst commitment period based on the principle of common but di¡erentiated
responsibilities. The per capita emissions of developing countries are indeed
much lower than the industrialised countries’ emissions and industrialised
countries are the main contributors to the prevailing atmospheric concentra-
tion of greenhouse gases. Avery important task for COP-6 was to strengthen
developing countries’ capacities to cope with their e¡orts to combat climate
change. Key issues included capacity building and transfer of technology,
particularly in relation to ¢nancial and technical assistance from Annex I
Parties.
* Adverse e¡ects: developing countries are su¡ering adverse e¡ects both from
climate change itself and some developing countries claim that they will su¡er
from the adverse impact of response measures undertaken to combat climate
change. Under the UNFCCC, Parties already agreed to address the needs and
concerns arising from these adverse e¡ects. Details on assistance to least
developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states, countries with
low-lying coastal areas and other vulnerable countries were still needed to be
elaborated upon. At the COP-6, characteristics of this assistance and
particularly the question of compensation should have been discussed.
3.2 The Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) ^ The Hague,
The Netherlands
COP-6 has been considered as the most important negotiation on global climate
change since the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to in 1997.The COP-6 was intended
to determine speci¢c rules and operational details that describe how the
commitments on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases under the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol canbe achievedandinwhichway the countries’mitigation e¡ortswillbe
measured. The talks were thus primarily supposed to clarify the details of vague
language in the Protocol before its ¢nal implementation and rati¢cation. A
30 Barbara Buchner

further aim was to reach agreement on actions to strengthen implementation of
the UNFCCC itself as well as to clarify the key issues on the BAPA (see above).
a) The Negotiations and Main Outcomes
The key negotiations took place between the United States supportedby Canada,
Australia, Japan and New Zealand (the‘Umbrella Group’), the European Union
guided by France (which had the presidency of the EU) and the G-77 group of
developing countries (however, China and AOSIS took separate positions from
the G-77 group)10
.
During the ¢rst days of the negotiations, progress was made with respect to
the de¢nition of the mechanisms and the completion of other text.Yet already at
the end of the ¢rst week, frustration was expressed due to the slow progress and
the amount of remaining political and technical issues for negotiation. The last
days were therefore focused on several proposals by the President of the COP-6,
the Dutch Minister of Environment Mr. Jan Pronk who tried to ¢nd a
compromise on a number of important issues by ¢rst identifying four ‘clusters’
of key political issues with the aim of facilitating progress on many disputed
political and technical issues. However, no consensus could be reached on the
core issues within the clusters and the negotiations appeared stalled. In an
attempt to advance the negotiations, President Pronk distributed a note contain-
ing his proposals on key issues, the so-called ‘Pronk document’. Further intense
talks on these proposals did not achieve a breakthrough and so the ¢nal e¡ort to
seek a consensus concluded without agreement. The ¢nal negotiations ended on
Saturday, 25 November 2000.The formal Plenary decided to suspend COP-6 and
to continue talks in 2001.The failure of COP-6 is mainly the result of four key
concerns for which compromises could not be reached between the participating
negotiators:
* Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); in particular sinks
* Supplementarity and the £exible mechanisms
* The nature of the compliance regime
* Financing mechanisms
b) A Brief Analysis of COP-6
The di⁄culty of the COP-6 consisted in ¢nding the right balance between
promoting rati¢cation of the Kyoto Protocol while at the same time maintaining
10
Indeed, most of AOSIS states are a member of G-77 and the same is true for China.
Actually, the group is called ‘G-77 and China’.

its environmental integrity. This con£ict was best illustrated during the very
controversial discussions regarding ‘sinks’. A main cause of the climate talks’
failure was the fundamental di¡erences between the EU and the US (backed by
the other members of the Umbrella Group) regarding the question of sinks. But
sinks were not the only problem; there were also various technical matters on
which text had been developed, but that were characterised by highly divergent
political points ofview. From thebeginning of the conference, it was obvious that
the negotiators had the enormous task of ¢nding common ground on the
emission reduction options for all the various countries. Nevertheless the break-
down of the climate talks created disappointment within the participants and
observers, in particular due to the high expectations that were set for this
conference. Notwithstanding progress and the approximations on di⁄cult key
issues, most importantly the greater acknowledgement of climate change, the
conference presented a missed opportunity given the fact that the chances of a
deal were more favourable at that time than ever before11
.
TheKyoto Protocolwas tohavebeen putinto e¡ect at The Hague inthat most
details were to have been clari¢ed at COP-6. The consequence of the failed
climate talks was the delay of the Kyoto Protocol’s rati¢cation, implying also that
some countries started worrying about the possibility to reach their emission
reduction targets on time.
3.3 The Resumed Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6bis) ^
Bonn, Germany
As a consequence of the failure at COP-6, the next round of negotiations became
very important for the success of the Kyoto Protocol. Several meetings were
convened after the failure in The Hague in an e¡ort to get negotiations back on
track. However, the resumed COP-6 was delayed to July 2001 due to the US
strategy to require more learning-time for the new administration. However, after
this date had been ¢xed, in March 2001 the new US President George W. Bush
announced his opposition and consequently the US rejection of the Kyoto
Protocol. In particular, President Bush declared the Protocol as ‘fatally £awed’
due to the harm that this climate treaty would incur on the US economy and the
exemptions of the developing countries from fully participating in the agreement.
Notwithstanding this step backward in international climate policy, the remain-
ing Annex I Parties decided to continue the Kyoto process and moved forward
with the resumed COP-6 in Bonn in July 2001 in order to complete the
negotiations on the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol and to bring the
talks initiated at The Hague to a successful end.
11
For a thorough discussion of the COP-6 see Buchner (2001).
32 Barbara Buchner

During a number of meetings after COP-6, some progress was achieved on the
sticky points that had caused the failure of the talks in The Hague. Nonetheless,
most of the open issues were forwarded to the resumed COP-6, and in particular
decisions on ¢nancial issues, compliance, LULUCF and supplementary in the
use of the mechanisms were needed. In Bonn, the negotiations proceeded
between the same Parties as in the previous meetings, although the US kept a
very low pro¢le and chose not to intervene in Kyoto Protocol issues unless it
created a precedent for international law or a¡ected key US interests.
The negotiations were characterised by the participants’ strong will to strive
for a break-through by achieving a political agreement on the key issues.
However, after the ¢rst week of negotiations, the process seemed to be slowed
down and President Pronk tried one more time to revive the talks by providing a
compromise proposal. Although a number of countries signalled agreement to
the proposal, disagreements on the section on compliance emerged. After intense
consultations, agreement was achieved by changing the proposed provisions on
compliance and leaving the remaining proposals on the political issues.The COP
formally adopted the political decision called ‘Bonn Agreement’. In addition,
political declarations by developed countries pledged additional funding for
climate change activities in developing countries. However, notwithstanding this
political success, the work on several key issues could not be completed but was
forwarded to subsequent COP. Most importantly, decisions on mechanisms,
compliance and LULUCF needed further negotiations. Summarising, the Bonn
agreement resolved key political issues in those decision texts, but did not ¢nalize
the actual decision texts.
b) A Brief Analysis of COP-6bis
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol, the other
Annex I Parties continued the process and indeed reached a political compromise
on the climate treaty at the resumed COP-6 in Bonn, July 2001.
The outcome of the Bonn negotiations, the so-called ‘Bonn Agreement’, has
been interpreted as a commitment to the approach embodied in the Kyoto
Protocol and represents the basis for its implementation. However, a number of
concessionswere madeto thekey players in order to keep the process alive, and in
this way the text of the Protocol was substantially watered down. For example,
both Russia and Canada obtained a larger number of credits for their forestry
(carbon sinks) than was o¡ered in earlier negotiations and requirements for
supplementarity, a previously high EU priority, was reduced in signi¢cance.
Several elements were included which reduced the Protocol’s environmental
integrity ^ which had been the main obstacle to ¢nding an agreement with the
US in The Hague ^ from the level set out in previously rejected proposals. In
addition to the sacri¢ces to keep the negotiations successful, a number of key

issues could not be concluded (most notably, compliance) contributing to
concerns that the Bonn Agreement neither assures the Kyoto Protocol’s rati¢ca-
tion nor its environmental e¡ectiveness.
Still, in the light of the low expectations prevailing after the failure in The
Hague and the US decision to defect from Kyoto, the outcome of the resumed
COP-6 represents a considerable success. In particular, the willingness to
continue e¡orts in multilateral cooperation on climate change control were
demonstrated, indicating that the Kyoto Protocol plays the role of a ¢rst step into
the right direction of more courageous future climate policy.
3.4 The Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP-7) ^
Marrakech, Marocco
Notwithstanding thepolitical deal reached inBonn, anumberof ‘technical’issues
related to the structure of the Kyoto Protocol remained unresolved and draft
decisionswereredirectedtothenextmeeting.COP-7inNovember2001,therefore,
represented a crucial event for ensuring the Protocol’s timely entry into force.The
conferencesoughttoclosethreeyearsofnegotiationsonthegoalssetoutinBuenos
Aires, andto completethetasksleftun¢nished atthetwolast meetings.
In Marrakech, the delegates continued the work on the outstanding technical
issues on the basis of the Bonn Agreement, attempting to resolve, among others,
details on mechanisms, the compliance system, LULUCF, and the Protocol
Articles 5 (methodological issues), 7 (communication of information) and 8
(review of information). On these issues, and on the input to the World Summit
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) to be held in September 2002, a package
deal was proposed towards the end of the second week. However, notwithstand-
ing the positive response from a number of negotiating groups (for example the
EU and G-77/China), key members of the Umbrella Group (Canada, Australia,
Japan, New Zealand and Russia) opposed the deal due to controversies on
eligibility requirements and banking under the mechanisms12
. After further
intense negotiations, consensus was found on these points and both compliance
eligibility requirements and limited banking of units by sinks under the CDM
were agreed to. The Annex I countries (except the US) agreed therefore to a
package deal which ensured the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of
Action. Being aware of the necessity to successfully close this conference in order
to support the Kyoto process, the key Umbrella countries that were needed to
12
Note that Norway and Iceland agreed with the compromise.
34 Barbara Buchner

satisfy the 55 per cent clause succeeded in further weakening their contribu-
tions13
.
Given the considerable concessions to the demands of the Umbrella Group, and
the corresponding undermining of the Kyoto Protocol’s environmental integrity,
the ¢nal deal left many observers and negotiators disappointed. However,
through the political conclusions achieved in Bonn, decisions on a number of
critical issues had been forwarded to COP-7 and therefore the stakes in
Marrakech were considerably high. The threat that, after years of negotiations,
the climate talks could still end without consensus (implying a failure of
international e¡orts in climate change control), characterised the atmosphere of
the conference. Therefore, emphasising that the ¢nal deal included not only
concessions but also considerable progress on various issues as the CDM and
compliance, the agreement was welcomed as a realistic ¢rst step in climate
change control, being both politically and economically feasible. The Marrakech
Accords were thus received as a milestone in international climate policy due to
the broad consensus on the important role of the Kyoto Protocol in serving as a
precedent for multilateral action against climate change.
The Marrakech Accords to the Bonn Agreement have politically opened up
the path for the rati¢cation of the Kyoto Protocol. Shortly after COP-7, the
WSSD took place in Johannesburg from 26 August to 4 September 2002. This
conference (whichwas thefollow-upof Rio’s Earth Summitin 1992), happenedat
a very crucial point in the determination of the Kyoto Protocol’s future. Indeed,
several declarations and discussions aboutthe Kyoto Protocol’s future were made
at the WSSD, which can be seen as a crucial milestone in the Kyoto process14
.
During this conference, China declared its rati¢cation of the Protocol while both
Canada and Russia announced their intents to ratify the Protocol very soon.The
WorldSummitthus demonstratedthat multilateral supportfortheKyoto process
was still intact.
3.5 The Eighth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP-8) ^
New Delhi, India
COP-8 took place in New Delhi from 23 October to 1 November 2002 and
marked the beginning of a new phase of negotiations. After the last conference
13
For example, Russia managed to almost double its sinks allowances.
14
For an overview on the key outcomes of the Johannesburg Summit see for example
United Nations (2002).

had completed three years of negotiations on the operational details of the Kyoto
Protocol, the COP-8 started discussion on the implementation of the Marrakech
Accords and UNFCCC issues which had been left unresolved at previous
meetings. India wanted to use this meeting mainly to address the implementation
of issues agreed thus far and to look at developing country matters ^ in particular
adaptation ^ and wanted to desperately prevent looking ahead to anything to do
with developing country commitments after 2012.
The negotiations in New Delhi were characterised by progress on a number of
issues previously left aside due to the pressing negotiations under BAPA. The
biggest issues were the continuing work on sinks in the CDM, the ¢nishing of the
work on the Non-Annex I national communication guidelines, the Canadian
proposal on clean energy exports, and the Delhi Declaration. In addition,
decisions and conclusions were taken on the following topics: guidelines for
Non-Annex I national communications; issues under ¢nancial mechanisms;
research and systematic observation; cooperation with relevant international
organisations; and methodological issues. Agreement on a number of technical
issues relating to the implementation of existing commitments was also reached.
COP-8 adopted the Delhi Declaration calling for the timely rati¢cation of the
Kyoto Protocol and urging countries that had not yet rati¢ed to do so in a timely
manner.
By adopting the Delhi Declaration, COP-8 further strengthened the process
towards the Kyoto Protocol’s rati¢cation. Nonetheless, the outcome of the COP-
8 re£ects a number of compromises, which were needed to conclude a set of the
climate negotiations and to prevent international climate policy from being a
complete failure. In particular, the issue of future development of the climate
change regime was central to COP-8. However, in this context, the negotiations
unravelled a lot of dichotomies, most importantly between developed and
developing countries, which were expressed through di¡erent views on the Kyoto
Protocol and the UNFCCC, on adaptation and mitigation and on environment
and development. As a consequence, expectations at COP-8 related to o¡ering
clearer long-term visions on climate change control or even explicit future steps
beyond the ¢rst commitment period were not satis¢ed. The Indian hosts had far-
reaching ambitions, tempting to bring climate policy closer to developing
countries by unifying climate-change control with sustainable development.
Above all, negotiators had hopedto weakentheusual division between developed
and developing country positions, highlighting the variety of interests of Non-
Annex I Parties. The breakdown of this dichotomy would have enabled a more
ambitious declaration, capable of initiating a dialogue on broadening the
36 Barbara Buchner

commitment after 2012. However, the few supportive voices within the group of
developing countries were overruledby the more powerful players, notably the oil
producers, who emphasised the need for a declaration concentrating on adapta-
tion15
. Although mitigation was acknowledged as continuing to have high
priority, the developing countries’ concerns about adaptation and their sensitiv-
ities in relation to accepting commitments led to a focus on adaptation in the
Delhi Declaration.
The ¢nal outcome of the COP-8 was characterised by a shift in the negotiating
Parties’ positions. In particular, the former ‘Green Group’ consisting of the EU
and the developing countries, which had loosely co-operated throughout pre-
vious COPs, experienced a number of di⁄culties and divisions16
. This develop-
ment was supportedbya further remarkable position change: the US modi¢ed its
standpoint regarding the developing countries, and instead of continuing to
require their substantial participation, it backed them in the short term by
opposing the ‘unreasonable’ demands by, in particular, the EU, Canada and
Japan, which would imply an economic slowdown. Although having promised in
2001 to not obstruct the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the US thus seemed
to have changed its mind and sided with Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries
in reducing the substance of various decisions.
Notwithstanding the missed opportunity to start a dialogue with the develop-
ing countries, observers report that informal discussions among the developed
and developing countries were initiated at COP-8.
3.6 The Ninth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP-9) ^
Milan, Italy
The COP-9 was held in Milan, Italy, from 1^12 December 2003. Over 5000
participants attended the session. The negotiations were aimed at strengthening
and building on the original UNFCCC treaty and at completing some technical
issues related to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. However, only modest
results were expected given the inertia of the political situation. Indeed, although
the international infrastructure for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force is to a
large degree in place, the implementation of the Protocol has been delayed while
awaiting that Russia rati¢es the agreement. As a consequence, also the formal
negotiations on major next steps in the international climate e¡ort and on
broader post-2012 perspectives are behind time.
Giventhis situation, a major focus at COP-9 was devotedto a large numberof
high quality side events which were meant to stimulate the discussion both on
15
In fact, among the developing countries only AOSIS provided support.
16
For a discussion of the COP-8 see Ott (2002).

topicswhichwere alreadyonthe agenda and also on issueswhich have provedtoo
‘hot’ for o⁄cial talks. In this context, the conference had to show whether the
relationship between the industrialised and the developing world could be
improved in order to lay the foundation for a more ambitious future approach
to global climate-change control.
Given the continued uncertainty on the Kyoto Protocol’s fate, the formal agenda
of COP-9 was very light. Nonetheless, the negotiations reached consensus on
some decisions, in particular concerning the technical rules for sinks projects in
the CDM for which COP-9 will be remembered as the ‘forest COP.’ Additional
outcomes were decisions on guidelines for the operation of two funds to assist
developing countries: the Special Climate Change Fund andthe Least Developed
Countries Fund. The o⁄cial negotiations produced thus modest progress on a
handful of largely technical issues; still they remained essentially deadlocked on
issues touching on the broader question of next major steps in the international
climate e¡ort.
The COP-9 was characterised as a new type of meeting in the climate negotiation
process. On one hand, the o⁄cial negotiations aimed at strengthening the
UNFCCC treaty and the Kyoto Protocol produced modest progress on some
technical issues. However, the negotiations basically remained deadlocked when
broader aspects related to next major steps in international climate policy were
addressed. Ontheother hand, though, there was a so-called‘second face’of COP-
9, re£ected by over 100 side events organised by numerous observer constitu-
encies, such as e.g. developed and developing country delegations, intergovern-
mental and non-governmental organisations, research institutions and the
private sector. These side events addressed both pertinent issues related to the
o⁄cial negotiations, and explored a number of highly important aspects which
did not yet receive a lot of attention in the negotiations given that they have
proved simply too‘hot’tobe handled by the COP. In short, the side events tackled
issues related to meeting the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective and demonstrated
that e¡orts to address the adverse e¡ects of climate change are already underway.
While resolving di¡erences in the o⁄cial negotiations remains complex, the
signi¢cant number of side events at COP-9 signals a change towards a more
positive outlook for future COP sessions. Indeed, regardless of the lack of
signi¢cant progress, vigorous e¡orts to address the adverse e¡ects of climate
change are already underway. In that sense, it has been demonstrated that
economic and interdisciplinary research can provide important inputs for the
design of e¡ective climate change control and is gaining momentum in the policy
process.
38 Barbara Buchner

4 Conclusions and the Outlook for the Future of Climate
Policy
During the last several decades, climate change has evolved as a major topic in
international policy discussions. The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, establish-
ing for the ¢rst time in history binding emissions reduction requirements for
industrialised countries, represents a milestone in the international e¡orts to
control climate change. Notwithstanding its limitations, the Kyoto Protocol
constitutes one of the best-written texts within the history of environmental
agreements since it links environmental, economic and legal components.
However, being the outcome of last-minute negotiations motivated by the high
expectations of the world as well as by the ambitious target to accomplish a
historic agreement, a number of issues in the Protocol were not su⁄ciently
elaborated or were left deliberately vague and therefore their de¢nitions posed
problems and disputes. A further di⁄culty consisted in the complexity and
technicality of the issues, expressed in the enormous volume of texts that had to
be agreed. As a consequence, the negotiations on the rules that were needed to
prepare for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force turned outto be very di⁄cult. In
addition, also the positions of some of the various groups of states involved in the
negotiations changed during the negotiating process, due to political interests or
further scienti¢c information. In particular, the decision of the by far biggest
producer of carbon dioxide emissions, the US, to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol
induced a numberofconsequences for the Kyoto process, increasing above all the
bargaining power of the remaining players ^ including Russia ^ due to the fact
that the rules for entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol require 55 Parties to the
Convention to ratify the Protocol, including Annex I Parties accounting for 55
per cent of that group’s carbon dioxide emissions in 1990.
This 55 per cent clause and the pressing need to conclude the negotiations on
the Kyoto Protocol in order to enable its timely entry into force have led to a
numberofconcessions atthelast COPs. Indeed, starting inTheHague, theKyoto
Protocol seems to have been watered down during the negotiations, inducing a
much lower degree of environmental e¡ectiveness than initially expected.
Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol still represents remarkable progress in
international climate policy and there is common consensus that its major value
is to start action against climate change and to make a signal to the public. Its
implementation could indeed trigger a chain reaction, creating incentives for
further activities. Indicators of the science, public and business sectors show that
there is hope for a common climate control consciousness, strengthened by the
series of major £oods and droughts around the world, which have reinforced
fears that global warming is also raising the risk of extreme weather events.
After COP-7, the international infrastructure for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry
into force is to a large degree in place. However, the Protocol can only become

operational if Russia rati¢es. Although repeatedly emphasising its intention to do
so, Russia has long been uncertain regarding its ¢nal strategy. Only recently signs
indicate that Russia is ¢nally very close to the rati¢cation of the Kyoto Protocol.
Indeed, on 30 September 2004, the Russian government approved the Kyoto
Protocol on climate change and sent it to parliament for rati¢cation (BBC News,
30 September 2004).The decision by the parliament, whose approval is necessary
for the treaty’s rati¢cation, is expected to take place within the next weeks and is
in general considered as a mere formality. The Russian rati¢cation would open
the way for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry-into force, sending thus a strong signal for
international climate policy.
In accordance with these improved signals for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into
force,‘Beyond Kyoto’ issues are receiving increased attention and the post-Kyoto
strategy is becoming an essential part of the international climate agenda. Post-
2012 perspectives need to be discussed and compromises among the diverse
countries have to be found. In this context, future climate talks will needto tackle
an issue which represented a key area of disagreement in New Delhi: the formal
engagement by the Parties on international climate-change control after the
Kyoto Protocol’s ¢rstcommitmentperiod. Delegates at COP-10 in Buenos Aires,
will have the di⁄cult task of improving the relationship between industrialised
and developing countries, which su¡ered a setback since COP-8. Indeed, COP-9
has further highlighted the division between developed and developing countries,
notwithstanding some progress observable in innovative approaches discussed in
the side events. Still, communications between the EU and the developing
countries require improvement, acknowledging that the question of equity needs
to be tackled not only on the scienti¢c, but also on the political level. Only after
such adebatehasbeen seriouslystarted, a commonbasefor negotiationsbetween
developed and developing countries on the future process of climate-change
control can be created.
The last round of climate negotiations in Milan has ended on a positive note,
emphasising the role of the UNFCCC’s constituencies as an important compo-
nent of the process to deliver an equitable global climate change regime, a point
clearly made by their demands for strong climate action, dedicated leadership,
information sharing and future thinking. Indeed, while resolving di¡erences in
the o⁄cial negotiations remains complex, the signi¢cant number of side events
signals a change towards a more positive outlook for future COP sessions.
As of 5 October 2004, 84 Parties had signed the Kyoto Protocol and 126 had
rati¢ed it, representing the countries that contributed 44.2 per cent of 1990
emissions. In addition, in particular Russia’s recent decision to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol generates optimism with regard to the treaty’s entry into force. While
this is encouraging, it nevertheless should not be forgotten that the Protocol itself
^ and in particular in its current form ^ will not a¡ect climatic development in any
observable manner. There is, therefore, consensus that the international process
on climate-change control needs to be kept alive, considering the Kyoto Protocol
40 Barbara Buchner

is only an important ¢rst step, which should induce a chain reaction to a more
ambitious future climate strategy. Indeed, studies and opinions coincide in
concluding that climate policy requires global emission reductions in order to
¢nd a long-term solution to combat climate change. In particular, without the
involvement of the key CO2 emitters ^ above all the US and the large developing
countries ^ global emission reductions will remain small. Given the circum-
stances in the developing countries, binding commitments are certainly not a
strategy in the short term. However, in the longer term, their involvement in
reducing global emissionswillbe a crucial componentto a successful approach to
climate-change control, as is the needto re-involve the US. As a consequence, any
type of e¡ective strategy to tackle the global problem of climate change needs to
be based on a global approach, involving as many countries as possible, and
accounting in particular for the large emitters of greenhouse gases.
Academic workhasbegunto identify possiblefuture architectures, taking into
account near-term and long-term incentives. Indeed, the progress achieved in
national climate policy, as for example the internal emissions trading scheme of
the EU or the various state-level initiatives in the US, as well as the emergence of
numerous bilateral cooperative e¡orts focusing on climate-change control
suggest that ^ despite the slow process of putting the Kyoto Protocol into force ^
the long-term prospects for climate protection look reasonable. Now the gap
between science and politics needs to be bridged. Since no universal solution to
climate change is available, the focus must be on the design of policy mixes17
.
Indeed, to strengthen the development of public awareness or consciousness of
the problem, it is important to start with every available tool that could help to
combat climate change. Climate-change control may depend to a degree on the
expectations that the business community has in playing a role and on its
engagement as an engine behind climate action. Further, the plan to use a wide
range of instruments could be successful in the long run. After the foundations
have been laid with this strategy, there is hope that the incentives and spillover
e¡ects of the various measures can induce further action to protect the climate.
Even more important than the broad use of alternative instruments is a second
main focus of a future strategy: the need to be equipped with reliable institutions
that can control the process of emission reductions. This requirement is crucial
because ^ dueto theglobal problem ofclimate change ^ thelong-term objective in
17
The series of climate negotiations linked to the Kyoto Protocol and the scienti¢c
research undertaken in parallel have highlighted a number of key issues for the future
climate policy. In particular, a crucial element of future climate strategies relates to
technology and technological transformation. In addition, high priority in the design of
the‘next’climate regime should be devoted to adaptation. Recent research suggests also that
regional agreements/fragmented regimes can sometimes induce stronger incentives than a
global approach and can therefore be seen as a ¢rst step in direction of e¡ective climate
change control.

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different content

Hall Basin, 100, 101.
Haloes, 200.
Hannah Island, ships anchored inside, 100; visit to, 101.
Hans Egede, 24.
Hans Hendrik, Eskimo engaged at Proven, 39; endeavour to
engage his brother-in-law, 48; seal shot by, 354.
Hares, traces of, 60, 107; at “Alert’s” winter quarters, 211;
traces of, on the Polar Sea, 296, 314; left by Captain
Nares for N. division, 321; shot, going south, 345, 351.
Harmonium, obtained from the “Valorous,” at church, 187.
Hartstene Bay, arrival at, 51.
Hawks, Cape, 83.
Hayes, Dr., 51, 52, 53, 72, 73, 85, 99, 360.
Hayes, Cape, Eskimo remains on, 69; ascent of, 90.
Hayes Sound, 60; tides in, 62; intended exploration, 330.
Henry Island of Hayes, not an island, 64.
“Hercules,” H.M. sledge, Lieut. W. H. May, R.N., 137, 217.
Hilgard, Cape, Eskimo remains on, 69.
Hoskins, Commodore A. H., sledging flagstaff presented by,
307.
Housing for winter quarters, 154, 155, 156.

Hudson’s Bay Company’s Taboggans, suitable in soft snow,
281.
Hummocks, difficulty of marching over, on the Polar Sea, 278,
279, 281, 284, 301; discoloured by mud, 301; great
barrier of, 303; great size, 304, 305; different colours of,
316.
Hunt, Wm., ward-room cook, H.M.S. “Alert,” songs by, 214.
Hydrostatics, lecture on, by Lieut. May, 169.
Ice, first seen, 22; stream of, near Cape Farewell, 23; the
middle pack, 44, 45; dangers, 65, 66; occupations when
detained by, 66; ships stopped by, 57, 65, 73, 82, 90, 95,
103, 110, 113, 121, 344; amusements on the, 77; dock
cut in the, 86; great height of, 89; increasing thickness,
96; extending across Hall Basin, 100; pressure on Cape
Frederick VII., 114; of the Polar Ocean, 127, 147, 200;
the dangerous state of the, in autumn travelling, 141;
movement of, during winter, 184; character of, in
travelling over the Polar Ocean, 284, 291, 300; symptoms
of disruption, 315, 320; state of, on the voyage
southward, 344. (See Palæocrystic, Blasting, Floe-bergs,
Hummocks.)
Ice navigation, most important maxim in, 45; uncertainty of,
57, 64; qualities required for, 82.
Icebergs first sighted, 22; constantly seen, 23; in Disco Bay,
32, 34; danger from, in the Waigat, 38; indicate shoal
water, 60; danger from, off Albert Head, 65; ships

endangered by, 91; number decreasing, 96; innumerable,
359.
Independence, Cape, of Kane, 98.
Insects collected, 351.
Isabella, Cape, 356, 357; Captain Markham lands at, 56, 57,
95; letters at, 358.
Itivdliarsuk glacier, 36.
Ivory gull, 46, 50, 101.
Jacobshavn, glacier of, 32.
John Barrow, Cape, 93.
Jolliffe, Thos., petty officer, H.M.S. “Alert,” in N. division sledge
party, holds out to the end, 326 (n.).
Joseph Henry, Cape, 127; Aldrich starts for, in the autumn,
136; depôt near, 147; dog “Sallie” lost at, 190; arrival of
sledges at, 263; floes off, 282; encamped abreast of, 285;
description of, 285; northern division of sledges reaches,
321; last seen, 343.
Kane, Dr., his open polar sea, 72, 98, 360.
Kardluk Point, in the Waigat, 36.
Kayak, difficulty of using, 30; adventure of Mr. Wootton, 30;
Eskimo pilot in, 43.

Kennedy Channel crossed, 103; musk-oxen on east side of,
103.
“Kew,” magnetic observatory at winter quarters so called, 154.
Kew Observatory, thermometer tested at, 223.
King ducks, 50, 332.
Knapsacks, sledging, contents, 235, 236.
Knots, seen and secured at Distant Cape, 110.
Lady Franklin Inlet, 103, 111.
Lafayette Bay (of Kane), 98, 99.
Lancaster Sound, geology, 67; remains of Eskimo on shores
of, 68; “Alert” off mouth of, 360.
Lemmings, traces of, 107; description, 115, 116; eaten by
“Nellie,” 212; traces away from the land, 278.
Letters at Cape Isabella, 358; at Godhavn, 363; at Littleton
Island, 358, 362.
Lieber, Cape, 102.
Lievely, 26. (See Godhavn.)
Life-boat Cove, visit to, 53.
Light, lecture on, by Lieut. Parr, R.N., 169; return of, 207, 225.
Lime-juice, regular daily issue of, 16; impossibility of using,
while in a frozen state, away sledging, 238; taken on the

sledges by Commander Markham and Lieut. Parr, 238;
served out to sledge crew by Commander Markham, 305;
useless unless the whole volume is thawed, 305; its use
in the treatment of scurvy, 329; used on all sledge
journeys when its use was possible, 330.
Lincoln Bay, 115; coast between, and Cape Union, 121; depôt,
117, 248.
Little Vulgar Boy, play acted by the officers, 214.
Littleton Island, visit of Captain Nares and Commander
Markham to, 53, 55; not visited, going south, 358; mail
at, 358, 362.
Looms (see Birds), 40, 41.
Loom soup, 40.
Louis Napoleon, Cape, Eskimo remains at, 69; passed by the
ships, 90.
Lyngenmarkfjeld, in Disco, ascent of, 31.
M‘Clintock, Admiral Sir Leopold, sledge of, the best, 281;
superintends outfit of expedition, 2; his detention in the
Melville Bay pack, 44; sledge equipments superintended
by, 231; on the absurdity of taking frozen lime-juice on
sledges, 238; tea-leaves recommended by, 316.
Magnetic observations, 31; while sledging, 73, 180, 305; snow
observatory for, 152, 153, 209.
Magnetism, lecture on, by Lieutenant Giffard, R.N., 169.

“Marco Polo,” H.M. sledge, 137, 217, 259.
Marine shells found above sea-level, 116.
Markham, Commander Albert H., R.N., visit to Littleton Island,
53; to Cape Isabella, 56; to Hannah Island, 101; to
Distant Cape, 110; starts on an autumn reconnaissance,
128; starts on second autumn sledge journey, 133; on
main autumn sledge journey, 137, 144; in charge of
magnetic observations, 154; lecture on astronomy, 169;
parts taken by, 174, 214; followed by a wolf, 228; takes
lime-juice on his sledge, 238; in command of the
northern division of sledges, 242, 311; attains the most
northern point ever reached by man, 309, 311; resolves
to abandon large boat, 288, 289; serves out lime-juice,
305.
Markham, Clements, on Eskimo wanderings, 68. (See
Clements Markham.)
“Markham Hall,” storehouse at winter quarters, 152;
demolition of, 210.
Maskell, William, H.M.S. “Alert,” songs by, 169, 216; parts
taken by, 174; sledge crew, N. division, holds out to the
end, 317, 318 (n.).
May, Lieutenant W. H., R.N., starts on autumn travelling, 137;
severely frost-bitten, 147; suffers amputation, 148;
astronomical observer, 152; his lecture on hydrostatics,
169; manager of the theatre, 214; glee sung by, 216;
sails his sledge, 231 (n.); comes to the rescue of the

northern division, 325; goes to succour Aldrich’s party,
331, 332.
Medical staff, their tests of the physical capacity of the officers
and men, 15; unremitting care of the sick, 333.
Medical inspections, 187, 204, 258, 326, 337.
Medical stores for sledges, 238 (n.); weight, 233.
Medical instructions to commanders of sledges, 238.
Melville Bay, 18, 44; passage through, 44; bear hunt in, 46.
Melville Island, remains of Eskimo at, 69; musk-oxen at, 106.
Men of the expedition, selection of, 4; tests of physical
capacity, 15; regular daily issue of lime-juice to, 16;
always reliable in an emergency, 125; sufferings and
excellent conduct in autumn travelling, 134, 145; their
good humour and wit, 146; frost-bites and amputations,
148; clothing during winter, 159, 160; school for, in
winter, 166, 167, 213; theatricals, 171, 173; Christmas
cheer, 195; fondness for dancing, 195, 197, 204;
excellent health, 204; paleness on return of sun, 211;
heroic conduct while sledging, 277, 286, 287, 291, 302,
310, 311, 313, 316, 352.
Meteor, brilliant, seen at winter quarters, 201.
Meteorites at Ovifak, 31.
Meteorological observations, 162, 180, 183, 223.
Middle pack, Captain Nares’s resolve to take the, 44.

Miocene Period, coal of, discovered, 347.
Mollies, 361.
Moon, 181. (See Paraselenæ.)
Moravian missionaries, 24.
Morton, Cape, 100, 102; depôt of, 100.
Morton, Mr., his “open polar sea,” 93; description of Cape
Constitution, accurate, 98; unable to ascend cliff, 98.
Mosquitoes, plague in Greenland, 32.
Moss, Dr., surgeon, H.M.S. “Alert,” reading by, 168; lecture on
mock moons under the microscope, 169; makes a balloon
on Guy Fawkes’ day, 180; paints scenery for theatre, 171;
succours the northern division, 326; sketch for bill of fare
by, 335; paints the boats, 245.
Murchison Sound, 50.
Musical instruments, 7. (See Harmonium, Piano.)
Musicians in the ships of Sir H. Gilbert and John Davis, 7, 8.
Musk-oxen, traces of, 60, 61; hunting, 104; range of, 106;
traces in Discovery Harbour, 107; beef presented by
“Alert” to “Discovery,” 108; hunt in Shift-Rudder Bay, 113;
quantity of meat from, 186, 204; meat nearly stolen by
dogs, 207; in the summer, 338.
Mustard and cress grown in the “Alert,” 205, 211, 345.

Nares, Captain George S., R.N., resolves to take the middle
pack, 44; visits Life-boat Cove and Littleton Island, 53;
constant vigilance, 66; visits Hannah Isle, 101; ascends
hill above Cape Morton, 102; selects winter quarters for
“Discovery,” 107; observes opening in the pack, 114;
catches a lemming, 115; desirous of finding a more
sheltered spot for winter quarters, 128, 135; his account
of sledge travelling, 140; lecture on astronomy, 169;
gives name to the Palæocrystic Sea, 200; excellent health
and spirits of those under his command at the
commencement of the New Year, 204; lecture on sledging
experiences, 215; arrangement for opening
communication with “Discovery,” 246; unjust attack upon,
regarding lime-juice, 237; absurdity of the charge against
him, 238; his Union Jack taken with northern division,
258; at Cape Joseph Henry Depôt, 321; leaves hares for
northern division, 321; comes to the relief of the northern
division, 325, 327; decision to return home, 337, 346;
anxiety for safety of Beaumont, 349; accepts offer of coal
at Egedesminde, 363; lands at Valentia, 367; satisfaction
of the Admiralty with his conduct of the Expedition, 368.
Narwhal hunting, 59.
Naturalist, zeal in a gale of wind, 19; visit to Ovifak, 31; finds
Eskimo remains at Cape Beechey, 69; ascends hill in
Bessels Bay, 101; at distant Cape, 110. (See Feilden,
Captain.)

“Nellie,” Commander Markham’s black retriever, coveted by
Eskimos at Proven, 39; dislike of Eskimo dogs, 78;
surprise at the tabogganing, 188; stood the cold well,
188, 189; adventure with, in the unifilar house, 209, 210;
eats the lemmings, 212; followed by a wolf, 228.
Nelson, Lord, an old Arctic officer, 179.
New Year’s day, 202, 203, 204.
Nip, preparations for, 65, 71, 83; off Cape M‘Clintock, 94;
south of Cape Beechey, 348. (See Ice.)
Norman-Lockyer Island, Eskimo remains on, 69, 74; visited,
73.
North extreme, camp, 307, 308; farthest point ever reached,
309, 311.
“North Water,” of Baffin Bay, 47; of Smith Sound, 72, 97.
Northumberland Island, 50.
Norton Shaw Cape, passed by the ships, 94.
Observations, scientific, in winter quarters, 180; difficulties,
180; while sledging, 305; at farthest northern point, 307,
310. (See Magnetic, Meteorological, Astronomical.)
Observatories, wooden, for transit instrument, 152; magnetic,
154; dismantling of, 227.
Officers, selection, 4; tests of physical capacity, 15;
amusements, 167; lectures by, 169; theatricals, 169, 173;

scientific observations, 180; birthdays celebrated, 184;
Christmas, bill of fare for, 196; approval of decision of
Captain Nares to return, 337. (See under names.)
Omenak fiord, discharging glaciers in, 38.
Orchestra, Royal Arctic Theatre, 171.
Osborn, Rear-Admiral Sherard, C.B., dedication to, v.; on
Eskimo wanderings, 68.
Ovifak, visit of naturalist to, 31.
Pack. (See Ice.)
Palæocrystic Sea, name given, 200, 234. (See Frozen Ocean.)
Palæocrystic floes in Robeson Channel, 92, 114, 118.
Palæocrystic grand chorus, 216; sung at the most northern
position ever reached by man, 310.
“Pandora” brings letters to Cape Isabella, 358; at Godhavn,
363; sighted in the Atlantic, 366.
Paraselenæ, 181, 200.
Parr, Lieut. A. C. C., R.N., ascends the hill above Bessels Bay,
101; starts on autumn travelling, 133, 137, 144; sledge
goes through the ice, 144; in charge of astronomical
observatory, 152; lecture on light by, 169; takes lime-
juice on his sledge, 238; an indefatigable road-maker,
286; sent to the ship for help, 322, 325.

Parry, Sir Edward, his farthest northern point passed, 150; his
sense of the importance of exercising and improving the
minds of the men in winter quarters, 163, 166; attempt
to reach the pole, 243 (n.).
Parry Islands, Eskimo remains on shores of, 68.
Payer Harbour, 58.
Pearce, Alfred, H.M.S. “Alert,” songs by, 216; severely frost-
bitten, 286; attacked by scurvy, 289.
Pemmican, 237, 270.
Pendulum Islands, Eskimos met with near, 69.
Petermann fiord, 100; fine view of, 103.
Petersen, Danish dog-driver, autumn travelling, 128, 129;
starts for “Discovery,” 248; frost-bitten, 248; efforts to
save his life, 248 to 254; brought back to the ship, 254;
death of, 255, 321.
Petowick glacier, 48.
Photographing at Godhavn, 31.
Pinkey and Collins’ patent topsails, 3.
Plants, 31, 57, 60, 74, 107. (See Vegetation.)
Plays. (See Theatricals.)
Play-bills, 173, 175, 176, 214.
Plymouth, visit from Commander-in-Chief, 11.

Polar Ocean, 122, 128, 215, 234, 242; Parry’s attempt to
sledge over, 243 (n.); march of the northern division over,
276, 311 (see Hummocks), 285, 301; young ice, 296.
Polaris Bay, 100; state of lime-juice found in, 305; sledge-
crew recruiting at, 346, 349.
“Polaris,” visit to her second winter quarters, 53, 54; her
cruise, 72; Dr. Bessels of, 92, 99; land seen from, 101;
musk-ox shot by crew of, 106; Eskimo kind to crew of,
360.
Polarization of light, observations, 180.
“Poppie,” H.M. sledge, Lieut. Giffard, 217, 259.
Poppies, 57, 74.
Popular entertainments in winter quarters, 168, 169;
programmes, 175, 176.
Portsmouth Dockyard, ships fitting out at, 1; harbour,
departure of expedition from, 9, 10; return to, 368.
Potentillas, 340.
Prayers, 187. (See Divine service.)
Presents to the expedition, 6, 7, 193, 194.
President Land has no existence, 101.
Prince Patrick Island, heavy pack on west coast of, 200.
Prince Regent Inlet, formation of cliffs, 64, 67.

Printing office in winter quarters, 164, 165; prospectus, 164;
bills of fare, 185.
Prologue, Royal Arctic Theatre, 172, 173.
Protococcus nivalis, 48.
Proven, arrival at, 38; survey of, 39.
Provisions for sledging, weight, 233; scale, 237.
Ptarmigan, 225.
Pullen, Rev. W. H., chaplain, H.M.S. “Alert,” glees by, 216;
lecture on Arctic plants, 169; author of the prologue, 171,
172, 176; leads the choir, 187; Christmas bill of fare by,
196; lines on the New Year by, 202; a burlesque operetta
written by, 214; grand chorus composed by, 216; service
on departure of sledges, 258, 259; lines welcoming
return of sledges by, 336.
Queenstown, rendezvous at, 367.
Radmore, John, chief carpenter’s mate, H.M.S. “Alert,” sledge
crew in northern division, holds out against scurvy, 318;
to the last, 326 (n.).
Radmore Harbour, Eskimo’s remains at, 69.
Rainbow, 325.
Rawlings, Thos., petty officer, H.M.S. “Alert,” captain of sledge,
northern division, attacked by scurvy, 306.

Rawlings Bay, 352.
Rawson, Lieutenant Wyatt, R.N., joins the “Alert” from the
“Discovery,” 108; visits Distant Cape, 110; glees by, 169;
parts taken in theatricals by, 174, 214; skill in
tabogganing, 187; visit to snow hut built by, 212;
accompanies Egerton on journey to “Discovery,” 247; his
efforts to save Petersen, 249 to 254; arrives from
“Discovery,” 346.
Rawson Cape, 219, 343.
Records left at Cape Isabella, 57; in cairn on Hannah Island,
101; at extreme northern point, 312; at Cairn Point
(winter quarters), 341.
Reindeer, Port Foulke, 52; traces, 60; scarce near
Egedesminde, 365.
Retrospect on New Year’s day, 197.
Reward for crossing 83rd parallel, 292 (n.).
Richardson Bay, 99.
Right whales, 21.
Rink, Dr., on the Eskimo, 33.
Ritenbenk, expedition at, 34.
Road-making on the ice, 273, 275, 277, 279, 286, 292, 294.
Robeson Channel, 69; view of, 110; position on American
chart not to be recognized, 115; palæocrystic floes of,
118; examination of fiords, 242.

Rorqual whale, 21.
Ross, Sir John, Arctic highlanders of, 48; red snow, 48.
Rotges, or little auks, 46, 50, 360.
Royal Arctic Theatre, 169, 170; prologue, 172; plays, 173,
214.
Rudder, arrangement for unshipping, 3; head damaged, 67;
unshipped for a nip, 83; seriously injured, 113; shifted,
113; frequent necessity for unshipping, 344; head badly
wrenched, 344, 351.
Sabine, Cape, 55, 57, 59; Eskimo remains on, 69; passed,
going south, 356.
Sails for sledges, 231 (n.).
“Sallie” suspected of robbing Rawson’s depôt, 213. (See
Dogs.)
Salt beef, character of, 154.
“Sanderson, his hope,” shooting looms at, 40.
Sanitary condition of the men in winter quarters, 187.
Saxifrage, 57, 74, 340.
Scenery of Greenland, 24; from Disco, 31; in Disco Bay, 35; in
the Waigat, 36; near Cape York, 48, 50; of the glaciers,
60; off Cape Hawks, 83; at winter quarters, 126; at the
extreme northern point, 310, 311.

School in winter quarters, 165, 166; last assemblage of, 213.
Scientific observations in winter quarters, 180.
Scoresby on the size of the rorqual, 21.
Scoresby Bay, 94.
Scurvy, 237; premonitory symptoms, 284, 285; dread of, 299;
increasing symptoms, 303, 304, 305, 313; decrease of
appetite, 314; extreme weakness, 317; outbreak on
board the “Alert,” 321; true causes of the outbreak, 329,
330; cure of patients, 333, 339, 345; patients
convalescent, 365; outbreak in sledge crews of
“Discovery,” 346.
Seals basking on the ice, 24, 45; shot by Hans, 354.
Selection of officers and men for Arctic service, 4.
Self, James, A.B., H.M.S. “Alert,” songs by, 216.
Shells, marine, found above sea-level, 116.
Shift-Rudder Bay, 114.
Shirley, John, stoker, H.M.S. “Alert,” songs by, 168; attacked
by scurvy, 282; on the sledge, 284.
Shooting parties in summer, 338 to 340.
Sick. (See Scurvy.)
Simpson, Thos., H.M.S. “Alert,” in sledge crew, northern
division, attacked by scurvy, 306.
Skating, 77, 110.

Sky, beauty of, 83. (See Meteor, Sun.)
Sledges, description of, 231 (n.); sails for, 231 (n.); weight,
233; boats on, 242 (n.); required for northern division,
244; dog sledge sent to “Discovery,” 247; departure of
sledges in the spring, 257, 258; sledge standards, 258;
art of packing, 277; high-runner sledges the best, 281;
(See Dogs, Marco Polo, Hercules, Victoria, Bloodhound,
Bulldog, Alexandra, Challenger, Poppie, Clements
Markham.)
Sledge crews, exercise of, 227.
Sledging, first lessons in 58; with dogs, 79, 80, 81, 128; first
experiences, 129; severe work, 133; details of, 137;
shore-going notions of, 138; realities, 139; lecture on, by
Captain Nares, 215; grand palæocrystic chorus, 216;
preparations for, during the winter, 230; equipments
superintended by Sir Leopold M‘Clintock, 231; weights,
233; auxiliaries and depôts, 234; tents, 235; cooking
apparatus, 235; contents of knapsack and storebag, 237;
scale of provisions, 237; medical stores, 238 (n.);
clothing, 239, 240; programme of sledding, operations,
241; the first encampment, 260; intense cold, 259, 262;
arrival at autumn depôt, 263; daily routine, 264 to 270;
road-making, 273, 275, 276; increasing difficulties, 304;
method of advancing, 295, 304, 306, 313; most northern
encampment, 307; extreme northern point, 309 to 311;
return journey of northern division begun, 312; northern
division reaches land, 321; return of northern division,
327; western division, 331, 332; eastern division, 350.
(See Autumn, Hummocks, Temperature, Foot-gear, Cook.)

Sleeping-bags, 139, 235, 240; weight of, 233; frozen hard,
280, 283, 287.
Smith, Mr. Krarup, Inspector of North Greenland, his
hospitality, 26, 29, 363.
Smith Sound, 47, 49, 69.
Snow, crimson, 48; heavy falls in Smith Sound, 71, 73, 95; in
Robeson Channel, 111, 119, 121; heavy falls during
autumn travelling, 147; buildings with, 152, 153, 154;
temperature at different depths, 162; heavy drifts during
winter, 205; drifts while sledge travelling, 261, 287, 306.
Snow blindness, precautions against, 240; use of goggles,
286, 303.
Snow bunting seen by sledge crews, 319.
Snow hut built by Rawson, 212.
Sorrel, 345.
Soundings at extreme northern point, 308, 309.
Southsea Common, farewell to the expedition from, 9, 10.
Specific gravity observations, 180.
Spectrum analysis observations, 180.
Standards for sledges, 258.
Stanton, Cape, in sight, 103.
Steam, lecture on by Mr. Wootton, 169.

Stone, Geo., of the “Discovery,” serving on board the “Alert,”
songs by, 174.
Store-bag, sledging contents, 237.
Stoves, 158.
Stuckberry, Thos., petty officer, H.M.S. “Alert,” parts and songs
by, 173, 216.
Summer, 337, 339.
Sumner, Cape, in sight, 103.
Sun, sets at midnight, 127; final disappearance, 141; last view
of, 148, 150; date of final departure, 151, 178; longing
for the return of, 207; return of, 219, 220, 221, 222;
effect of, on the ice, 207, 313.
Sylvester heating apparatus not supplied, 158.
Symons, Robert, A.B., H.M.S. “Alert,” printer, 164 (n.), 169,
175, 216; songs by, 214.
Tabogganing, 187.
Taboggans, Hudson’s Bay Company’s sledges, suitable for soft
snow, 281.
Temperature, observations for, 162; variations during winter,
183; extreme cold, 223, 224; while sledging, 259, 262,
278, 283, 286, 290, 294, 295, 302, 313, 314, 320.
Tents, 139; weight, 233; description of, 235, 260.

Terns, 110, 332.
Tests of physical capacity, 15.
Theatricals, dresses, 171; orchestra, 171; prologue, 172; play-
bills, 173, 175, 176, 214; plays, 173, 214.
Thermometers tested, 224.
Thermometrical observations, 162, 223. (See Temperature.)
“Thursday pops,” 168, 169, 175, 176, 215.
Tidal observations at Twin Glacier Bay, 62; in winter quarters,
161, 180.
Tides, meeting of, at Cape Fraser, 92; in Polar Sea, 304, 309.
“Tigress,” at Life-boat Cove, 53.
Torske bank, fishing on, 25.
Trafalgar day celebrated, 179.
Turnstones, 360.
Twin Glacier Bay, 61.
Tyndall Glacier, 359.
“Unies.” (See Narwhals.)
Unifilar House, 209.
Union, Cape, 101, 103, 118; rounded, 121, 122; pressure on,
125, 343.

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