Community forestry. Where and why has devolution of forest rights contributed to better governance and livelihoods?
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The document discusses the evolution and impact of community forestry (CF) and the devolution of forest rights across various regions, highlighting the benefits of involving local communities in forest management. Key elements include the relationship between secure property rights and governance, different regional approaches to CF, and examples from countries like Mexico, Nepal, and Guatemala. It concludes with a vision for the future of community forestry, emphasizing the need for simultaneous social and commercial goals and the importance of new local governance structures.
![Mexico links forest rights with land rights
• Where forest rights are secured through land rights and agrarian reforms, they are
more likely to enjoy constitutional backing and are removed from the jurisdiction
of the forestry authorities
• 1986 forestry law transferred decision-making power over forests to ejidos on
condition that they meet SFM standards (e.g. based on management plan drafted
by forester.) Stumpage fees accrue entirely to ejidos. The role of the state reduced
essentially to supervision & support (Carter, 2005)
• Bray, et al, (2006) find that in Mexico, “agrarian reform laws have been more
crucial in [fostering] Community Forest Enterprises (CFEs) than specific forest
legislation.”
• “Agrarian reform distributed forest lands to communities and provided a template
for community governance that could later serve as an institutional platform for
the development of CFEs.” (CFEs emerging as social enterprises)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/stevelawrywebinar29aug-170830154559/85/Community-forestry-Where-and-why-has-devolution-of-forest-rights-contributed-to-better-governance-and-livelihoods-20-320.jpg)
Community forestry. Where and why has devolution of forest rights contributed to better governance and livelihoods?
- 1. COMMUNITY FORESTRY WHERE AND WHY HAS DEVOLUTION OF FOREST RIGHTS CONTRIBUTED TO BETTER GOVERNANCE AND LIVELIHOODS? Steven Lawry Director, Equal Opportunities, Gender, Justice, and Tenure, CIFOR 29 August 2017
- 2. What’s meant by “Community Forestry?” • Community Forestry (CF) programs began with a focus on involving communities in government programs for reforestation and forest protection. • CF programs have gradually evolved towards more-devolution of use and management rights, and more active use of forests by the local communities.
- 3. • Greater devolution of rights has been promoted by rights groups and donors, arguing that by assigning greater governance responsibility and clear use and management rights to communities, environmental and livelihoods outcomes might be better. • Developing country governments have for the most part been ambivalent about rights devolution, with a few notable exceptions.
- 4. TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION • The geography of rights devolution • Research findings on Community Forestry (CF) “success factors” • The significance of property rights • Forest rights reforms in Mexico, Nepal and Guatemala • A model of the investment effects of rights devolution • The future of community forestry
- 5. The geography of rights devolution
- 6. The Forest Tenure Transition in Latin America* Percent Area by Tenure Type *Source: Hatcher and Bailey, 2011. (8 countries; 82% of Latin America’s tropical forests).
- 7. Key Features of Forest Reform in Latin America • Forestlands are demarcated and titled as collective or communal properties; States retain alienation rights • Titles require retention of forest cover • Emphasis has been on transferring rights to indigenous and ethnic communities • Social mobilization by Indigenous peoples and civil society - key in promoting and ensuring tenure reform implementation, monitoring the progress and defending the rights: ▪ In Peru, over 10 million hectares titled to about 2,000 native communities, around 20% of national forest area. • Considerable diversity in tenure models: ▪ Indigenous territories, extractive reserves, agro-extractive and forestry settlements, community concessions, e.g. Guatemala
- 8. The Forest Tenure Transition in Africa* Percent Area by Tenure Type * Source: Hatcher and Bailey, 2011 Tropical Forest Tenure Assessment. (Data for 8 countries, representing 84% of African tropical forests).
- 9. Key Lesson from Africa Benefit-Sharing Arrangements Fall Short, User Groups Receive Limited Use Rights • Focus on benefit sharing arrangements, funded for instance by REDD+ PES schemes, administered by public or nonprofit organizations exercising discretion over terms and benefits. • Benefit-sharing schemes are often expensive to administer and generate high transaction costs for government agencies and village participants alike, and rely on continuation of donor funding • Also, some focus on establishment of local forest user and conservation groups, licensed to exercise limited use rights in return for conservation services. • For instance, Kenya’s Forest Act of 2005 provides for establishment of Community Forest Associations. Registration requires detailed management plans specifying conservation program and permitted extractive activities. CFA management plan approval process faces delays.
- 10. The Forest Tenure Transition in Asia* Percent Area by Tenure Type * Hatcher and Bailey, 2011 (8 countries; 90% of Asian tropical forests but does not include India or the Philippines). Major approaches: Benefits sharing, rights recognition, individual and household allotments
- 11. Key Lessons from Asia • Variety of approaches • Nepal’s 1993 forest rights devolution to Community Forest User Groups (20,000 CFUGs covering 25% of Nepal) believed to have contributed to significant increases in forest cover, but livelihood outcomes are mixed or uncertain. Significance of large rural labor out-migration as factor reducing pressure on forests not understood. • India’s Joint Forest Management (JFM) rationale: communities protect forests from fire, illegal grazing, timber cutting, in exchange for use of non-timber forest products (NWFPs). Disparities between states in success & failure. (Patra). Nationalization of NWFP markets reducing returns to beneficiaries. • Vietnam. Forest Land Allocation (FLA) program grants up to 50 ha of land to families for afforestation. • Indonesia is attempting to devolve use and management rights to some indigenous communities, subject to approved plans and strict use conditions. Implementation slowed by heavy planning requirements.
- 12. Types of Forest Rights Models by Region
- 14. CFG SUCCESS Factors explaining failure or success of community forestry tend to interact in complex ways Modified version from Baynes, et al (2015)
- 15. “Key factors which influence the success of community forestry in development countries” 1. Secure property (tree and land) rights (necessary) 2. Material benefits to community members (necessary) 3. Socio-economic status and gender based inequality 4. Intra-community forest user group governance 5. Government support Baynes, et al, 2015, Key factors which influence the success of community forestry in developing countries, Global Environmental Change, 35, 226–238
- 16. The significance of property rights
- 17. Baynes, et al 2015 apply Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) schema of a ‘bundle of rights’ in which security increases with the duration of tenure in which occupants may 1. access land and withdraw resources from it, 2. manage and improve the land, 3. exclude others from it and 4. sell or lease it. “As these rights are lost, security of tenure decreases and peoples’ motivation for community forestry is subsequently reduced.” Baynes, et al, 2015 The significance of property rights
- 18. Governments only partially devolve management rights, reducing tenure security • “The lessons which may be extracted from the literature are that both secure land and tree tenure, provided either through government or extra-legal mechanisms, are necessary success factors.” • Unfortunately governments often only partially devolve management rights (i.e. power) to CFGs, with negative influences on their operations. • The effect of government interference with land and tree tenure is pernicious. For example, in the Philippines, the government’s willingness to revoke community forestry agreements has seriously weakened CFGs. • In Vietnam, Thanh and Sikor (2006), found that formal devolution of land management from the state to CFGs sometimes did not translate to actual rights, resulting in opportunistic overharvesting of residual native forest. • Holland, et al, 2017 found that “forest-friendly” collective titles reduced deforestation rates in Ecuador but use restrictions met with resistance by local people.
- 19. Forest rights reforms in Mexico, Nepal and Guatemala
- 20. Mexico links forest rights with land rights • Where forest rights are secured through land rights and agrarian reforms, they are more likely to enjoy constitutional backing and are removed from the jurisdiction of the forestry authorities • 1986 forestry law transferred decision-making power over forests to ejidos on condition that they meet SFM standards (e.g. based on management plan drafted by forester.) Stumpage fees accrue entirely to ejidos. The role of the state reduced essentially to supervision & support (Carter, 2005) • Bray, et al, (2006) find that in Mexico, “agrarian reform laws have been more crucial in [fostering] Community Forest Enterprises (CFEs) than specific forest legislation.” • “Agrarian reform distributed forest lands to communities and provided a template for community governance that could later serve as an institutional platform for the development of CFEs.” (CFEs emerging as social enterprises)
- 21. Nepal grants forest management rights to community user groups • 1957: Forest Nationalization (centralization) Act and consequent heavy deforestations @1.7% (1978-94) • 1970s: National initiative to decentralize forest management to local bodies • 1980s: Initiatives to transfer management rights to Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs), formalized in Forest Act of 1993 • Today: Over 40% of population involved in Community Forestry (CF) program through 20,000 CFUGs, managing almost 33% of Nepal’s forest area • Forest cover increased by 13% between 1990 and 2014 (FRA, 2015)
- 22. Nepal: Reform’s Effects on Forest Investment • Most informants believe that the forest rights granted to communities were a necessary pre-condition to the investments that have occurred. • Generally good provision made to ensure that disadvantaged community members benefit from investments and enterprises. (Emerging social enterprise models.) • Evidence that rights devolution has restored and deepened community cohesion • The regulatory burden is heavy, stymies investment, and regulations are inconsistently applied, as a result: ▪ Informants’ perceptions of tenure security, while still higher than pre-reform, declined significantly from highs immediately post-reform (Sharma et al, 2017).
- 23. Guatemala’s experiment with Community Concessions in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve • Encompasses 2.1 million hectares of lowland tropical rainforest; Mayan forests of Mexico and Guatemala make up the largest contiguous tropical forest north of the Amazon. • Five objectives: conserve biodiversity; maintain the ecological equilibrium of the area; conserve cultural heritage; provide development alternatives consistent with resource conservation; promote active participation of society. • 14 concessions granted in the MUZ since 1995 (12 community and 2 industrial concessions); 25-year concession term. Harvesting based on FSC-approved management plan. • Annual deforestation rate 2001-2009 0.5% compared to pre-concession (1991) rate of 1.5%. (2.0% per year in Peten outside of concessions.) • Most timber sales are generated by mahogany (75%) and cedar (10%-15%), which are not in great supply, raising concerns about the economic sustainability of the concessions. Difficult to commercialize non-traditional species (Reyes Rodas, 2014),
- 24. A tentative model of the investment effects of forest rights devolution
- 25. Rights can catalyze investment in community forest enterprises • Rights devolution “triggers” new kinds of action (social and economic) at the local level and externally that lays foundations for investment in new forms of CFEs. • Two key points to keep in mind: (1) We are adding a time dimension to understanding “investment readiness” as a process of internal and external social and economic development that unfolds through stages, and (2) We want to bring out aspects of the social character of the process, determined by the social, collective character of the resource rights.
- 26. Stage 1: Inward investment and development of representative institutions At the community level • New private investment in housing, education, health; funded by local savings and remittance flows. • New community-level organizations formed, catalyzed by rights and the new space for decision-making about forest use made possible by less regulation (Community User Groups) External action(s) • Formation of regional or national organizations/federations representing interests of Community User Groups
- 27. Stage 2: Community institutions gain confidence, local leaders and entrepreneurs emerge At the community level • Further development of local social capital: NGO-supported small business projects; improvement of forest conditions; CUGs gain experience in sorting out local conflicts. (Emergence of effective local leadership may prove essential to moving into successful stage 2.) • First Community Forestry Enterprises (CFEs) emerge. External actions • “Forest reform.” Tenure reform plus investment, in roads, training, health, education, i.e. in public goods deemed important to help ensure success alongside new rights (analogous to “agrarian reform” programs of the 1960s, i.e. the “full package.”)
- 28. Stage 3: Stronger local social capital attracts new forms of “bridging capital” At the community level • Community User Groups license CFEs harvesting and processing goods for the external market, with investment in capital equipment in the form of donor grants and concessionary loans. • CFEs have a “social character,” in that poor sections of the community may be principal suppliers of NTFPs and labor (note that Nepal law requires that 30-35 percent of income be set aside for Dalits). External actions • Federations of forest user groups focus initially on ensuring efficient government implementation of rights commitments, but may begin to give greater attention promoting commercial investment, including by advocating for investment- friendly regulations. • Certified forest use and extraction plans meet investment conditions of ESG investors (e.g., Guatemala community forest concessions FSC certified.)
- 29. The Future of Community Forestry
- 30. • Powerful drivers of change in the forestry sector are here to stay: ▪ Communities, indigenous people and their partners challenging state hegemony in forest governance. ▪ Women and previously voiceless challenging and disrupting how forests are used and governed locally. • Secure land rights can amplify benefits of forest rights reforms. • States will retain an interest in forest outcomes. Advocates & researchers can foster fresh thinking on appropriate state roles (that reduce over-reach), donors can support reform of forest agencies. • Because of social character of collective tenure, forest enterprises must pursue commercial and social goals simultaneously. • International agreements (FPIC, GCF, VGGT) and corporate sustainability commitments keep pressure on for rights recognition. The future of community forestry
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