Consider the CMS core measures and the data used to support the re.docx

Consider the CMS core measures and the data used to support
the reporting. Which do you believe are the easiest to collect
and which do you think are the most difficult to collect?
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 1
Introduction
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a refundable
tax credit to lower-income working families. In 2011, the EITC
reached 27.9 million tax filers at a total cost of $62.9 billion.
Almost 20 percent of tax filers receive the EITC, and the
average credit amount is $2,254 (IRS 2013). After expansions
to the EITC in the late 1980s through the late 1990s—under
Democrat and Republican administrations—the EITC now
occupies a central place in the U.S. safety net. Based on the
Census Bureau’s 2012 Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM),
the EITC keeps 6.5 million people, including 3.3 million
children, out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities [CBPP] 2014a). No other tax or transfer program
prevents more children from living a life of poverty, and only
Social Security keeps more people above poverty.
Since the EITC is only eligible to tax filers who work, the
credit’s impact on poverty takes place through encouraging
employment by ensuring greater pay after taxes. The empirical
research shows that the tax credit translates into sizable
and robust increases in employment (Eissa and Liebman
1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). Thus, the credit
reduces poverty through two channels: the actual credit, and
increases in family earnings. This dual feature gives the EITC
a unique place in the U.S. safety net; in contrast, many other

programs redistribute income while, at least to some degree,
discouraging work. Importantly, transferring income while
encouraging work makes the EITC an efficient and cost-
effective policy for increasing the after-tax income of low-
earning Americans.
Yet a program of this size and impact could be more equitable
in its reach. Under the current design of the EITC, childless
earners and families with only one child, for instance, receive
disproportionately lower refunds.
In 2014, families with two children (three or more children) are
eligible for a maximum credit of $5,460 ($6,143) compared to
$3,305 for families with one child. Married couples, despite
their
larger family sizes, receive only modestly more-generous EITC
benefits compared to single filers.1 Childless earners benefit
little
from the EITC, and have a maximum credit of only $496—less
than 10 percent of the two-child credit.
Prominent proposals seek to mitigate these inequalities.
President Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget includes an
expansion
of the childless EITC, a concept outlined by John Karl Scholz in
2007 in a proposal for The Hamilton Project. Notably, MDRC
is currently evaluating Paycheck Plus, a pilot program for an
expanded EITC for workers without dependent children, for
the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (MDRC
2014). The recent Hamilton Project proposal for a secondary-
earner tax credit addresses the so-called EITC penalty for
married couples (Kearney and Turner 2013). And the more-
generous EITC credit for three or more children was recently
enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, and is currently scheduled to sunset in 2017.

Considering this broad set of EITC reforms, and recognizing
the demonstrated effectiveness of the program as an
antipoverty program with numerous benefits, this policy
memo proposes an expansion for the largest group of EITC
IMPROVING SAFET Y NET AND WORK SUPPORT
Proposal 11: Building on the Success
of the Earned Income Tax Credit
Hilary Hoynes
University of California, Berkeley
2 Policies to Address Poverty in America
IMPROVING SAFETY NET AND WORK SUPPORT
Proposal 11: Building on the Success of the Earned Income Tax
Credit
recipients: families with one child. In particular, I propose to
expand the one-child schedule to be on par with the two-child
schedule, in equivalence scale-adjusted terms. An equivalence
scale captures the cost of living for a household of a given size
(and demographic composition) relative to the cost of living
for a reference household of a single adult, and is a standard
component in defining poverty thresholds. The proposal
expands the maximum credit for one-child families to $4,641,
from $3,305 under current law, an increase of about 40 percent.
The expansion will lead to a roughly $1,000 increase in after-
tax income for taxpayers in the bottom 40 percent of the
income distribution receiving the higher credit. As this paper
outlines, the expansion is justified on equity and efficiency
grounds. This expansion is anchored in the equity principle

in that the generosity of the credit should be proportional to
the needs of families of differing sizes; I use the equivalence
scale implicit in the poverty thresholds of the Census SPM as
a guide for household needs. This proposal is also supported
by efficiency principles given the EITC’s demonstrated success
at raising labor supply among single mothers.
The target population for the proposal is low-income working
families with children. Implementing this proposal requires
legislative action by the federal government; it is important
to note that altering the EITC schedule requires a simple
amendment to the tax code, and not a massive overhaul of our
nation’s tax system. The revenue cost of the proposal derives
from additional federal costs of the EITC, less the additional
payroll and ordinary federal income taxes. The private
benefits include increases in after-tax income and reductions
in poverty. The proposal would also generate social benefits
through the spillover effects that the increase in income plays
in improving health and children’s cognitive skills (Dahl and
Lochner 2012; Evans and Garthwaite 2014; Hoynes, Miller,
and Simon forthcoming).
The Challenge
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that gives a taxpayer with
no federal income tax liability a tax refund for the full amount
of the credit. The amount of the credit depends on filing status,
number of qualifying children, and earned income (and, for
some taxpayers, adjusted gross income). (The EITC schedule is
explained in box 11-1.) Because the EITC is one of our nation’s
most effective antipoverty programs, the challenge considered
in this policy memo is how to leverage this tool to have even
greater impact.
Enacted in 1975, the EITC’s original intent was to offset payroll
taxes for low-income families. The EITC has been expanded

by tax legislation five times in the subsequent years: in 1986,
1990, 1993, 2001, and 2009. Figure 11-2 illustrates these policy
expansions by plotting the maximum EITC credit by number
of children for each year between 1985 and 2014 (in real 2014
dollars). The 1993 expansion is the most significant, having
introduced the more-generous schedule for those with two or
more children. Additionally, the 1993 expansion introduced
the relatively small credit for childless taxpayers. The 2009
expansion, enacted as part of the federal stimulus, introduced
a separate schedule for those with three or more children.
BOX 11-1.
The Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule
Figure 11-1 presents the schedule for the EITC for tax year
2014. The EITC schedule has three regions. In the phase-in
region,
the credit is phased in at a constant rate, which is 7.65 percent
for taxpayers without children, 34 percent for those with
one child, 40 percent for those with two children, and 45
percent for those with three or more children. In the flat region,
taxpayers receive the maximum amount of the EITC benefit. In
the phase-out region, the credit is phased out at a constant
rate: one-child families lose 15.98 percent of each dollar earned
due to the lost credit, families with two or more children
experience a 21.06 percent phase-out, and childless filers a 7.65
percent phase-out. The dotted lines in figure 11-1 indicate
the somewhat more-generous schedule for married taxpayers—
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 and later legislation expanded the flat and phase-out
regions for married couples; in 2014, the phase-out threshold
for
married couples is $5,430 larger than for single filers. This
expansion of the schedule for married couples was introduced to
reduce the marriage penalties that the EITC creates for lower-

income taxpayers.
To illustrate the mechanics of the credit, consider a single
mother with one child earning $15,000 per year. Her earnings
would place her in the flat region of the credit—that is, in the
range of income in which a tax unit receives the maximum
credit and in which benefits are neither phased in nor phased
out; she would receive an EITC of $3,305. If her earnings were
instead $20,000, she would be in the phase-out region and her
credit would fall by $347 to $2,958. In other words, her credit
would equal the maximum credit minus 15.98 percent of all
earnings that lie in the phase-out region.
Hilary Hoynes
FIGURE 11-2.
Earned Income Tax Credit Maximum Credit by Number of
Children, 1985–2014
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 2014.
No children 1 child 2 children 3 or more children
M
ax
im
u
m
c

re
d
it
(i
n
2
01
4
d
o
lla
rs
)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000

7,000
FIGURE 11-1.
Earned Income Tax Credit Amount by Earnings Level and
Number of Children, 2014
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 2014.
No children 1 child 2 children 3 or more children
Ea
rn
ed
in
co
m
e
cr
ed
it
(i
n
d
o
lla
rs
)

Earned income (in dollars)
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
Credit
Table 11-1 gives a snapshot of EITC recipients for 2011 (IRS
2013). A total of 27 million taxpayers received the credit,
representing almost 20 percent of all tax filers. The total cost
of the credit in 2011 was $62.9 billion. As a comparison, in
2011, payments for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp
Program, totaled $72.8 billion, and Unemployment Insurance

payments totaled $107.0 billion (Bitler and Hoynes 2013).
EITC benefits averaged $2,199 for one-child families, $3,469
for two-child families, $3,750 for families with three or more
children, and less than $250 for taxpayers with no children.
About a quarter of the EITC returns went to taxpayers without
children, 36 percent to those with one child, 27 percent to
those with two, and 12 percent to those with three or more
children. Overall, the majority (97 percent) of EITC dollars go
to families with children; the small share of dollars claimed
among those without children (3 percent) reflects their much
lower potential and actual credit amounts.
Figures 11-1 and 11-2 illustrate that the EITC is substantially
more generous for families with two or more children than it
is for those with one child. For families with two children, the
maximum credit is $5,460 and the phase-out range extends to
earned income of $43,756, while for families with one child,
the maximum credit is $3,305 and extends to earned income
of $38,511. Standard equity arguments would imply that larger
families should receive a higher credit than smaller families.
But what is the right adjustment? The needs of a family grow
with each additional child but, due to economies of scale in
consumption, not in a proportional way. I use the family-size
adjustment that forms the basis of the poverty thresholds in
the Census SPM to capture the varying needs across family
sizes. Known as equivalence scales, they are used to establish
the appropriate adjustments to the cost of living between
different family sizes. Using the SPM equivalence scale, the
maximum credit for families with two children should be
about 18.7 percent higher than the maximum credit for one-
child families. Under current law it is 65 percent higher.2 I
return to this in the proposal below.
The EITC is explicitly tied to work. As shown in figure 11-1,
if a family has no earned income, then it is not eligible for the

credit. Overall, the credit subsidizes entering and staying in
the workforce, and redistribution occurs while encouraging
work. This stands in contrast to virtually all other elements of
the U.S. safety net—such as SNAP and Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families, commonly referred to as welfare—where
the largest benefits are transferred to those with no earnings.
This work-promoting earnings subsidy is at the core of EITC’s
cost-effectiveness.
The empirical research provides robust evidence that the EITC
leads to sizable increases in the employment of single mothers
(Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000,
2001). For example, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find that
a 10 percent increase in EITC income leads to a 6.9 percent
increase in employment rates (an elasticity of 0.69). Because
of the two potential earners in the household, the labor supply
predictions are more complex for married couples, generally
suggesting a reduction in employment for secondary earners.
The existing evidence shows that the EITC leads to modest
reductions (an elasticity of 0.267) in the employment of
married women (Eissa and Hoynes 2004). In contrast, we have
little empirical evidence on the possible employment effects of
the credit for taxpayers without children; the MDRC pilot of a
childless EITC currently in the field in New York City should
fill this important gap in our knowledge.
TABLE 11-1.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Recipients by Number of
Children, 2011
Average credit amount
(in dollars)
Share of EITC returns

(percent)
Share of EITC benefits
(percent)
No children 264 25 3
1 child 2,199 36 35
2 children 3,469 27 41
3 or more children 3,750 12 20
All recipients 2,254 100 100
Sources: IRS 2013; author's calculations.
Hilary Hoynes
The release of the Census SPM in 2011 provides annual reports
on the number of persons lifted out of poverty due to safety net
programs. The EITC lifted 3.3 million children out of poverty,
more than any other program (CBPP 2014a). SNAP was the
next largest, with 2.2 million children lifted from poverty
(Short 2013). Overall, the credit lifted 6.5 million individuals
out of poverty (CBPP 2014a).
These calculations based on the SPM are static; they calculate
poverty with and without the specific income source (e.g., the
EITC) but do not take into account the behavioral effects of

that source on employment and earnings. To the extent that
the EITC leads to an increase in employment and earnings, the
statistics cited above are underestimates of the full antipoverty
effects of the EITC.
Several studies have quantified benefits of the credit beyond
those on employment, earnings, and income. Dahl and
Lochner (2012) find that the increase in income through
the EITC leads to improvements in child test scores.
Hoynes, Miller, and Simon (forthcoming) find the increase
in income through the EITC leads to an improvement in
infant health by reducing the incidence of low-birth-weight
births.3 Evans and Garthwaite (2014) find evidence that
the expansion of the EITC improved health indicators—
measured by blood and medical tests—for mothers,
suggesting a significant relationship between increased
income and a reduction in stress.
A New Approach
Given the efficient and cost-effective reduction in poverty
that the EITC achieves for families with children, proposals
are being advanced to expand the EITC for childless
taxpayers and for married taxpayers. The proposal outlined
in this paper to raise EITC benefits for the largest group of
recipients—one-child families—is part of this broader set of
proposed EITC reforms.
I justify this proposal on the basis of equity and efficiency
grounds: first, as discussed below, based on the principle that
the credit should be equal across different family sizes in
proportion to their needs, the EITC for one-child families is
below what it should be. Second, I have robust evidence based
on historical expansions that expanding the EITC provides a
cost-effective reduction in poverty for families with children
by encouraging more work as the credit on income expands.
Combined, these justifications are especially important given

that real household incomes in the lower half of the income
distribution have stagnated over the past forty years, and that
the highest poverty rates for Americans are found among
children (Short 2013; U.S. Census Bureau 2014).
As presented above, using the family-size adjustment that
forms the basis of the poverty thresholds in the SPM, the
maximum credit for families with two children should be
about 18.7 percent higher than the maximum credit for one-
child families, yet under current law it is 65 percent higher.
My proposal is to expand the EITC to one-child families to
be on par with the maximum credit for two-child families,
in equivalence-scale units. I keep the two-child schedule at
n
o
c
h
a
n
g
e
n
o
c
h
a
n
g
e

TABLE 11-2.
Details of Policy Proposal by Number of Children, 2014 Tax
Year
1 child 2 children 3 or more children
Current Law Proposal Current Law Proposal Current Law
Proposal
Phase-in rate 34.00% 34.00% 40.00% 45.00%
Minimum income for maximum credit $9,720 $13,650 $13,650
$13,650
Maximum credit $3,305 $4,641 $5,460 $6,143
Phase-out rate 15.98% 21.06% 21.06% 21.06%
Beginning income of phase-out $17,830 $17,830 $17,830
$17,830
Ending income of phase-out $38,511 $39,867 $43,756 $46,997
Sources: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 2014; author’s
calculations.
Note: The gray font applies to cells with values that change
under the proposal.

Credit
current law and as the reference schedule. The specific changes
to the tax credit are shown in table 11-2. The phase-in rate for
one-child families remains at 34 percent, as under current law,
but the phase-in income range is extended to $13,650 (from
$9,720) to match the range used for two- and three-or-more–
child credit schedules. The maximum credit increases from
$3,305 to $4,641, an increase of 40 percent. The phase-out rate
increases from 15.98 percent to 21.06 percent (matching the
two- and three-or-more–child credit rates) and the phase-out
income range extends from $17,830 to $39,867 (compared to
$17,830 to $38,511 under current law). This proposal presents
an opportunity to bring the credit for families with children
into a harmonized schedule, using the equivalence scale in the
SPM as the basis for harmonization.
To illustrate the effect of this proposal, table 11-3 presents tax
and income calculations for hypothetical families with a single
parent with one child. Assume that a woman works full-time
for the full year and that the family spends 10 percent of gross
earnings on child care. Panel A considers the case where the
single woman earns the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.
Under current law (column 1), after child-care expenses and
payroll taxes, and after federal tax and credits, the family has
a disposable income of $16,097.4 In column 2, I show how
taxes and disposable income change with the policy proposal
(and no behavioral changes). The EITC rises to $4,651 from
$3,305 and disposable income rises to $17,443, an increase of
8 percent. Panel B considers a family where the woman earns
150 percent of the minimum wage ($10.90 per hour). For that
family, the proposal would increase family disposable income
by 5 percent, from $20,581 to $21,691.

COSTS AND BENEFITS
The costs of the proposal include the federal revenue cost of
expanding the EITC. However, including all economic effects,
namely higher labor supply, the EITC cost would be offset
by the additional payroll tax revenue and (ordinary) federal
TABLE 11-3.
Comparison of Current Law and Earned Income Tax Credit
Proposal for Hypothetical Families
One-child family
Current law (2014)
One-child family
Proposal
A. Minimum wage ($7.25 per hour)
Total earnings 15,080 15,080
Payroll taxes –2,307 –2,307
Federal income tax 0 0
Child Tax Credit (including refundable) 1,000 1,000
EITC 3,305 4,651
Child-care costs –1,508 –1,508
Child and Dependent Care Credit 527 527

Family disposable income 16,097 17,443
Increase in income 8%
B. 150% of minimum wage ($10.90 per hour)
Total earnings 22,672 22,672
Payroll taxes –3,469 –3,469
Federal income tax –592 –592
Child Tax Credit (including refundable) 1,000 1,000
EITC 2,531 3,621
Child-care costs –2,267 –2,267
Child and Dependent Care Credit 706 706
Family disposable income 20,581 21,671
Increase in income 5%
Source: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM (see Feenberg and
Coutts 1993).
Note: The gray font applies to cells with values that change
under the proposal. All figures, with the exception of the
increase in income, are in dollars.
Hilary Hoynes

income tax revenue collected with increases in employment
and earnings. Taxpayers benefit privately from the increase in
after-tax income and from the reduction in poverty. Because
the expansion in the EITC is expected to boost employment
and earnings of single-parent families, their income would
increase through the expanded credit as well as through the
predicted increase in earnings.5 The expansion may also lead
to important social benefits resulting from the increase in
income for these families. Studies find that the increase in
income could yield spillover effects by improving health and
children’s cognitive skills (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Evans and
Garthwaite 2014; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon forthcoming).
The distributional effects of the proposal, derived from the
Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center microsimulation model,
follow the Joint Committee on Taxation convention of holding
gross domestic product constant and subsequently assuming
no change in labor supply. As shown in table 11-4, the proposal
is decidedly progressive, raising after-tax income by 0.4
percent for taxpayers in the bottom income quintile and 0.3
percent for taxpayers in the second quintile, with effectively
no impact on taxpayers in the top two quintiles. Tax units
benefitting from this proposal—8.1 million in total—would
each see their after-tax income rise by about $1,000.
The benefits would be especially high among taxpayers
with one child. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
microsimulation model only shows output for all taxpayers
with children, but these estimates illustrate the higher benefit
of this proposal on this select demographic group. Roughly
one-quarter of taxpayers with children in the bottom quintile
and over one-third of these taxpayers in the second quintile
would see an increase in after-tax income. Among taxpayers
with children, those in the bottom quintile would see their

after-tax income rise by an average of 1.2 percent; taxpayers
with children in the second income quintile would see their
after-tax incomes rise, on average, by 0.8 percent. The average
benefits for one-child families would be even higher under my
proposal.
The proposal would have a substantial effect on the well-being
of low-income families. Using the SPM to define poverty,
CBPP (2014b) estimates that this EITC expansion would lift
410,000 people—including 131,000 children—out of poverty.
This proposal would also improve the livelihood of a large
number of people living below the poverty line. In total, 3
million people in poverty—including 1 million children—
would be made less poor.
These estimates are conservative—that is, taking into account
behavioral effects and increases in employment and earnings
should lead to a reduction in costs (due to the offsetting payroll
and federal income taxes) and an increase in private and social
benefits. The empirical research shows robust evidence that
an increase in the EITC leads to an increase in employment
and earnings for single filers. For single parents already in
TABLE 11- 4.
Simulation of Proposed Policy by Expanded Cash Income
Percentile
All taxpayers Taxpayers with children
Tax units
with tax cut
(in percent)

Average tax
cut among
beneficiaries
(in dollars)
Change in
after-tax income
(in percent)
Tax units
with tax cut
(in percent)
Average tax
cut among
beneficiaries
(in dollars)
Change in
after-tax income
(in percent)
Bottom quintile 5.5 –1,029 0.4 24.9 –1,051 1.2

Second quintile 11.1 –969 0.3 36.7 –975 0.8
Middle quintile 5.0 –830 0.1 14.2 –739 0.2
Fourth quintile 0.2 –741 0.0 0.3 –714 0.0
Top quintile 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0
All 5.0 –958 0.1 15.9 –957 0.2
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center microsimulation
model version 0613-3 (see Rohaly, Carasso, and Saleem 2005).
Note: Includes both filing and nonfiling units but excludes those
that are dependents of other tax units. Tax units with negative
adjusted gross income are excluded from their respective
income class but are included in the totals. For a description of
expanded cash income, see Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center
(n.d.). The income percentile classes used in this table are
based on the income distribution for the entire population and
contain an equal number of people, not tax units. The resulting
percentile breaks are 20 percent $17,272; 40 percent $31,839;
60 percent $52,010; 80 percent $82,156; 90 percent $114,150;
95 percent $160,278; 99 percent $376,776; 99.9 percent
$1,971,618 (in 2013 dollars).
Credit
the labor market, this proposal provides a simple income
transfer to those eligible for the EITC (assuming no change

in earnings for those already in the labor market). For single
women currently out of the workforce, the expanded EITC is
predicted to encourage employment and earnings, leading to
an increase in after-tax income through the EITC, other tax
credits, and earnings (less payroll taxes and any owed federal
income taxes). For married couples, the behavioral effects are
expected to be more muted, with minimal effects for married
men and modest reductions in employment and earnings for
married women. In sum, family resources would increase
through earnings and the EITC.
The proposal also comes with costs, foremost among them
the lost revenue and expanded outlays owing to the more-
generous credit. The Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center
microsimulation model estimates that the expanded EITC
would lose roughly $9 billion per year, or $92.8 billion
between 2015 and 2024. For reasons noted above, namely the
convention that labor force be held constant, this estimate
overstates the potential cost of the expansion. A second cost
is that the expansion increases effective tax rates on those
workers whose earnings fall in the phase-out range. For these
workers, the lost benefits for each dollar earned rise from
15.98 percent to 21.06 percent—raising the disincentive to
work. This raise in effective tax rates may slightly offset the
gains to employment.
Questions and Concerns
Given the five prior expansions in the EITC, have we
reached the limit of the employment-inducing effects
of the program?
As shown in Jim Ziliak’s proposal in this series, employment
rates for single women with children have declined
considerably from their peak in 2000. He shows that the
employment rate of single mothers with less than a high
school diploma and with a child under age thirteen has fallen

10 percentage points from 70 percent in 2000 to 60 percent
in 2012; it has also fallen for single mothers with more than
a high school diploma from 82 percent to 72 percent. While
these are higher employment rates than were experienced on
the eve of welfare reform and the expansion of the EITC in
the 1990s, we have no evidence that employment rates will not
respond to the proposed expansion.
Can the EITC provide all the safety net we need for
low-income families?
This proposal is based on the established track record for the
success of the EITC in increasing after-tax income through
encouraging work. While the EITC now forms a central piece
of the U.S. safety net for families with children, its prominence
does not eliminate the need for other safety-net programs such
as SNAP. Critically, the EITC does not help families in the face
of labor market weakness and job loss. I bring attention to this
limitation of the EITC in recent joint research with Marianne
Bitler and Elira Kuka (Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka 2013). The
implication is that in the post-welfare reform era, the Great
Recession resulted in more extreme poverty than we would
have expected from experience prior to welfare reform (Bitler
and Hoynes 2013). SNAP is essential for providing protection,
especially for keeping families out of extreme poverty (Parrott
2014).
How would your proposal change if you used the
equivalence scale implicit in the official poverty
thresholds rather than the SPM?
The main theoretical grounding for our proposal—that
the one-child schedule is too low relative to the two-child
schedule given the difference in family size—holds regardless
of whether we use the equivalence scale implied by the SPM or

the official poverty threshold.
Why not expand the schedule for childless workers?
The equivalence-scale argument also extends to provide
justification for expanding the EITC for taxpayers without
dependents. Expanding the EITC for childless workers is
supported by many, and recently appears prominently in
President Obama’s budget. I see my proposal for the one-child
credit as part of a broader set of policies for expanding and
updating the EITC. I focus on the one-child credit because of
the robust employment effects found for single mothers and
the prevailing unacceptably high child poverty rates, and in
an effort to work in concert with these other proposals.
Doesn’t your argument imply that the maximum credit
for married couples should be larger than the credit for
single taxpayers?
Yes, it does. Families with two parents have greater needs than
do families with one parent (for a given number of children),
and this is recognized by a larger equivalence scale and poverty
threshold. I focus my proposal on expanding the one-child
schedule for reasons of cost and in recognition of the broader
policy context. In particular, there are other policies—notably
The Hamilton Project proposal for a secondary-earner tax
credit (Kearney and Turner 2013)—that address the EITC
penalty for married couples. Kearney and Turner’s proposal
is motivated by reducing the tax cost of entering work for low-
and moderate-income families. This has the feature of de facto
increasing the generosity of the EITC for married couples.

Hilary Hoynes
Conclusion
The EITC occupies a central place in the U.S. safety net. The
program raises 6.5 million persons, including 3.3 million
children, out of poverty. The only program that raises more
Americans above poverty is Social Security. The EITC raises
after-tax incomes at the bottom of the distribution while
encouraging employment. It redistributes income through the
credit as well as through increases in earnings. I propose to
expand the EITC for families with one child, the largest group
of EITC recipients. In particular, I propose to expand the one-
child schedule to be on par with the two-child schedule, in
equivalence scale–adjusted terms. The proposal expands the
maximum credit for one-child families to $4,641, from $3,305
under current law, for an increase of about 40 percent. This
expansion is predicted to raise after-tax income by about
$1,000 for 8.1 million working families. I view this proposal as
part of the broader agenda for expanding the EITC, including
the childless expansion proposed by President Obama and The
Hamilton Project (Scholz 2007), and expansions for married
couples through a secondary-earner tax credit (Kearney and
Turner 2013). Together, these expansions will rebalance the
EITC such that its benefits more-closely match the varying
needs across families of different sizes and so its benefits are
more equitably distributed across the population.
Credit

Author
Hilary Hoynes
Professor of Public Policy and Economics, Haas Distinguished
Chair in Economic Disparities, University of California,
Berkeley
Hilary Hoynes is a professor of public policy and economics
and holds the Haas Distinguished Chair in Economic
Disparities. She is the co-editor of the leading journal in
economics, American Economic Review. Hoynes is an
economist and specializes in the study of poverty, inequality,
and the impacts of government tax and transfer programs on
low-income families. Current projects include evaluating the
impact of the Great Recession across demographic groups,
examining the impact of Head Start on cognitive and non-
cognitive outcomes, examining the impact of the Earned
Income Tax Credit on infant health, and estimating impacts
of U.S. food and nutrition programs on labor supply, health,
and human capital accumulation. In addition to her faculty
appointment, Hoynes has research affiliations at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, the University of California,
Davis Center for Poverty Research and the Institute for Fiscal
Studies. She sits on the National Advisory Committee of
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health
Policy Research Program and the Advisory Committee for
the National Science Foundation’s Directorate for the Social,
Behavioral, and Economic Sciences.
Hilary Hoynes

Endnotes
1. The maximum credit is the same for married and single
filers.
However, the flat and phase-out regions of the credit are ex-
panded for married couples, in essence raising the EITC credit
amounts for married filers with earnings over $17,000.
2. The SPM equivalence scale for families with one parents is
(1 + 0.8*first child + 0.5*other children)0.7, which is equal to
1.50 for one-child families and 1.79 for two-child families.
Interestingly, the three-child EITC is already on par with the
two-child credit in equivalence-scale units: the three-child
equivalence scale is 2.06, suggesting a 15 percent higher maxi-
mum benefit compared to the two-child credit; under current
law it is 12.5 percent higher.
3. Additionally, Baker (2008) and Strully, Rehkopf, and Xuan
(2010) find that the EITC increases average birth weight.
4. In this and the other calculations in this policy memo, we
assume incidence of the payroll tax is on the worker and thus
the worker “pays” the employer and employee portions of the
payroll tax. We also assume child-care costs of 10 percent of
gross earnings.
5. Earnings are predicted to decrease for married couples
through the modest predicted reduction in work for sec-
ondary earners (Eissa and Hoynes 2006). Figures calculate
households’ taxes based on earnings and demographic
variables from the March Current Population Survey, as well
as Census Bureau estimates of tax filing units and adjusted
gross income. Poverty status is based on after-tax resources
of the SPM family unit.

Credit
References
Baker, Kevin. 2008. “Do Cash Transfer Programs Improve
Infant
Health: Evidence from the 1993 Expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit?” Mimeo, University of Notre Dame,
South Bend, IN.
Bitler, Marianne, and Hilary Hoynes. 2013. “The More Things
Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Safety Net,
Living Arrangements, and Poverty in the Great Recession.”
Working Paper 19449, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA.
Bitler, Marianne, Hilary Hoynes, and Elira Kuka. 2013. “Do In-
Work Tax Credits Serve As A Safety Net?” Working Paper
19785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
MA.
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). 2014a. “Policy
Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit.” Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC.
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). 2014b.
“Unpublished Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
analysis of March 2013 Current Population Survey and
Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) public use files.”
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC.

Dahl, Gordon, and Lance Lochner. 2012. “The Impact of Family
Income on Child Achievement: Evidence from the Earned
Income Tax Credit.” American Economic Review, 102(5):
1927–56.
Eissa, Nada, and Hilary Hoynes. 2004. “Taxes and the Labor
Market Participation of Married Couples: The Earned
Income Tax Credit.” Journal of Public Economics 88: 9–10.
Eissa, Nada, and Hilary Hoynes. 2006. “Behavioral Responses
to
Taxes: Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply.” Tax
Policy and the Economy 20: 74–110.
Eissa, Nada, and Jeffrey Liebman. 1996. “Labor Supply
Response
to the Earned Income Tax Credit.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 111: 605–37.
Evans, William, and Craig Garthwaite. 2014. “Giving Mom a
Break:
The Impact of Higher EITC Payments on Maternal Health.”
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6(2): 258–90.
Feenberg, Daniel Richard, and Elizabeth Coutts. 1993. “An
Introduction to the TAXSIM Model.” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 12 (1): 189–194.
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.
Hoynes, Hilary, Douglas L. Miller, and David E. Simon.
Forthcoming. “Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit,
and Infant Health.” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy.
IRS. 2013. “Statistics of Income Tax Year 2011.” Table 2.5.

IRS,
Washington, DC. http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-
Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-
(Complete-Report).
Kearney, Melissa, and Leslie Turner. 2013. “Giving Secondary
Earners a Tax Break: A Proposal to Help Low- and Middle-
Income Families.” Discussion Paper 2013-07, The Hamilton
Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
MDRC. 2014. “Paycheck Plus: Expanded Earned Income Tax
Credit for Single Adults.” http://www.mdrc.org/project/
paycheck-plus-expanded-earned-income-tax-credit-single-
adults#featured_content.
Meyer, Bruce D., and Dan T. Rosenbaum. 2000. “A Making
Single
Mothers Work: Recent Tax and Welfare Policy and its
Effects.” National Tax Journal, Vol. 53: 1027–1062.
Meyer, Bruce D., and Dan T. Rosenbaum. 2001. “Welfare, the
Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single
Mothers.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3): 1063–
1114.
Parrott, Sharon. 2014. “The EITC Works Very Well—But It Is
Not a Safety Net by Itself.” Center for Budget and Policy
Priorities, Washington, DC.
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Saleem. 2005. “The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
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UploadedPDF/411136_documentation.pdf.

Scholz, John Karl. 2007. “Employment-Based Tax Credits for
Low-
Skilled Workers.” Discussion Paper 2007-14, The Hamilton
Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
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Tax Credits and Birth Weight.” American Sociological
Review 75: 534–562.
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Inequality.” U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC.
Purpose:
The goal of this research project is to teach you how to apply
the tools learned in the course to real-world policy questions
regarding the tax code.
Project Content:

You will make a proposal to change one aspect of the tax code,
and analyze the benefits and costs associated with this proposed
tax change. You can choose to make any proposal that you wish,
as long as a detailed analysis of proposal does not already exists
out there.
When writing the proposal, consider:
· a) Why do you think this change to the tax code is important?
· b) Who will be affected by the policy?
· c) The effects on the budget: will tax revenues increase or
decrease, and what is the estimated change?
· d) The effect on individual behavior: will the policy lead to
changes in labor supply, savings, investments, marriage,
fertility, etc?
· e) The general equilibrium effects: can you think of possible
repercussions to other sectors of the economy?
· f) Efficiency and equity: will this proposal lead to changes in
efficiency and equity?
For all your predictions, you need to cite previous literature and
the basic theory or empirical evidence on the topic. Never make
statements that cannot be backed up by evidence or sound
economic reasoning!
Coming up with good ideas for a proposal might be hard. Here
are some proposal examples that can help you think on how a
real proposal is made, and how yours should look like.
· a) Hoynes (2014) proposal on the EITC, posted on the Project
folder.
· b) Look at this website:
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/.
And here are suggestions that can help you generate ideas for
good proposals:
· a) Go to the presidential candidates (Republicans or
Democrats) website and look at their tax proposals. Analyze
one of the proposals.
· b) Think of all the aspects of the tax code that you have
learned so far in lecture, and think of way to change them.

For example, here are a few changes to the tax code you could
propose:
i. Items going into itemized deducations (mortgage interested,
charity spending, health spending, etc)
ii. Quantity of exemptions and deductions.
iii. Changes to marginal tax rates.
iv. Changes to tax credits (child credits, educational credits,
EITC, etc)
v. Changes to sales taxes.
vi. Changes to 401Ks and other retirement accounts.
· c) Come talk to me about possible ideas!
Project Instructions:
Both the presentation and the paper should include the content
describe above. More details below:
· a) Presentation requirements:
i. Around 12 minutes, plus a few minutes for Q&A.
ii. At least 2 group members must speak during the presentation
but not everyone in the group has to have a spoken part.
· b) Paper requirements:
i. 10 pages (9 are also fine), Font 12 Time New Roman, 1-inch
margins, double spaced.
ii. Include Figures and Tables (to be included in the 10 page
count).
iii. Include bibliography and citations (to not be included in the
10 page count).
Grading:
The final group presentation and project will affect 15% of your
overall grade (5 for presentation, 10 for paper). To make sure
that all group members are contributing to the project, each
student will also fill in a peer evaluation form evaluation the
contribution of his/her other group members. If the peer
evaluations are consistent in pinpointing at some students
contributing significantly more or less to the project, I reserve
the right to assign slightly different grades for individuals in the
same group.

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