Detecting deception from emotional cues

ORIGINAL PAPER
Detecting Deception from Emotional and Unemotional
Cues
Gemma Warren Æ Elizabeth Schertler Æ Peter Bull
Published online: 4 November 2008
Ó Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract Encoders were video recorded giving either truthful or deceptive descriptions
of video footage designed to generate either emotional or unemotional responses. Decoders
were asked to indicate the truthfulness of each item, what cues they used in making their
judgements, and then to complete both the Micro Expression Training Tool (METT) and
Subtle Expression Training Tool (SETT). Although overall performance on the deception
detection task was no better than chance, performance for emotional lie detection was
significantly above chance, while that for unemotional lie detection was significantly below
chance. Emotional lie detection accuracy was also significantly positively correlated with
reported use of facial expressions and with performance on the SETT, but not on the
METT. The study highlights the importance of taking the type of lie into account when
assessing skill in deception detection.
Keywords Deception detection Á Emotion Á SETT Á METT
Deception, whether through omission or direct falsification, is a fundamental part of human
social interaction (DePaulo et al. 2003). Deception may refer to anything from trivial, so-
called ‘‘white lies’’, to situations in which the consequences of detected deception are
grave—especially those involving the law. Although many lies are uncovered due to
physical evidence or to the presence of third-party information (Park et al. 2002), some-
times this may be insufficient or even non-existent. In such contexts, lie detectors (such as
law enforcement agents) may be forced to rely on other cues, such as nonverbal behavior,
as indicators of a statement’s truth or falsehood.
G. Warren (&) Á E. Schertler Á P. Bull
Department of Psychology, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK
e-mail: gcw102@york.ac.uk
Present address:
E. Schertler
National Academy of Parenting Practitioners, Institute of Psychiatry, London WC2R 1HH, UK
123
J Nonverbal Behav (2009) 33:59–69
DOI 10.1007/s10919-008-0057-7

Despite beliefs to the contrary, research thus far has indicated that most individual’s
accuracy at lie detection is relatively poor. A recent meta-analysis by Bond and DePaulo
(2006) found that participants displayed a significant, but modest, 54% accuracy rate when
identifying items as either truthful or deceptive. This is similar to the accuracy ratings
found in previous reviews (Vrij 2000; Zuckerman et al. 1981). Bond and DePaulo also
replicated prior findings that individuals are better at identifying when a statement is
truthful from when it is a lie. However, although average performance in lie detection has
been found to be unimpressive, research has also identified people who are good at this
task. For example, Ekman and O’Sullivan (1991) found that secret service agents achieved
64% accuracy; similarly, Ekman et al. (1999) found accuracy rates between 68% to 73%
amongst groups with a special interest in deception detection. Thus, although most people
display lie detection accuracy only moderately better than chance, there do appear to be
some individuals who are skilled in this respect. Seemingly, behavioral cues to deception
do exist, although most individuals are not particularly good at identifying them.
It should be noted that there is no good evidence for one single, reliable cue to deception.
Pinocchio’s nose, said to grow longer with each fib that Pinocchio told, is but a charming
fairy tale. However, a number of possible context-dependent indicators have been identified
(e.g., DePaulo et al. 2003; Vrij 2000; Zuckerman et al. 1981). In particular, it has been
theorised that nonverbal cues to deception arise primarily from cognitive and emotional
sources (Ekman 2001). In the former, this is attributed to the increased cognitive load
experienced during deception (e.g., Vrij et al. 2001), in the latter to the nonverbal leakage of
lie-related emotions, such as fear or guilt, incongruent with the lie the deceiver is trying to
present (Ekman 2001; Ekman and Friesen 1969, 1974). This may be due either to affective
experiences associated with the content of the deception (e.g., if the person is lying about
highly emotional experiences), or to emotions aroused by the act of lying itself (Ekman
2001). Leakage is believed to occur through a number of different nonverbal channels,
specifically facial expression, body movements or vocal tone (Ekman et al. 1991).
The relative importance of these different channels has been the subject of some debate.
It has been hypothesized that both the body (Ekman and Friesen 1969) and the voice
(Scherer 1986) are of comparable importance to facial expression in deception detection.
Indeed, it has been claimed that their importance may be even greater, both because
deceivers pay less attention to controlling the body (Ekman and Friesen 1969), and because
vocal cues are less controllable (Scherer 1986). However, research evidence does not seem
to support these claims, showing reduced body movement (Ekman et al. 1988; Vrij 2000),
and minimal affect-related pitch differences during deception (Scherer 1986). There is,
however, substantial research evidence that facial expressions are of prime importance in
the leakage of suppressed affective reactions. Specifically, felt emotions automatically
trigger facial affective displays for six or seven universal emotions (Ekman and Friesen
1975; Ekman et al. 1983). Although repression, masking or inhibition of these emotional
displays is learned from a young age in accordance with cultural or individual display rules
(Ekman 2001; Ekman and Friesen 1975), leakage of these automatic expressions will
nonetheless often occur through either so-called ‘‘reliable’’ facial muscles or through
micro-expressions. Thus, despite the considerable control we exert over facial expression,
it may nonetheless be the best source of emotional leakage to deception (Ekman and
Friesen 1969).
There are two principle sources of facial leakage of repressed affective expressions:
subtle expressions and micro-expressions. Subtle facial expressions are fragments of
otherwise suppressed or masked affect displays using only part of the normally associated
musculature. Arguably, these may be due to reliable groups of facial muscles, notably
60 J Nonverbal Behav (2009) 33:59–69
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around the forehead and brow, which are difficult to control voluntarily. As such, these will
not be present in fabricated emotional expressions, nor will they be inhibited by sup-
pression or masking, thus providing valuable leakage cues as to the target’s genuine affect
(Ekman and Friesen 1975). However, it is important to note that not all expressions contain
such reliable muscle groups (Ekman 2001). Furthermore, there are people who can
manipulate these muscles; for this subgroup they will not be reliable indicators of
deception (Ekman 2001). Another form of leakage of suppressed facial emotions are
micro-expressions; these are full muscular expressions of affect that occur for only a brief
instant, typically around 1/25th of a second (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Frank and Ekman
1997). Such is their brevity that the majority of observers will fail to perceive them,
although accurate identification can be improved with training in facial expression coding
(Ekman and Friesen 1974).
Due to the insufficient suppression of affective facial expressions, both micro and subtle
expressions have been theorized to provide valuable cues to deception. Indeed, two studies
have shown that for college students and professional lie catchers, the ability to identify
micro-expressions correlates significantly with deception detection accuracy (Ekman and
O’Sullivan 1991; Frank and Ekman 1997). There have, however, been no comparable
studies of subtle expressions. It is thus of considerable interest to investigate whether skill
in perceiving subtle expressions is correlated with deception detection accuracy, and to
compare its relative importance in this respect to skill in perceiving micro-expressions.
Whereas identifying micro-expressions relies on the perception of a full expression of
emotion but displayed over a short time period, identifying subtle expressions requires the
extrapolation of an emotional expression from partial cues. Thus, in this study, it was
hypothesized that skill in identifying both subtle and micro-expressions will be signifi-
cantly and independently correlated with lie detection accuracy.
To test this hypothesis, an experiment was conducted, based on a procedure developed
by Ekman (Ekman and Friesen 1974; Ekman et al. 1988, 1991; O’Sullivan et al. 1988). In
Ekman’s experiments, a group of nursing students (encoders) watch two films, one
intended to be stressful (an unpleasant surgical operation), the other to be neutral (a
pleasant landscape scene). They are asked honestly to describe their reactions to the
landscapes but to describe the surgical operation scenes as if they too are pleasant land-
scapes scenes. These lies were made high stake by informing participants that the ability to
hide negative affective reactions would be related to later job performance. Another group
of participants (decoders) are asked to watch the videos, and to identify which film the
encoder in each scene is watching. Because the experimenter knows this information, it is
possible to say objectively whether or not each response is correct.
It should be noted that in Ekman’s procedure, participants are asked to deceive only
under conditions intended to arouse strong negative emotion (viewing an unpleasant sur-
gical operation). This may make deception easier to detect, because the effects of intent to
deceive are potentially confounded with those due to emotional arousal. The current
experiment seeks to address this concern by the addition of two additional conditions:
deception based on unemotional stimuli and truthful accounts of emotional stimuli. Hence,
in effect, the experiment tested two types of deception detection: emotional and unemo-
tional. Given that lies based on strong affective content will arguably contain more cues to
deception, it was hypothesized on the basis of Ekman and Friesen’s (1969, 1974) theory of
nonverbal leakage that emotional lie detection would be superior to unemotional lie
detection.
Baseline behavior was also included in the current study, as previous research has
indicated that many deceptive behaviors are dependent on individual differences; as such,
J Nonverbal Behav (2009) 33:59–69 61
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they must be viewed in the context of an individual’s normal behavior to allow correct
interpretation (Ekman and Friesen 1974; Vrij et al. 2000). Indeed, prior research had
indicated significantly increased accuracy through the inclusion of a baseline measure of
honest behavior (O’Sullivan et al. 1988).
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (12 females and 8 males) were recruited through an advertisement
offering them the chance to test their deceptive abilities and win £10 in the process. All
were native English speakers, either full or part-time students at the University of York,
aged between 18 and 45. These participants were the encoders who assisted in the con-
struction of the lie detection test.
A further 30 participants (11 males and 19 females) were recruited from the University
of York, and entered into for a £50 prize for their participation. All were native English
speakers, aged between 18 and 45; one was an administrator at the university, the others
were all students. These participants were the decoders who took the lie detection test once
it was constructed.
Apparatus
Video Clips
Two sets of video clips (three emotional and five unemotional) were used. The unemo-
tional clips were selected from promotional footage of Hawaiian landscapes. These were
considered pleasant to observe, but unlikely to generate more than a mild positive affective
response. The emotional clips used footage of surgical operations which it was considered
would generate a strong negative emotional reaction in observers. All eight clips varied in
exact length between 28 and 31 s. On the basis of a pilot study this was considered
sufficient duration for generating deceptive communications. Furthermore, as research has
indicated that most real life lies are generally short (typically 6–61 s, Mann et al. 2002) this
duration was deemed ecologically valid. It was considered unlikely that the slight variation
in the length of the clips would impact significantly on participant performance. All eight
clips were encoded using an MPEG-2 codec, in 320 9 240 resolution, to ensure com-
patibility. They were displayed using a RealOne player at Full Screen size on a 1700
CRT
monitor placed approximately 1 m away from the participant.
Micro Expression Training Tool (METT)
The METT was developed by Ekman (2002) for training in the recognition of micro-
expressions of emotion. It comprises a calibration test, training exercises and a further
post-training test. In the current study, only the calibration test was used as it was deemed
an appropriate test of micro-expression recognition ability. It comprises 12 Japanese and
Caucasian faces each displaying a micro-expression which participants have to identify
from seven categories (Happy, Sad, Surprise, Contempt, Disgust, Fear and Anger). No time
limit was set on decoders’ decisions; they controlled the speed at which they progressed
through the test. Although there have been no validity studies of the METT, it was
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developed from expressions used in the Brief Affect Recognition Test (BART) which has
been shown to have good reliability and validity (Matsumoto et al. 2000). It has also been
used in previous deception detection research (Frank and Ekman 1997).
Subtle Expression Training Tool (SETT)
The SETT was published by Ekman (2002) as part of the same training package as the
METT and is designed to improve recognition of subtle expressions of emotion. It has no
equivalent to the METT’s calibration test, therefore in this study the ‘‘practice’’ option was
used to assess skill in perceiving subtle expressions. This comprises 37 expressions all
displayed by the same young Caucasian female. As with the METT, decoders had to
identify the expression from seven categories (Happy, Sad, Surprise, Contempt, Disgust,
Fear and Anger). The expressions can be viewed at three speeds (slower; normal; faster); in
this experiment they were displayed at the ‘‘normal’’ setting although decoders controlled
the rate at which they progressed between items. Unlike the METT calibration test, the
SETT practice procedure provides ongoing feedback as to the accuracy of each selection. It
also presents an option to ‘‘Try Again’’ should participants make an error; however, in this
study, decoders were instructed to disregard this and to continue on to the next expression.
Procedure
In Stage 1 of the experiment, encoders sat facing the computer screen with the interviewer
just off to their left. They were filmed using a wall-mounted camera above and behind the
interviewer such that only the encoder was captured. Each encoder was first instructed to
give a brief (30 s) description of their hobbies or what they did in their free time, which
was recorded so as to provide a baseline. The actual length of these descriptions varied
between 17 to 55 s, with a mean length of 28.7 s. However, it was deemed that restricting
encoders to the instructed 30 s would result in an artificial testimonial which would not
serve as an appropriate baseline. Encoders then observed one of either the unemotional or
emotional clips, presented in a counter-balanced order between participants, with
instructions to deceive when describing the footage. Thus, if they saw the surgical pro-
cedures they were asked to describe them as if watching a Hawaiian beach scene. If they
saw the Hawaiian beach scene, they were asked to describe it as if watching a series of
surgical procedures. Encoders in both conditions were advised that their performance
would be judged by other participants in the study and if their deception was successful
they would win £10. Encoders who had seen the surgical procedures then observed the
Hawaiian beach scene and vice versa; in this phase of the experiment, they were asked to
describe the clips truthfully. Thus, the deceptive condition always preceded the truthful
condition and the two clips used for each encoder were always taken from opposing sets.
This was to avoid possible effects due to either practice or emotional priming/habituation.
Finally, encoders were debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment and all received £10
for their participation.
The footage was then edited into short clips approximately 1 min in length. Each
consisted of a baseline and either a deceptive or truthful account, with both a ‘‘truth’’ and a
‘‘lie’’ item from each encoder. A pilot study was conducted to generate a difficulty rating
for each item, based on the percentage of participants who identified it correctly. For the
final test, items were selected to ensure a sufficient spread of difficulty; there was one item
from each encoder, equally divided between truthful/deceptive and emotional/unemotional
clips. In total, the deception detection task (DDT) comprised 20 items: 5 unemotional-
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truth, 5 unemotional-lie, 5 emotional-truth and 5 emotional-lie. Thus, the DDT could be
analysed in terms of two subscales: emotional lie detection and unemotional lie detection.
Because the clip distribution was chosen according to item difficulty, encoder gender
distribution was somewhat uneven. Overall, there were a total of 20 encoders (12 female, 8
male). In the emotional-truth and emotional-lie conditions, there were 4 female encoders
and 1 male each; in the unemotional-truth and unemotional-lie conditions, there were 2
female and 3 male encoders each. The chosen clips were randomized and separated by a
10-s interval to allow decoders time to respond. The length of individual clips within the
test varied between 46 and 85 s, with a mean length of 60 s. The overall length of the DDT
was 23 min and 15 s.
In Stage 2 of the experiment, the decoders completed the DDT followed by the METT
and the SETT. The tests were administered to participants on a one-to-one basis in a single
session. They were informed that approximately the first 30 s of each item would consist of
a truthful baseline followed by a roll-over effect and then either a deceptive or truthful
description of a clip of video footage. Decoders were informed that after each item they
would have 10 s in which to make a decision as to the target’s truthfulness. They were
asked to report which of the following 6 cues led them to make their decision: ‘‘What they
said’’, ‘‘How they said it’’, ‘‘Facial Expression’’, ‘‘Body Language’’, ‘‘Gut reaction’’ or
‘‘Guess’’. They were also asked to indicate on a 7-point scale their degree of confidence in
their decision and, as a control measure, their familiarity with the target.
After completing the DDT, decoders were administered the METT and the SETT in a
counterbalanced order. This was always done after taking the DDT to avoid the possibility
of practice effects or priming towards nonverbal cues. At the end of Stage 2, decoders were
debriefed and informed of their scores on the DDT; the METT and SETT automatically
give feedback on the screen after taking each test.
Results
Seven participants indicated that they knew targets in the test at either a ‘‘casual
acquaintance’’ level or higher; accordingly, these participants’ data were excluded from the
analysis.
Overall mean performance on the DDT was 50% indicating that decoders’ performance
was no better than chance. However, analysis of the emotional and unemotional sub-scales
tells a different story. Mean accuracy for emotional lie detection at 64.35% was signifi-
cantly above chance, t(22) = 4.67, p .01, d = .98. In contrast, mean accuracy for
unemotional lie detection at 36.09% was significantly below chance, t(22) = - 4.06,
p .01, d = .85. To test for effects due to both the stimulus dimensions (emotional/non-
emotional and truths/lies), a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted (see
Table 1). This showed a significant main effect for emotion, with accuracy for emotional
items greater than that for unemotional test items, F(1, 22) = 30.78, p .01, gp
2
= .58.
However, no significant main effect was found for truths/lies, F(1, 22) = .26, p [ .05, nor
was there a significant interaction between the two dimensions, F(1, 22) = .22, p [ .05.
To test whether sensitivity to micro and subtle expressions is related to lie detection
accuracy, METT and SETT scores were correlated with overall DDT performance, as well
as with emotional lie detection and unemotional lie detection (see Table 2). Neither overall
DDT performance nor unemotional lie detection were significantly correlated with the
SETT or the METT, although a negative correlation between the SETT and unemotional
lie detection just missed significance, r(21) = -.34, p .10. However, a significant
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positive correlation was found between emotional lie detection and the SETT, r(21) = .46,
p .05, but not the METT, r(21) = .20, p [ .05.
A series of correlations were also conducted to investigate the relationship between
deception detection accuracy and cue utilization (see Table 3). Neither overall DDT per-
formance nor unemotional lie detection were significantly correlated with reported cue
utilization. However, emotional lie detection was significantly positively correlated with
reported use of facial expressions, r(21) = .52, p .01.
In order further to investigate the predictive accuracy of factors influencing emotional
lie detection, a backwards stepwise multiple regression was performed. Reported cue usage
together with SETT and METT scores were all entered into the analysis with emotional lie
detection accuracy as the dependent variable. The resulting model contained only two
variables, namely, reported use of facial expression and SETT performance; between them
they accounted for 38% of the variance, F(2, 20) = 6.20, p .01. However, the results of
this regression analysis should be interpreted with a degree of caution, given the relatively
small number of decoders used in this study.
Table 1 Mean accuracy for emotional and unemotional lie detection (n = 23)
Items correct Accuracy (%)
Mean Standard deviation
Truth Lie Truth Lie Truth Lie Total
Emotional 3.22 3.22 1.04 1.08 64.4 64.4 64.35
Unemotional 1.91 1.69 1.12 1.11 38.2 33.8 36.09
Table 2 Correlation coefficients between METT and SETT scores and lie detection accuracy (n = 23)
Total lie detection Emotional lie detection Unemotional lie detection
METT .11 .20 -.03
SETT .05 .46* -.34
* Significant at the .05 level
Table 3 Means (and standard deviations) for cues and their correlations with lie detection accuracy
(n = 23)
Mean (and std dev) Total lie
detection
Emotional
lie detection
Unemotional
lie detection
‘‘How they said it’’ 9.48 (3.79) .26 .34 -.01
‘‘What they said’’ 7.78 (4.26) .26 .24 .05
‘‘Facial
Expression’’
9.70 (4.25) .12 .52* -.31
‘‘Body Language’’ 6.61 (2.55) .30 .27 .12
Guessa
4.22 (3.38) -.21 -.30 -.02
* Significant at p .05
a
Includes responses on both ‘‘Guess’’ and ‘‘Gut Reaction’’
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Discussion
Whereas many previous studies (Kraut 1980; Vrij 2000) have shown that observers per-
form at no better than chance in lie detection, the results of this study showed an average
accuracy of 64%, but only for identifying lies or truths based on responses to emotional
stimuli. In contrast, the accuracy rate for unemotional stimuli at 36% was significantly
worse than chance. Comparably, whereas SETT scores showed a significant positive
correlation with emotional lie detection, they were negatively correlated with unemotional
lie detection, although this latter finding did not quite reach statistical significance.
Reported cue usage also differed between the two sub-tests of the DDT. Whereas none of
the reported cues were significantly related to unemotional lie detection, a significant
positive correlation was found between reported use of facial expressions and emotional lie
detection.
These results certainly provide good support for nonverbal leakage theory (Ekman and
Friesen 1969, 1974), indicating that leaked emotions incongruous with the intended
message can provide useful cues to deception. Although the difference between emotional
and unemotional lie detection was predicted on the basis of leakage theory (Ekman and
Friesen 1969, 1974), its magnitude was nonetheless surprising. Notably, it has important
implications for traditional deception detection research design, where typically truthful
accounts have been given in response to ‘‘pleasant’’ stimuli, deceptive accounts in response
to ‘‘unpleasant’’ footage (e.g., Ekman and Friesen 1974). Thus, prior research may have
been confounded by encoders’ differing affective experience in response to deceptive and
truthful conditions. In contrast, the results of this study suggest a possible moderator effect
of emotion type and/or emotion intensity on lie detection accuracy. Even so, it must be
acknowledged that there was no direct assessment in the current study of the encoders’
emotional response to the video clips. Hence, further empirical investigation is required to
test the hypothesized role of emotion and its differential effects on deception detection.
The significant positive correlations between emotional lie detection and both SETT
performance and self-reported use of facial expressions cues also support previous
research, which showed that observers faced with high-stake lies display greater accuracy
when attending to nonverbal cues (DePaulo et al. 1983, 1988). Thus, it would appear that
the ability to read leaked emotions through subtle expressions is associated with lie
detection accuracy. However, this finding needs some qualification, given the negative
correlation found between SETT performance and unemotional lie detection. Although this
correlation was only significant at the .10 level, it suggests that, dependent on context,
identification of subtle expressions of emotion may not always improve deception detec-
tion. This proposal has important practical implications. For example, training police
officers to read subtle expressions will not necessarily increase their detection skill; indeed,
under certain circumstances, their error rate might actually increase.
It was notable in this study that decoders performed significantly below chance in
unemotional lie detection. If poor performance resulted simply from a lack of observable
emotional cues, then chance accuracy might have been expected. Thus, an alternative
explanation is that decoders’ poor performance occurred because of intentional misrep-
resentation on the part of the encoders. Arguably, when the emotional content of the
stimuli is low it is much easier for encoders to control and/or dissimulate their nonverbal
behavior, and hence to actively mislead observers as to the nature of the observed stimuli.
Another possibility is that these results may be due to decoders misinterpreting negative
affect due to the act of lying, in this case resulting specifically from detection apprehension
and performance anxiety on the part of the encoders.
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Unlike previous research, the current study failed to find a significant correlation
between ability to identify micro-expressions and lie detection (cf. Ekman and O’Sullivan
1991; Frank and Ekman 1997). One possibility is that this reflected a lack of visible micro-
expressions within the DDT. To test this hypothesis, a survey of the DDT was conducted
by the first and third authors, from which microexpressions were identified in nine of the 20
test items. However, only three of these instances came from the emotional clips. Hence,
the non-significant correlation between METT and emotional lie detection performance
could well reflect a lack of visible microexpressions. The remaining six microexpressions
occurred in response to unemotional items. Of these, five were judged to be actively
misleading, suggesting possible deception when the encoders were giving truthful accounts
(three instances), or truthful accounts when the encoders were engaged in deception (the
other two instances). Hence, the non-significant correlation between METT and non-
emotional lie detection is unsurprising.
This disparity between the findings for the SETT and the METT is obviously an issue
which needs to be addressed in future research. Because encoders are motivated towards
successful deception, one possibility is that their facial expressions are not fully fledged
displays of emotion. Thus, they may be more similar to what is shown in the SETT than the
METT, which has full (if brief), uninhibited displays of emotion. In this context, a detailed
FACS analysis (Ekman et al. 2002) of the relative incidence of micro and subtle expres-
sions would undoubtedly be useful. Certainly, the exact relationship between the METT
and the SETT needs to be clarified in future research, to what extent are they measuring
different types of skill, or the same underlying skill. It would also be useful to investigate
whether the findings reported here for the METT and the SETT replicate with a different
sample. Nevertheless, the results of this study do support the growing body of evidence
that people who pay more attention to nonverbal cues and perceive them more accurately
are also better detectors of deception.
A notable finding of this study was the striking difference between emotional and
unemotional lie detection. This result could not have been demonstrated by previous
experiments which have compared deceptive responses only to emotional stimuli with non-
deceptive responses only to unemotional stimuli (e.g., Ekman and Friesen 1974). Hence, it
is important in designing future experiments not to confound these two dimensions of
deception and emotionality. Although in this study accuracy ratings for emotional lie
detection are comparable to those found when a baseline of truthful behavior is included
(e.g., 60%, O’Sullivan et al. 1988), it should be noted that the baseline condition used here
preceded both the emotional and unemotional items. Hence, it is unlikely that a baseline
effect accounted for the higher accuracy rate in emotional lie detection. Thus overall, the
results of this study demonstrate the importance of taking the type of lie into account when
assessing observers’ decoding skills.
Nonetheless, there are a number of methodological concerns that need to be discussed
with regard to the DDT. One is the potentially confounding influence of camera shyness.
This may have affected behavior more in the deceptive condition, given that it always
preceded the non-deceptive condition. However, since both conditions were always pre-
ceded by the baseline, encoders should have been more at ease by the time at which they
reached the deceptive phase of the experiment.
Another concern is that of participant motivation. Notably, DePaulo et al. (2003) found
significantly stronger deception cues in studies using identity-relevant motivation than in
those using instrumental motivation. In the experiment reported here, it is open to question
whether the use of monetary rewards was sufficient to generate high-stake lies. However,
DePaulo et al. (2003) did also find significantly more deception cues in instrumental
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motivation studies than in those with no stakes at all. Furthermore, given that in this
experiment both emotional and unemotional lies were subject to the same monetary
reward, motivational differences should not account for the observed difference in accu-
racy rates.
Finally, there are issues with regard to the gender and ethnicity of the test participants. It
should be noted that the METT contains a high number of Asian-American encoders,
which perhaps might have affected participants’ scores on this test. However, this should
not have been a problem, given both the multi-cultural nature of British society, and the
relatively high proportion of Chinese students at the University of York (UK), where this
research was conducted. Of more concern is the somewhat uneven representation of male
to female participants within the DDT, in terms of both overall numbers and distribution
between the sub-scales. It is possible that at least some of the difference found between the
emotional and unemotional sub-scales might reflect gender differences in encoder
expressiveness. However, this should not have been the case, given that the items were
selected specifically to ensure an even spread of difficulty throughout the test.
Lie detection is a complex process, and the results of this study have shown how some
of the generalizations of previous research fail to stand up to closer scrutiny. Nevertheless,
further investigation is required both of the nonverbal decoding skills that lead to better lie
detection, and of how they are affected by the type of lies under scrutiny. Such advances
should not only enhance our theoretical understanding, but also improve our practical
ability to train lie detectors in this most difficult of skills.
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